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We shall have to think away distinctions that seem to us as clear as the sunshine; we must 
think ourselves back into a twilight. 
– F.W. Maitland1 
                                                        









I. Zisca’s drum 
Shortly before he died, Edmund Burke (1730-1797) begged to be forgotten. By 1796, he was 
arguably the most famous politician in England. Over the last decades of his life, Burke had 
made his name as one of Parliament’s most jealous defenders of the British Constitution – a 
vociferous opponent of royal prerogative, a critic of ministerial corruption in the Empire, a 
friend of American Independence and the cause of religious toleration, and, in recent years, 
Europe’s most famous (or infamous) denunciator of the French Revolution. But now, at the 
end of his life, Burke wished only to be left in peace. ‘Why will they not let me remain in 
obscurity and inaction?’ he complained of his relentless critics: 
Are they apprehensive, that if an atom of me remains, the [revolutionary] sect 
has something to fear? Must I be annihilated, lest, like old John Zisca’s, my 
skin might be made into a drum, to animate Europe to eternal battle, against a 
tyranny that threatens to overwhelm all Europe, and all the human race? … 
‘Leave me, oh leave me to repose!’1 
In the years and decades after his death in July 1797, his compatriots were largely obliging. 
For a brief period, he was eulogized in the British press as a talented orator and a historically 
significant figure; his erstwhile colleagues recalled his fiery personality and his strength of 
principle; and posthumous writers debated the alleged ‘inconsistencies’ of his career.2 But 
afterwards, he was set aside. No political party took up Burke’s mantle in the years after his 
death, and early nineteenth-century political theorists roundly ignored him (presumably on 
the grounds that an ‘inconsistent’ mind like Burke’s would not reward careful scrutiny).3 As 																																																								
1 Burke, Letter to a Noble Lord [Feb. 1796]; in The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 
[hereinafter W&S], ed. Paul Langford et al., 9 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970-2015), vol. 9, pt. 
1, pp. 145-87, at pp. 147-8, italics removed from orig. Burke alludes here to the Hussite general Jan 
Žižka (1360-1424) who, according to legend, ordered that if killed, he was to be flayed and his skin 
made into a drum so that he could continue inspire his army in battle. Burke’s plea for ‘repose’ is a 
quotation from Thomas Gray’s Descent of Odin (1768). 
2 This question of ‘consistency’ was the leitmotif of Burke’s first biography: see Robert Bisset, Life of 
Edmund Burke…, 2 vols. (London: Cawthorn, 1798).  
3 Cf. James Sack, ‘The Memory of Pitt and the Memory of Burke: English Conservatism Confronts its 
Past, 1806-1829’, The Historical Journal, vol. 30, no. 3 (Sept., 1987): pp. 623-40; Stefan Collini, 
Donald Winch, and John Burrow, That Noble Science of Politics: A Study in Nineteenth-Century 
Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), passim. Burke had admirers 
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Emily Jones has recently shown, it was not until the 1880s and ’90s – amidst heated debates 
over Irish Home Rule and in the face of a growing socialist movement – that Burke’s Tory-
Unionist admirers christened him the founder of modern conservatism, a label he still wears 
today.4  
 If it took nearly a century for Burke to regain relevance in Britain, his canonization in 
America was even more belated. Though he was sporadically invoked by nineteenth-century 
politicians to warn of the dangers of revolutionary violence, this did not amount to a 
confrontation with his ideas: before the Cold War, Burke was more a badge to be worn than a 
mind to be understood.5 This changed in the 1940s, when an enterprising coterie of anti-
communists, neo-Thomists, and Christian traditionalists – America’s so-called ‘new 
conservatives’ – discovered Burke and situated him as the founder of their shared creed.6 For 
Russell Kirk, Peter Viereck, and Frances Canavan, Burke’s campaign against the politicized 
atheism of the French revolutionaries paralleled their own war against the threat of Stalinism 
abroad and, more subtly, of moral exhaustion and ennui at home.7 This Cold War reception 
forced political scientists to circle back to Burke’s thought, in an effort to make sense of the 
new conservatives who imagined themselves his progeny. Like their Victorian predecessors, 
American thinkers like Samuel Huntington soon uncovered a stable ‘Burkeian ideology’ of 
conservatism – a coherent philosophical tradition stretching from the 1790s to the present.8   
 On the European mainland as well, there failed to materialize any serious reception of 
Burke’s political thought in the early-nineteenth century. His political thought was attractive 																																																								
among the English Romantics, but here his influence was aesthetic, not political: on this reception, 
see Alfred Cobban, Edmund Burke and the Revolt against the Eighteenth Century: A Study of the 
Political and Social Thinking of Burke, Wordsworth, Coleridge and Southey (London: Allen & 
Unwinn, 1929). 
4 Emily Jones, Edmund Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism, 1830-1914: A British 
Intellectual History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). For Burke’s dogged association with 
conservatism, see, e.g., Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to 
Sarah Palin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Jesse Norman, Edmund Burke: The First 
Conservative (New York: Basic Books, 2013). 
5 Drew Maciag, Edmund Burke in America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013), chs. 2-8. 
6 On this episode, see Seamus Deane, ‘Burke in the United States’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Edmund Burke, ed. David Dwan and Christopher Insole (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), pp. 221-33; on the new conservatism, cf. Mark Henrie, ‘Understanding Traditionalist 
Conservatism’, in Varieties of Conservatism in America, ed. Peter Berkowitz (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Press, 2004), pp. 3-30 
7 On liberal exhaustion, see, e.g., Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana 
(1953), 7th ed. (Chicago: Regnery, 2001) pp. 3-4, 462. 
8 Samuel Huntington, ‘Conservatism as an Ideology’, American Political Science Review, vol. 51, no. 
2 (June, 1957): pp. 454-73, at p. 456. Cf. Gordon Lewis, ‘The Metaphysics of Conservatism’, Western 
Political Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 (Dec., 1953): pp. 728-741; Clinton Rossiter, Conservatism in 
America (New York: Knopf, 1955); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (1955), 2nd ed. 
(New York: Harcourt, 1991). 
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to isolated French thinkers, to be sure. Liberals like Constant, Staël, Guizot, and Tocqueville 
saw his anti-revolutionary Whiggism as a potential via media between the anarchic principles 
of 1789 and the absolutism of the post-1815 Bourbon regime.9 Ultramontane writers such as 
Bonald and Maistre, similarly, were taken by his trenchant critique of the Jacobins’ heretical, 
pathological irreligion.10 But in neither context did their engagements with Burke cohere into 
a sustained debate about the meaning of his politics, or lead to anything like a self-conscious 
Burkean school.11 French Ultramontanes – indeed, Catholic counter-revolutionaries across 
Europe – were sober enough to see the vast distance that separated their absolutist political 
theology from Burke’s latitudinarian Anglicanism.12 For the Doctrinaires, meanwhile, Burke 
was something of a poisoned chalice: if he were a useful interlocutor in private, his heated 
anti-French polemics made them reticent to identify with Burke publicly. As a result, while 
assorted European thinkers recognized his importance for coming to terms with the legacy of 
the Revolution, early engagement with his thought were solitary; their debates, subterranean.  
The one exception to this rule – the one context in which Burke’s political writings 
were met with a robust, vibrant, and sophisticated reception in the early-nineteenth century – 
was Germany. Throughout the 1790s and into the 1800s, as German political writers sought 
to come to grips with the origins, character, and meaning of the Revolution across the Rhine, 
they turned to Burke. Unlike in Britain, where internecine party-political disputes about his 
‘consistency’ forestalled any posthumous reception, these German readers approached Burke 
from a certain critical distance. From their perspective, his Reflections on the Revolution in 
France (1790) read as a broadly philosophical analysis of the revolutionaries’ errors, rather 
than an intervention into a more local parliamentary controversy.13 Soon after its publication, 
																																																								
9 C.P. Courtney, ‘Burke and the Writings of Benjamin Constant’, in The Reception of Edmund Burke 
in Europe, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick and Peter Jones (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 105-124; Robert 
Gannett, Tocqueville Unveiled (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp. 57-65; Biancamaria 
Fontana, Germaine de Staël: A Political Portrait (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 
pp. 65ff; Michael Drolet, ‘Carrying the Banner of the Bourgeoisie: Democracy, Self and the 
Philosophical Foundations of François Guizot’s Historical and Political Thought’, History of Political 
Thought, vol. 32, no. 4 (winter 2011): pp. 645-90, esp. pp. 655-59.  
10 Rod Preece, ‘Edmund Burke and his European Reception’, The Eighteenth-Century, vol. 21, no. 4 
(autumn, 1980): pp. 255-73. 
11 Norbert Col, ‘“The climacteric event in our history”: Aspects of Burke’s reception in France’, in 
Burke in Europe, pp. 125-48. 
12 See Carolina Armenteros, The French Idea of History: Joseph de Maistre and his Heirs, 1794-1854 
(London: Cornell University Press, 2011), which dispatches with the idea that Burke was ‘Maistre’s 
intellectual mentor’ at p. 11; cf. J.C.D. Clark’s ‘Introduction’ to Burke, Reflections on the Revolution 
in France, ed. J.C.D. Clark (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 23-111, at pp. 106-
108 
13 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the Proceedings of Certain Societies in 
London relative to that Event (London: Dodsley, 1790). In the following, I cite from J.C.D. Clark’s 
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a robust network of journals and magazines ferried his ideas across the Holy Roman Empire, 
sparking a robust, long-running debate about how the Reflections should be understood, 
whether its arguments were persuasive, and what its principles meant for German politics. 
Reflecting back on this process of interpretation and appropriation, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-
1829) recalled how 
… for all of Europe – and for Germany especially, judging from its fruitful 
employment [of his ideas] – that great statesman and orator Burke became a 
new light of political wisdom and moral understanding …, a salvation for an 
age that had been carried away by the storms of the Revolution, [which] was 
encroaching deeper and deeper into the inner essence of states….14 
The German ‘employment’ of Burke was indeed ‘fruitful’. In scrutinizing the philosophical 
roots of the Reflections and debating its implications for the future of Germany, his admirers 
produced a series of commentaries on his thought that were rich, nuanced, and sophisticated. 
In the early-nineteenth century, it became a common boast in Germany that it was here, not 
Britain, that Burke’s anti-revolutionary worldview had been elaborated in all its fullness. ‘We 
have translated, understood, and incorporated [Burke’s] works into our moral sciences; we 
have written, built, and lived wholly within the spirit of his works’, bragged the political 
economist Adam Müller (1779-1829). ‘I say with pride, he belongs to us more than the 
British. … However effective his deeds on behalf of Great Britain may have been, his praises 
truly belong in the German sphere’.15  
 Debates about the meaning of Burke’s worldview included thinkers from across the 
German states and from a diverse set of backgrounds. In Göttingen, the Hanoverian civil 
servants Ernst Brandes (1758-1810) and August Wilhelm Rehberg (1757-1836) were among 
his earliest and most ardent defenders. In 1793, the translation of his Reflections by Friedrich 
Gentz (1764-1832), a Prussian bureaucrat and aspiring publicist, led nearly all of Germany’s 
most prominent philosophers and political thinkers to engage with Burke’s arguments in the 
coming years – Georg Forster (1754-1794), Christian Garve (1742-1798), Wilhelm von 
Humboldt (1767-1835), Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), 
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805), and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834). From Jena, early 
Romantic writers like Novalis (1772-1801) and August Wilhelm Schlegel (1767-1845) were 																																																								
critical edition (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), but have also consulted the notes in 
J.G.A. Pocock’s edition (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987) and in W&S, vol. 8, pp. 53-293. 
14 Schlegel, Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur: Vorlesungen, gehalten zu Wien im Jahre 1812 
(Berlin: Athenaeum, 1841); in Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe, ed. Ernst Behler et al., 35 vols. 
(Munich: Schöningh, 1958-2002), vol. 6, pt. 1, at p. 351.  
15 Müller, Vorlesungen über deutsche Wissenschaft und Literatur (1806); in Kritische, ästhetische und 
philosophische Schriften, ed. Walter Schroeder and Werner Siebert, 2 vols. (Berlin: Luchterhand, 
1967), vol. 1, pp. 11-137, at pp. 101-2. 
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captivated by the Reflections’ eloquence, artistry, and sheer rhetorical power. Inspired in part 
by his conversations with these early Romantics, Müller came to believe that Burke – ‘the 
last prophet to appear on this disenchanted earth’16 – held the key to a post-revolutionary 
theory of state and society, which he enthusiastically laid out over the 1800s and ’10s.   
 As these German theorists wrestled with Burke, the world around them was changing 
rapidly. In 1781, Kant’s revolutionary first Kritik sparked a series of debates over the nature 
of moral and political liberty, debates which deeply influenced German discussions of Burke 
and the Revolution. As Kant spelled out the implications of his metaphysics throughout the 
1790s, it became tempting to see the Revolution as a concrete instantiation of his new theory 
of liberty.17 As such, debates on the Revolution often revolved around Kant. In this context, 
the Reflections appeared not merely as a political analysis of where France had gone awry, 
but as a philosophical weapon with which to battle the Revolution’s Kantian defenders. It fell 
to Burke’s German students to bring his thought into dialogue with the sea-changes in 
metaphysics that were occurring in their day. The question of how to relate Burke and Kant 
became a recurrent feature of their interpretive debates.18  
At the same time, tumultuous social and political change within Germany and across 
Europe gave these theoretical debates a sense of profound gravity.19 In the twenty-five years 
between the publication of the Reflections and the Congress of Vienna, the German churches 
were shaken to their roots. Kant’s critique of revelation forced Lutherans and Catholics alike 
to reexamine their respective Church’s theologies. The rapid rise of commerce and industry 
led capital and labor to flow into Germany’s cities, causing depopulation and economic 
decline in the countryside. Led by Prussia, many of the German states attempted to liberalize 
their economies in the 1800s by abolishing manufacturing guilds and serfdom, curtailing 
noble privileges, and encouraging the free movement of capital. Political reformers likewise 
sought to modernize territorial constitutions and streamline their often-bloated bureaucracies. 
These internal vicissitudes coincided with the Germanies’ humiliating subjugation by 
																																																								
16 Müller, Ueber König Friedrich II und die Natur, Würde und Bestimmung der preussischen 
Monarchie (Berlin: Sander, 1810), p. 52. 
17 Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Frederick 
Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political 
Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).  
18 In international perspective, Kant’s centrality to German debates about the Revolution was 
something of an anomaly: in Scotland, for instance, neither Hume nor Smith figured as substantial 
lenses for understanding or criticizing the Revolution. See Anna Plassart, The Scottish Enlightenment 
and the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
19 For this context, see Joachim Whaley, Germany and the Holy Roman Empire, 2 vols. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), vol. 2, pp. 447-556. 
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Napoleon and the traumatic destruction of their thousand-year-old Holy Roman Empire in 
1806. Were these political and economic transformations liberating? Or were they corroding 
the social bases of German society, setting it down a dangerous path toward the dystopian 
liberté of their French neighbors? Interpretive debates on Burke turned on combatants’ 
respective attitudes toward these rapid processes of religious, social, and economic change. 
 All of Burke’s interpreters agreed that his Reflections was the definitive critique of, 
and antidote to, the French revolutionaries’ ideology. What was less clear, however, was how 
to translate this critique into their unique German context, politically and philosophically. To 
mediate the gap between Burke’s Britain and their own society, his students were obliged to 
identify what they took to be the Reflections’ central insights, to set out an interpretive lens 
through which to read these insights, and to spell out their practical political implications for 
Germany. This process of exegesis meant that his readers had to look beyond Burke’s narrow 
policy arguments and locate the more basic principles and historical vision that animated 
them. Recent studies of Adam Ferguson and William Robertson’s receptions have illustrated 
how radically this process of exegesis and assimilation transformed British political theorists 
upon their arrival in Germany, and how elastic contemporary translations of British political 
texts were.20 By the 1790s, the norms of professional translation allowed interpreters wide 
latitude to ‘improve’ the work before them. Often – as in the case of Burke – this was taken 
as license to co-opt a text to an interpreter’s own ends.  
Efforts to translate Burke’s ideas into a German vernacular were further complicated 
by his insistence on the contextual and historical character of political discourse. Repeatedly 
in the Reflections, he attacked the ‘metaphysical’ conceit that abstract and universal claims 
about justice were politically intelligible. Constitutional principles could not be extracted 
from one context and applied in another without doing violence to their integrity. This 
presented his German students with a problem. Was repurposing his critique of the French 
Revolution and defense of the British Constitution for their own purposes not to fall into 
precisely the form of unhistorical politics that Burke had attacked? His German interpreters 																																																								
20 Fania Oz-Salzberger, Translating the Enlightenment: Scottish Civic Discourse in Eighteenth 
Century Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); László Kontler, Translations, Histories, 
Enlightenments: William Robertson in Germany, 1760-1795 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
For a précis of Oz-Salzburger’s argument – that Ferguson’s attempt to square republican liberty and 
commercial society was distorted beyond recognition upon its arrival in Germany – see her essay on 
‘Scots, Germans, Republic and Commerce’, in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, ed. 
Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 197-
226. Cf. also Sophus Reinert Translating Empire: Emulation and the Origins of Political Economy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011); Jennifer Willenberg, Distribution und 
Übersetzung englischen Schrifttums im Deutschland des 18. Jahrhunderts (Munich: Sauer, 2008). 
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were keenly, indeed painfully, aware of the distance between their own political situation and 
his; they were under no illusions that his policy preferences were applicable in their own 
context in any immediate sense. Burke’s Britain was a unitary state with a mixed 
constitution, a limited monarch, a national Church, a liberal culture of toleration, and highly 
developed networks of commerce and trade. Germany was a loose collection of city-states, 
principalities and episcopates, each of which was governed by its own unique constitutional 
settlement as well as the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire. Its economy was largely 
agrarian; hierarchical relations between feudal landholders and serfs were well-entrenched; 
and civil liberties varied drastically across the Empire. If Burke were to be made applicable 
to this very un-British context, his readers saw that they would need to take a good deal of 
interpretive license: they would need to look past the letter of his arguments to the spirit that 




Despite Burke’s importance to Anglo-American political theorists and historians of political 
thought, they have long ignored, or else been unaware of, his robust reception in Germany.21 
To the extent that Burke scholars do acknowledge his German protégés, they are often quick 
to deny them any claim to his mantle. This move is often implicitly partisan, meant to protect 
the purity of an Anglo-American conservative tradition against a morally suspect continental 
one. Thus for Rod Preece, ‘Burke’s influence – in the sense of convincing his audience to 
accept his philosophy – was negligible because he was not understood in Europe.’22 J.C.D. 
Clark likewise looks askance at ‘the anti-libertarian, holistic views of order and authority 
with which German admirers wrongly associated Burke’.23 But this skepticism is question-
begging, insofar as it has allowed Burke scholars to ignore his German reception by claiming 
there is little to be learned from it. It takes as a premise what can only fairly be asserted as a 
conclusion.   
The goal of this dissertation is to begin to fill this scholarly gap – to reconstruct and 
set out the interpretations of Burke that were assembled in Germany during the Revolution 
and Napoleonic Wars. It centers on Burke’s three most incisive and influential interpreters:  
																																																								
21 But cf. László Kontler, ‘Varieties of Old Regime Europe: Thoughts and Details on the Reception of 
Burke’s Reflections in Germany’, in Burke in Europe, pp. 313-329. 
22 Preece, ‘Burke and his European Reception’, p. 256. 
23 Clark, ‘Introduction’ to Burke, Reflections, ed. Clark, pp. 23-111, at p. 106. 
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August Wilhelm Rehberg, Friedrich Gentz, and Adam Müller. It was their writings that 
provided the main conduits through which Burke’s ideas entered the bloodstream of German 
discourse. Even for specialized historians of political thought in this period, these German 
Burkeans can seem somewhat obscure, dwarfed in comparison to their better-known 
interlocutors: Kant, Fichte, Humboldt, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Schlegel. But in their own 
day, Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller were among Germany’s most prominent political theorists, 
leading the philosophical charge against the Revolution and its consequences. 
 As we will see in Chapter 2, a longstanding historiographical tradition in Germany, 
stretching from the early-twentieth century to the present, has situated Rehberg, Gentz, and 
Müller as the leaders of a counter-revolutionary backlash against Enlightenment. Beginning 
with Friedrich Meinecke, this tradition claimed that, if Burke was the first and greatest critic 
of Enlightenment – setting out an essentially negative case against the liberal, cosmopolitan, 
and secular values of the eighteenth century – his German admirers were the first to theorize 
a positive vision of a post-enlightened politics. Amalgamating Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller 
into an ideological axis variously described as ‘conservative’, ‘Romantic’, or ‘nationalist’, 
this scholarship painted them as the partisans of tradition over reason, realism over idealism, 
and nationalism over individualism. They thus formed a bridge between Germany’s 
conservative reaction to the Revolution, and the eventual rise of the Bismarckian nation-state. 
Though this story was modified and refashioned over the twentieth century, its fundamental 
premise – that Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller were to be seen as ideologically-united allies in a 
common campaign against Enlightenment – has remained largely unchallenged to the present 
day. 
 In reexamining these figures in the chapters below, my dissertation seeks to bring this 
historiography into question. What the conventional narrative misses is that Burke’s German 
students did not construct a single, hegemonic alternative to Enlightenment. Rather, they 
devised a variety of competing, often incompatible, visions of post-revolutionary politics, 
rooted in fundamentally divergent readings of Burke. It is misleading to claim that Rehberg, 
Gentz, and Müller were members of an ideologically-uniform political axis: indeed, it would 
be more accurate to call them rivals.24 While they all shared a mutual admiration for Burke, 
they disagreed – publicly, explicitly, and sharply – over how to interpret the Reflections, and 																																																								
24 This conflation is not, however, a wholly modern phenomenon: in a 1796 letter, Gentz complained 
that ‘the men of our day don’t have the impartiality to grasp … that one can translate, interpret, and 
praise Burke without absolutely endorsing every single line he ever wrote.’ See Gentz to Böttiger, 21 
Dec 1796, in von und an Friedrich von Gentz, ed. F.P Wittichen, 3 vols. (Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1909), 
vol. 1, pp. 223-5, at p. 225. 
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over what its lessons meant for their own context. To understand the ways in which they read 
Burke, we must set aside the interpretive categories that twentieth-century scholars affixed to 
them: conservatism, Romanticism, historicism. These anachronistic labels occlude what was 
a deeply contested point of debate among Burke’s followers: how – through which analytical 
lens – should the Reflections be read? In the 1790s, the answer to this question was not clear. 
Where, exactly, did the crux of Burke’s argument lie? In his defense of established property, 
law, and government? In his critique of overconfident metaphysicians? In his indictment of 
atheism and irreligion? The Reflections was not (and is not) a simple book, and it did not (and 
does not) admit of simple answers. To take these questions seriously again, we must read 
Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller not through the lens of later developments, but from within their 
own conceptual categories, using the ideas and arguments that were available to them in their 
own day. This, in turn, opens up the richness, diversity, and profound contingency of Burke’s 
reception. 
 Chapter 3 begins with the skeptical, Humean interpretation of the Reflections set out 
by Rehberg in the early 1790s. It begins by resituating him within the intellectual and social 
milieu of his native Hanover. For Rehberg and his compatriots, the British Constitution was a 
source of inspiration for many decades before the Revolution. Its careful balance of power 
between Crown and Parliament seemed a model for how to curtail absolutism in Germany, 
and Burke’s pre-revolutionary arguments in defense of this Constitution were an object of 
intense study. Rehberg’s engagement with the Reflections was shaped by his early study of 
Hume. In the course of the Pantheismusstreit of the 1780s, he rejected both the traditional 
rationalism of Leibnitz and Wolff, as well as the moral philosophy of Kant’s critical idealism. 
Like Hume, Rehberg argued that morality and justice were not divine directives or a priori 
principles of practical reason, but historically-contingent human achievements. Like Hume, 
Rehberg also believed that the rise of political ‘opinion’ had been a crucial step on the path to 
modern British liberty, displacing theological certitudes, metaphysical theories of justice, and 
the sectarianism they fostered. Throughout the early 1790s – in a series of reviews of Burke’s 
anti-revolutionary works, in debates with his contemporaries, and in his Untersuchungen 
über den französischen Revolution (1793) – Rehberg co-opted Burke in order to defend this 
modest, anti-foundationalist vision of liberty, in contrast to the revolutionaries’ enthusiastic, 
illiberal politics. Highlighting Burke’s critique of those metaphysicians who rode roughshod 
over custom, prerogative, and opinion, Rehberg depicted the Revolution as a recrudescence 
of religious dogmatism, deceptively representing itself as its opposite. This critique brought 
him into conflict with Kant, whose metaphysics, in his view, formed the most cogent case for 
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the universalizing ideology that animated the Revolution. For Rehberg, in other words, Burke 
framed a debate between Kantian idealism and Humean skepticism – between metaphysics, 
enthusiasm, and dogmatism on the one hand, and the skeptical, irenic liberty of the British 
Constitution on the other. 
Chapter 4 turns to the starkly divergent interpretation of the Reflections defended by 
Burke’s translator, Gentz.25 A student of Kant in the 1780s, Gentz maintained an allegiance 
to his teacher’s liberal idealism – his intellectual ‘foster mother’ ‹Pflegemutter›, he called it26 
– throughout his life. This disposed him to a very different reading of Burke than Rehberg’s. 
In his 1793 edition of the Reflections, Gentz argued that the revolutionaries had gone wrong 
not in trying to theorize and implement the universal rights of man; rather, as Burke saw, 
their movement failed because they were imprudent, recklessly assuming that a priori reason 
was not only necessary, but entirely sufficient, for political practice. Like Kant, Gentz argued 
that the state is a condition of modern liberty. Attempting to implement the rights of man 
without taking into account any of the empirical conditions of political order – questions of 
political economy, constitutionalism, statecraft, and diplomacy – the revolutionaries’ crusade 
had led not to justice, but to the injustice of an anarchic state of nature. In his translation, 
Gentz used Burke to outline a counter-model of how the dictates of practical reason could be 
reconciled with the conditions of political stability – one in which theory and practice, the 
demands of reason and the exigencies of real politics, were brought into alignment. 
Subsequently, in a series of books and articles throughout the late 1790s, Gentz again used 
Burke to articulate a principled critique of Sieyès’s vision of popular constitutionalism, and 
to outline the case for intervention against the revolutionary government. Across these 
various engagements, Gentz insisted that political prudence ‹Klugheit›, a kind of Aristotelian 
judgment that he associated with Burke, was a necessary condition for the realization of 
Kant’s normative ideals. In order to realize the rights of man in practice and to secure a just 
international peace, he argued, it was imperative that Kantian principles be paired with the 
sort of practical, sober approach to political reality that Burke embodied, and which was 
necessary for mediating the daunting gap between theory and practice.   
																																																								
25 Ch. 3, secs. 1-3 draws on researches previously conducted towards the completion of my MPhil in 
Political Thought and Intellectual History (University of Cambridge, 2012-2013). The result of this 
research was published in two articles, the content and language of which overlaps in part with these 
three sections: Jonathan Green, ‘Friedrich Gentz’s Translation of Burke’s Reflections’, The Historical 
Journal, vol. 57, no. 3 (Sept. 2014): pp. 639-59; idem., ‘Fiat Iustitia, Pereat Mundus: Immanuel Kant, 
Friedrich Gentz, and the Possibility of Prudential Enlightenment’, Modern Intellectual History, vol. 
14, no. 1 (2017): pp. 35–65. 
26 Gentz to Garve, 5 Mar. 1790, in Briefe, vol. 1, p. 156. 
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Chapter 5 takes up the reading of Burke that Müller articulated in the early 1800s. For 
Müller, Burke was neither a moral skeptic nor primarily a defender of the inherent dignity of 
politics; instead, he celebrated Burke for what he saw as his essentially theological critique of 
liberal subjectivism. Müller began reading and engaging with Burke while Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre was at the center of German philosophical discourse. Fichte’s claim, 
which Müller took very seriously, was that Kant’s idealism, if pushed to its logical terminus, 
led to a radical form of intellectual and moral subjectivism. Fichte celebrated this insight, and 
situated his ‘subjective idealism’ as a vindication of the new, post-feudal Europe that was 
being realized in France. But for Müller, Fichte’s vision was terrifying. It seemed to herald a 
dystopian world in which morality and justice had been severed from any objective moorings 
in nature, history, or God – in which Europe was alienated from all the traditions, customs, 
and belief systems that had traditionally ordered life and given it meaning. Moreover, for 
Müller the violence of the Terror seemed to indicate that, if Europe were cleansed of its 
Christian heritage, political order would itself be fragile and tenuous. The central question 
that framed Müller’s interpretation of Burke, therefore, was: In a post-revolutionary world of 
deracinated individuals, cut off from the religious certitudes of past generations, could man 
be reunited with nature and with God? Once a society was trapped in the cage of 
subjectivism, was it possible to escape? In his commentaries on Burke, Müller reached for 
the idea of ‘tradition’ as a solution to this paradox. What Burke saw, he argued, was that 
institutions, customs, and beliefs with deep roots could check the claims of solipsistic reason, 
precisely because they had the weight of history behind them. In this way, tradition – 
represented institutionally in the Church and the hereditary aristocracy – could tether a 
subjectivized world to the moral grounding of past generations. For Müller, in other words, 
Burke’s central insight was that freedom is not enough. If modern liberty was to be 
stabilized, Europe needed something to be free for.  
 After forensically reconstructing these three thinkers’ readings of Burke, Chapter 6 
concludes by briefly highlighting the salient differences between them, and by considering 
the historical processes that led subsequent generations of Germans to conflate them. By the 
early-twentieth century, it was possible to describe Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller as aspects of 
a broader ‘deutsche Bewegung’ against Aufklärung. But in setting aside this historiography, a 
different picture comes into focus, one of a diverse group of thinkers with conflicting views 
on Enlightenment. Rather than standing at some dramatic historiographical precipice, each of 
these thinkers used Burke to shepherd their peculiar vision of Enlightenment through the fires 
of the Revolution, down into the nineteenth century. Rehberg, for instance, turned to Burke to 
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defend a Humean vision of Enlightenment against Kant’s. Gentz, meanwhile, contended for 
an Anglo-Kantian vision of Enlightenment, over and against what he saw as an abortive, 
Franco-Kantian axis. For Müller, finally, Burke held the key to redeeming Enlightenment, a 
strategy for how the autonomous Kantian subject could be resituated within the moral and 
social architecture of an objective natural and divine order. Taken together, these thinkers 
illustrate just how contested the idea of Enlightenment was in early-nineteenth century 









I. Frieda Braune’s Edmund Burke-Problem 
The first and only book-length study of Edmund Burke’s reception in Germany was written 
at the University of Heidelberg during the First World War by a doctoral student named 
Frieda Braune.1 Entitled Edmund Burke in Deutschland, her dissertation was composed under 
the supervision of Hermann Oncken, a historian of political thought who, like his uncles 
Wilhelm and August Oncken before him, was a pillar of the liberal-nationalist establishment 
in the Wilhelmine academy.2 The aim of Braune’s dissertation was twofold: first, to 
reconstruct the processes of translation and dissemination through which Burke’s anti-
revolutionary writings entered the bloodstream of German discourse in the 1790s and 1800s;3 
and second, to use this material-textual history to evaluate the philosophical impact of 
Burke’s Weltanschauung on the statesmen and writers that he inspired.4 Her narrative 
centered on the four men – Brandes, Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller – who, according to Braune, 
spearheaded the German counter-revolution. She recounted how, upon reading the 
Reflections, they turned their backs on the Revolution, joined Burke’s résistance, and began 
propagating and defending his critique of the revolutionaries throughout central Europe. 
Edmund Burke in Deutschland was thus a collaborative story, an account of how Burke and 
his German disciples worked together to combat the threat of revolutionary ideology. The 
irony of publishing such an argument in 1917, while her fellow countrymen were locked in a 
violent war with the British Empire, was not lost on Braune. ‘It is of course hard to take 
pleasure in recalling this once so-fruitful exchange [between England and Germany] when 
one reflects on the current degradation of the English nation, which has fallen victim to a 
crass this-worldliness of spirit,’ she wrote in her dissertation’s preface. ‘But the England of 
                                               
1 Frieda Braune, Edmund Burke in Deutschland: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des historisch-
politischen Denkens (Heidelberg: Winters, 1917). 
2 For Oncken’s politics, see, e.g., Hermann Oncken, ‘Die Idee von 1813 und die deutsche Gegenwart: 
Eine säkulare Betrachtung’, in Historisch-politische Aufsätze und Reden, 2 vols. (Berlin: Oldenbourg, 
1914), vol. 1, pp. 21-36; cf. Klaus Schwabe, ‘Hermann Oncken’, in Deutsche Historiker, ed. Hans-
Ulrich Wehler, 9 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1971), vol. 2, pp. 81-97. 
3 See Braune, Burke in Deutschland, chs. 1-2.  
4 See ibid., chs. 3-6. 
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the eighteenth century is not the England of today, and we must not withhold gratitude to the 
former that which it has bequeathed to us.’5 
Braune’s dissertation was a work of careful scholarship and sophisticated 
philosophical analysis. Yet far from an impartial account of Burke’s entry into Germany, it 
bore clear signs of the ideological moment in which it was conceived. It was predicated on 
the assumption – quite common among her fin de siècle contemporaries – that the character 
of the British and German peoples had diverged over the course of the nineteenth century. 
Though they fought as allies in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, Britain had since 
degenerated into a philistine society of materialism, avarice, and imperial vainglory. By the 
outbreak of WWI, the British Empire had become intoxicated by its own wealth and power. 
Nineteenth-century Germans, by contrast, had drawn on the moral and spiritual resources of 
their past to establish a progressive, self-confident nation-state, one distinguished by an 
incredible outpouring of music, art, culture, and philosophy. According to Braune, the root 
cause of these divergent national trajectories could be traced back to Britain and Germany’s 
different responses to the French Revolution, and above all to Burke.   
Burke’s campaign against the Revolution, she argued, was fundamentally a 
philosophical campaign against the rationalism of the French philosophes and their allies. 
The Reflections was the first work to perceive and denounce the conceit, incubated in the 
Enlightenment and enacted in the Revolution, that pure reason – shorn from the inherited 
particularities of tradition, habit, custom, and circumstance – could furnish a timeless, 
universal standard of justice against which extant religious, social, and political institutions 
could be judged. In rejecting the ‘Naturbegriff der Aufklärung’ (as one of Braune’s reviewers 
put it), Burke dealt a fatal blow to the metaphysics and moral philosophy underpinning the 
revolutionary state.6 If, as he argued, political reason is necessarily time-bound and 
situational, then the transcendent catalogue of the droits de l’homme that the philosophes 
claimed to have uncovered would be an illusion: their cosmopolitan vision of a rational state, 
a timeless politics, would be a contradiction in terms. Reconstructing France de novo 
according to an abstract vision of political justice, seemed dangerously naïve to Burke. Such 
an approach would, he predicted, subvert all the customary, contingent institutions that held 
France together – its monarchy, nobility, established church, and legal system. In this way, 
the dream of the philosophes – to slip the chains of history and establish on the ruins of the 
                                               
5 Ibid., p. vi. 
6 Alfred Martin, review of Braune, Burke in Deutschland, in Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 120, no. 3 
(1919): pp. 495-99, at p. 496. 
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ancien régime a universally applicable, rationally defensible constitution – would collapse 
into a nightmarish anarchy.  
For Braune, then, Burke’s contribution to the history of political thought was 
negative. The Reflections was to be understood as an ideological ‘counterforce’ ‹Gegenkraft› 
to the deracinated ‘cosmopolitanism’ of the eighteenth century, and to its un-historical, static 
vision of human nature.7 But in the course of ‘his lifelong [battle against] the political 
consequences of unbridled individualism and ethical materialism’, Burke did not set out a 
positive, prescriptive vision of political order: 
State-theories like Sieyes’s, which sought to make all peoples happy 
‹beglücken› through the same [constitutional] means, were just as alien to him 
as theories like Rousseau’s, which sought to dissolve state and society into 
their [pre-political] atomic particles. He battled both of these extremes with 
scorn and rage. He would have been better positioned to refute them, perhaps, 
if he had something positive to set against them. But circumstances led him to 
place his emphasis on negation.8  
For Braune, this meant that Burke’s worldview was essentially incomplete. While he offered 
a compelling cri de cœur against the ‘Gedankenwelt der Aufklärung’, he never described the 
sort of politics that should succeed the revolutionaries’ failed experiment: he did not set out 
an alternative to Enlightenment.9 For this reason, Braune believed that the Reflections posed 
a challenge to its readers, both in the eighteenth century and in her own time – namely, to 
complete Burke’s worldview, to spell out the positive implications of his predominantly 
negative perceptions. 
 In the early-nineteenth century, Burke’s German disciples seized on this question, 
laying out a robust, grounded, and systematic vision of Burkean politics in the post-
revolutionary world. In a telling analogy, Braune described the Reflections as a ‘spiritual 
seed’ ‹geistiges Samenkorn› which ‘took root’ in Germany and, through the ‘cultivation’ of 
Burke’s students, matured into a full and vibrant worldview.10 Burke rejected rationalism out 
of an instinctual deference to tradition: his German followers were the first historicists. Burke 
was a critic of individualism: his students were the first communitarians. In this way, by 
complementing his critique of the revolutionaries’ ideology with new, positive vision of 
politics, the German Burkeans were able to chart a path up from Enlightenment: 
Edmund Burke’s political wisdom is among the gifts that the German people, 
then in their political childhood, happily appropriated from the older, more-
experienced political nation ‹Staatsvolk› [of England]. The German spirit 
                                               
7 Braune, Burke in Deutschland, p. v. 
8 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
9 Ibid., p. 180 (arguing that Gentz was too enmeshed in the ‘Gedankenwelt der Aufklärung’ to take 
seriously Burke’s argument for the necessary union of Church and State).   
10 Ibid., p. vii. 
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seized upon this stimulus ‹Anregung› with its own distinct creative power, 
transformed it, and made it into an organic part of its own national character. 
It is the goal of the following study to explain this process of appropriation 
and improvement ‹Annahme und Weiterbildung›.11 
Because he understood the vital role that such contingencies as tradition, custom, and 
language play in the maintenance of political communities, Burke saw that contractarian 
political theorists were blind to the inextricably ‘irrational’ foundations of civil society. On 
the basis of this insight, his students renounced the liberal tradition, forcing a new vision of 
the state that gave primacy of place to the historical, the particular, and the inherited: 
His understanding of the state not as a mechanical, but as an organic entity; 
his emphasis on the value and dignity of the historical; his investigation of 
those irrational forces, the imponderable wellsprings of the state and society – 
these are the ideas through which Burke made his lasting impact…. It was the 
German Romantics who gave his ideas about peoples and nations, about 
sovereignty, about law and the state, a form in which they could live on and 
exert a lasting influence.12 
According to Braune, this Romantic vision of politics ultimately culminated in the German 
nation-state. ‘It was his undeniable achievement to have intimated ‹hingeweisen› the 
historical and psychological conditions of national individuality.’13 And yet it was his 
students who, over the course of the nineteenth century, transfigured these anti-rationalist 
intuitions into a principled case for nationalist cause realized in 1871. Braune positioned his 
followers in Göttingen, Brandes and Rehberg, as a bridge between Burke and the historicist 
jurisprudence of Savigny, Stein, and Ranke. As Brandes and Rehberg clarified and 
systematized this Burkean worldview, his innate historicism became theoretically self-
reflective and took on its familiar attributes: a ‘rejection of dogmatic natural law political 
theories’ and a ‘new vision of the nation as an organic body’.14 Gentz, likewise, was inspired 
by Burke’s critique of the philosophes’ moralizing liberalism and set it as the keystone of his 
own sober, hard-nosed vision of statecraft. In Braune’s presentation, it was hard not to see 
Gentz as a forerunner of Bismarckian Realpolitik.15 But it was above all Müller whose 
nostalgia for a lost ‘age of chivalry’ and whose paeans to medieval Germania set post-
Napoleonic Romanticism upon its determinate political course, which reached its terminus in 
the unification of the Germanies. ‘The doctrine of nationality constitutes the very pinnacle of 
those ideas which Burke incited in Adam Müller.’16  
                                               
11 Ibid., p. vi-vii. 
12 Ibid., p. 2-3. 
13 Ibid., p. 1. 
14 Ibid., p. 138. 
15 See ibid., ch. 5, esp. pp. 59-72.  
16 Ibid., p. 216. 
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In its original context, the polemical implications of Edmund Burke in Deutschland 
were unambiguous. Victorian Britons had foolishly ignored the wisdom of their native son, 
allowing Burke’s prescient critique of cosmopolitanism to lie fallow. His Germans admirers, 
by contrast, heeded Burke’s call, theorizing a positive vision of the Nationalstaat that stood 
as an alternative to both an abortive French Enlightenment and an enervated Anglo-American 
tradition. And this was cause for celebration. In the throes of the Great War, the Wilhelmine 
Empire embodied the promise of a post-Enlightenment politics – a path through the 
decadence, disillusionment, and ennui that gripped contemporary Europe. Germany had 
solved Das Edmund Burke-Problem.17 
In the century since Braune made this argument, it has exerted a powerful pull on the 
historiography of Burke’s German reception. Whether in agreement or disagreement, her 
thesis – that Burke’s critique of Enlightenment set out a challenge, a problem that his 
German-speaking disciples subsequently answered – has framed a hundred years of debates 
about Burke’s ‘impact’ in Germany. This is not to say that historians have simply arrayed 
themselves in two opposing camps, one endorsing Braune and the other dismissing her. 
Rather, as I suggest in the pages that follow, the scholarly terrain is more varied than this. 
Since 1917, scholars have tried to expand her canon of German Burkeans. Some historians 
have sought to revise the political implications of her narrative, in order to conscript Burke 
and his progeny as the origin of political causes not congenial to her nationalism – interwar 
liberalism, Catholic corporatism, völkisch conservatism, even Nazism. Many postwar 
scholars, meanwhile, have inverted her story’s moral valences, painting the Reflections as the 
main catalyst of Germany’s post-revolutionary Sonderweg. What all these historical 
arguments share, however, is the strongly teleological structure that Braune imposed upon 
this narrative, tracing a line of causality from Burke’s critique of the Revolution, through its 
entrée into Germany, its cultivation, development, and refinement by his followers, and 
ultimately to its political ‘realization’. For a century of historians, in other words, Burke’s 
Reflections has been a turning point, the fulcrum on which Germany pivoted from 
Enlightenment to its opposite. Given this premise, the only salient question to be resolved 
was what, exactly, this post-Enlightenment vision of politics entailed.    
 
                                               
17 This is, of course, an allusion to ‘Das Adam Smith-Problem’, a phrase coined by August Oncken in 
1898 to describe German debates about whether Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments was compatible 
with his Wealth of Nations: see August Oncken, ‘Das Adam Smith-Problem’, Zeitschrift für 
Socialwissenschaft, vol. 1 (1898): pp. 25-33, 101-8, 276-87. For this debate’s history, cf. Keith Tribe, 
‘“Das Adam Smith Problem” and the origins of modern Smith scholarship’, History of European 
Ideas, vol. 34 (2008): pp. 514-525.  
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II. Shaping the canon 
Upon its publication, readers of Braune’s thesis soon recognized it as a contribution to the 
larger historiographical project set out by Friedrich Meinecke – close friend and colleague of 
Braune’s Doktorvater, Hermann Oncken18 – in his seminal Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat 
(1908).19 Edmund Burke in Deutschland was part to a growing body of Burke scholarship 
that appeared in the wake of Meinecke’s magnum opus.20 Braune’s dissertation was an 
attempt to corroborate one of the central hypotheses of Meinecke’s Weltbürgertum – namely, 
that the Reflections had played a crucial role in the rise of German nationalism.21 Her intent 
was clear to Meinecke himself: in editions of the work published after 1917, he credited her 
for having ‘decisively proven’ Burke’s ‘strong influence’ on Müller and the national 
tradition.22   
 Situating Edmund Burke in Deutschland within Meinecke’s wider narrative makes 
clear just how ambitious Braune’s project was. Meinecke’s Weltbürgertum was an attempt to 
trace the emergence of the German nation-state out of ‘the cosmopolitan Enlightenment’ of 
the eighteenth century, first as a philosophical concept then as a historical fact.23 His 
Whiggish march toward 1871 was slow and incremental, yet inexorable. In the wake of the 
French Revolution, each of his key figures helped to extricate Germany from the tainted 
legacy of the Enlightenment. Weltbürgertum began with Humbolt’s incipient nationalism – a 
philhellenic idea of German identity which, though ‘still permeated by the universal, 
cosmopolitan ideals of the age that preceded him’, nevertheless paved the way for Novalis, 
the Schlegel brothers, and the early Romantics.24 In turn, these poets and literary critics 
exposed just how alienating and deracinating the ideology of liberal individualism was: since 
                                               
18 In the 1920s Meinecke and Oncken co-edited the series Klassiker der Politik (Berlin: Hobbing); 
and in 1935, when the Nazi historian Walter Frank orchestrated Oncken’s expulsion from the German 
university system – decrying him as the ringleader of a now-displaced ‘old liberal Geheimrats-Klique’ 
– Meinecke publicly defended him: see Schwabe, ‘Oncken’, pp. 82-3. 
19 Braune admitted as much in print: see Burke in Deutschland, pp. 2, 183, 200; for her 
contemporaries’ recognition of this dissertation’s genealogy, see Martin, review of Braune, Burke in 
Deutschland, p. 495. 
20 Friedrich Meusel, Edmund Burke und die französische Revolution: zur Entstehung historisch-
politischen Denkens, zumal in England (Berlin: Weidmann, 1913); Kurt Lessing, August Wilhelm 
Rehberg und die französische Revolution: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des literarischen Kampfes 
gegen die revolutionären Ideen in Deutschland (Freiburg: Bielefeld, 1910); Gunnar Rexius, ‘Studien 
zur Staatslehre der historischen Schule’, Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 107 (1911): pp. 496-539. 
21 Friedrich Meinecke, Weltbürgertum und Nationalstaat (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1908); trans. as 
Cosmopolitanism and the National State by Robert Kimber (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1970), pp. 99-104; cf. the first ed. (1908), p. 126ff. Citations and references below are to 
Kimber’s translated edition, though I have sometimes modified his English after consulting the 
original. 
22 See the reference to Braune in Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, p. 99, f. 16, trans. modified. 
23 Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, pp. 69-70. 
24 Ibid., p. 42, trans. modified. 
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the revolutionaries’ understanding of freedom was unhistorical – indeed, anti-historical – it 
gave the people of France no sense of collective identity, belonging, or kinship. These 
Romantics began to think of politics as a vehicle for expression of a people’s historically 
conditioned personality, embodied in its art, culture, customs, and values. Fichte’s Reden an 
die deutsche Nation (1808), delivered in the wake of Napoleon’s conquest of the Holy 
Roman Empire, fused this aesthetic nationalism to his own Kantian idealism: just as moral 
freedom consisted in autonomous self-legislation, Fichte’s Reden argued that the German 
people would only be free if they gained the capacity for collective national agency. In this 
way, he wedded Kant’s ‘individualism’ to the particularism of the Romantik.25 
But it was not until the arrival of Müller’s Elemente der Staatskunst (1809), according 
to Meinecke, that the national idea assumed a concrete political form. Freeing the concept 
from its earlier quietism, Müller presented the moral and spiritual integrity of the Germanic 
Middle Ages as an image, a standard, of the Germany that he and his contemporaries could 
resuscitate. In uniting to throw off their French conquerors, the integrity of the German 
nation could be restored in the present – not only notionally, as a bearer of Kantian moral 
agency, but also politically, as a sovereign nation-state. In this sense, Meinecke later 
remarked, ‘Müller’s doctrine represents the first step towards Ranke.’26 The impetus for this 
politicized nationalism, in turn, was Burke. According to Meinecke, Burke taught Müller to 
see the ‘irrational’ forces of history – ‘the power of tradition, custom, instinct, and intuition’ 
– as the bedrock foundation not only of community (an aesthetic insight that the Jena 
Romantics had already grasped), but of politics as such.27 This recognition allowed Müller 
‘to overcome the idea of a normative or ideal state’ and to conceptualize a theory of 
legitimacy that was rooted in his own national tradition: 
Not only did [Burke] provide the opponents of the Revolution with their most 
powerful intellectual tools but, more importantly, he struck the first decisive 
blow against eighteenth-century conceptions of the state, which were formed 
on the basis of natural law…. He showed us that it is practical to attempt to 
understand that which that has previously been regarded as weakness or 
irrationality, and to recognize the kernel of wisdom in the husk of prejudice. 
The consequence of this insight for Burke and for his student Adam Müller 
was a deep respect for the latent wisdom in that which the living inherited as a 
bequest from the past, and therefore a deep mistrust of the wisdom of those 
who wanted to cut themselves off from the past.28  
                                               
25 See ibid., ch. 6. 
26 Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson (1924); trans. as Machiavellism: The Doctrine of Raison d’État 
and its Place in Modern History by Douglas Scott (London: Routledge, 1957), at p. 371, trans. 
modified. 
27 Meinecke, Weltbürgertum, p. 101, trans. modified. 
28 Ibid., p. 101-2, trans. modified. 
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But Müller’s repudiation of the moral universalism of the Aufklärung had not left him 
rudderless, without the ethical moorings necessary to render his vision of the state humane. 
On the contrary, his traditionalism allowed him to erect his politics on a surer moral basis 
than his predecessors. According to Meinecke, Müller’s historically grounded state-theory 
sublimated up into itself the accumulated moral wisdom of his fellow Germans, made 
immanent their local customs, values, institutions, and traditions. Thus in Müller, ‘natural 
law and the law of reason retreated before positive law, which then rose to the position of 
true natural law.’29 Though his neo-medieval vision retained an unhappy vestige of Catholic 
cosmopolitanism, Meinecke nevertheless believed that it was sufficiently cogent to provide 
an intellectual basis for the eventual rise of the Nationalstaat. Under Burke’s inspiration, 
Müller had introduced the Germans to a ‘concept of nationality [that] is completely political 
and represents a close union and interpenetration of state, nation, and individual’.30 
 As Meinecke and Braune were both well aware, this basic historiographical 
dichotomy – between eighteenth-century rationalism and nineteenth-century historicism – 
was hardly unique to their own time. Neither was the more specific claim that Burke’s 
Reflections was the stimulus for Germany’s transition from the solipsism of reason to the 
higher wisdom of history. Already in the 1870s, no less an authority than Heinrich von 
Treitschke was describing Burke’s reception in precisely these proto-historicist terms. 
Gentz’s translation of the Reflections, he claimed, had been ‘a turning-point in the history of 
our political maturation ‹Bildung›’, containing ‘the basic principles of a new and vibrant view 
of politics ‹Staatsanschauung›, one that was closely related to the incipient historical sense of 
the German sciences.’ In the Reflections, Treitschke explained, ‘the Revolution’s 
cosmopolitan radicalism came up against a historical theory of politics ‹eine historische 
Staatslehre›’.31 His peers seemed to agree. Two years later, Karl Hildebrand would claim that 
‘[Burke] was for England and political theory exactly what Herder was for Germany and 
literary theory – the herald of the historical principle, who signaled the attack against the 
rationalism and mechanism of the eighteenth century’.32 This idea became so commonplace 
that by 1911, six years before Edmund Burke in Deutschland, one scholar thought it ‘widely 
known’ ‹bekanntlich› that ‘the original impetus for the historical theory of the state 
originated in Burke, but it only took on systematic form in Germany’. Indeed, he was 
                                               
29 Ibid., p. 102. 
30 Ibid., p. 112. 
31 Heinrich von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, bis zum zweiten 
Pariser Frieden (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1879). I cite here from the 10th ed. (1918), pp. 117-8. 
32 Karl Hildebrand, Aus und über England, in idem., Zeiten, Völker, und Menschen (Berlin: 
Oppenheim, 1881), vol. 5, at p. 55. Cf. Heinrich Ahrens, Naturrecht oder Philosophie des Rechts und 
des Staates, 6th ed. (Vienna, 1870), vol. 1, pp. 168-69. 
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prepared to argue that the story of ‘the evolution of the historicist view of politics in 
Germany is principally the history of the dissemination of Burke’s ideas’.33  
 What was new in Meinecke and Braune, however, was their methodology. 
Rearticulating this familiar narrative with the tools of the new Ideengeschichte, they were 
concerned to recount not merely the general ebb and flow of opinion during the Revolution, 
but the precise moral and metaphysical premises upon which Burke and his students’ 
argument depended. As a result, the opposition between enlightened rationalism and post-
enlightened historicism that they sketched was much sharper than Treitschke’s, and proved 
extremely durable over the coming decades. In 1925, a young Karl Mannheim used his 
Habilitationsschrift as an occasion to present their story about the revolutionary origins of 
post-enlightened Burkeanism in what he considered to be its basic ‘sociological’ form.34 He 
also gave this worldview a name: conservatism. Whereas Braune and Meinecke had been 
reticent to invoke party-political labels to describe Burke’s followers – they preferred 
descriptors like ‘traditional’, ‘historical’, ‘Romantic’, and ‘national’ – Mannheim believed 
that, in sociological terms at least, their history was essentially a genealogy of ‘Das 
konservative Denken’. Drawing on Braune’s primary research – which he acknowledged in 
an unfortunate footnote to ‘Friedrich [sic] Braune, Edmund Burke in Deutschland’35 – 
Mannheim distilled her argument into a causal narrative of crystalline purity. The ideology of 
conservatism, according to Mannheim, was to be sharply distinguished from the more general 
phenomenon of ‘traditionalism’, an innate human disposition toward stability which (as he 
noted) Max Weber had already explored.36 As a historically unique ideology, conservatism 
arose in the wake of the French Revolution, ‘in conscious opposition to the highly organized, 
coherent and systematic progressive movement’ of its leaders. 37 The rapid spread of their 
subversive republican ideology across the German states posed a dire threat to pre-existing 
structures of social and political authority. This danger thus required a response, a vindication 
                                               
33 Rexius, ‘Staatslehre der historischen Schule’, pp. 497, 513. According to Rexius, the ‘historische 
Schule’ began with Burke – ‘in whom the positive-constructivist principles of the historical school … 
originated’ (p. 505) – and included Hugo, Spittler, Humboldt, Rehberg, Brandes, Gentz, and Savigny, 
among others. Stein and Dahlmann then translated their principles into a practice, calling for a 
national German parliament. 
34 Karl Mannheim, ‘Das konservative Denken: Soziologische Beiträge zum Werden des politischen-
historischen Denkens in Deutschland’ (1927); reprinted in From Karl Mannheim, ed. and trans. Kurt 
Wolff, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1993), pp. 260-350. For this essay’s origins, cf. the 
‘Introduction’ to Karl Mannheim, Conservatism, ed. David Ketter, Volker Meja, Nico Stehr (London: 
Routledge, 1986), pp. 1-26.  
35 See ibid., p. 286. 
36 See ibid., p. 281; cf. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 
vols. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), vol. 1, p. 37.  
37 Mannheim, ‘Das konservative Denken’, in From Karl Mannheim, pp. 280, 285. 
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of the status quo, which German readers found in Burke. As their intuitive, unreflective 
preference for the established order was elevated to the intellectually conscious plane of the 
Reflections, German conservatism was born. Over time, as Burke’s insights were ‘pursued to 
their logical conclusions’, his German students enlisted him in a full-scale counterassault 
against Aufklärung: 
The main stimulus [of German conservatism] actually came from England – 
much more politically developed at that time than Germany. It came from 
Burke. Germany contributed this process of ‘thinking through to the end’ – a 
philosophical deepening and intensifying of tendencies which originated with 
Burke and were then combined with genuinely German elements. … Counter-
revolutionary criticism of the French Revolution originated … in England, but 
achieved its most consistent exposition on German soil.38 
As a result of the efforts of Burke’s students, ‘conservative thought is to be found in its 
sharpest and most logically consistent form in Germany in the first half of the nineteenth 
century.’39 
 Mannheim’s digestible reiteration of Braune’s argument appeared amidst a 
groundswell of interwar scholarship on Burke’s German reception, which coincided with 
what Armin Mohler later (and controversially) described as a ‘konservative Revolution’ on 
the Weimar Right.40 After Germany’s defeat in 1918, historians began anxiously turning to 
the central figures of Braune’s argument in an attempt to find new paths forward for their 
beleaguered and bewildered nation. Competing visions of Germany’s future led scholars to 
reflect on the origins of their national tradition. Very often, this led them to Burke. From 
1918 to 1933, Braune’s German Burkeans were subjected to intense academic scrutiny, while 
at the same time a litany of new ‘Burkeans’ were added to her canon. Five new books on 
Müller’s politics were published between the wars, as well as a critical edition of his 
Elemente der Staatskunst.41 The same era witnessed renewed efforts to compile Gentz’s 
                                               
38 Ibid., pp. 324, 268. 
39 Ibid., p. 269. 
40 Armin Mohler, Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932 (1950), 6th ed., 2 vols. 
(Graz: Ares, 2005). 
41 For the former, see Ferdinand Reinkemeyer, Adam Müllers ethische und philosophische 
Anschauungen im Lichte der Romantik (Osterwieck am Harz: Zickfeldt, 1926); Giesela Busse, Die 
Lehre vom Staat als Organismus: kritische Untersuchungen zur Staatsphilosophie Adam Müllers 
(Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1928); Reinhold Aris, Die Staatslehre Adam Müllers in ihrem 
Verhältnis zur deutschen Romantik (Tübingen: Mohr, 1929); Jakob Baxa, Adam Müllers Philosophie, 
Ästhetik und Staatswissenschaft (Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt, 1929); idem., Adam Müller: Ein 
Lebensbild aus dem Befreiungskriegen und aus der deutschen Restauration (Jena: Fischer, 1930). For 
the latter, see Adam Müller, Die Elemente der Staatskunst, ed. Jakob Baxa, 2 vols. (Jena: Gustav 
Fischer, 1922). Cf. Paul Kluckhohn, Persönlichkeit und Gemeinschaft: Studien zur Staatsauffassung 
der deutschen Romantik (Halle: Niemeyer, 1925); Kurt Borries, Die Romantik und die Geschichte 
(Berlin: Deutsches Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1925). 
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unpublished works.42 Meanwhile, new studies of Humboldt, Stein, and Metternich stressed 
Burke’s centrality to modern German statecraft.43 Contemporary research on Novalis, the 
Schlegel brothers, and Fichte detected Burke’s influence at the heady nexus of early 
Romanticism and post-Kantian idealism.44 The Restorationism of Haller and Baader was cast 
as an aspect of a broader Burkean counter-revolution.45 And Burke was described as a 
forerunner of the historicism of Savigny, Niebuhr, and Ranke.46 Mannheim’s hypothesis 
became a scaffolding on which scholars could hang these new ‘discoveries’. Since Burke was 
the author of German conservatism, and since German conservatism was the highest 
expression of the worldview, uncovering a thinker’s Burkean pedigree became a form of 
ideological validation. The ranks of his ‘school’ swelled so prodigiously that, by 1945, Hans 
Barth felt justified in complaining that Braune’s Burke in Deutschland was far too narrow in 
its scope, and that she had dramatically underreported Burke’s importance in German 
intellectual history.47 
 This inflated narrative gradually drifted into the Anglophone world in the 1930s, 
along with émigré scholars fleeing the Nazis. In The History of Political Thought in 
Germany, 1789-1815 (1936), the expatriated Müller expert Reinhold Aris incorporated it into 
what became the standard English-language study of post-revolutionary German thought for 
                                               
42 Friedrich Gentz, Staatsschriften und Briefe, ed. Hans von Eckhardt, 2 vols. (Munich: Drei Masken, 
1921), which was intended to complete Briefe von und an Friedrich von Gentz, ed. F.C. Wittichen, 3 
vols. (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1909-1913) and the posthumous Schriften von Friedrich von Gentz, ed. 
Gustav Schlesier, 5 vols. (Mannheim: Hoff, 1838-40). 
Brandes and Rehberg, by contrast, were less interesting to interwar historians, perhaps due to 
their well-known Anglophile and liberal tendencies.  
43 S.A. Kaehler, Wilhelm von Humboldt und der Staat (1927), 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1963), pp. 148-9; Erich Weniger, ‘Stein und Rehberg’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch, vol. 2 
(1925): pp. 1-124; Erich Botzenhart, Die Staats- und Reformideen des Freiherrn von Stein (Tübigen: 
Osiander, 1927), esp. pp. 202-225; Heinrich von Srbik, Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch, 
2 vols. (Munich: Bruckmann, 1925), vol. 1, pp. 94-5, 333. 
44 On Novalis, see Richard Samuel, Die poetische Staats- und Geschichtsauffassung Friedrich von 
Hardenbergs (Frankfurt am Main: Diesterweg, 1925), p. 78ff; but cf. Benno von Wiese, ‘Novalis und 
die romantischen Konvertiten’, in Romantikforschungen, ed. Betty Heimann (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929), 
pp. 205-242, which cast dout on the Burke-Novalis connection. For the Schlegels, cf. Richard 
Volpers, Friedrich Schlegel als politischer Denker und deutscher Patriot (Berlin: Behrs, 1917); Otto 
Brandt, August Wilhelm Schlegel, der Romantiker und die Politik (Stuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1919). For Fichte as Burkean, see Jakob Baxa, Einführung in die romantische 
Staatswissenschaft (1923), 2nd ed. (Jena: Fischer, 1930), p. 152. 
45 Karl Guggisberg, Karl Ludwig von Haller (Leipzig: Huber, 1938), esp. pp. 94-5; for Baader, cf. 
Hans Barth, ‘Edmund Burke and German Political Philosophy in the Age of Romanticism’ (1945), in 
idem., The Idea of Order, trans. Ernst Hankamer and William Newell (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 
1960), pp. 18-47, at p. 197.  
46 Bernhard Hoeft, Rankes Stellungnahme zur französischen Revolution (Griefswald: Adler, 1932). 
47 ‘She does not consider Stein, Niebuhr and Novalis, among others’: Barth, ‘Burke and German 
Political Philosophy’ (1945), at p. 196. 
Chapter 2: Das Edmund Burke-Problem 
	 29 
some three decades.48 ‘The influence which Burke exerted upon German thinkers [can] 
hardly be overestimated’, Aris boldly proclaimed to his Anglo-American readers. ‘Burke was 
the spiritual father not only of the Romantic and the Historic schools but also of the 
conservative movement as it developed after the war of liberation.’ In ‘refuting the theory of 
Natural Law and insisting on the value of tradition’, Burke had inspired his students – Gentz, 
Novalis, Schlegel, Brandes, Rehberg, Müller, Stein, and von der Marwitz, among others – to 
turn against Enlightenment as well. ‘The German conservative thinkers learned from Burke 
to think in historical categories, but they also learned from him to think of the state not as a 
congeries of patriarchal relationships but as an organic unity.’ Aris pointed especially to 
Müller, Burke’s ‘most faithful disciple on the Continent’, as the pivotal figure in this story. In 
situating ‘the idealized feudal state of the Middle Ages’ as a radical alternative to 
revolutionary liberalism, ‘Müller initiated a movement which was to find its climax in 
Hegel’s philosophy and in Bismarck’s policy.’49 Unlike most of his contemporaries, Aris did 
not mean this as a compliment. In his view, Germany’s reaction against Aufklärung was the 
first sign of a pathological conservatism which, by the 1930s, had destroyed it. As one 
reviewer noted in the American Political Science Review, Aris saw German liberals as 
‘isolated phenomena in a sea of emotionalism and authoritarianism’. This impression was not 
misleading, according to this reviewer, for ‘almost all the elements of the Nazi ideology (the 
cult of the will, of the race, of the soil, of the unconscious, the idea of leadership and 
authority, the rejection of the values of Western democracy, the tendency to return to the past 
in the form of the corporative state, the vehement antipathy to the Jews, etc.) can be found 
clearly stated and hailed by influential currents of public opinion in the romantic and 
nationalistic tendencies of these early decades.’50 On Aris’s reasoning, in other words, the 
Nazis’ hyper-conservatism was so vicious precisely because Burke’s reception had been so 
robust.  
 
III. Competing conservatisms 
Throughout the Weimar era, Burke’s rising prospects and the growing ranks of his German 
allies afforded historians an opportunity to revisit the political upshot of Meinecke’s 
Weltbürgergum. In the aftermath of the German Empire’s collapse in 1919, the proto-
                                               
48 Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany, 1789-1815 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1936 [republished in 1962, 1965]); cf. the citations of Braune and Meinecke at pp. 64, 265. A 
promised second volume, bringing the story from 1815 to 1914, never materialized. 
49 Ibid., pp. 250, 307-8, 394, 308, 312.  
50 Oscar Jaszi, review of Aris, History, in The American Political Science Review, vol. 31, no. 3 (June, 
1937): pp. 537-9, at p. 538. 
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Bismarckian alternative to Enlightenment that he had traced back to Burke seemed 
compromised, complicit in the country’s humiliating defeat in WWI. His teleological 
narrative took a harsh blow. As scholars returned to Meinecke’s terrain with fresh eyes, a 
series of new interpretations of Burke’s German legacy came into view. In reprioritizing 
Burke’s students and retracing the trajectories of his influence, these reinterpretations gave 
competing factions of Weimar conservatives divergent genealogies of counter-revolution, 
and different stories about the origins of their own politics.  
Perhaps the most important of these revaluations was advanced by Meinecke himself, 
in his interwar studies of Staatsräson (1924) and Historismus (1936).51 In 1907 Meinecke 
had been content to gloss pre-revolutionary Europe as cosmopolitan, rationalistic, and 
unhistorical; but in these later works, he tried to give a more precise account of the world 
against which Burke and his students recoiled. The eighteenth century, he now argued, was 
riven by two kinds of political universalisms. On the one hand was a ‘natural law’ tradition 
that began with Hobbes, and which Meinecke ran through Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, 
Leibnitz, Rousseau, the French philosophes and the German Wolffians. Grown out of early-
modern Christian jurisprudence, this school was dedicated to the use of human reason to 
discover the universal conditions of liberty and justice – normative principles that could 
provide a moral anchor for politics, filling the space formerly occupied by the Church. This 
rationalistic tradition ran counter to the ‘empirical realism’ of Machiavelli, Hume, and 
Montesquieu. Like Hobbes, these Machiavellians aspired to ground the state in trans-
historical truths about human psychology. But unlike their natural law rivals, this empirical 
school denied that transcendent moral foundations could be located outside the flux of time 
and contingency. They were principally concerned to describe techniques of political 
management to stave off corruption in the body politic, and this quickly led them into debates 
about the relation between commercial society and raison d’état. According to Meinecke, it 
was this irreducible tension between ‘naturalism and rationalism’, ‘kratos and ethos’, that 
gave eighteenth-century political theory its incredible dynamism.52 But it was these 
categories’ incompatibility that also ultimately led to the collapse of Enlightenment in the 
Revolution.  
                                               
51 Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsräson (1924); idem, Die Entstehung des Historismus (1936), trans. as 
Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook by J.E. Anderson (London: Routledge, 1972). In the 
following I cite to Anderson’s edition of Historismus, and have used his translations unless otherwise 
noted. 
52 Meinecke, Historismus, p. 102; idem., Staatsräson, p. 4. For a restatement of Meinecke’s 
hypothesis (conceptualized as an eighteenth-century tension between ‘stoics’ and ‘epicureans’) see 
Istvan Hont, Politics in Commercial Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
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What was important to see about the fissures within the Aufklärung, Meinecke 
argued, was that both of these traditions of thought only engaged with history superficially. 
Hobbesians used the past as a tabula rasa upon which to project their normative claims; 
Machiavellians, as a cosmopolitan trove of examples from which to surmise generalizable 
truths about human social behavior.53 In his Reflections, Burke was the first to reject this 
‘negative relationship to history’ in favor of a ‘positive’ relationship to the inherited past.54 
Beholden to neither morals nor politics in the abstract but instead deferential to the normative 
integrity of history in sich, he transcended the limitations of Hobbes and Machiavelli. ‘Burke 
did not view the state in a general and abstract manner, like the thinkers bound down by 
natural law, nor empirically, mechanically, and from the utilitarian angle, like Hume.’ Rather, 
he gave ‘the higher powers in history primacy over the conscious rational will of man.’ He 
signaled the arrival ‘a new historical sense that went beyond anything Hume had written 
under the influence of the Enlightenment’. Even Gibbon, despite his seeming ‘approval of 
Burke’s Reflections’, was too enlightened ‘to appreciate the deeper spirit that undergirded 
them’.55 Burke represented a clean break from the eighteenth-century in which Gibbon and 
Hume’s historiography was embedded.  
 Upon its arrival in Germany, his ‘revitalized traditionalism’ was ‘not yet 
historicism’.56 Though Burke showed a way through the central impasse of the eighteenth 
century, he did not himself pursue it. It was his German students who completed the task, re-
plinthing his politics on the metaphysical foundations of emergent idealist movement (which 
had overcome the binary opposition between reason and sentiment, norms and facts, at a 
philosophical level), and using it to ‘activate’ the preexisting historical sense of such figures 
as Möser, Herder, and Goethe. It was for this reason that Meinecke placed Hume at the ‘limit 
of Enlightenment’: his radical skepticism was the intellectual dead-end of the eighteenth 
century, the conundrum that was transcended by this German historicist-idealist synthesis of 
ethics and politics.57 This narrative, in turn, allowed Meinecke to sharpen the political 
implications of Burke’s reception: Germany now stood not just as the historical successor to, 
but as a repudiation of, an internally-incoherent Anglo-American tradition. It allowed 
                                               
53 Humboldt also stumbled across a third form of ‘negative’ history: he saw it as an emancipatory 
process wherein men attain self-government – enabling them, ironically, to jettison the provincial 
constraints of custom, tradition, and local culture; see Weltbürgertum, pp. 34-48. 
54 Meinecke spelled out this distinction in his discussion of Goethe; see Historismus, p. 424-491. 
55 Ibid., pp. 224-6, 221,189, trans. modified. 
56 Ibid., pp. 227-28. Cf. Friedrich Meinecke, ‘Edmund Burke: Leistung für den Historismus’, 
Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 14 (1935): pp. 218-19. 
57 Meinecke, Historismus, p. 186. 
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Meinecke to jettison much of the liberalism of Weltbürgertum, in favor to a less ethically 
constrained, more directly political form of nationalism.58 
Around the same time, the influential Breslau lawyer Georg Quabbe used Burke to 
push his fellow conservatives precisely in the opposite direction, towards a more Anglophilic 
position. Quabbe was a proud member of the DNVP, but hoped to disabuse his party of what 
he saw as its excessive fixation on race and unnecessary anti-Semitism, which he (wrongly) 
believed were electorally untenable.59  His Tar a Ri: Variationen über ein konservatives 
Thema (1927) was an attempt to set out a ‘theoretical basis’ for a liberalized German 
conservatism, and possibly a new ‘republican-conservative party’.60 Towards this end he 
adopted an unexpected tactic, denying that Meinecke’s Romantics were Burkean at all. It was 
true that Burke was the first conservative, and that the vocation of conservatives was to wage 
‘Aufklärung gegen die Aufklärung’.61 But whereas Meinecke defined eighteenth-century 
thought in terms of its a-historicity, Quabbe took a different view: what was characteristic 
about the Enlightenment he renounced, rather, was its radicalism. The Burkean antidote to 
this sickness was not historicism, but moderation. It was self-defeating to try to locate a 
‘systematic conservatism’ in Burke, he argued: a rational case for irrationalism was viciously 
circular.62 ‘An internal refutation [of Enlightened rationalism] is problematic’, he explained, 
‘insofar as Burke essentially restates the ancient question of Pontius Pilate. He does not 
prosecute Enlightenment on its own grounds, that of reason, but rather denies the legitimacy 
of reason to determine anything at all.’63 
In an argument that Samuel Huntington would popularize twenty years later, Quabbe 
insisted that conservatism could only ever amount to a ‘situational’ doctrine, a defense of the 
status quo in the face of revolutionary upheaval.64 The content of conservatism, in other 
words, depended on its sociopolitical context. As a result, it could never cohere into a 
positive doctrine like liberalism or socialism, defined by their trans-historical ideals and by 
the canon of thinkers responsible for their propagation. Quabbe was led to conclude that 
conservatism, the defence of history, was itself without a history:  
                                               
58 See especially Meinecke, Staatsräson, chs. 15-17. 
59 See Georg Quabbe, Tar a Ri: Variationen über ein konservatives Thema (Berlin: Verlag für Politik 
und Wirtschaft, 1927); reprinted in the Quellentexte zur Konservativen Revolution, vol. 2 
(Toppenstedt: Uwe Berg-Verlag, 2007), at pp. 17-24. For Quabbe, see Mohler, Die konservative 
Revolution, p. 470. 
60 Ibid., p. 12. Quabbe’s title was (he claimed, p. 7) medieval Irish for ‘Come, oh King’, and the 
etymological origin of the contemporary label ‘Tory’.  
61 Ibid., p. 9. 
62 See ibid., pp. 181-9.  
63 Ibid., p. 53. Cf. John 18:30: ‘Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?’  
64 See Samuel Huntington, ‘Conservatism as an Ideology’, American Political Science Review, vol. 
51, no. 2 (June, 1957): pp. 454-73. 
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With resignation, we conservatives must admit that such a [true conservative] 
has only appeared once, in Burke. All of the conservative verities of the last 
century have faded away, but his sermons about the sanctity of tradition and 
about human nature, which yearns after tradition, will live eternally, even if 
his name should be forgotten. To once more take up his doctrine against the 
[radical] party is far more than a victory: it is a step forward for all of 
mankind.65  
Conservatives were those who appreciated, like Burke, that the principle of stability is just as 
necessary in modern societies as that of reform. Though he denied Burke an intellectual 
progeny, Quabbe conceded that Burke’s deference to establishment had inspired subsequent 
generations of conservatives to adopt a similar posture of moderation. The protagonists of 
Tar a Ri were both German and British: they included not only Möser, Müller, Haller, and 
Stahl, but Bolingbroke, Burke, Disraeli and Peel. Just as these men protected their societies 
from destructive change, he intimated, the duty of Weimar conservatives was to stabilize the 
republican constitution they had inherited. Tar a Ri was an exhortation to modesty, a call for 
Quabbe’s peers to recognize partisan calls for a revival of the Reich as a revolutionary – and 
therefore anti-conservative – doctrine. 
 Quabbe thought it necessary to decouple Burke and reaction precisely because so 
many of his right-wing contemporaries were intent on uniting them. During the Third Reich’s 
rise to power, Burke and his Romantik admirers became fertile ground for Nazi historians of 
political thought, who depicted their own ideology as the incarnation of the Romantic dream 
of a post-Enlightened world. Such appropriations – often from quite prominent ideologues 
like Richard Benz and Walther Linden – tarnished the reputation of Burke’s German 
disciples for decades after the war.66 This process ensnared Burke himself as well. In an 
essay on ‘Das konservative Welt- und Staatsbild Edmund Burkes’ (1934), the Anglicst Harro 
de Wet Jensen went so far as to describe Burke and Hitler’s politics as ‘essentially’ the 
same.67 This research was carried out during the Nazi’s rise to power, and while Jensen 
himself was in the process of joining the SS.68 ‘It goes without saying,’ he admitted in his 
preface, ‘that the following study has been deeply shaped and informed by the ideological 
                                               
65 Ibid., p. 188. Quabbe’s understanding of Burke was gleaned primarily from his reading of Morley’s 
biography; see ibid., pp. 49-50. 
66 Richard Benz, Die deutsche Romantik: Geschichte einer geistige Bewegung (1937), 2nd ed. 
(Leipzig: Phillip, 1940), which described Romanticism as a ‘prototype for every German rebirth and 
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67 Harro de Wet Jensen, ‘Das Konservative Welt- und Staatsbild Edmund Burkes’, Anglia: Zeitschrift 
für englische Philologie, vol. 58 (1934): pp. 155–291, at p. 161. 
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am Main: Klostermann, 2003), pp. 474-5. 
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and political contests of recent years.’69 But this would have been obvious without the 
warning: in Jensen, Burke appeared as positively contemporary. ‘One of the vanquishers of 
the English Enlightenment’, Burke was presented as a precursor of the pagan naturalism that 
Jensen admired in the Nazis.70 The intrinsic ‘unity’ of conservatism, he argued, rested on 
Burke’s deference to a ‘natural order’ that undergirds and structures reality. ‘With Burke’, he 
wrote, ‘it is always a question of bonds, of bonded-ness: man is bound to the divine, to the 
world of “nature”, to the world of morals ‹des Sittlichen›, to the world of politics and 
community – namely through religious bonds, through spiritual-moral ones, and through ties 
of blood, respectively.’71 In political terms, this naturalism made Burke a defender of 
hierarchy, authority, and nationality, just like the fascists of Jensen’s day:  
The political thought of Moeller van der Bruck and of Hitler frequently 
converges quite closely upon Burke’s own principles – despite the fact that in 
many respects they go even further than him, deepening and developing [his 
principles].72  
Burke’s quasi-pagan organicism brought him into alignment with a spiritual community of 
Anglo-Germanic conservatives that spanned time and space, among whom Jensen included 
‘Goethe, Moeller van der Bruck and Hitler, Shakespeare, Burke, and Galsworthy’.73 
 The more influential case for Burke as a forerunner of German authoritarianism was 
published much earlier, in Carl Schmitt’s polemical critique of Politische Romantik (1919).74 
In this essay, Schmitt’s primary aim was to replace Meinecke’s reason-history opposition 
with his own opposition between morality and ‘the political’. Burke, Schmitt argued, was 
praiseworthy not because he defended tradition, but because he rightly rejected the 
moralizing Aufklärung as intrinsically unpolitical. In order to elicit a conservative tradition 
out of this reading of Burke, Schmitt was forced to expel Müller and Schlegel from the 
existing canon of German Burkeans, giving pride of place instead to Gentz. This involved 
distinguishing Burke, Gentz, and counter-revolution on the one hand, from ‘political 
Romanticism’ on the other. Far from a renunciation of the Enlightenment, Schmitt painted 
Müller’s Romanticism as a straightforward extension of its moralizing and utopian escapism: 
Müller’s ‘conservatism’ was colored by an idealized nostalgia for the Middle Ages that was 
just as politically subversive as the Jacobins he claimed to oppose. (In fact, it was even more 
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72 Ibid., p. 161. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik (1919), trans. as Political Romanticism by Guy Oakes, 2nd ed. 
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pathetic, because he was too cowardly to act on his ideals.) According to Schmitt, ‘men like 
Burke, de Maistre and Bonald cannot be unthinkingly placed in the same category of political 
thought ‹politischer Geistigkeit› as Adam Müller and Friedrich Schlegel’.75 The latter were 
no more than ‘bourgeois literati’, pseudo-conservatives who were infected by a vicious strain 
of ‘subjective occasionalism’ which turned politics into a question of taste, rather than a 
contest of authority.76 In this, Müller could not have been further from Burke. Whereas 
Müller turned to an abstract, imagined ‘tradition’ to escape from politics, Burke’s 
traditionalism was an attempt to protect the concrete institutions of the British Constitution 
from its moralizing critics. According to Schmitt it was not Müller but Gentz – ‘his rational 
clarity of thought, his practical and dispassionate sensibility, his capacity for legal argument, 
his sense of the limits of state-power’ – who had the more plausible claim to Burke’s 
mantle.77 Not Romantic paeans to some lost Germanic ancien régime, but a sober grasp of 
politics as such, was the true alternative to Enlightenment to be found in the Reflections. ‘An 
emotion that does not transcend the limits of the subjective cannot be the foundation of a 
community.’78 
In context, Schmitt’s broadside against Romanticism was intended as a challenge to 
his coreligionists on the Catholic Right, many of whom saw Müller as the visionary of a 
corporatist ‘third way’ between liberal republicanism on the one hand, and the extremes of 
Bolshevism or fascism on the other.79 In undercutting Müller, Schmitt was trying to force a 
choice between these three concrete alternatives. As he noted in the second edition of 
Politische Romantik (1925), his argument – his criticisms of Müller in particular – had 
incited a heated series of ripostes.80 These often came from Müller’s Catholic admirers, who 
insisted that he did, in fact, represent a philosophical extension of Burke’s counter-
revolution.81 In making this argument, these Müller-defenders were attempting to preserve 
the viability of a non-liberal, yet non-fascist (or at least non-Nazi) conservatism. When 
Müller’s Schriften zur Staatsphilosophie were published in 1923, the German-Polish 
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theologian, and later anti-Nazi dissident, Erich Przywara prefaced it with the following 
endorsement: 
Adam Müller’s Christian philosophy of the state … has the extremely timely 
vocation of reminding our present age, drunk on an ancient pagan nationalism, 
that Christ’s salvation and the example of his life are relevant to all human 
and humane pursuits, and that we must not allow a privatized Christianity to 
exist alongside Paganism in the public sphere…: ‘for there is neither Jew nor 
Greek, neither slave nor free, neither man nor woman; for you are all one in 
Jesus Christ.’82  
Müller was attractive to Przywara, in other words, precisely because he located the state 
within the moral architecture of a theologically-ordered universe. His vision of politics thus 
offered an antidote to the confusion of Przywara’s own time, and encouragement in the face 
of the Weimar Right’s ‘pagan nationalism’.  
Müller’s credentials as a Burkean were passionately defended by corporatists of a 
non-Catholic (or nominally Catholic) stripe as well. In the Weimar academy, his most 
prominent defenders came from the so-called Spannkreis at the University of Vienna. Their 
leader, Othmar Spann, admired Müller because his politics seemed congenial to Spann’s own 
‘universalism’, a metaphysical project that took its inspiration from Schelling, and which 
Spann developed in the context of his debates with Hans Kelsen and Vienna’s legal 
formalists.83 Müller figured briefly in Spann’s Der Wahre Staat (1921) as a precursor to 
Spann’s own anti-capitalism – ‘the dragon-slayer of Smithianism’.84 But it was primarily 
Spann’s student, Jakob Baxa, who was responsible for reviving Müller’s Burkean credentials 
in the wake of Schmitt’s polemic.85 In his Einführung in die romantische Staatswissenschaft 
(1923), Baxa cast Burke as a Christ-figure, a messiah who redeemed the Germans from 
Enlightenment and awakened their Romantic genius; and Müller, as the custodian of Burke’s 
testament: 
Edmund Burke’s writings became nothing less than a political gospel 
‹politisches Evangelium› for the German Romantics, and in particular for 
Adam Müller, who again and again pointed to this great Englishman as his 
political inspiration. The portrait of Burke that Müller sketched in his writings 
is unsurpassable; Burke’s character was truly reflected in the spirit of his 
works, a spirit that was so close to Müller’s own. ‘Oh, read Burke!’ he cried to 
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his contemporaries who, lacking their own great ideas, peered towards distant 
lands in the hopes of importing them from afar. But they did not heed Müller’s 
appeal, instead holding fast to the French and to Adam Smith. For them, 
Burke’s truly Germanic spirit ‹warhhaft germanischer Geist› remained a 
testament closed with seven seals. 86 
In sharp contrast to Schmitt, in other words, Baxa insisted that Müller represented the 
perfection of Burke’s conservatism. The ‘politische Romantik’, he explained elsewhere, was 
comprised of three primary ingredients: ‘Fichtian idealism, and his organicist view of the 
state; Schelling’s Naturphilosophie, and his advancement and refinement of the organic 
principle; and the political ideas of Burke, who defended the old feudal-state ‹Feudalstaat› 
and its aristocratic constitution as the only possible alternative to the representative-state of 
modern democrats’. Müller’s achievement was to combine these three elements into a 
‘glorious edifice’, a strategy for how the Burkean spirit of medieval feudalism could be 
revived in the form of the post-liberal, corporatist state.87 For Baxa, Müller’s Elemente der 
Staatskunst were no less than ‘a masterpiece whose greatness can be compared to that of 
Plato’s Republic.’ The only Kultur to have rivalled the ancient Greeks were the German 
Romantics, he reasoned; and just as the Republic was the emblem of ancient political 
greatness, his Elemente were the highest expression of Romantic politics.88 In context, this 
claim was not especially eccentric. In a speech to a group of American academics in 1940, 
for instance, the expatriated political economist Goetz Briefs made precisely the same point:  
Edmund Burke had played the role of an awakener to Gentz and Friedrich 
Schlegel; he became a prophet to Adam Müller. The conservatism of the great 
Irish statesman and writer underwent in the work of Müller a translation into 
the intellectual and sentimental vernacular of Romanticism. Out of this 
general situation there arose the new phase which we may call political and 
economic Romanticism.89 
From this Burkean moment, Müller’s Elemente emerged as ‘the climax of political and 
economic thought within the Romantic movement.’90 
 Whether or not one accepts the wider thesis of Mohler’s Konservative Revolution, he 
was certainly correct to argue that Nazism’s eventual ascendance over rival ideologies has 
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made it difficult to recapture the diversity of these interwar debates over the meaning of 
conservatism. Their internal logic only becomes clear in light of the thesis of Braune’s Burke 
in Deutschland. If, as she claimed, Burke’s critique of Enlightenment had been polished, 
refined, and perfected in the nineteenth century – if the German tradition stood as a definitive 
retort to a moribund liberal tradition, embodied by France in the 1790s and the Anglo-
American world in the 1920s – then the shape of this tradition mattered immensely. In 
assembling different genealogies of Burke’s legacy, Weimar historians of political thought 
were proposing divergent visions of Germany’s future. But beneath their ideological 
disagreements lay the more basic assumption that, thanks to Burke, Germany held forth the 
promise of a post-Enlightened politics. Mannheim was simply giving voice to this 
widespread assumption when he claimed that ‘Germany achieved for the ideology of 
conservatism what France did for the Enlightenment – she exploited it to the full extent of its 
logical conclusions.’91 
 
 IV. Postwar Afterlives 
One might have thought that the rise of Nazism, Germany’s defeat in WWII, and subsequent 
revelations about its wartime enormities would have dealt a blow to Meinecke’s teleological 
Burke-to-Bismarck story. But they did not. Instead, the basic structure of his Weltbürgertum 
remained robust, and indeed metastasized beyond Germany’s borders in the decades after 
1945. Postwar scholars did not repudiate his story, but repackaged it: instead of dismissing 
the grand metanarrative of a German-Burkean reflux against Aufklärung, they reassessed its 
implications. This process of moral revaluation became a major preoccupation for the wave 
of young émigré scholars who had migrated to the Anglo-American academy in the ’30s, 
bringing these interwar debates about Burke’s legacy with them. Likewise, for scholars back 
in Germany, Meinecke’s narrative offered a way to come to grips with the origins of Cold 
War totalitarianism. 
Key variables in his story were of course destabilized, forcing scholars to adapt. On 
the one hand, as the reputation of German conservatism fell into disrepute, the Burkean 
canon that interwar scholars had so vigorously contested became toxic. Müller and the 
politische Romantik fared especially poorly after the war; and indeed, his reputation has not 
really recovered since.92 Efforts to redeem Gentz began earlier and had more success. During 
                                               
91 Mannheim, ‘Das konservative Denken’, p. 268. 
92 In the 1960s German literary scholars attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to de-toxify his reputation 
by publishing a compendium of Müller’s ‘non-political’ writings: see Müller, Kritische, ästhetische 
und philosophische Schriften, ed. Walter Schroeder and Werner Siebert, 2 vols. (Berlin: Luchterhand, 
1967). 
Chapter 2: Das Edmund Burke-Problem 
	 39 
the War, Golo Mann wrote a biography of Gentz while in exile, in which he tried to vindicate 
Gentz as a cosmopolitan ‘realist’ avant la lettre, and in which Gentz’s journalistic campaign 
against Napoleon figured as a not-so-subtle parallel to the Mann family’s own literary war 
against Hitler.93 Hannah Arendt, similarly, defended Gentz as the representative of a 
conservative strain of Prussian liberalism.94 Yet his close association with such reactionaries 
as Burke, Müller, Metternich, and Schlegel worked against their untimely efforts to burnish 
his anti-fascist bona fides. Like the other luminaries of the Restoration, he remained deeply 
suspect to postwar historians.  
Second, as John Robertson has recently observed, the Aufklärung against which pre-
war scholars situated these German Burkeans was also subjected to scholarly scrutiny in the 
late ’40s and ’50s, and eventually fractured along disciplinary lines.95 Postwar historians, on 
the one hand, began to position Enlightenment as the origin of a better, more humane past for 
Europe. Led by the Italian antifascist Franco Venturi, they discovered a pan-European 
network of men of letters, moral philosophers, religious reformers, and cosmopolitan 
statesmen, all committed to the joint project of bettering man’s earthly prospects.96 In this 
schema, Enlightenment was no longer the pathological past from which Europe needed to 
escape, but a necessary anchor to keep it from drifting back into horrors of Nazism. 
Continental philosophers, on the other hand, remained dubious. For this rival cohort of 
scholars, many of whom were the direct descendants of Burke’s interwar adulators – Reinhart 
Koselleck, for instance (a student of Schmitt), Eric Voegelin (a student of Spann), Leo 
Strauss (an interlocutor of Schmitt and Meinecke) – careful diagnosis of the Enlightenment’s 
inner contradictions remained a central preoccupation after the war, a way of wrestling with 
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the origins of a modernity gone badly wrong. Meinecke’s critique of an ahistorical and 
totalizing eighteenth century retained much of its potency for these thinkers, who repurposed 
it not only as a genealogy of the French Terror, but of the more recent terrors of Nazism and 
Stalinism. The most famous instance of this critique, of course, was Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s Dialektik der Aufklärung (1944; 2nd ed. 1947), which argued that eighteenth-
century rationalism had in fact exacerbated the very same relations of domination that the 
French philosophes claimed to have overcome.97 But such postwar criticisms did not emanate 
only from the Marxian Left; they remained vital on the German Right as well.  
Postwar scholars responded to these shifting contexts in two distinct ways, a 
bifurcation that roughly paralleled this split between ‘historical’ and ‘philosophical’ views of 
Enlightenment. While more philosophically-inclined historians – that is, those disposed 
toward a skeptical view – continued to indict the eighteenth century, the claim that the 
Germans had theorized a Burkean alternative to Enlightenment simply evaporated. Rather 
than confidently situating the nineteenth century as a solution to the eighteenth, this 
generation of scholars reconciled itself to a negative, apophatic critique. In Koselleck’s Kritik 
und Krise (1959), for instance, readers encountered a story about the ‘pathogenesis’ of 
modern politics that closely tracked Schmitt’s.98 Beginning with the post-Reformation 
cleavage of morality and politics, Koselleck explained how the philosophes – cloistered away 
in their unpolitical salons, coffeehouses, and masonic lodges – had crafted a moralizing 
critique of the state that was subversive, utopian, and totalizing, which ultimately swallowed 
up French politics in 1789, and which lay at the root of the grand ideologies of the mid-
twentieth century.99 In its presentation of the eighteenth century, Koselleck’s narrative was 
no more than an explication of the Schmittian dichotomy between politics and morals. What 
was different about Kritik und Krise, however, was that Koselleck cut off his story abruptly 
with the Revolution, omitting all the anti-revolutionary figures – Maistre, Bonald, Gentz, and 
Burke – whom Schmitt had earlier posited as the necessary antidotes to Enlightened 
moralism. He wrote as if the nineteenth century never happened. 
 Similarly, Eric Voegelin spent the 1950s arguing that modern totalitarianism needed 
to be understood as a recrudescence of the ancient heresy of gnosticism, and that 
Aufklärung’s motive principle had been the drive for gnostic wisdom. Like Spann, Voegelin 
believed that a religious yearning for transcendence was intrinsic to human nature, and that 
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the secularization of Western societies in the early-modern period had led men to project this 
religious need into the temporal, mundane realm of politics – in effect, to attempt to achieve 
religious salvation through political-technocratic means. In his New Science of Politics 
lectures at the University of Chicago (1951), and in his Wissenschaft, Politik, Gnosis lectures 
as the University of Munich (which he delivered upon his inauguration as its first post-Nazi 
chair of political science in 1958), he attempted to set out a diagnosis of this 
‘pneumopathology’, the spiritual sickness that seduced men into confusing religion and 
politics.100 Unlike Spann, however, Voegelin was reticent to locate an antidote to this disease 
in Schelling, Müller, or the German Romantik. In fact, he saw Spann’s universalism as itself 
a kind of Spinozist gnosticism, and rejected the radical Austro-fascism that it underpinned. 
Where the liberals of the eighteenth century idolized the autonomous self, Spann had simply 
deified the national collective.101 
A more sophisticated riff on Meinecke’s tune was provided in Strauss’s Natural Right 
and History lectures (1949).102 While he endorsed the idea that the Reflections was Burke’s 
historicizing turn away from eighteenth-century liberalism and the rationalism that grounded 
it, Strauss denied that Burke represented a solution to the crisis of ‘modern natural right’. 
Unlike the liberty of the ancients, he believed that modern liberty was intrinsically unstable 
because it was not rooted in a transcendent account of human nature (either theological or 
philosophical). Instead, Strauss saw post-Machiavellian freedom as essentially egoistic, 
rationalized through a this-worldly appeal to self-preservation and utility. This constructivist 
position was open to the charge of relativism, and as a result – because it did not have access 
to a transcendent account of right – it was unable to counter the Rousseau’s suspicion that 
modern liberty was in fact slavery. The collapse of modern natural law in the French 
Revolution could have been countered, Strauss averred, through a ‘return to the premodern 
conception of natural right’. But this was not Burke’s position. While the Reflections did 
attempt to shore up the divorce between right and nature by invoking such classical virtues as 
chivalry, patriotism, piety, and honor, it was not an adequate response to the crisis at hand.103 
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According to Strauss, Burke ‘parts company with the Aristotelian tradition by disparaging 
theory and especially metaphysics’. Rather than answering the threat of relativism by turning 
to the normative realism of the ancients, Burke altogether rejected attempts to define an 
ahistorical standard of justice. ‘It is only a short step from this thought of Burke to the 
supersession of the distinction between good and bad by the distinction between the 
progressive and the retrograde or between what is and what is not in harmony with the 
historical process.’ In Burke ‘what would appear as a return to the primeval equation of the 
good with the ancestral is, in fact, a preparation for Hegel.’104 With this subtle barb, Strauss 
was claiming that prewar scholars were wrong to think that Burke had fundamentally rejected 
the eighteenth century. In ratifying the idea that modern politics could not and indeed should 
not be ‘metaphysical’, he merely exacerbated the aversion to transcendence that was already 
present in Hobbes, and which would eventually culminate in Nietzschean nihilism and the 
German catastrophe. 
Postwar historians – those who, like Venturi, were more sanguine about 
Enlightenment – found a very different way to deal with Meinecke. Rather than splicing his 
story and leaving out its latter half, they simply inverted its normative thrust. They continued 
to insist that Burke was (in the words of one Weimar scholar) ‘the origin of that enmity 
towards reason that we find in later Romantics’.105 But whereas prewar scholars celebrated 
Burke as the progenitor of a German post-Enlightenment, postwar historians implicated him 
in the rise of what was now re-described as ‘the counter-Enlightenment’, a historical category 
with a suspicious moral pedigree. The most conspicuous exponent of this view was Isaiah 
Berlin. In a series of influential essays from the 1960s and ’70s, he effectively reproduced the 
logic of Meinecke’s Historicism, but turned its moral implications on their head.106 Just as 
Meinecke contrasted the ‘negative’ historiography of the eighteenth century and the 
‘positive’ historicism of the nineteenth, Berlin painted an image of ‘counter-Enlightenment’ 
that was riven in two. His essays situated the early counter-Enlightenment of Möser, Herder, 
and Vico – whom he applauded for their cosmopolitan appreciation of historical diversity – 
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against the post-revolutionary counter-Enlightenment of Burke, Maistre, Bonald, Haller, 
Schlegel and Müller. Berlin presented the former as the font of a liberalism that was 
pluralistic, tolerant, and open to difference, and which was therefore a healthy corrective to 
the totalizing tendencies of eighteenth-century thought.107 But the latter, he suggested, was 
the cradle of a dark, reactionary illiberalism. What began as a salutary celebration of variety 
was eventually diverted into a chauvinistic form of ethno-nationalism. Crucially, for Berlin as 
for Meinecke, Burke remained the pivotal figure in the transition from the former to the 
latter. Burke’s Reflections, in Berlin’s view, was animated by his ‘resistance to attempts at a 
rational reorganization of society in the name of universal moral and intellectual ideals’ – an 
‘onslaught on the principles of the French revolutionaries’ which, anticipating ‘later 
romantic, vitalistic, intuitionist and irrationalist writers’, ‘stresses the value of the individual, 
the peculiar, the impalpable, and appeals to ancient historical roots and immemorial custom, 
to the wisdom of simple, study peasants uncorrupted by the sophistries of subtle “reasoners”’ 
and which therefore ‘has strongly conservative and, indeed, reactionary implications’.108 
Having forsaken the security of eighteenth-century moral universals, Burke opened the door 
for German counter-revolution that was not only counter- but anti-Enlightenment, one hostile 
to the cause of liberty and pluralism. In the postwar era, as Enlightenment emerged as a 
bulwark against the racism and authoritarianism that nearly destroyed Europe, Burke and his 
students’ repudiation of it came to seem tragically misguided at best, and positively immoral 
at worst. 
 This same upending of Meinecke’s thesis structured Klaus Epstein’s Genesis of 
German Conservatism (1966) as well, still the leading English-language work on the 
subject.109 Though far better researched than Berlin’s essays, Epstein arrived at the same 
conclusions (albeit using a different terminology to articulate them). Conservatism, he 
argued, arose as an attempt to protect Germany’s ‘traditional’ civil and ecclesial 
establishments against the critique leveled at them by the revolutionary ‘Party of Movement’ 
that aspired ‘to transform society in a secular, egalitarian, and self-governing direction’.110 
Epstein described Burke (somewhat predictably) as the ‘ideal type’ of conservatism, and 
maintained that Burke set out ‘almost all the elements of the central Conservative case in his 
Reflections on the Revolution in France’.111 Yet his thorough researches allowed Epstein to 
                                               
107 On Berlin and Marxism see Duncan Kelly, ‘The Political Thought of Isaiah Berlin’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, vol. 4, no. 1 (2002): pp. 29-45. 
108 Berlin, ‘Counter-Enlightenment’, pp. 256-7. 
109 Klaus Epstein, The Genesis of German Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1966), pp. 315-16. 
110 Ibid., p. 5. 
111 Ibid., p. 13. 
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nuance earlier accounts of conservatism’s rise as well. First, he introduced a new a system for 
classifying types of conservatives – ‘status quo’, ‘reform’, and ‘reactionary conservatives’. 
All of these groups shared Burke’s aversion to radical change, but differed over how to 
combat it most effectively.112 Epstein admired Rehberg as an exponent of the reformist 
school, but had little sympathy for the other two: ‘status quo’ conservatives appeared 
obstinate and boorish; ‘reactionaries’, as malevolent and spiteful.113 Second, echoing Fritz 
Valjavec, he claimed that recognizable strains of German conservatism could be observed in 
the years before Burke’s Reflections.114  Formulated in response to the growing political 
influence of aufgeklärt rationalism, secularism, and standardization, this pre-revolutionary 
ideology was epitomized in the writings of Justus Möser, whose Osnabrückische Geschichte 
(1768, 1780) seemed to Epstein a proto-Burkean defense of the ‘Lokalvernunft’ of the 
customs and traditional constitution of his native Osnabrück.115 Yet in the final analysis, 
Möser was only a precursor of the ‘conscious’ conservatism that Burke fully articulated. 
Though this argument was less polemically stated than Berlin’s – and though his history did 
not cover the rise of Romanticism and Restorationism116 – his opposition to the conservatism 
that his Weimar precursors fêted was nonetheless perceptible. As Jacques Droz observed, 
‘Epstein presents a Germany which, at the dawn of the contemporary epoch and at a moment 
when the great options were taking form, in some manner closed in upon herself again and 
defined her own values in opposition to the Western world.’117 Standing on the far side of the 
German catastrophe – one which had forced Epstein into exile in America – it was difficult 
for him not to see this Sonderweg in a tragic light. 
 The one-dimensional picture of Enlightenment that Berlin and Epstein held is no 
longer tenable due to a wave of scholarship in the 1970s and ’80s dedicated to pluralizing the 
concept.118 In recent years, Burke scholars have brought into question his traditional 
                                               
112 For a more theoretically-sophisticated modification of Epstein’s typology, see Jörn Garber, ‘Drei 
Theoriemodelle frühkonservativer Revolutionsabwehr: Altständischer Funktionalismus, 
spätabsolutistisches Vernunftrecht, evolutionärer “Historismus”’, Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche 
Geschichte, vol. 8 (1979): pp. 65-101. 
113 For Epstein on Rehberg, see his Genesis, ch. 11. 
114 Fritz Valjavec, Die Entstehung der politischen Strömungen in Deutschland, 1770–1815 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1951); cf. Epstein, Genesis, p. 65. I owe this point to Richard Bourke, ‘War Edmund 
Burke ein Konservativer? Notizen zum Begriff des Konservatismus’, Leviathan, vol. 44., no. 1 
(2016): pp. 65-96, at p. 82. 
115 See Epstein, Genesis, ch. 6.  
116 Before his untimely death in 1967, Epstein had planned a sequel to Genesis of German 
Conservatism.  
117 Jacques Droz, review of Epstein, Genesis, in Central European History, vol. 2, no. 2 (June, 1969): 
pp. 177-180, at p. 179.  
118 For this process of pluralization, see John Robertson, The Case for The Enlightenment: Scotland 
and Naples 1680–1760 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2005), ch. 1; for an audacious 
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association with conservatism.119 Yet with a few notable exceptions, this revisionist 
scholarship has yet to penetrate the historiography of his German reception.120 Epstein’s neo-
Meineckean thesis continues to cast a pall on the field. Sometimes its influence is overt – as 
when, for instance, Zeev Sternhell’s The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition denounced Burke 
(along with Herder) as ‘one of the originators of nationalism’, and his German students as the 
precursors of fascism.121 But more often its influence is subtle, evident in the staying-power 
of Meinecke’s heuristic binaries: progress and conservatism, reason and tradition, Aufklärung 
and Romantik. Dieter Henrich’s revival of the theory-praxis controversy of 1793, for 
instance, straightforwardly presented this debate as a contest between Enlightenment and its 
detractors, juxtaposing Kant, reine Vernunft, and the rights of man on the one hand, against 
Gentz and Rehberg’s illiberal conservatism on the other.122 More recently, Reidar Maliks 
reproduced this opposition in his history of Kant’s Politics in Context.123 Maliks presents 
Kant as a principled liberal, embattled throughout the 1790s by a coterie of ‘conservative 
critics’ who, inspired by Burke, ‘challenged [Kant’s] egalitarian concept of freedom and the 
very idea that principles should dictate politics.’ Instead, they ‘defended the existing order, 
partly because they were afraid of social chaos and partly because they were convinced that 
moral values grow out of tradition and convention.’124 Perhaps most influentially, Frederick 
Beiser has presented Burke as a ‘conservative’ committed to the cause of ‘tradition’, whose 
impact on German thought generally, and on Gentz especially, was largely malign.125 Though 
he has distanced himself from Epstein’s claim that Burke was ‘the father of German 
                                               
attempt to preserve Meinecke’s prewar Aufklärung, see Jonathan Israel, Radical Enlightenment 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Enlightenment Contested (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), and Democratic Enlightenment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
119 See, seminally, Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution: The Political Life of Edmund Burke 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). 
120 Aside from Bourke, ‘Konservatismus’, cf. László Kontler, ‘Varieties of Old Regime Europe: 
Thoughts and Details on the Reception of Burke’s Reflections in Germany’, in Burke in Europe, pp. 
313-329. Already in 1986, Jonathan Knusden was pointing to flaws in the traditional interpretation of 
Möser as proto-Burkean: see his Justus Möser and the German Enlightenment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986). See, more recently, Raphaël Cahen, Friedrich Gentz: Penseur 
post-Lumières et acteur du nouvel ordre européen (PhD diss., Ais-Marseille Université, 2014). 
121 Zeev Sternhell, The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition (2006), trans. David Maisel (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2009), p. 26. 
122 Dieter Henrich, ‘Einleitung’ to Kant, Gentz, Rehberg: Über Theorie und Praxis (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1967), pp. 7-38, at p. 21. 
123 Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), esp. pp. 39-79. 
124 Ibid., pp. 55, 60.  
125 See Frederick Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German 
Political Thought, 1790-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 281-334, esp. p. 
326; cf. also his essay, co-authored with Pamela Edwards, on ‘Philosophical Responses to the French 
Revolution’ in The Cambridge History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Allen Wood and 
Songsuk Susan Hahn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 601-622, esp. 601-611. 
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conservatism’, this is less an attempt to exonerate Burke than an effort to insulate Germany’s 
impressively philosophical political theorists from what Beiser considers to be Burke’s vapid 
anti-intellectualism.126 
Postwar studies of Burke’s individual students – Rehberg, Gentz, Müller – have 
tended to reinforce Meinecke’s paradigm as well. Even while adding nuance to the Weimar 
scholarship, they have generally continued describing these Burkeans as the progenitors of a 
counter-attack against Aufklärung. The best postwar biography on Rehberg, for instance, 
presents him as a proto-historicist who, out of an innate aversion to Kantian rationalism, 
theorized an elaborate ‘conservatism’ in which ‘tradition’ was the necessary mediating agent 
between theory and praxis.127 Likewise, in his valiant and solitary attempt to resuscitate 
Müller’s reputation, Benedikt Koehler was ultimately forced to fall back onto the contrast 
between mechanism and organicism: the ‘nervus rerum’ of the Müller’s Elemente, he 
suggested, lay in its attempt to counteract eighteenth-century listlessness through an 
‘aesthetic politics’ in which medieval Germania was presented not so much a blueprint for 
political reform as a quasi-religious icon, one which could revive and enliven the fractured 
German lands.128 And while postwar Gentz scholarship has become more robust, his 
affiliation with conservatism is still persistent. There is considerable debate today about when 
he renounced his youthful, principled liberalism for the counter-Enlightened politics of his 
later years – some scholars point to his confrontation with Burke’s Reflections as the moment 
of conversion, while others date it later, after his move to Vienna in 1801 – but that he 
renounced Aufklärung sooner or later has been largely accepted.129 This assumption permits 
                                               
126 Ibid., p. 288; cf. ibid., p. 317 (the Reflections as a piece of ‘righteousness, pomp, [and] spleen’). 
127 Ursula Vogel, Konservative Kritik an der bürgerlichen Revolution (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 
1972); cf. the discussion of Rehberg and Burke at pp. 95-107.  
128 Koehler, Aesthetik der Politik, esp. pp. 28-31, 81-113. Cf. Hans-Christoph Kraus, ‘Die politische 
Romantik in Wien: Friedrich Schlegel und Adam Müller’, in Konservativismus in Österreich, ed. 
Robert Rill and Ulrich Zellenberg (Graz: Stocker, 1999), pp. 35-70, which confirms Müller as an 
apologist of Habsburg-Catholic Restorationism. 
129 Kontler, e.g., argues for a liberal reading of Gentz’s Reflections, echoing Günther Kronenbitter’s 
suggestion that Gentz’s conservatism developed slowly over the 1790s and early 1800s: see Kontler 
‘Old Regime Europe’; and Kronenbitter, Wort und Macht: Friedrich Gentz als politischer 
Schriftsteller (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994). The earlier studies Theresa Dietrich and Philip 
Pirler present a more abrupt volte-face: see her Ideologie der Gegenrevolution: Ursprünge 
konservativen Denkens bei Friedrich Gentz, 1789-1794 (PhD diss., Humboldt University, 1989), esp. 
pp. 57-131, and his Friedrich von Gentzens Auseinandersetzung mit Immanuel Kant, (PdD diss., 
Ludwig-Maximilian University Munich, 1980), pp. 17-70. Cf. also Theresa Dietrich, ‘Das Konzept 
einere “wahren” Politik des Friedrich Gentz’, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 38 (1990): pp. 
346-353. For a tendentious portrait of Gentz as a Romantic Restorationist, see John Whiton, 
‘Friedrich Gentz and the Reception of Edmund Burke in post-revolutionary Germany’, German Life 
and Letters, vol. 36, no. 4 (Oct., 1993): pp. 311-18. 
Gentz has also attracted significant interest as a pioneer of Öffentlichkeit in the revolutionary era: 
aside from Kronenbitter’s Wort und Macht, see Iwan Michelangelo-d’Aprile, Die Erfindung der 
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Harro Zimmerman, for instance, to credit Gentz with the ‘Erfindung der Realpolitik’ – the 




The basic assumption informing this scholarship – indeed, the entire literature on these 
German Burkeans, from Meinecke to today – is the same. The Reflections is presumed to 
have incited a backlash against Aufklärung which, in time, became the cornerstone of an 
exceptionally robust tradition of German conservatism. In the early-twentieth century, this 
story was recounted with optimism and pride; in the years since 1945, it has been viewed 
with far more suspicion. What has remained constant, however, is its linear determinism. 
Burke’s critique of rationalism, it is argued, posed a challenge to his students, an Edmund 
Burke-Problem: in a world where reason had come to threaten all of the inherited, pre-
rational traditions that order human life and give it meaning, how was it possible to centre a 
post-revolutionary politics? To put the question another way, once Germany’s collective 
‘moral imagination’ had been fractured by the politics of radical individualism, how could a 
vital centre be reconstituted? In the century since Braune’s Burke in Deutschland, historians 
of political thought have given effectively the same answer: it was the shared achievement 
(or, alternatively, the misfortune) of the German Burkeans to have resolved this question, 
extracting a viable politics from the Reflections and, by invoking ‘the higher powers in 
history’, planting it squarely within their own national tradition.131 
                                               
Zeitgeschichte: Geschichtsschreibung und Journalismus zwischen Aufklärung und Vormärz (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2013); as well as the proceedings of the conference ‘Virtuosen der Öffentlichkeit?: 
Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832) im globalen intellektuellen Kontext seiner Zeit’ (Cologne, March 
2015), available online at: http://www.historicum-estudies.net/epublished/virtuosen-der-
oeffentlichkeit/editorial. 
130 Harro Zimmermann, Friedrich von Gentz: Die Erfindung der Realpolitik (Munich: Ferdinand 
Schöningh, 2012). 










In the decades before Burke published his Reflections on the Revolution in France, his 
thought was of little interest to most German political writers.1 Those who were familiar with 
his career in Parliament would have thought of him as a talented orator, a critic of 
monarchical overreach, and a parliamentary apologist for American independence. But aside 
from newspaper summaries of his speeches and the reportage of the Parliamentary Register, 
their acquaintance with his principles was superficial at best.2 This was largely a matter of 
genre. Burke’s works drifted into Germany along with the quotidian political flotsam of 
elections held, motions filed, scandals uncovered.3  For Germans who encountered him in 
this context, it was not immediately obvious that Burke should be read as anything more than 
a practical politician. He seemed neither a constitutional analyst in the tradition of Coke, 
Blackstone, de Lolme, and Montesquieu, nor a philosopher of commercial society in the 
tradition of Ferguson, Hume, and Smith. With the notable exception of the Annual Register 
(1758-65) – portions of which were sold as sourcebooks on recent British history4 – none of 																																																								
1 The complex reception of Burke’s Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime 
and Beautiful (1756) – a decades-long engagement that included Lessing, Mendelsohn, Herder, and 
Kant, among others – lies beyond the scope of this study; here, it is sufficient to note that debates 
about Burke’s aesthetics did not substantially color the initial reception of his anti-revolutionary 
works. It was not until the early 1800s that the Jena Romantics began to read the Reflections vis-à-vis 
the Enquiry (for which, see Ch. 5 below). 
2 Brandes and Rehberg voiced precisely this complaint in their reviews of the Reflections: see 
[Brandes], review of Burke, Reflections, in Göttingsche Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen (26 Nov. 
1791): pp. 1897-1907, at p. 1898; [Rehberg], review of Burke, Reflections, in Allgemeine 
Literaturzeitung (4 Mar. 1791): pp. 561-6, at pp. 561-2, 566.  
3 See, e.g., Annalen der britischen Geschichte, ed. Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz, vol. 1 (1788), at 
pp. 31ff; cf. ibid., vol. 20 (1800), p. 17 for an index of the Annalen’s references to Burke from 1787 to 
1800. 
4 The Annual Register was in fact translated twice. The first edition – anonymously translated by the 
Danzig minister Samuel Wilhelm Turner as Edmund Burkes Jahrbücher der neueren Geschichte der 
englischen Pflanzungen in Nordamerika, 4 vols. (Danzig: Flörke, 1777-81), and marketed as a pre-
history of the American Revolution – was filled with voluminous editorial notes meant to clarify 
Burke’s history. As the Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek noted (see vol. 35 [1788]: pp. 539-40), the 
effect was rather the opposite. Turner repeatedly voiced doubts about whether Burke was the 
Register’s author (see ibid., vol. 1, preface; vol. 3, pp. 485-6); but as the reviewer in the Göttingische 
gelehrte Anzeigen wryly observed (Zugabe zu den Göttingischen anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen [13 
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Burke’s pre-revolutionary writings on politics were translated into German. Indeed, 
Germany’s literary journals and book reviews – a reliable guide to the country’s reading 
habits – rarely mentioned their publication.5 It was only after the appearance of the 
Reflections, in the wake of the explosive debates it provoked, that Burke’s German 
contemporaries began to recognize him as a philosophically astute theorist of modern 
politics. 
The exception to this rule was Hanover. In the half-century since George I assumed 
the British Crown, his homeland in the northwest corner of the Holy Roman Empire had 
become the German lands’ leading centre for intellectual, cultural, and economic exchange 
with the United Kingdom.6 Eighteenth-century Hanoverians developed a strong affinity for 
the English language and culture, which was reinforced by the belief that many of the habits, 
customs, and mœurs that distinguished Hanover from the other German territories were 
shared by their English cousins. They took no small pride in describing themselves as ‘halb-
Engländer’.7 Since its establishment in 1734, the Electorate’s leading university in Göttingen 
had become a vibrant hub for the study of British law and politics. By the latter eighteenth 
century, it contained the German world’s leading authorities on the subject, Ludwig 
Timotheus Spittler and August Ludwig Schlözer.8 But this Hanoverian interest in the British 
Constitution was not confined to Göttingen’s Law Faculty. Practicing civil servants such as 
Justus Möser, Ernst Brandes, and August Wilhelm Rehberg also boasted a formidable 
																																																								
June 1778]: pp. 369-372, at p. 369), this had not deterred him from putting Burke’s name in his title 
‘in order to entice buyers’. 
The second edition – Geschichte der neuesten Weltbegebenheiten im Großen, aus dem 
Englischen, [trans. Johann Lorenz Benzler, ed. Christian Wilhelm von Dohm], 16 vols. (Leipzig: 
Weygand, 1779-89) – was more prosaic. Dohm shared Turner’s reservations about authorship: in his 
preface, he reported the ‘rumor’ that Burke – ‘who revealed himself as a sharp-minded theorist of 
aesthetics in his treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful (which Herr Prof. Garve translated), and a 
talented defender of the parliamentary system in his speeches’ (vol. 1, unpaginated preface) – was the 
author, but could not corroborate it. (Only the first two volumes in this series, covering the years 1755 
to 1766, coincided with the period of Burke’s editorship of the Register [1759-65].) 
5 See Frieda Braune, Edmund Burke in Deutschland (Heidelberg: Winters, 1917), ch. 3.  
6 On Hanover’s relation to Britain, cf. Nick Harding, Hanover and the British Empire, 1700-1837 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 2007). 
7 ‘Here [in Göttingen] we are happily half-Englanders: not only in our dress, habits, and fashions, but 
also in our character’: see L.T. Spittler, ‘Vorrede des Verfassers’ to Geschichte des Fürstenthums 
Hannover seit den Zeiten der Reformation bis zu Ende des siebenzehnten Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek, 1786), in idem., Sämmtliche Werke, ed. Karl Wächter, 15 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1828-
37), vol. 7, at p. xvi. 
8 On Spittler and Schlözer, see Hans-Christof Kraus, Englische Verfassung und politisches Denken im 
Ancien Régime, 1689-1789 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2006), pp. 581-95. Cf. also Martin Peters, Altes 
Reich und Europa: Der Historiker, Statistiker und Publizist August Ludwig von Schlözer, 2nd ed. 
(Münster: Lit Verlag, 2005), pp. 273-80. 
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knowledge of the inner workings of the British state.9 These Hanoverians’ fascination with 
Britain’s exceptional, yet seemingly fragile, constitutional settlement led them to closely 
observe eighteenth-century debates about its origins, its current state of stability (or 
instability), and its prospects for its future. These debates, in turn, led them to Burke. 
It was from this context that the first major interpretation of the Reflections emerged. 
In late 1789, Germany’s widely-read Allgemeine Literaturzeitung commissioned August 
Wilhelm Rehberg, a 32-year-old civil servant in the Hanoverian government, to write a 
regular column reviewing books on ‘Staatswissenschaft’.10 With an eye to ongoing 
developments across the Rhine, Rehberg spent the next three years appraising all of the major 
pro- and anti-revolutionary works written in France, Britain, and Germany. At a time when 
optimism prevailed among German political writers, he was something of a contrarian. 
Immediately sympathetic to Burke, Rehberg turned his column into a stronghold of the 
German counter-revolution, and used it as a platform to defend Burke against the violent 
wave of criticism that arose in response to his Reflections. As France descended into violence 
in the early 1790s, German public opinion on the Revolution grew increasingly polarized. In 
this context, Rehberg’s Literaturzeitung column became immensely controversial. In January 
1793, the same month as Louis XVI’s execution, he released his Untersuchungen über den 
französischen Revolution, in which he sought to vindicate his anti-revolutionary position – 
and, by implication, Burke’s – by systematically explicating the basic principles which, he 
claimed, had informed his political judgments over the past three years.11 Rehberg’s 
Untersuchungen quickly became the definitive Hanoverian line on the Reflections, and yoked 
his reputation to Burke’s for the rest of his life. 
Largely as a result of this work’s success, Rehberg now enjoys an established position 
in the canon of revolutionary-era German political theorists. Typically, intellectual historians 
																																																								
9 For Möser and Brandes on Britain, see Kraus, Englische Verfassung, pp. 456-64, 603-616; for 
Rehberg, see Frederick Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 302-309; Ursula Vogel, Konservative Kritik an der bürgerlichen 
Revolution (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1972), pp. 95-8, 142-56, 203-212.  
Möser’s Osnabrück was not a permanent Hanoverian possession, but during the three decades of 
his administration (1768-94) the episcopate was under the control of the Hanoverian Duke of York. 
For this reason, Möser is often counted among the ‘Hanoverian Whigs’ (with Brandes, Rehberg and 
Spittler).  
10 For an index of works reviewed in this column, see Rehberg, Sämmtliche Schriften, 3 vols. 
(Hannover: Hahn, 1828-31), vol. 2, pp. 64-82. (The volumes of Rehberg’s Schriften are numbered 1, 
2, 4; a third was planned but never published.) 
11 Untersuchungen über die französische Revolution nebst kritischen Nachrichten von den 
merkwürdigsten Schriften welche darüber in Frankreich erscheinen sind, Von August Wilhelm 
Rehberg, 2 vols. (Hannover: Christian Ritscher, 1793). 
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have described his significance in terms of his ‘conservatism’.12 Under Burke’s influence, 
Rehberg is said to have set forward a skeptical critique of the revolutionaries’ liberal 
rationalism, their faith in the power of human reason to discern the conditions of a just 
society. According to Rehberg, such abstract moral criteria were dangerously indifferent to, 
and indeed militated against, those established traditions, customs and institutions which 
were the necessary conditions of political stability. Though he conceded that prudent, 
moderated reforms may sometimes be in order, his ultimate aim – according to the 
conventional interpretation – was the perpetuation of the socio-political status quo of pre-
revolutionary Germany. Scholars have therefore described him as a ‘reform conservative’ or, 
more boldly, ‘the founding father of German conservatism’.13  
 But ‘conservatism’ is an unhelpful label for making sense of Rehberg’s relation to 
Burke. Not only is it prone to prolepsis, it flatly contradicts his repeated insistence that the 
conservation of extant political institutions, merely because they exist, was morally 
indefensible. As Rehberg explained in his initial review of the Reflections, the ‘perpetuation 
of abuses’ ‹Verweigung der Misbräuche› was not justifiable, even if the abuses in question 
were ancient.14 Rather than wading into anachronistic debates about the character of his 
‘conservatism’, the following chapter seeks to resituate his reading of Burke within his 
original intellectual and social context. From his pre-revolutionary study of Hume’s Essays, 
Rehberg came to believe that moral skepticism, far from a threat to constitutional liberty (as 
his revolutionary critics charged), was a necessary condition of modern liberty. A cheerful 
agnosticism about essential questions of theology and philosophy, Hume had intimated, was 
necessary for a culture of free expression and religious toleration. In a free state, the 
certitudes of religious revelation or philosophical reason had to be displaced by the modest, 
opinion-based politics of ‘convention’. In a society governed by the rule of law, moral 
discourse would be rooted not in the dogmatic authority of clerics, but in the respect afforded 
																																																								
12 See Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism, pp. 302-309; Klaus Epstein, The Genesis 
of German Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 547-94; Dieter 
Henrich, ‘Einleitung’ to Kant, Gentz, Rehberg: Über Theorie und Praxis (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1967); Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
pp. 55-60; Vogel, Konservative Kritik, passim.  
13 Frederick Beiser, ‘August Wilhelm Rehberg’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (winter 2012), 
ed. Edward Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/august-rehberg/>. Strangely, 
Beiser has also cast Justus Möser in the same role: see Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism, p. 
288. 
14 [Rehberg], review of Burke, Reflections, p. 566. For the (facially implausible) suggestion that 
Burke’s thought was rooted in precisely such a commitment to the perpetuation of abuses (provided 
that such injustices were ‘prescriptive’), see Paul Lucas, ‘On Edmund Burke's Doctrine of 
Prescription; Or, an Appeal from the New to the Old Lawyers’, Historical Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 
(1968): pp. 35-63. 
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to secular institutions of government. Because such ‘conventions’ were historically 
contingent, they would be malleable; yet because they commanded shared deference, they 
would offer a stable foundation for political society.  
 When Rehberg came across the Reflections, it struck him as a defense of this strain of 
skeptical, historicist liberalism, in contradistinction to the self-assured pseudo-liberalism of 
the revolutionaries. Burke’s defense of the British Constitution, in his view, was an attempt 
to protect Britain’s irenic, moderate political culture from collapsing into the illiberal, 
essentializing dogmatism from which it had extricated itself in 1688. In Rehberg’s view, the 
rationalism of the revolutionaries was essentially similar to the dogmatism of Cromwell or 
the Stuart legitimists: it was an illiberal, inflexible moral system, clothed in the false garb of 
liberté. Over the coming years, he used Burke to warn his peers about the dangers of a 
politicized ‘metaphysics’, and to contend for a historicist alternative. Once we recognize that 
‘metaphysical concept[s] of liberty’ are chimerical, Rehberg argued, ‘we are forced onto the 
terrain of a totally different system, which grounds the whole civil constitution voluntarily 
‹willkürlich› in concrete principles, in conventions and contracts, and which, in contrast to 
any metaphysical system, can therefore be called the historical system.’15 In defending Burke 
against his critics, Rehberg was attempting to distinguish this second vision of Enlightenment 
from the revolutionaries’, and to keep open the possibility of a liberal, post-revolutionary 
future for his native Hanover. Whether this Humean agenda marred his interpretation of 
Burke is a good question, and one worth investigating in the pages that follow. Whether it 
was ‘conservative’ is not. 
 
II. Hanoverian contexts 
By the time Rehberg arrived to study at the University of Göttingen in 1774, it already had a 
reputation throughout central Europe for its distinct intellectual milieu. Aside from its 
English cultural tendencies, the university was known for its ‘philosophical’ (i.e. secular) 
culture of moral skepticism on the one hand, and for its historico-empirical approach to the 
study of politics on the other. These tendencies were mutually reinforcing. When Johann 
Jakob Moser designed the course of study for the Law Faculty in the 1740s, he conspicuously 
omitted Naturrecht from the curriculum. Rather than instructing students about the 
transcendent ground of Recht, Moser invited students to probe the positive evolution of the 
Holy Roman Empire’s interwoven and overlapping legal systems – German customary law 																																																								
15 [Rehberg], review of Paul Philippe Gudin de la Brenellerie, Supplément au Contrat social (Paris: 
Maradan and Perlet, 1791), in Alllgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (12 Sep. 1791): pp. 537-542, at p. 540, 
italics in orig. 
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and imperial Roman law – in order to describe what Recht is, rather than what it should be.16 
History thus came to serve as an ersatz form of jurisprudence, filling the normative space that 
was standardly dedicated to Leibniz, Wolff, Grotius, and Pufendorf.17  
Elevated to this privileged position, the discipline of history flourished in Göttingen. 
In a 1796 letter to Burke, Brandes (who served as the university’s rector from 1790 to 1810) 
proudly boasted that it was here, at his alma mater, that ‘the principal points which make 
modern history and its concomitant sciences interesting and valuable to the enlighten’d mind, 
were first shown in their true light.’18 By the eve of the Revolution, Hanover housed many of 
Germany’s most respected historians: not only British specialists like Spittler and Schlözer, 
but also classicists such as Arnold Hermann Ludwig Heeren and Christian Gottlob Heyne, 
medievalists like Johann Christoph Gatterer and Justus Möser, and legal historians such as 
Johann Stephan Pütter and Gustav Hugo.19 This older generation of historians exerted a 
decisive influence on Rehberg, both during his student years and afterwards. During his years 
as the Duke of York’s tutor in Osnabrück (1783-86), Rehberg later recalled, his close 
working relationship with the ‘Rath Möser’ gave him an invaluable understanding and 
appreciation of ‘the world of politics ‹die bürgerliche Welt› as it existed [in Hanover] before 
the Revolution’.20   
Thanks largely to the scholarship of J.G.A. Pocock, it is now widely acknowledged 
that the ideological warfare of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain was waged on the 
terrain of history.21 Whigs and Tories were divided not only – perhaps not even primarily – 
by their divergent theories of liberty, but by incompatible stories that they told about their 																																																								
16 For Moser and the Göttingen curriculum, see Michael Carhart, The Science of Culture in 
Enlightenment Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 52–63; for Moser’s 
skepticism, see Mack Walker, Johann Jacob Moser and Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1981), pp. 290-301. 
17 For the relation of philosophical skepticism, German liberties, and historiography in Moser’s 
thought, see Mack Walker, ‘Johann Jacob Moser’, in Aufklärung und Geschichte, ed. Hans Erich 
Bödeker et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1986), pp. 105-118. 
18 Brandes to Burke, 29 Oct. 1796, in Stephen Skalweit, ‘Edmund Burke, Ernst Brandes und 
Hannover’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch für Landesgeschichte, vol. 28 (1956): pp. 15-72, pp. 37-72, 
at p. 58.  
19 Cf. Rudolph Vierhaus, ‘Die Universität Göttingen und die Anfänge der modernen 
Geschichtswissenschaft im 18. Jahrhundert’, in Geisteswissenschaft in Göttingen, ed. Hartmut 
Boockmann and Hermann Wellenreuther (Göttingen: Vandenhoek, 1987), pp. 9-29. 
20 Rehberg, ‘Deutschland vor dem Ausbruche der Revolution vom 1789’, in idem., Schriften, vol. 2, 
pp. 1-97, at p. 23. 
21 J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law (1957), 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987); idem., ‘Introduction’ to The Political Works of James Harrington 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Cf. Eric Nelson, ‘“Barons’ Wars, under Other 
Names”: Feudalism, Royalism and the American Founding’, History of European Ideas, vol. 43, no. 2 
(2016): pp. 198-214; James Harris, Hume: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015), pp. 305-407. 
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national past. Whigs, on the one hand, postulated the existence of a sacred ‘ancient 
constitution’, which they projected back into ‘time immemorial’, of self-governing, property-
bearing Englishmen whose king was the mere executor of their collective will, as expressed 
in their parliamentary councils. The Norman Conquest and the arrival of feudalism marked 
the tragic demise of this happy state of affairs; the enthronement of William and Mary in 
1688 announced its return. Tory historians, on the other hand, denied the existence of any 
ancient English legislature. It was only after the Norman Conquest, they held, that the tribal 
warfare of pre-feudal England was quelled, property rights made secured, parliamentary 
institutions established, and a landed aristocracy came into existence. But throughout the 
early-modern era, as the Whig nobility slowly accumulated wealth and power, they had 
reintroduced these pre-Norman pathologies back into Britain, weakening the Crown’s 
authority and engendering factional rivalries that were a threat to public peace and liberty. In 
this way, royalist historians could situate the Civil Wars within a longer narrative of 
constitutional disintegration, characterized by the enervation of the monarchy and the rise of 
a destabilizing class of self-interested aristocrats.22 
What Anglophone historians have not sufficiently appreciated, however, is the extent 
to which these paradigms – of ancient liberties lost through conquest, then regained; of civil 
chaos arrested, then reintroduced on the coattails of a resurgent aristocracy – pervaded 
contemporary German discourse as well. When these Göttingen historians peered into the 
distant Saxon past, they discovered an ‘ancient constitution’ that closely resembled the one 
described by the English Parliamentarians: small communities of property-holding freemen, 
representative councils, citizen militias, and constrained monarchs. As the so-called 
‘Hanoverian Whigs’ told this story, ‘teutche Libertet’ was lost with the Carolingian conquest 
of the Germanies in the ninth century. Their Frankish conquerors replaced Germanic law 
with Roman law, allodial property with feudal tenures, and sovereign parliaments with an 
overweening Holy Roman Emperor. As Spittler saw it, this shameful process of subjugation 
destroyed ‘the truly Germanic constitution ‹wahrhaft germanische Verfassung› that prevailed 
in all German states in the Middle Ages’.23 Crucially, the pre-Carolingian nobility figured as 																																																								
22 After Walpole became Prime Minister, this historiography’s partisan valences were inverted: Tories 
began arguing that a balance of power between Crown and Parliament was essential to the Settlement 
of 1688 (and that the rise of a new Crown-in-Parliament was therefore unconstitutional), while Whigs 
argued for the interdependence of Crown and Parliament. On this sea-change, see Quentin Skinner, 
‘History and Ideology in the English Revolution’, The Historical Journal, vol. 8, no. 2 (1964): pp. 
151-78; and idem., ‘The Principles and Practice of Opposition: The Case of Bolingbroke versus 
Walpole’, in Historical Perspectives: Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J.H. 
Plumb, ed. Neil McKendrick (London: Europa, 1974), pp. 93-125. 
23 L.T. Spittler, Vorlesungen über Politik, ed. Karl Wächter (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1828); in Spittler, 
Werke, vol. 15, at p. 96. 
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the necessary trustees of German liberty in this narrative, in much the same way that British 
anti-monarchists cast agrarian patriotism as the last line of defense against despotism. As 
Knudsen has observed of Möser’s Osnabrückische Geschichte, it was the rise and fall of the 
medieval Ritterschaft – not Osnabrück’s princes or church leaders – that was the work’s 
primary index for tracing the shifting fortunes of liberty. Its Whig themes and structure are so 
pronounced that Knudsen has described Möser as ‘a German Harrington’.24 
According to Möser and his compatriots, these ancient Saxon liberties began to 
reemerge in the sixteenth century. As Rehberg explained in his Geschichte des Königreichs 
Hannover (1826), the rise of territorial sovereignty in the wake of the Reformation allowed 
small states to reassert their corporate liberties against what Brandes had described as ‘the 
exorbitant power of the Austrian monarchy’.25 The intra-imperial balance of power that 
resulted from the Peace of Westphalia, moreover, had certified the principle of state 
autonomy not only as a legal norm but as a political fact.26 To these Hanoverians, the liberties 
of 1648 seemed to foreshadow those of 1688. Yet there existed an obvious difference 
between the English and Hanoverian contexts: while corporate liberties were now secure 
within the Holy Roman Empire, most of the German states’ internal constitutions had 
evolved in the opposite direction from Britain’s.27 Over the eighteenth century, a series of 
ambitious German rulers – in Prussia and Austria, especially –threw off restraints on their 
power, crushed the resistance of the estates, built large standing armies, and consolidated 
government in centralized bureaucracies. This, too, was an affront to the ancient liberties of 
the German peoples, according to Spittler, a flagrant transgression of the ‘many charta 
magna liberatum’ that Saxons once venerated but which ‘are dismissed as [mere] antiquities’ 
by the apologists of absolutism.28 Historians have sometimes mistaken this Hanoverian 																																																								
24 Ibid., p. 106; cf. pp. 102-3, 110. Cf. Pocock, ‘Introduction’ to Works of Harrington. Interestingly, 
as Knudsen notes, Möser abruptly cut off his story in the thirteenth century, with the final capitulation 
of Osnabrück’s sovereignty to the Holy Roman Emperor: he was unable (or unwilling) to trace how 
modern liberty had emerged from such a hopeless situation. 
25 Rehberg, Zur Geschichte des Königreichs Hannover in den ersten Jahren nach der Befreiung von 
der westphälischen und französischen Herrschaft (Göttingen: Bandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1826); 
Brandes to Burke, qtd. in Skalweit, ‘Brandes und Burke’, p. 25. 
26 Knudsen, Möser and Enlightenment, pp. 101-109. 
27 The Holy Roman Empire, Jürgen Overhoff has argued, was a key inspiration for Montesquieu’s 
theory of federalism in De l’Esprit de Lois: see Overhoff, ‘Vorwort’ to Montesquieu, Meine Reisen in 
Deutschland, 1728-29, ed. Jürgen Overhoff (Stutttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2014), pp. 11-35. Cf. Ruldolph 
Vierhaus, ‘Montesquieu in Deutschland’ in Collegium Philosophicum, ed. Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde et al. (Basel: Schwabe, 1965), pp. 403-37. 
28 L.T. Spittler, Geschichte Wirtembergs under der Regierung der Grafen und Herzoge (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoek, 1783), in idem., Werke, vol. 5, pp. 191-494, at p. 404. Cf. his ‘Summarische 
Entwicklung der Entstehungs-Geschichte des Englischen Parlements’, Göttingisches Historisches 
Magazin, vol. 5 (1789): pp. 613-653 (on the British Parliament from Saxon times to the fourteenth 
century); reprinted in Werke, vol. 14, pp. 135-70. 
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critique of absolutism as a kind of conservative traditionalism avant la lettre: this is what 
Wilhelm Roscher was implying, for instance, when he complained that Möser, not Burke, 
‘should have been’ the founder of German conservatism (since the Osnabrückische 
Geschichte predated Burke’s Reflections).29 But this is to misjudge the politics of tradition in 
Hanover: for Möser, Spittler, and Schlözer, recovering the ancient liberties of the pre-
Carolingian Germans was a way to ward off despotism in the present.  
 The Hanoverian’s unique historiographical agenda can only be understood in light of 
their political context.30 Unlike Prussia to the east, where the centripetal pull of absolutism 
had given rise to what Rehberg called ‘a complete system of military monarchy’, Hanover’s 
nobility and estates ‹Landesstände› remained powerful throughout the eighteenth century.31 
Ever since George I moved to England in 1714, it had been effectively governed by its local 
legislature, the Geheime Rat. This body was comprised of delegates from each of Hanover’s 
six provincial councils ‹Landesräte›, which were populated by its hereditary nobility. While 
the king was nominally in charge of Hanover’s government and military, he was unable to 
levy taxes without the consent of both the central and provincial councils. The nobility 
therefore held an effective veto on most legislation, and was doggedly opposed to the 
centralization of political power in the capital. Over the eighteenth century, there emerged a 
rough constitutional balance of power. The government was strong enough to maintain the 
territory’s integrity and enforce a single foreign policy, but too weak to consolidate 
administration in a single, streamlined bureaucracy. Hanoverian patriots often contended that, 
just as in England, this constitutional balance had kept the threat of arbitrary government at 
bay, safeguarding individual liberty and guaranteeing the security of property. By the 1780s, 
this mistrust of concentrated power was a prominent part of regional identity.32  
 Nevertheless, even the most passionate defenders of the Hanoverian constitution 
admitted that it had serious weaknesses. In the years before the Revolution, Rehberg and his 
close friend Brandes were among a group of Hanoverian administrators and academics who 
began calling for liberalizing reforms. One major defect, in their view, was the extreme social 
stratification of the Electorate. As in the ancient world, inequality had long been the price of 
constitutional liberty in Hanover. The hereditary nobility held a virtual monopoly on political 																																																								
29 Wilhelm Roscher, ‘Die romantische Schule der Nationalökonomik in Deutschland’, Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. 26, no. 1 (1870): pp. 57-105, at p. 59; cf. Beiser, Enlightenment, 
Revolution, Romanticism, p. 288. 
30 For Rehberg on the Hanover’s constitution, see his Geschichte des Königreichs Hannover. 
31 Rehberg, ‘Deutschland vor dem Ausbruche der Revolution von 1789’, in Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 3-31, 
at p. 13. 
32 See Brandes to Burke, 29 Oct. 1796 (describing Hanoverian society and politics), in Skalweit, 
‘Brandes und Burke’, pp. 37-72; Vogel, Konservative Kritik, pp. 142-49. 
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power, explicitly barring non-noblemen from voting and from sitting as representatives in the 
territory’s legislatures. The highest position to which a talented Bürger like Rehberg or 
Brandes could aspire was to serve as a counselor to a (noble) member of the Geheime Rat, or 
to work in the territory’s bureaucracy. It was, in Brandes’s view, a grotesque ‘Egyptian or 
Indian caste-system’.33 Not only was this inequality unjust, it also placed the constitution in a 
precarious position: in principle, there was little preventing its collapse into simple oligarchy. 
To effect a ‘badly-needed reformation of the constitutional system’, Rehberg later recalled, it 
was imperative that noble power be checked ‘through the inner opposition of [the 
constitution’s] constituent elements’.34 Among the reforms that Rehberg and Brandes 
promoted were an end to the secret deliberations of the Geheime Rat; an expansion of the 
franchise to include (at least) some members of the bourgeoisie; non-noble representation on 
the provincial and central Räte; and the elimination of the nobility’s traditional exemption 
from taxes. They also hoped to curtail inefficiencies that resulted from the region’s federal 
structure. Each of the six Hanoverian provinces had its own legal code governing criminal 
offences, principles of ownership, rules of conscription, and censorship laws; and each had its 
own bureaucracy charged with enforcing these laws. One result of this redundancy, Brandes 
told Burke, was that ‘with respect to taxes every province is treated by the other as a foreign 
country.’35 While these reformers supported the principle of federalism wholeheartedly, they 
also believed that some degree of cooperation between the provinces could streamline 
governance, reduce administrative expenditures, and lead to greater mobility of people and 
goods across the Electorate. 
  As has often been noted, the Hanoverian Whigs were inspired by the British 
Constitution, and hoped to replicate its achievements – representative government, the rule of 
law, separation of powers, the inviolability of property – in their own context. But it does not 
follow that they hoped to import British institutions wholesale into Hanover, or to turn their 
Geheime Rat into a mere replica of Parliament.36 Indeed, Rehberg specifically renounced the 																																																								
33 Brandes, ‘Über die gesellschaftlichen Vergnügungen in den vornehmsten Städten des 
Churfurstentums’, Annalen der Braunschweigisch-Lüneburgischen Churlande, vol. 3 (1789): pp. 761-
800, and vol. 4 (1790): pp. 56-88, at vol. 3, p. 788. Cf. [Brandes], ‘Über den politischen Geist 
Englands’, Berlinische Monatsschrift, vol. 7 (Feb., Mar., Apr., 1786): pp. 101-126, 217-41, 293-323, 
where Brandes denies that Britain has such a ‘caste-system’ (p. 120). 
34 Rehberg, ‘Detuschland vor dem Ausbruche der Revolution von 1789’, in Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 3-31, 
at p. 7. 
35 Brandes to Burke, qtd. in Skalweit, ‘Burke und Brandes’, p. 30. 
36 ‘[The Hanoverians] cherished the idea that one day the estates would evolve in the direction of the 
English Parliament. If only Hannover became like London – if only George III brought the English 
constitution to his native land – utopia would have been realized on earth’: Beiser, Enlightenment, 
Revolution, Romanticism, p. 303. Cf. Vogel, Konservative Kritik, pp. 149-68, 207-212; Epstein, 
Genesis, pp. 567-72. 
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idea that ‘every country should [have] a constitution like the English’.37 They admired Britain 
because its constitution effectually preserved British liberties as they had arisen over the 
course of British history. Its vital institutions, and the mœurs, traditions, customs, and beliefs 
that animated them, were rooted in the historical contingencies of British society, as 
Montesquieu famously observed.38 Different social realities in Hanover meant that an 
effectual balance of power in this context would look very different from the form it took in 
England. It would be senseless to turn the Geheime Rat into a bicameral legislature, for 
instance, since there were not enough Bürger in Hanover to support a viable lower house.39 
Rather, they hoped to adapt the generally-applicable precepts of British liberty to the 
particular society they inhabited. For inspiration, they turned to Burke. 
 
III. Burke in Hanover, before the deluge 
As in Britain, Burke’s pre-revolutionary reputation in Hanover was defined by his 
idiosyncratic Whiggism. Hanoverians sympathetic to the Earl of Chatham’s campaign against 
partisanship, or to the North administration’s American policy, or the younger Pitt’s calls for 
electoral reform found Burke’s intransigent opposition to these measures annoyingly self-
indulgent. Schlözer, for instance, claimed that Burke’s ‘nagging complaints’ about the 
American War had divided the British public against itself, weakening the nation’s resolve 
and thereby dealing ‘a mortal blow to the honour and interests of [his] country’.40 But as 
Schlözer understood, this was a minority view. The great majority of his compatriots were 
quite impressed by what seemed like Burke’s uncompromising fidelity to the principles of 
1688, even in the face of widespread public opposition. This was the impression that Brandes 																																																								
37 Rehberg, Untersuchungen, vol. 1, pp. 56. 
38 For Montesquieu on national ‘esprit’, see De l’esprit des lois (1748), bk. 1, ch. 3; for his analysis of 
Britain, see ibid., bk. 11, ch. 6 and bk. 19, ch. 27. Cf. Michael Oakeshott, ‘The Investigation of the 
“Character” of Modern Politics’, in Morality and Politics in Modern Europe, ed. Shirley Letwin (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), pp. 29-44; Sylvana Tomaselli, ‘The Spirit of Nations’, in The 
Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought, ed. Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 7-39. 
39 Brandes, Ueber einige bisherige Folgen der französischen Revolution in Rücksicht auf Deutschland 
(Hannover: Ritscher, 1792), p. 135. 
40 Schlözer, ‘Vorbericht des Übersetzers’ to Kurze Geschichte der OppositionsPartei, während der 
letzten ParlementsSitzung vom 26 Novemb 178 biz zum 3 Jul. 1779 [trans. Schlözer] (1780); in August 
Ludwig Schlözer's Briefwechsel, meist historischen und politischen Inhalts, 10 vols. (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck, 1776-82), vol. 6, bk. 31, pp. 3-47, at p. 39. 
By 1793, Schlözer’s tone had moderated slightly. He was willing to accept Burke as an ally in the 
war against the Revolution, but denied that the Reflections had made any real contribution to the 
science of politics. ‘I have diligently read and studied many of the recent writers who hope to reform 
constitutional law ‹Staatsrechtlichen Reformations-Schriftstellern› – Necker and Burke, Mounier and 
Payne, &c. – but … have not found anything really new [in them] that would demand a substantial 
alteration of [my previous views]’: see idem., Allgemeines Staatsrecht und Staatsverfassungslehre 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1793), pp. vi-vii, italics in orig. 
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and Rehberg took from their study of his pre-revolutionary works. Towards the end of his life 
Rehberg remembered how, in the early 1780s, he and Brandes had closely studied ‘the most 
important party-political works ‹Parteischriften› that had appeared in England since the 
beginning of George III’s reign’, reading them ‘alongside the notes of Parliament’s 
proceedings’.41 Among these would have been Burke’s Thoughts on the Present Discontents 
(1770), his speeches against the American War (1774-75), and his Speech at Bristol Previous 
to the Election (1780).42 Throughout the 1780s these two men closely followed Burke’s 
career, as he turned his attention to thwarting Pitt’s plans for parliamentary reform and to 
indicting the Crown’s mismanagement of its imperial holdings in India.  
Brandes, especially, was captivated by the vision of liberty outlined in these early 
works. Indeed, he was so inspired that while planning his post-graduation Bildungsreise to 
England, he specifically arranged to meet with Burke during his travels.43 During the winter 
of 1784-85, he visited Burke at Beaconsfield on multiple occasions, where the two men laid 
the foundation of a friendly correspondence that lasted until Burke’s death.44 In the 
Revolution’s early years, when Burke sent his son Richard to the Rhineland to help organize 
the émigré resistance, Brandes was among the German contacts that he gave Richard; and as 
the Revolutionary Wars intensified in the mid-1790s, Burke trusted Brandes as a reliable 
informant on Germany’s rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.45 Rehberg even reports that 
Burke informally offered Brandes a job in the British Foreign Office, should he find himself 
in the parliamentary majority again.46 Though this last story is probably apocryphal, what is 
certain is that Brandes’s time in England confirmed his admiration for what he saw as 
																																																								
41 Rehberg, ‘Deutschland vor dem Ausbruche der Revolution von 1789’, in Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 3-31, 
at p. 19. 
42 For Brandes and Rehberg on Burke’s pre-revolutionary career, see Brandes to Burke, 12 Jan. 1787, 
in Skalweit, ‘Burke und Brandes’, pp. 34-7; Brandes, ‘Geist Englands’, p. 221 (where he discusses the 
1783 India Bill in detail); [Brandes], review of Burke, Reflections, p. 1900; Rehberg, ‘Carl James 
Fox’, in Schriften, vol. 4, pp. 34-73.  
43 Robert Elsasser, Über die politischen Bildungsreisen der Deutschen nach England (Heidelberg: 
Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1917), pp. 62-8. As Braune notes (Burke in Deutschland, p. 
79), it seems likely that Brandes’s father, who was rector of the University of Göttingen, arranged this 
meeting with Burke. 
44 In 1787 Brandes apologized for ‘transgressing … your patience, on which I made so many rude 
attacks during my stay in England’: Brandes to Burke, 12 Jan. 1787, in Skalweit, ‘Burke und 
Brandes’, pp. 34-7, at p. 34.  
45 See the letters attached to Skalweit, ‘Burke und Brandes’, especially Brandes’s long (c. 80 pp.) 
dossier on Hanoverian politics and culture (partially reprinted at pp. 37-72), which he wrote at 
Burke’s request; cf. also Braune, Burke in Deutschland, p. 81. 
46 Rehberg, ‘Ernst Brandes’ (1810), in Sämmtliche Schriften, vol. 4, pp. 407-426, at pp. 410-411; for 
the case against this story, see Skalweit, ‘Burke und Brandes’, pp. 18-20. 
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Burke’s sober-minded, yet principled constitutionalism.47 In his last published work, 
composed just before his death in 1810, Brandes was still describing Burke as ‘one of the 
greatest authorities on men and on politics’ ‹Menschen- und Staats-Kenner› in the modern 
world.48 
 Shortly after returning home from his Bildungsreise, Brandes published a series of 
essays on British society and politics, including ‘Über den politischen Geist Englands’ 
(1786).49 This essay is regularly cited as a definitive statement of Hanoverian Anglophilia.50 
But more than this, Brandes’s essay was a clear attempt to distill and outline a peculiarly 
Burkean interpretation of the British Constitution for his peers.51 ‘Geist Englands’ thus 
provides an invaluable lens for understanding how Brandes and his contemporaries – 
Rehberg, in particular – saw Burke in the years leading up to the Revolution.52 In certain 
respects, Brandes’s argument reinforced longstanding battle-lines between Germany’s 
estatists and monarchists: in submitting it to the Berlinische Monatsschrift, Brandes was 
consciously trying to defend the idea of constitutionally-limited government against a hostile 
Prussian readership.53 But this essay was also an intervention into more local British 
discourse: namely, internecine debates among pre-revolutionary Whigs about the relation 
																																																								
47 This admiration bordered on idolatry: during his travels, Brandes commissioned George Romney to 
paint a portrait of Burke, which he thenceforth considered ‘the most valuable ornament in my 
possession’: see Brandes to Burke, 12 Jan. 1787, in Skalweit, ‘Burke und Brandes’, pp. 34-7, at p. 35. 
48 Brandes, Ueber den Einfluß und die Wirkungen des Zeitgeistes auf die höheren Stände 
Deutschlands, 2 vols. (Hannover: Hahn, 1810), vol. 1, p. 47. 
Largely on the basis of this relationship, Brandes has often been counted among Burke’s German 
students (for this canon’s formation, see Ch. 2 above). Despite their friendship, however, Brandes 
played a marginal role in the interpretation and dissemination of the Reflections’ arguments. Unlike 
Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller, Brandes’s reputation was never popularly associated with Burke’s. His 
1791 review of the Reflections was anonymous, and his previous assessment on the Revolution had 
been explicitly anti-Burkean: see Brandes, Politische Betrachtungen über die französische Revolution 
(Jena: Mauke, 1790); but cf. his Folgen der französischen Revolution (1792), where he recanted his 
initial, pro-revolutionary arguments.  
49 [Brandes], ‘Über den politischen Geist Englands’ (1786); idem., ‘Ueber die Justiz- und 
Gerichtsverfassung Englands’, Hannover’sches Magazin (28 Oct. – 18 Nov. 1785): pp. 1361-1472. 
For the former, cf. Kraus, Englische Verfassung, pp. 603-615, which describes ‘Geist Englands’ as 
‘the most comprehensive, precise, and profound presentation, analysis, and interpretation of the 
English constitution set out in [Germany] in the years before 1789’ (p. 615). 
50 See, e.g., Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution, Romanticism, p. 418, fn. 48; Epstein, Genesis, p. 549. 
51 Though Brandes did not cite Burke as his inspiration, he had good reason not to: as Rehberg later 
noted, it would have been imprudent to explicitly praise the same Burke who was Parliament’s 
leading critic of Hanover’s king, and Brandes’s employer, George III: see Rehberg, ‘Brandes’, in 
Schriften, vol. 4, pp. 407-426, at p. 410. 
Brandes mentioned Burke only in passing, to complain that so many Germans had written him off 
as a ‘mercenary lackey’ ‹bestochener Schreier› of the Rockinghams (‘Geist Englands’, pp. 105-6); 
but this was part of his broader complaint about Germans’ ignorance of British party-politics. 
52 Brandes’s indebtedness to Burke is glossed in Epstein, Genesis, pp. 568-9, and in Kraus, Englische 
Verfassung, pp. 609-610. 
53 On the Prussian antipathy to mixed government, see Kraus, Englische Verfassung, p. 492-532. 
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between liberty and politics. Surveying the controversies that had inflamed this debate of late 
– electoral reform, imperial administration, the idea of party – Brandes suggested that a 
consistent vision of liberty undergirded the variegated, often-inscrutable positions that Burke 
took in each of these controversies. 
 Like all eighteenth-century Whigs, Burke took it as axiomatic that liberty required 
limits on the power of the state. These constitutional constraints gave subjects confidence in 
the safety of their person and property, and faith in the impartial rule of law. But what made 
Burke’s grasp of liberty different from that of his less-sophisticated peers, according to 
Brandes, was his clear-eyed recognition that such a normative theory of liberty was useless in 
practice without effective political checks on the various branches of government. This, in 
turn, demanded an equilibrium of power between Crown and Parliament – power not in an 
abstract legalistic sense (i.e., a right to act), but in the hard-nosed, Schmittian sense of Macht. 
For Burke, in other words, the fate of liberty was inseparable from the practical dynamics of 
constitutional realpolitik. Underneath law, lie politics. This made Burke deeply wary of 
reformers who use abstract moral theories to indict concrete political institutions. As he 
explained in 1784, an abstract theory of politics, unmoored from practical considerations, 
were a threat to liberty: 
A prescriptive Government, such as ours, never was the work of any 
Legislator, never was made upon any foregone theory. It seems to me a 
preposterous way of reasoning and a perfect confusion of ideas, to take the 
theories which learned and speculative men have made [and] to accuse the 
Government as not corresponding with them. … Whenever I speak against 
theory, I mean always a weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfounded or imperfect 
theory; and one of the ways of discovering, that it is a false theory, is by 
comparing it with practice. This is the true touchstone of all theories, which 
regard man and the affairs of men—does it suit his nature in general;—does it 
suit his nature as modified by his habits?54 
In ‘Geist Englands’, Brandes posited this sort of practically-minded liberalism as the 
lynchpin of the British system. Following Burke, he argued that the Constitution was 
threatened by moralizing politicians who ‘fantasize about Platonic republics’ and are ‘led 
astray by the cries of republican ideologues – those who always criticize established systems 
of government, who only want to tear down, but never to build up.’ What such men fail to 
understand is that ‘acting and reasoning, practically participating and passively observing, are 
two very different things’.55 
																																																								
54 Burke, ‘Speech on Parliamentary Reform’ (16 June 1784), in W&S, vol. 4, pp. 215-226, at pp. 220-
21. 
55 Brandes, ‘Geist Englands’, p. 320; cf. ibid, p. 121, where Brandes complains of ‘philosophers’ who 
‘do not want to adapt their schemes to men, but men to their schemes’, and pp. 109, 219, 299. 
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 Explaining the practical operations of the British system to German readers was 
difficult. The writers who had grasped Britain’s ‘true constitution, the spirit that upholds it, 
the causes and effects of partisanship: in short, that through which England truly is what it is, 
and remains what it is’ – he pointed to Hume, Blackstone, and de Lolme in particular – were 
largely unknown in Germany.56 Further complicating matters, the misguided definitions of 
‘Freiheit’ that prevailed among his compatriots were insufficient to comprehend Britain’s 
‘exceptional constitution and national spirit’.57 The German aristocracy was too quick to 
associate freedom with ‘anti-noble ressentiment’ ‹Fürstenhaß› and the threat of rebellion. 
Their bourgeois counterparts, on the other hand, cynically conflated the cause of liberty with 
the defense of the nobility’s legal privileges, especially their exemption from taxation. 
Philosophers, finally, confused liberty and popular sovereignty: following Rousseau, they 
held that liberty entailed ‘a very precise equality’ of rights and was inimical to any social 
hierarchy that contravened the ‘original equality of men’.58 But as Brandes went on to argue, 
each of these assumptions were undermined in the case of Britain. Its example proved that 
liberty and aristocracy were not incompatible; that taxes on noble property were not 
(necessarily) a prelude to absolutism; and, above all, that the rule of law did not imply a 
precise equality of rights. Citing Möser on the distinction between ‘human rights and civil 
rights’ ‹Menschenrechte und Bürgerrechte›, Brandes explained that different groups in 
British society held distinct responsibilities under its constitution. It was entirely fitting that 
their legal rights corresponded to their particular duties. He defended property-based 
restrictions on the franchise, the right of hereditary Peers to sit in the Lords, and the 
immunities given to Parliamentarians as indispensable elements of constitutional order in 
Britain. Each of these prerogatives were vital in order to maintain an effective legislature 
powerful enough to set limits to executive power.59 It was this political balance of power, he 
explained, that safeguarded what was fundamental about British liberty – namely, the 
																																																								
56 Ibid., p. 105.  
According to Brandes, the best systematic overview of the British Constitution was de Lolme’s 
Constitution de l'Angleterre (1771), but it had been poorly received in Germany – perhaps because of 
the author’s suspicious background as a ‘Genevan’ and a ‘republican’, or perhaps because his analysis 
was too empirical for the taste of German natural lawyers (pp. 108-9). 
57 Brandes, ‘Geist Englands’, p. 102. 
58 Ibid., pp. 115, 117. Cf. ibid., 125-6, where Brandes criticizes Rousseau’s suggestion that ‘the liberty 
of the English is an illusion, and that they are slaves except during the season of parliamentary 
elections’. Burke had earlier denounced the same passage in the ‘Debate on the Conduct of 
Government during Tumults’ (8 March 1769); qtd. in Richard Bourke, Empire and Revolution: The 
Political Life of Edmund Burke (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), at p. 264. 
59 Ibid., p. 118. 
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freedom from caprice or despotism that was afforded to all subjects, regardless of their 
station in society.60 
 As matters stood in 1785, Brandes told his readers, the constitution was in relatively 
good health: royal prerogative was limited by Parliament’s powers of review and by its 
control of the Treasury, while the Parliament was checked by the king’s veto and, more 
subtly, by the growing influence of his ministers in the Commons.61 But this balance was 
extremely delicate. In ‘Geist Englands’, Brandes intimated that George III’s attempts to 
consolidate his authority begun to jeopardize this equilibrium, imperiling a constitution 
which, as Hume had noted decades ago, was more towards monarchy than republicanism.62 
Because he believed that the Parliament was under assault from the executive, Brandes, like 
Burke, had little patience for Pitt the Younger’s proposed electoral reforms. It was obvious 
why ‘those who brood on politics’ ‹Staatsgrüblern› in abstraction would endorse the 
abolition of ‘pocket boroughs’, the standardization of constituency sizes, and the expansion 
of the franchise, he conceded; indeed, when considered in abstraction the preservation of the 
status quo seemed self-evidently unjust. Yet as ‘the wisest’ voices in this debate understood – 
it is difficult not to hear Brandes speaking of Burke here – ‘the English constitution consists 
in an artificial synthesis ‹Gewebe› of three forms of government [i.e. monarchy, aristocracy, 
and democracy]; their relation to each other cannot be articulated or determined in 
mathematical terms’.63 Pitt’s proposed reforms would cripple the Prime Minister’s ability to 
form a durable, competent government (a process in which allocating party-controlled seats 
was vital). Thus enervated, Parliament would be unable to exercise its constitutional duties, 
creating a power vacuum that would be filled by the king’s ministers. Ironically, then, a 
reform movement that was meant to expand popular liberty would in fact radically augment 
the power of the executive, imperiling constitutional order and threatening liberty itself.64 
Brandes picked out three additional, indispensable elements of the British 
constitution. First, he argued that the uniquely ‘republican’ character of the British people – 
woven into their culture, education, institutions, religion, and mœurs – was the sine qua non 
of their exceptional liberty. This ‘Nationalgeist’ was the motor that drove the British 																																																								
60 Ibid., p. 217. 
61 Brandes depicted the ‘royal veto’ as a legal fact (see ibid., p. 218); Rehberg suggested the same in 
his Untersuchungen (vol. 1, p. 143). In fact, its constitutionality was contested throughout the 
eighteenth century: see Eric Nelson, The Royalist Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2014), p. 9-23. 
62 ‘By all indications, if a great alteration in the Constitution were to take place, an unconstrained 
monarchy would be far more likely to emerge than a headless republic’: ibid., p. 234. 
63 Ibid., pp. 240-41. 
64 For discussion of Burke’s identical argument, which he made in Parliament one year before 
Brandes’s visit, see Bourke, Empire and Revolution, pp. 440-47. 
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constitution.65 From a young age, Britons were taught to see deliberative government as a 
positive good to be defended, and their liberties as a prize to be protected. He considered the 
latitude granted to the British press; the English Church’s tolerant attitude towards 
heterodoxy; the British university system, and the love of rhetoric that its curriculum 
inspired. All these institutions fostered a civic-minded ‘public spirit’ that pervaded all levels 
of British society.66 It was not true, he insisted, that ‘Publicität’ debased British political 
discourse relative to Germany. Channeling Burke’s arguments for the dignity of 
parliamentary deliberation, he insisted that the British system of government in fact conferred 
gravity on vital matters of state. Popular scrutiny focused the attention of government 
officials, and incentivized the virtues of persuasion, eloquence, and probity. ‘It is not merely 
the eyes of England that observe the proceedings of Parliament’, he wrote in ‘Geist 
Englands’, in language redolent of Burke’s ‘Speech on Fox’s India Bill’; ‘the great orator [in 
Parliament] … sees that the eyes of the whole civilized world are upon him.’67 Obliquely, 
Brandes used this point to suggest that the Räte of Hanover would become more effective, 
not less, if their opaque proceedings were opened to the public. Similarly, he intimated that 
Hanover’s political culture would be improved if its rigid class system were gradually 
softened. In Britain, the potential for economic and social advancement, even ennoblement, 
was open to all men. This led to a culture of ‘aspiration’ ‹Ehrgeiz›, in which talented men 
from all classes could make themselves useful. The British example showed that it was 
possible, and indeed wise, to unite the political stability of an established aristocracy with the 
dynamism of a meritocratic, commercial society.68 Indeed, it was precisely this synthesis that 
gave the British Parliament its vigour and made it an effectual check on the Crown. 
Finally – and in his German context most controversially – Brandes followed Burke 
in arguing that ‘a [partisan] opposition is absolutely necessary for the preservation of the 
English constitution’.69 Just like Pitt’s arguments for electoral reform, earlier Chathamite 
criticisms of partisanship had been essentially unpolitical, and threatened the constitutional 
settlement upon which British liberty rested: 
‘But why have a particular party in the government? Measures, not men.’ – As 
true as this idea seems at first glance, it is among those theoretical [claims] 
that, at least in England, are always refuted by experience.70  																																																								
65 Ibid., p. 105.  
66 Ibid., pp. 227-8; cf. Rehberg, Untersuchungen, vol. 2, pp. 375-6. 
67 Ibid., p. 228; cf. Burke, ‘Speech on Fox’s India Bill’ (1 Dec. 1783), in W&S, vol. 5, pp. 378-451, at 
p. 381: ‘[The result of this debate] will turn out a matter of great disgrace or great glory to the whole 
British nation. We are on a conspicuous stage, and the world marks our demeanour.’ 
68 Ibid., p. 122. 
69 Ibid., p. 293. 
70 Ibid., p. 299. 
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To suggest that factionalism was a salutary feature of British politics was a direct affront to 
the self-image of the German Aufklärung, and its core values of impartiality and non-
sectarianism. Yet in Brandes view, it was precisely German theorists’ inability to grasp the 
messy realities of politics that made their liberalism so feeble. Confronting this tendency 
head-on, he reiterated the central thesis of Burke’s Thoughts on the Cause of the Present 
Discontents (1770).71 Without parties, Parliament would be a disorganized, chaotic, and 
fractious collection of self-interested politicians. The executive, however, would remain 
unitary, dexterous, and avaricious. The king and his allies thus be well-positioned able to 
exploit the vulnerability of an impotent legislature. It may have been desirable to eradicate 
faction from Britain’s body politic in theory; in practice, however, if the elder Pitt’s 
campaign against parties had been successful, his naïveté would have quickly been exploited 
by George III’s ministers to emasculate the legislature. Only the presence of a vigilant 
opposition had prevented these machinations. It was an absence of parties, Brandes believed, 
that would pose a threat to the constitution. As Burke wrote in his Present Discontents, 
‘when bad men combine, the good must associate; else they will fall, one by one, an unpitied 
sacrifice in a contemptible struggle.’72 Without a jealous, patriotic opposition committed to 
exposing corruption and preserving the Parliament’s autonomy, the government could be 
lulled into the complacency of a ‘political slumber’ ‹Staatsschlummer›.73 In this way, Pitt’s 
policy of ‘measures, not men’ threatened to vitiate the Parliament’s political efficacy, 
destroying the very constitutional liberty it intended to protect. 
What ‘Geist Englands’ suggests, in other words, is that well before the first stirrings 
of revolution in France, Brandes had come to share Burke’s longstanding worries about the 
risks that well-intentioned, yet politically-inept reformers posed to the delicate equipoise of 
the British Constitution. Rehberg agreed. Though we have little record of his pre-
revolutionary engagement with Burke, he later voiced these same worries about imprudent 
constitutional reformers, and on the same rationale as Brandes. ‘It is evidently a very popular 
proposal, often repeated by certain members of the English Parliament, that the length of 
parliaments should be reduced from seven years to perhaps a single year,’ he wrote in his 
Untersuchungen. Like Burke and Brandes before him, Rehberg argued that any potential 
																																																								
71 On the historical origins of Burke’s theory of constitutional party-politics, see Max Skjönsberg, 
Internecine Discord: Party, Religion, and History in Early Hanoverian Britain (PhD diss., London 
School of Economics, 2018). 
72 Burke, Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), in W&S, vol. 2, pp. 241-323, at p. 
315. 
73 Brandes, ‘Geist Englands’, p. 293. 
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theoretical justification for this proposal was irrelevant. In practical terms, it was 
constitutionally reckless and counterproductive: 
This proposal is totally opposed the people’s true interests. … Frequent 
elections would increate corruption both great and small, multiplying the 
periods in which it would be advantageous. It is much easier for that party that 
has the support of the court and whose leaders are royal ministers, to form a 
parliamentary majority. The private persons who are not associated with this 
party and who comprise the Opposition can manage to wage a campaign 
perhaps every six or seven years, but cannot do so every year: their expenses 
would be far higher, yet the result of these elections would be far less 
meaningful. Annual Parliaments would therefore be far more likely to remain 
under the control of the current government [i.e. Pitt and the Tories] than 
seven-year Parliaments.74 
For Rehberg and Brandes, in other words, the central lesson of Burke’s pre-revolutionary 
works was that constitutional liberty was inimical to abstract theories of politics. The latter 
were necessarily dangerous: philosophical theories, which trade in universals, are incapable 
of comprehending the contingencies of real politics. As Montesquieu noted, the ‘liberty of 
the citizen’ is only possible under a balanced constitution – that is, in a system where checks-
and-balances were not merely notional principles, but were effective politically.75 In order to 
revive individual liberty in the German states, Rehberg and Brandes believed, effective 
constitutional constraints needed to be placed on absolutism. This was a task not for the 
philosopher, but for the practical politician.  
 
IV. Rehberg, Hume, skepticism 
In ‘Geist Englands’, Brandes was relatively uninterested in scrutinizing the reform proposals 
that Burke opposed on their own, philosophical terms. Rather than laying out a theoretical 
critique of them, Brandes was largely satisfied to show their impracticability. In this respect, 
his essay was indicative of the broader indifference to metaphysics that pervaded Hanover. 
Rehberg was the exception to this rule. While most of his Göttingen professors chose simply 
to ignore debates in contemporary metaphysics, during his university years Rehberg 
discovered an innate talent for, and love of, philosophical argument. Epstein attributes this 
passion for metaphysics to Rehberg’s insatiable, probing, and somewhat-obsessive 
personality – a suggestion corroborated by Gentz’s complaints about his narrow and cramped 
writing style.76 Whatever the reason, he spent considerable time in Göttingen independently 
reading the authoritative figures of mid-century rationalism – Pufendorf, Leibnitz, Wolff, 																																																								
74 Rehberg, Untersuchungen, vol. 1, pp. 141-2; cf. ibid., vol. 1, p. 101. 
75 Cf. Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, bk. 11, ch. 6. 
76 Epstein, Genesis, p. 553; Gentz to Brinkmann, 18 Nov. 1793, in Briefe von und an Friedrich von 
Gentz, ed. F.C. Wittichen, 3 vols. (Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1909), vol. 1, pp. 42-43. 
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Baumgartner – as well as the empiricist critique of this school that had been developed in 
Britain by Locke, Berkeley, and above all Hume. Atypically, Rehberg also dedicated himself 
to a close study of Spinoza’s Ethics (1677), a work which had fallen out of favor by the 
eighteenth century, and which would not reemerge as a locus of controversy until a decade 
later, in the mid-1780s.77 These early philosophical engagements led Rehberg to accept what 
he would later describe as an ‘absolute skepticism’ ‹vollendeten Skeptizismus›, a principled 
belief that the theoretical claims of metaphysicians were not only inapplicable in the real 
world, but that the foundations upon which they stood were necessarily groundless.78 Like 
Hume, Rehberg thus found himself in the paradoxical position of forwarding philosophical 
arguments against the pretensions of philosophy. As he explained, somewhat ironically, in 
1787, ‘the metaphysician does a real service for mankind – perhaps the only case in which he 
can hope to do as much – when he demonstrates that all possible speculation on 
[philosophical and theological] concepts’ is ‘insufficient’ ‹unzulänglich› to prove their 
existence.79  
Rehberg began publicly defending this skeptical position as a young man, in a 
submission to an essay contest sponsored by Berlin’s Akademie der Wissenschaften. 80 In his 
contribution, he later recalled, he had set out to undermine ‘the hegemony that the Wolffians 
had lorded over the [German] nation for quite some time.’81 In an argument that 
foreshadowed Jacobi’s later Spinoza Briefen (1785), Rehberg contended that all metaphysics, 
if pushed to its logical conclusions, leads to the monism and determinism of Spinoza. 
Rehberg therefore presented his readers with a choice between metaphysics and Spinoza’s 
(apparent) denial of free will on the one hand, or a radically anti-philosophical skepticism on 
the other: 
It seemed to me that this entire mode of philosophizing, according to which 
the nature of things ‹Wesen der Dingen› is described in concepts, must finally 
lead to the [sort of] system in which abstraction is made into a first principle. 
… If generalized concepts, derived from ideas ‹Vorstellungen› in the human 
mind, are projected onto things that are rooted in [external] appearances 
‹Erscheinungen›, one is thrown back onto these abstractions again and again. 
With Spinoza, one is lead to declare that the mere concepts ‹bloßen Begriffe› 																																																								
77 Rehberg, Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 4-8. 
78 Ibid., p. 8. 
79 Rehberg, Über das Verhältnis der Metaphysik zu der Religion (Berlin: Mylius, 1787), pp. 11-12. 
80 Rehberg, Abhandlungen über das Wesen und die Einschränkungen der Kräfte, welcher die 
Königliche Akademie zu Berlin in May 1779 das Accessit zuerkannt hat (Leipzig: Wigand, 1779). For 
the role of this competition in the development of German philosophy, cf. Cornelia Buschmann, ‘Die 
philosophischen Preisfragen und Presisschriften der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften im 18. 
Jahrhundert’, in Aufklärung in Berlin, ed. Wolfgang Förster (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1989), pp. 
165-228. 
81 Rehberg, Schriften, vol. 1, p. 5. 
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of thought, space, and existence are realities, and ultimately, the only thing 
that is real ‹das einzige Wirkliche›.82  
In one sense, Rehberg was enamored of Spinoza. His system was sublime in its simplicity, ‘a 
perfect work of art that could never be surpassed’.83 For the same reason, however, he found 
it terrifying. Rehberg believed that the post-Cartesian urge to impose conceptual coherence 
onto reality had led theorists to mistake the conditions of our subjective cognition of reality 
with the conditions of reality itself. Spinoza’s metaphysics was the paradigmatic case of this 
non sequitur. In order to explain the myriad diversity of the human experience, Spinoza had 
conceptualized all of reality in terms of a single, all-encompassing divine substance. As a 
liberal, Rehberg resented this sleight of hand because it seemed to collapse human nature into 
nature per se, eliminating the possibility of moral freedom. He also feared Spinozism’s 
notoriously dangerous implications for political and social life, and the destructive 
egalitarianism that it seemed to foster.  
But it was the theological upshot of Rehberg’s argument that would have proved most 
controversial to the prize committee in Berlin. In accusing the Wolffians of Spinozism, he 
was also charging them with an anti-Christian heresy. Spinoza’s pantheistic definition of God 
ruled out the conceptual possibility of miracles a priori, thereby flatly contradicting central 
doctrines of Christianity – a divine creation, scriptural revelation, Christ’s identity as both 
God and man. Here again, Rehberg’s reductio ad absurdum forced his readers to choose 
between revelation, miracles, and faith on the one hand, or else philosophical reason and 
heterodoxy on the other. What was not a defensible position, according to Rehberg, was the 
comfortable via media of ‘rational religion’ that Wolff and his followers had tried to shore 
up. The ambition of his prize-essay, he later recalled, was ‘to use [Spinoza’s] system, the 
most rigorous form of metaphysical speculation imaginable, to destroy metaphysics itself.’84 
The onset of the Pantheismusstreit and the debut of Kant’s critical system gave 
Rehberg further occasion to sharpen his skepticism.85 His primary contribution to these 
debates came in the form of three exceptionally lucid reviews – of Jacobi’s David Hume 
(1787), Herder’s Gott: einige Gespräche (1787), and Kant’s second Kritik (1788) – which he 
published in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung.86 For different reasons, each of these thinkers 																																																								
82 Ibid., p. 7. 
83 Ibid., p. 8. 
84 Ibid., p. 11. Cf. also Rehberg’s analysis of Spinoza’s metaphysics in Verhältnis, pp. 33-64. 
85 The best introductions to this dispute are in Manfred Frank, Unendliche Annäherung: Die Anfänge 
der philosophischen Frühromantik (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 1997); and Eckart Förster, The Twenty-Five 
years of Philosophy, trans. Brady Bowman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).  
86 [Rehberg], review of J.G. Herder, Gott: einige Gespräche (1787), in Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (2 
Jan. 1788): pp. 9-16; [Rehberg], review of F.H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder 
Idealismus und Realismus: ein Gespräch, in ibid. (16 Apr. 1788): pp. 105-112; [Rehberg], review of 
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shared Rehberg’s belief that the Wolffian ideal of a ‘rational religion’ was incoherent, and 
that metaphysical rationalism as it had traditionally been practiced in Germany was self-
cannibalizing. To the extent that their contributions helped put an end to Wolffianism, 
Rehberg welcomed them; but to the extent that they claimed to have uncovered new ways 
into the ‘essence of things’, he was sharply critical. In the wake of rationalism’s demise, he 
argued, the properly philosophic response was to follow the example of ‘Hume, who, like the 
ancient Skeptics, disputed the comprehensibility (κατάληψις) of things through reason’, and 
resign oneself to a cheerful agnosticism.87 What frustrated Rehberg about Jacobi, Herder, and 
Kant was that they, too, should have recognized this: it was Hume who awoke Kant from his 
‘dogmatic slumber’, and who played a vital role in persuading Jacobi and Herder to reject 
Wolff as well.88 But rather than allowing a genuinely Humean skepticism to displace their 
former rationalism, they had chosen to pursue new means of pursuing the same metaphysical 
and moral certitude which, as Hume had shown, was necessarily unattainable.  
 In his initial intervention into the Pantheismusstreit, Rehberg excitedly endorsed 
Jacobi’s proposition that if one wants to establish consistent foundations for morality, one has 
to choose between a rationally-defensible Spinozism on the one hand, or a salto mortale into 
faith on the other. But why, he wondered, should we presume that the universe is objectively 
ordered at all, or that the human mind is capable of grasping its structure? As he later 
summarized his position: 
Even Jacobi – who, like me, recognized Spinoza’s metaphysics as the only 
truly consistent one – tried to find a way to avoid this desperate realization 
that [the search for] knowledge of things-in-themselves ‹Dingen an sich› is 
empty and meaningless. He sought refuge in a faith in the divine, which 
cannot be grasped by human understanding.89  
It was not true, Rehberg insisted, that Jacobi’s Christian fideism had turned him into a 
fanatical apostle of ‘Jesuitism’, as his Wolffian critics averred.90 And though the overwrought 																																																								
Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (1788), in ibid. (6 Aug. 1788): pp. 345-52. These reviews were 
reprinted together in Rehberg, Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 25-84. 
In this vein, see also the occasional essays on religion in Rehberg, Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 158-238, 
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87 Rehberg, review of Jacobi, David Hume, in Schriften, vol. 1, p. 26. ‘Katalepsis’ (κατάληψις) was 
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Reception of David Hume in Europe, ed. Peter Jones (London: Blooomsbury, 2005), pp. 98-138. 
89 Ibid., p. 12. 
90 Rehberg, review of Jacobi, David Hume, in Schriften, vol. 1, p. 26. 
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religious language of the Spinoza Briefen was unhelpful, Jacobi’s position was at least 
internally coherent, which was more than his critics could claim. What most bothered 
Rehberg about Jacobi’s stance, rather, was his slippery attempt to use Hume’s authority to 
defend his very un-Humean fideism. In his epistemological reflections, Hume had indeed 
insisted on the primacy of sense belief over reason: in order to make causal inferences about 
the nature of the external world, we need a basic faith in the veracity of our sensory 
impressions. Jacobi’s David Hume had twisted this argument, misleadingly suggesting that 
Hume claimed that ‘faith ‹Glaube› is the basis of all knowledge and action’.91 Belief in the 
mere existence of an extra-subjective world was not at all equivalent to a religious faith that 
this world was morally ordered, or that this order had been providentially disclosed to 
mankind in the person of Christ. 
Though Rehberg did not follow Jacobi in this leap of faith, he admired the carefulness 
with which Jacobi reconstructed the rival positions of Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Kant. The same, 
unfortunately, could not be said of Herder. In Gott, Herder purported to prove that pantheism 
was not an irredeemably deterministic and amoral metaphysics, as Jacobi had claimed; yet at 
the same time, Herder dismissed theoretical philosophy as empty and abstruse speculation. 
Rehberg found this attitude presumptuous and distasteful.92 Rather than refuting Jacobi’s 
argument Gott, had attempted to poeticize pantheism, on the assumption that an ‘organic’ 
understanding of the divinity could resolve the inner weaknesses of Spinoza’s mechanistic, 
Newtonian conception of God. ‘“Organic…” – Herr Herder plays with this word far too 
often, using it to create fanciful images, rather than concrete doctrines.’93 Though he 
personally admired Herder’s aestheticized idea of religion, Rehberg insisted that Herder had 
not moved the Pantheismusstreit much beyond where Jacobi had left it.94  
 Of these three thinkers, Rehberg found Kant’s critical idealism the most promising. 
This was because, perhaps surprisingly, Rehberg saw Kant’s system as consistent with his 
own form of skepticism. As Christopher Meckstroth has recently observed, this response was 
typical of Kant’s earliest readers: to them, the first Kritik seemed first and foremost a 
trenchant critique of aufgeklärt rationalism.95 Rehberg saw Kant as an ally in this respect. 
‘Kant began from exactly where I stood, but which I could not venture beyond in my own 
thinking.’96 Like Hume, the first Kritik had rigorously distinguished between things and 																																																								
91 Ibid. 
92 Cf. Rehberg on Herder’s anti-Kantianism: [Rehberg], review of Herder, Gott, in Schriften, vol. 1., 
pp. 39-40, 43-44. 
93 Ibid., p. 46. 
94 Ibid., pp. 38, 45-46. 
95 Meckstroth, The Struggle for Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 114-38. 
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concepts – between an external world of objects and an inner world of sense impressions, 
logical inference, and probabilistic reasoning.97 Going beyond Hume, however, Kant had 
proven that this inner world was not anarchic but governed by necessary laws of reason. In 
his review of Kant, Rehberg faithfully explained that these laws took as their foundation a 
series of synthetic a priori concepts which were presupposed in the operation of reason itself. 
All of this seemed quite plausible to Rehberg. Indeed, he went out of his way to defend 
Kant’s claims about pure reason against Jacobi’s famous complaint that (as Rehberg put it) 
Kant’s system ‘was incompatible with the premise of external objects which impress 
themselves on the senses, yet without this premise, was totally incomprehensible.’98 
According to Rehberg, in demonstrating that synthetic a priori concepts are intrinsic to pure 
reason, Kant did not need to make any reference to the phenomenal world at all. He was 
establishing the conditions of our reason’s perception of external objects. But as Jacobi 
rightly observed, there was no necessary reason why the laws that govern human reason 
should also govern the extra-human world. 
 This was the reason why, despite his enthusiasm for the first Kritik, Rehberg parted 
ways with Kant over the second: while Kant’s account of pure reason in a ‘regulative’ sense 
marked a genuine advance, his attempt to define the necessary conditions of practical reason 
in a positive, ‘constitutive’ sense was misguided.99 Any attempt to locate the transcendent 
criteria of morality was doomed to fail, because ‘pure reason is not practical’ and never can 
be.100 In contrast to his metaphysics, which made descriptive claims about the internal 
structure and limits of reason, Kant’s moral philosophy claimed to describe the necessary 
conditions of rational action in the world. 101 In Rehberg’s mind, this was an unsuccessful 
attempt to span the ineliminable gap between mind and nature that Kant, drawing on Hume, 
had himself already established. It was true, Rehberg explained, that ‘if morality exists at all 
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– if it is not to be vilified as a mere doctrine of prudence ‹Klugheitslehre› – then the 
principles of morality must be categorical.’ But this was a conditional proposition, not a 
necessary one. ‘And thus we must consider whether pure reason, of its own power, can 
establish a synthetic principle of its own efficacy [in the outer world]?’102 Rehberg used this 
rhetorical question to make a recognizably Humean point: in describing what reason is, Kant 
could never give a satisfactory account of how one should exercise it.103 To think otherwise 
was to commit a category error. ‘Reason only ever operates within itself’, he wrote: ‘it cannot 
project itself beyond itself, or uncover synthetic principles’ to legitimate its authority in the 
external world.104 As a result, ‘Kant has not produced anything close to a satisfactory answer 
to Hume’s skepticism’.105 Reason could not furnish a transcendent standard for 
differentiating between moral and immoral actions, just and unjust societies, because the 
objective criteria of morality were necessarily unknowable to fallible, time-bound human 
beings – if morality existed at all.106 
 In disarming Kant’s moral philosophy, Rehberg also believed that he had fatally 
upended Kant’s practical solution to the Pantheismusstreit. In his second Kritik and the 
Grundlegung (and later, more explicitly, in his 1793 tract on justifiable belief), Kant had 
reasoned that in order to fulfill our moral duties, it was necessary to have faith in the 
providential course of history, and in the promise of life after death.107 Without such 
assurances, human beings would fall into despair. Since an impossible-to-perform duty was a 
contradiction in terms, Kant argued, it was therefore justifiable to lean on religion as an aid to 
right conduct. But as Rehberg pointed out in a tract on Das Verhältnis der Metaphysik zu der 
Religion (1787), if a priori reason did not in fact legislate universal moral duties, then Kant’s 
attempt to rationalize religion on this basis collapsed.108 He agreed that, ‘since we completely 
lack any metaphysically self-evident (i.e. demonstrable a priori) knowledge of [external] 
objects, of things in themselves, and of their [principles of] vitality and relation to one 
another, it is futile to try to provide apodictic proofs for the existence of God’.109 Such 
arguments were simply meaningless – but so too, and for the same reason, he maintained, 
was Kant’s practical argument for morality. 
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 Rehberg rejected Kant’s moral philosophy, in other words, on the same grounds that 
he rejected Jacobi’s fideism: despite appearances, ‘[Jacobi] was not really an opponent of 
Kant’.110 Whether through divine revelation or (constitutive) a priori reason, both men hoped 
to attain a knowledge of moral universals that, according to Rehberg, was inaccessible. His 
repudiation of this sort of foundationalism entailed political implications that are far more 
radical than scholars have appreciated to date. Rehberg’s complaint against Kantian 
liberalism was not (in Beiser’s words) that ‘there is no criterion by which to apply the 
universal principals of practical reason to ordinary life’.111 This was a popular line of 
criticism, but it was not Rehberg’s.112 His argument was that ‘universal principles of practical 
reason’ do not exist at all. As a result, the assumption that ‘the entire system of human 
education and culture should be grounded in scientific insight ‹wissenschaftliche Einsicht› is 
both false in theory and impossible in practice.’113 In other words, because normative 
political theories failed on their own terms, there was no gap between theory and practice to 
be spanned.114 
 
V. Burke and the pamphlet wars in Germany, 1790-93  
In February 1790, when Burke first rose in Parliament to voice his opposition to the 
Revolution in France, German intellectuals and writers were almost uniformly sympathetic to 
the republican cause.115 Just over one year earlier Louis XVI had summoned the états 
généraux to Versailles. Since then, European observers had witnessed the creation of a 
national French legislature, the abolition of feudal privileges, the nationalization of the 
Gallican Church’s lands, and the fall of Bourbon absolutism. As a series of recent works on 																																																								
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the Spätaufklärung have shown, these changes were greeted with great enthusiasm in 
Germany.116 Thinking themselves witnesses to a world-historical moment of national 
liberation, German writers were prepared to rationalize brief early spasms of violence – the 
march on Versailles in October 1789, most significantly – as regrettable, but ultimately trivial 
obstacles on the road to a stable constitutional republic.   
 As news of Burke’s speech in the Debate on the Army Estimates migrated into 
Germany in the winter and spring of 1790, therefore, it was met with indifference and 
frustration. His loud criticisms of the revolutionaries’ principles seemed cynical at best and 
immoral at worst. In March, the Politisches Journal of Hanover reported that 
… the Opposition’s two most impressive orators in the Commons, Fox and 
Burke, have begun to differ on some important subjects. Burke seems to have 
taken up a new [political] system that is very different from his former one. 
Many observers are speculating that the recent revolution in France and its 
[unruly] consequences have made a deep impression on him, giving his ideas 
– which were for so long devoted to the most vigorous freedom – a very 
different, more restrained character. … On 9 February [Burke’s] new system 
showed itself in its whole force when he rose to counter the motion of a Herr 
Flood…. He swore to oppose any legislation born of the sort of reforming, 
speculative spirit that had been unleashed in France, and which had brought 
forth nothing but strife.117     
The Journal’s London correspondent was hardly persuaded. ‘Far from a dangerous example’, 
he opined, ‘the Revolution in France presents an exceptionally useful lesson for the British’ 
in how to reform antiquated and unjust institutions.118 Two months later, when Hamburg’s 
Historisch-politisches Magazin chose to translate and print long excerpts from the Army 
Estimates address in its pages, the magazine’s editor, Albrecht Wittenberg, felt obliged to 
justify their inclusion.119 ‘Herr Burke’s noteworthy speech on the army’s estimates has not 
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yet been properly presented in any of our public journals’, he rather equivocally explained.120 
Whatever Burke’s politics, he at least deserved a fair hearing. 
 In June 1790, Christoph Martin Wieland took to the pages of his Neue Teutsche 
Merkur to chastise Burke publicly.121 An early admirer of the Revolution – it was, Wieland 
had enthused, the ‘triumph of understanding and reason over prejudice and delusion’122 – he 
warned his readers that the French cause was under assault from a small, but vocal band of 
counter-revolutionaries. Scattered across Europe, these illiberal revanchists were conspiring 
to ‘bring the situation back to its old footing’, exploiting the Revolution’s occasional 
missteps to undermine its principles.123 Chief among these voices was Burke:    
The man who chooses to publicly caricature each of the fleeting and 
individual maladies that always afflict exceptional, world-historical events 
like the French Revolution (maladies which proceed from a thousand different 
necessary and incidental causes); who paints his caricature with the broadest 
brush possible, and in the most garish colors imaginable, with no discretion 
and no respect for the truth; who, in the mournful tone of a balladeer at a 
carnival, invents a terrifying story of misery and murder for the astonished 
masses, leading them to conclude that the entire national assembly is a hell-
bound pack of schemers, fools and idiots who orchestrated this disaster partly 
on purpose, partly out of a lack of judgment – such a gentleman, whether he 
calls himself Bergasse or Burke or Mephistopheles (or whatever else he 
pleases), is just as wise and useful as a man who, after eating and drinking to 
the point of gluttony, proves his excellent grasp of human affairs and his 
charity ‹Menschenkenntniß und Menschenliebe› by writing a long jeremiad 
about all of the physical, moral, political and economic evils, trials and 
afflictions with which we poor sons of Adam are beset…. Oh you who strain 
out a gnat yet swallow a camel! Is it not better to work on behalf of those 
twenty-four million suffering men and to alleviate their afflictions…, even if 
operating upon this sick body politic will cause a certain amount of pain 
(albeit only for a tenth of the body politic [i.e. the nobility])?124      
Perhaps most shockingly, Brandes himself rejected the arguments of Burke’s Army Estimates 
speech, choosing instead to cast in his lot with the Revolution. In his Politische 
Betrachtungen über die französische Revolution, published in July 1790, he insisted pace 
Burke that a radical transformation of the French constitution had been ‘necessary’.125 Given 																																																								
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the extreme obstinacy of the Bourbon regime, whose ‘administration was as rotten as its 
constitution was bad’, it was impossible to effect this reformation ‘except through revolution, 
i.e. through the influence of an armed populace’.126 The French people had long suffered 
under an intolerable form of tyranny, which its self-interested, corrupt aristocrats had failed 
to curtail.127 With an optimism that later embarrassed him, Brandes heralded the abolition of 
feudalism as a ‘truly wise decree’, cheered the humiliation of the clergy, and celebrated the 
expropriation of church lands.128 Though the universal principles of justice announced in the 
Declarátion were exorbitant, Brandes dismissed them as a superfluous rhetorical defense of 
what was fundamentally a justifiable revolt against unaccountable power.129  
 In this context, Rehberg’s sympathetic review of the Army Estimates speech must 
have come as a surprise to his readers.130 Not only were Burke’s political views extremely 
unpopular: they were being endorsed by Rehberg, an author known primarily for heterodoxy 
bordering on irreligion. Yet Rehberg’s attraction to Burke was evidently sincere. Since he 
began reviewing political works for the Literaturzeitung six months earlier, he had focused 
almost exclusively on French sources – Sieyès, Bergasse, Mounier, Lally-Tollendal, Malby, 
Rabaut de Saint-Étienne.131 But as he explained to the Literaturzeitung’s readers, Burke’s 
unique perspective – as a British observer of French affairs, and as a ‘man of great genius, 
capacious vision, [and] exquisite insight into questions of state’ – was indispensable for 
making sense of the unfolding drama in Paris.132 ‘To date, most of his works have been 
written for specific debates in the British Parliament, or they concern the specific history of 
England; they are known in Germany only to a few.’ But this was unfortunate, according to 
Rehberg, since Burke’s writings ‘contain splendid teachings on … the nature of free 
constitutions.’133 This constitutional acumen had led Burke to see that the French Revolution 
represented an abrupt departure from the revolutionary ideals of the British Whig tradition: 
Aside from Burke’s very wise, energetic and (as one comes to expect from 
this writer) well-spoken judgments on the Revolution, this book … compares 
the Revolution in France to the well-known events that placed William III 
onto the throne in England. The author shows that these two events are unlike 
each other in every relevant point. England preserved, and indeed 
strengthened, its inner tranquility and ancient constitution ‹alte Verfassung› by 																																																								
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changing only the person of the monarch. The French kept their sovereign, but 
destroyed the proportions of their ancient estates.134 
In their ‘lust for innovation’ ‹Neuerungssucht›, the revolutionaries had become intoxicated by 
abstract concepts – the rights of man, the sovereignty of the people, the natural equality of 
man – that were perilously unmoored from practical politics. Though Rehberg admitted that 
Burke’s ‘love of established and customary constitutions’ may have led him to underestimate 
the intrinsic faults of the pre-revolutionary French government, he nevertheless insisted that 
Burke’s worries about the possibility of a failed state in France, and of ideologically-inflected 
warfare throughout Europe, were well-grounded, and worth heeding.135 
At the end of this review, Rehberg reported that ‘a more extensive work from Burke 
has recently appeared, which we will appraise in our next installment.’136 But by the time his 
review of the Reflections on the Revolution in France appeared in March 1791, Rehberg 
already felt a latecomer to the fierce debate that this work had incited. If Burke’s Army 
Estimates speech was met with exasperation, the response to his Reflections was positively 
hostile. As in England, the work quickly became a lightening rod of criticism. A hasty 
translation appeared in Vienna less than three months after the original was printed in 
London, and found a wide readership in the southern German states.137 For German 
sophisticates (as well as the émigré nobility stranded in the Holy Roman Empire), the French 
edition of Pierre-Gaëton Dupont also provided a means of ingress to Burke’s arguments.138 																																																								
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Regional magazines, finally, circulated German translations of the Reflections’ most 
sensational passages: Burke’s depiction of Marie Antoinette’s humiliation, his Jeremiad for 
the death of chivalry, his thundering attack on the droits de l’homme.139 ‘Already [the 
Reflections’] sphere of influence has extended far beyond the scope of the British Isles’, 
lamented the Rhenish democrat Georg Forster in mid-1791. ‘It is being read assiduously 
across Germany, and has appeared in a (quite inelegant) French translation as well.’140  
Almost at once, German defenders of the French cause took aim at this work. In 
Berlin, the Prussian Aufklärer Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz dropped the normally 
impartial tone of his Neue Litteratur und Völkerkunde to declaim the Reflections as a toxic 
muddle of sanctimony, hypocrisy, and ignorance.141 ‘Herr Burke speaks of the political 
changes in France with the most obscene bitterness’, he fumed, despite the fact that Burke 
was ‘completely unfamiliar’ with the actual details of these reforms. If he were, he would see 
that the French ‘plan for the creation of an effective legislature is the most sensible in theory, 
the most elegant in practice, that history has yet to witness.’ The image of the Revolution 
presented in the Reflections was precisely the opposite. ‘Burke has misrepresented this 
system so radically that one would be hard pressed to find anything [so revolting] in all the 
annals of politics and literature.’142 
Forster’s review was similarly acerbic, denouncing the ‘biases in [Burke’s] argument, 
his partisan perspective, the vanity of his unproven assertions, his pretended air of authority 
and his faulty logic, which is rooted in false premises that he uses to seduce the reader into 
adopting his conclusions.’143 Burke was so unhinged in this work that Forster felt justified in 
psychologizing Burke’s embrace of such a ludicrous, conspiratorial argument. In the Army 
Estimates debate, he speculated, Burke’s fanciful imagination must have seduced him into 
temporarily embracing the wild idea that a pan-European cabal of republicans were intent on 
toppling Europe’s established governments. Too embarrassed to renounce this position in the 
months afterwards, Burke chose to double-down on it, composing the Reflections as an 
elaborate face-saving measure:  
There remained for him not other option than to defend these new principles, 
and to use all his talents to present this impulsive alteration of his beliefs as 
[the result of] a coherent set of principles. There is no other explanation for 																																																								
139 See, e.g., Historische Nachrichten und politische Betrachtungen über die französische Revolution, 
ed. Christoph Girtanner, vol. 1 (1788): pp. 86-137. 
140 Georg Forster, ‘Geschichte der Litteratur [sic]’, Annalen der britischen Geschichte (July 1791): pp. 
184-314, esp. pp. 227-48, at p. 231. 
141 ‘Ueber eine Stelle in Herrn Burke’s Betrachtungen über die Revolution in Frankreich’, Neue 
Litteratur und Völkerkunde, ed. Johann Wilhelm von Archenholz (Mar. 1791): pp. 237-45.  
142 Ibid., pp. 237-8, 243. 
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the appearance of this book, which is one of the strangest things ever written. 
… [It] has satisfied none of its readers; it has offended the moral sentiments of 
both his friends and enemies. One looks with astonishment at Herr Burke, and 
wonders how he could have written a work so unworthy of him. With good 
reason, one can excuse the master [orator] when he is simply carried away by 
his transient fixations: one can look past his scornful, stirred-up attitude, and 
admire this piece of art which, like his four-day address against Hastings, 
enchants listeners with an intelligence and an imagination that surpasses the 
very finest of the ancients. And yet it wins over no man’s heart or mind.144 
Forster was so confident in the error of Burke’s arguments that he was half-disposed to pity 
him. But this sympathy was tempered by his scorn for Burke’s ‘melodramatic narrative, his 
dialectics and casuistry, his intolerance and petulance’.145  
 In March, Rehberg’s endorsement of the Reflections firmly established him as 
Burke’s most prominent German apologist. Like the work’s more critical reviewers, Rehberg 
was deeply impressed by its sheer rhetorical force. Burke’s words ‘spill forth with the 
ferocity of a raging river’, he told his readers; ‘the impression is extremely severe.’146 But 
unlike most of his peers, Rehberg also found the central argument of the Reflections broadly 
persuasive. The wafer-thin rationalism that stood at the root of the revolutionaries’ ideology 
was indeed sufficient to indict the pre-revolutionary constitution. But after tearing down the 
monarchy, aristocracy, and clergy, this weaponized appeal to reason was not substantial 
enough to hold France together. ‘Burke shows that the national assembly has either 
unwittingly neglected or intentionally destroyed all the possible means of holding together 
their kingdom.’147 Without deference to the established pillars of the French state, civil 
society would collapse into chaos, and the possibility of politics itself would be evacuated. 
Under these conditions, Burke had shown, the likeliest outcomes were either rule by a 
despotic revolutionary cabal in Paris, or else an intervention by the French army leading to a 
military dictatorship. From Rehberg’s point of view, neither was preferable to the status quo 
ante. 
 The Reflections deserved careful attention, according to Rehberg, because ‘it is the 
work not of a speculative theorist, but of a man who boasts an lifetime of continual 
engagement with the most important matters of [his] commonwealth’.148 Anticipating a 
distinction between theory and practice upon which he expanded in his Untersuchungen – 
and which had roots in his earlier quarrel with Kant and Jacobi – Rehberg presented Burke as 
an avatar of the practical science of statecraft, which was incompatible with the normative 																																																								
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claims of political theorists. Burke’s voice was especially vital in Rehberg’s context, since 
‘such statesmen are rarely writers in Germany’. Over the course of the eighteenth century, the 
practical and intellectual bifurcation of Germany’s royal advisors and administrators from its 
philosophers had impoverished both groups. Focused exclusively on the practical tasks of 
state management, it was difficult for Germany’s cameralists to find time ‘to review, order 
[and] concentrate their diverse insights’ on politics in order to share them with the public. 
‘The great majority are so consumed by the countless details and demands of their work that 
they are unable to elevate themselves to this level of [general] reflection.’149 Yet Germany’s 
political theorists, on the other hand, did not have the most basic understanding of how 
statecraft was conducted. This had led to an impasse: 
The most exceptional German philosophical writers, men have observed 
[human nature] and who possess an impressive knowledge of individual 
persons, do not often assume a political point of view; yet the great majority 
of our political writers, even the best, who distinguish themselves with 
conclusive reasoning and knowledge of affairs ‹Sachen›, often regrettably 
neglect those actual people [for] whom all of the state’s affairs must be 
[organized].150 
Because Burke had overcome this divide, combining an ‘exquisite insight into questions of 
state [with] an exceptional knowledge of human nature’, he could vindicate the exigencies of 
politics against the apostles of theory. His practical experience of government allowed Burke 
to perceive ‘the harmful consequences of the democratic system’, and to prophesy the 
destruction it would inexorably bring.151  
 In the summer and fall of 1791, as news from France increasingly seemed to 
corroborate Burke’s anxieties, Rehberg gained new allies. After the failed flight to Varennes 
in June, Louis XVI’s suspension by the assembly effectively transformed France into a 
unicameral democracy with an unconstrained legislature. The tenor of French republican 
discourse grew more radical, political violence became commonplace, and Habsburg 
intervention on behalf of the Bourbons seemed imminent. Throughout late 1791, these 
troubling developments caused many of Burke’s early critics to reevaluate their position. In 
October, Wieland took to the pages of his Merkur to recant his earlier opinions. ‘From the 
first signs of revolution in France to its outbreak, I have warmly wished for a political and 
moral regeneration … in this nation which I have always prized highly’, he wrote. ‘It would 
have given me great satisfaction to see the [contrary] view, which has been peddled by 
powerful men [like Burke] and widely accepted on the basis of their authority … be 
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unexpectedly contradicted by experience.’ 152 But with unchecked power in the hands of the 
radicalized Assemblée, the emergence of a constitutional liberty seemed unlikely:    
A people who wants to be free but who has not yet learned, after two full 
years, that liberty without absolute and unconditional obedience to the law is 
absurd in theory and is, in practice, a condition infinitely more ignoble and 
degenerate than Asiatic slavery; a people who yearns for liberty, yet allows 
itself to be incited and enraptured by a faction of men, qui salva republica 
salvi esse non possunt, to the most wild debaucheries, to deeds of which 
cannibals would be ashamed – such a people is, to put it mildly, not yet ready 
‹reif› for freedom….153 
In its comment on the Reflections, the Annalen der Geographie und Statistik argued that 
Burke’s position was in fact quite moderate: namely, he had simply rejected the 
revolutionaries’ choice between slavery or rebellion as a false one.154 ‘Here we find a free 
Briton, widely known as a long-serving statesman, a great orator, defender of the civil law, 
and enemy of despotism’ who saw that France’s established constitution provided an 
adequate foundation for the construction of a well-balanced constitution. ‘He has therefore 
earned also the right to be heard in our country, where so many otherwise intelligent 
observers have claimed that this revolution must be totally condemned or else triumphantly 
celebrated.’155 
Most significantly, the Reflections apparently induced Brandes to reverse his 
allegiances, too. In an anonymous review published in November, he directly repudiated the 
argument of his earlier Politische Betrachtungen.156 This volte-face was so abrupt that it 
caused Heyne some consternation: ‘the good Ernst Brandes’, he told a friend, ‘who was 
formerly the most horrible kind of democrat, has in an instant taken up the other extreme, and 
seems to have been led into the opposing faction by Herr Burke.’157   																																																								
152 Wieland, ‘Erklärung des Herausgebers über die im 6ten Monatsstück des T. Merk. 1791 auf der 
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What Burke saw at an early date, but what Brandes only now recognized, was that the 
revolutionaries’ rationalism was not incidental to their cause, but rather its animating 
principle. Burke’s hostility to this ‘metaphysical’ mode of politics was, according to Brandes, 
the ‘spirit which pervades his whole argument’: 
That which, from the perspective of theory, seems malformed or incoherent in 
the pure understanding of men is not to be overthrown in the real world. For 
men do not act solely according to deductive rational principles. Reason is 
only a part of man’s being ‹Wesen›. Passions, habits, inclinations and 
authorities determine our actions as much as, if not more than, [rational 
calculations about our happiness]. These are ineradicable, essential features of 
his nature. Abstract systems suppose a self-made rational perfection that is 
simply impossible for the great majority of men…. For the statesman who 
hopes to promote the common good of the nation he serves, such systems are 
of little use. A brief and sober investigation of men’s needs and inclinations, 
which are determined by their locale and environment – this is the true mark 
of the statesman….158 
Brandes was especially concerned to combat the criticism that the Reflections entailed a 
betrayal of Burke’s Whig principles, and spent most of his article reviewing Burke’s 
parliamentary career and stressing his bona fides as a liberal critic of overweening power.159 
‘The American unrest, the governance of English East-India, the issue of royal and 
ministerial expenditures, the union of Great Britain and Ireland – these are the topics of his 
published writings and speeches, which for too long have been less known in Germany than 
they deserve to be.’ But like the Reflections, these texts were infused with Burke’s ‘aversion 
to metaphysical systems as the foundation of a constitution’. Throughout his life Burke had 
maintained his belief that ‘arbitrary power ‹Willkür› and [unregulated] license are both false 
paths’, neither of which is conducive to a free society.160  
Not only did German readers become more receptive of Burke’s politics throughout 
1791 and 1792, they were also inundated with a barrage of anti-Burkean tracts that had been 
composed during the pamphlet wars that the Reflections incited. This had the unintended 
effect of keeping Burke at the centre of the German agenda. As the critiques written by 
Joseph Priestley, Thomas Price, James Mackintosh, George Rous and – most controversially 
– Thomas Paine drifted into Germany, they sparked a proxy-war among German reviewers, 
reinforcing the division between pro- and anti-Burkean commentators and forcing readers to 
choose a side.161 Rehberg emerged as the chief voice of the first faction, while Paine’s 																																																								
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defender Forster became leading spokesman for the latter.162 It was the experience of this 
debate in particular that ultimately convinced Rehberg to give up his Literaturzeitung column 
in order to write the Untersuchungen. 
In his review of Burke’s Appeal from the new to the old Whigs, Rehberg made clear 
that the central point of disagreement between Burke and his Whig critics did not turn on 
their shared aversion to despotism, but rather on the permissibility of revolution as a tactic to 
escape it. The answer to this question, he explained, turned on whether civil society was 
natural or artificial.163 Was sociability a basic trait of human psychology, or was civil society 
a contingent phenomenon in history? Once all the political intrigue of personal feuds was 
stripped away, this was the basic question that separated Burke from Price, Priestley, and 
Paine. Rehberg found the Appeal such a powerful intervention into this debate that he 
translated it himself, excerpting and publishing the essay’s ‘universally-applicable passages’ 
in Wieland’s Merkur under a new title, ‘Das Recht der Völker, ihre Staatsverfassungen 
willkürlich abzuändern, geprüft von Burke’.164 In this text, he explained by way of 
introduction, Burke set out a philosophical analysis of ‘the most important questions of our 
time’: namely, ‘the doctrine of the inalienable sovereignty of the people’, which ‘is the 
foundation of Rousseau’s system in his famous book Du Contrat Social’, and which had 
‘entirely permeated the French way of thinking about politics.’165 Revolutions cannot be 
made legal through a philosophic appeal to popular sovereignty, Burke held against his Whig 
critics, because in the moment of rebellion, civil society is dissolved, and ‘the people’ cease 
to exist in any meaningful sense: they become a collection of atomized individuals in a state 
of nature. Thus there was an internal contradiction in the very idea of a right to popular 
rebellion. ‘For to be a people, and to have these rights, are things incompatible’, Burke 
explained in the Appeal. ‘The one supposes the presence, the other the absence of a state of 
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civil society.’166 The only way out of this dilemma was to place society prior to the state: to 
suggest, in other words, that human beings are capable of self-government in the absence of 
law. This assumption was so naïve that, as Rehberg noted, not even Rousseau had fallen 
victim to it.167 Yet the vulgarized Rousseauians of Paris and their British allies were now 
dogmatically committed to this supposition: it was a premise of their argument that because 
the Bourbon regime had violated the people’s ‘natural’ rights, it could justifiably be 
overthrown. With Burke, Rehberg rejected this revolutionary logic as a disastrous conflation 
of man’s natural, pre-political condition and the state of civil society that made the concept of 
right intelligible in the first instance.168 
 The obvious objection to this argument, which Burke’s critics were quick to point out, 
is that it seemed to obviate the crucial moral distinction between extant governments and just 
ones.169 In an introduction to the first German edition of Paine’s Rights of Man, Forster 
pressed just this line of attack.170 ‘What is truth? What is freedom? What is justice ‹Recht›? – 
It behooves every man of reason to turn his mind to these questions. He who has dedicated 
himself to this task with diligence and impartiality will … gladly collect every bit of foreign 
light [that he can], in order to illuminate the dark metaphysical abyss.’171 The problem with 
Burke’s legal positivism, Forster believed, was that it led ultimately to moral relativism, 
insofar as it denied men access to any extra-historical or transcendent standard of justice. It 
was just a clever means of rationalizing power. Fortunately, Paine proceeded from the 
opposite premises: moral right was perceptible through human reason, and offered an 
unchanging criterion with which to adjudicate existing regimes. Rather melodramatically, 
Forster presented the argument between these men as a duel between two prizefighters, a 
contest between Paine’s principled rationalism and Burke’s traditionalism. ‘We are invited to 																																																								
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167 Rehberg, Untersuchungen, vol. 1, pp. 6-16; cf. [Rehberg], review of Charles-Francois Lenormant, 
J.J. Rousseau, Aristocrate (Paris, 1790), Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (7 Mar. 1791): pp. 603-5. 
168 For a satirical take on Rehberg’s translation of the Appeal, see ‘Schreiben an Herrn Magister 
Superbus, über das Recht der Völker, ihre Staatsverfassungen willkührlich abzuändern, geprüft von 
Burke’, Neues Braunschweigisches Journal, ed. Joachim Heinrich Campe (Jan. 1792): pp. 110-128. 
169 For these English criticisms of the Reflections, cf. Bourke, Empire and Revolution, pp. 741-819. 
170 Paine, Die Rechte des Menschen, trans. Meta Forkel-Liebeskind, with an introduction by Georg 
Forster (Berlin: Vossische Buchhandlung, 1792); Forster’s introduction has been reprinted in his 
Werke, ed. Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, 18 vols. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1958-), vol. 
8, pp. 220-7. Forkel-Liebeskind’s translation was later supplemented with Paine’s Rights of Man: 
Part the Second, and published in Copenhagen (Prost, 1793). Cf. Kurzer Abriß der Entstehung der 
französischen Revolution von Thomas Paine, trans. Johann Gottfried Dyck (Leipzig: Dyck, 1791), a 
translation of Paine’s account of the Revolution’s origins; and Paine, Über die Regierungen und die 
Ur-Grundsätze einer jeden derselben, trans. anonymous (Paris, 1794) (a translation of Rights of Man: 
Part the Second). The latter was reviewed in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (23 June 1797): pp. 761-
3. 
171 Ibid., p. 220. 
Chapter 3: August Wilhelm Rehberg 
	85 
be spectators’, he explained his readers, ‘to chose the knight that appeals to our hearts, to 
cheer him when he lands a mighty blow and to tremble when his opponent gains the upper 
hand.’172 
 But Forster’s introduction did not merely censure Burke: he concluded it with an 
explicit, gratuitous attack on Rehberg’s personal integrity. ‘We could have ended here and 
trusted our work to the public’s judgment’, he wrote, ‘if a certain German reviewer had not 
recently chosen to attack Paine … with a harshness that is a disgrace the very practice of 
reviewing. We warn the public of this author, who attempts to give his judgments an air of 
impartiality.’173 Forster was referring to Rehberg’s review of Rights of Man, published a 
month earlier, which had dismissed Paine’s work as a recapitulation of stale arguments that 
Burke had already defanged.174 Forster took personal offense, insisting that it was Rehberg 
who was parroting worn-out arguments, and that his Literaturzeitung column had become no 
more than a vehicle of Burkean reaction:   
We can assure this reviewer [i.e. Rehberg] that we are not blind to his theory 
of constitutionalism, which he sets against that of our democrats and 
revolutionaries. … If we strip away all of [his] exotic and superfluous 
obfuscations … his basic thesis is that since the cultivation of the human race 
is a work in time, proceeding slowly from imperfection to perfection, we have 
sufficient reason to leave the errors of our forefathers uncorrected. We wish 
him luck with this logic, which is far more appropriate to a dicastery [of the 
Roman Catholic Church] than a learned journal, where one should try to avoid 
peddling such obvious sophistries.175  
Like Burke, in other words, Rehberg had rejected reason’s sufficiency to discern the basic 
rights of man, throwing him back onto a historically-contingent definition of right which, 
according to Forster, was unable to clear distinctions between norms and facts. Making 
matters worse, he was using his position as a reviewer to promulgate this relativistic 
philosophy. 
Rehberg took the occasion to defend himself against Forster a few months later. ‘An 
accusation has been leveled at the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung’, he reported, ‘that its 
evaluation of works on the French Revolution has been uniformly and completely partisan. 
This same critic has also made it clear that he wants to see another point of view get a 
hearing in this journal.’176 Interestingly, Rehberg did not take refuge in a typically aufgeklärt 																																																								
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profession of neutrality. Instead he freely admitted that, although he always tried to judge 
books on their merits, he also had a well-conceived set of principles which informed the 
judgments in his column.177 ‘Any intelligible review must proceed on the basis of a fixed, 
established perspective. Anyone who gains a thoroughgoing understanding of a scientific 
subject comes to see certain basic principles and ideas as true, good and useful.’ The 
relationship between a critic and his readers is built on mutual trust. It would have been 
dishonest for Rehberg to hide his own views – especially on a topic as important as the 
Revolution. ‘In so far as a [reviewer] wants to do justice to … a writer whose principles seem 
mistaken and harmful to him, or one who sets out to defend false hypotheses, … he cannot 
renounce his own convictions.’178 Indeed, it was a sign of intellectual rigor and integrity to 
remain committed to one’s principles in the face of opposition. And so ‘if the accusations of 
partisanship against the present reviewer [mean] that all his reviews have been composed in 
one spirit and flow from the same principles, then … this reproach is much more a badge of 
approval [than reproach].’179  
Yet however unwarranted, Forster’s accusations did reveal a deficiency in Rehberg’s 
Literaturzeitung column, one that applied to the position of counter-revolutionary writers 
more generally. As a critic, Rehberg was obliged to contend with new arguments as they 
appeared, but seldom had the chance to forward his own positive agenda. ‘The principles 
upon which I judged the new [French] constitution and the work of the men who contributed 
to it were only obliquely indicated in my reviews.’180 Burke had been in a similar position, 
Rehberg thought, responding to events in France as they unfolded rather than setting out his 
own principles in a systematic and compelling way. This had put revolutionaries at a 
structural advantage: while their leaders were able to paint a vivid, proactive image of the 
world they hoped to bring into being, their critics were only pointing out this vision’s flaws. 
This had led some observers to conclude that Burke and his allies were without positive 
principles at all: that they were little more than recalcitrant skeptics. ‘This book will probably 
be criticized in Germany for lacking systematic order’, Brandes had written of the 
Reflections. ‘We are so used to seeing everything in systematic terms that we assume a work 																																																								
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is well-argued only if is presented in these terms.’ It was incumbent on Burke’s German 
allies, therefore, to elucidate ‘the sublime harmony of his first principles.’181   
Rehberg agreed. In his earlier review of the Reflections, he had voiced similar 
anxieties about the work’s suitability for German audiences. While his compatriots were able 
to recognize the work’s eloquence, Burke’s philosophical principles were more difficult to 
detect. His primary objective had been political, not theoretical. The Reflections were an 
immediate reaction to the threat that the Revolution’s principles posed to Britain – an attempt 
to protect its constitutional system of government from collapse. But most Germans lived in 
territories with no traditions of self-government and few limits on the state power. ‘In its 
political and civil institutions England possessed a great treasure’, he later recalled. ‘Burke 
could therefore make their preservation the first and final object of all his exertions. But what 
part of Holy Roman Empire’s constitution, or those of the provincial states, could a German 
writer have [defended] in order to further the national interest?’182 At best, some of the 
German states had rudimentary traces of constitutional government, but nothing approaching 
the English example. It was therefore necessary not only to make a case against the 
Revolution, but also to explain, in positive terms, what a Burkean reform of the Germanies 
would entail. Rehberg said as much explicitly in his review of the Reflections:  
The English have an admirable constitution to lose, but in Germany there are 
few traces of good constitutions. Where there are constitutions, they require 
vast improvements. In England, a general spirit of liberty is the strongest 
defense against despotism; in Germany, only the education of our nobility and 
the excellence of our administrators ‹Staatsverwaltung› protect our liberties. 
… The English writer can oppose the excellence of his constitution against an 
insatiable lust for innovation ‹Neuerung›. But in many other countries, the 
duty of the virtuous citizen is not to find new ways to protect the old order – 
which would do nothing but perpetuate the same abuses that have made the 
nobility indolent and arrogant – but rather to rouse the nobility from its 
dangerous sleep. We must show our aristocrats that the only way to stop a 
revolution (such as the French) is to enact reforms from the top down, before 
the people begin to flirt with rebellion. Herein lies a great task for the German 
writer. For the French Revolution has clearly marred the cause of liberty.183  
The duty of Burke’s allies in Germany was not to conserve an established status quo, but 
rather to begin reforming their governments, yet to do so while avoiding the pitfalls that had 
ensnared the French. For this task the Reflections was a useful, but insufficient, guide. ‘A 
book that could serve Germany the way that Burke’s has served England would make use of 
his observations, but extract them from his context and present them differently’, Rehberg 
																																																								
181 [Brandes], review of Burke, Reflections, pp. 1906-7. 
182 Rehberg, ‘Deutschland vor dem Ausbruche der Revolution’, in Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 3-32, at p. 30. 
183 [Rehberg], review of Burke, Reflections, pp. 565-6. 
Chapter 3: August Wilhelm Rehberg 
	88 
explained. It would distill and systematize the principles scattered throughout Burke’s 
winding argument, and using them to outline an agenda for prudent, moderate liberalization:   
Such a work would take up the principles adopted by the assemblée nationale, 
systematically setting them out and methodically rebutting them in all of their 
various claims and consequences. For it is this form of [systematic] scientific 
insight that the best members of the German public admire and appreciate 
above all else.184  
Without such mediation, ‘it is doubtful that this excellent work … will enjoy the same 
approval outside Great Britain that it has found within it.’185  
 
V. Burke and the Untersuchungen 
Sometime in the summer of 1792, Rehberg decided to respond to his own appeal: to compose 
a systematic defense of Burke’s constitutionalist vision of liberty, one that would be 
intelligible to his German peers.186 The benefits of such a treatise would be twofold. On the 
one hand, it would allow him to explain the principles that had informed his judgments as a 
critic over the past few years, and in so doing, defend himself against Forster’s recent 
accusations of partisanship. More importantly, it would allow him set out a philosophical 
critique of ‘the system that the legislators of France have pursued’, a critique that began from 
his first principles and proceeded inductively towards a practical explanation of the 
Revolution’s failure.187 Rehberg also recognized that, by 1792, his authority as a political 
commentator was considerably stronger than it had been when he first began his 
Literaturzeitung column: as Spittler observed, ‘his intuitions about everything that has taken 
place in France since these reviews first appeared [can now] be vigorously restated with the 
greatest justification.’188 Alongside this new philosophical treatise, Rehberg also decided to 
republish a selection of his earlier critical essays. He spent the fall rewriting many of them, 
and strung them together in a rough sequential narrative, so that they read as a history of 
political debates in the Revolution’s early years.189 He completed both sections of this new 
work by September, and released his two-volume Untersuchungen über die französische 
Revolution in January 1793. 
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 As in the Literaturzeitung, the majority of the Untersuchungen’s historical section 
was dedicated to French primary sources. But Rehberg attached a long appendix, in which he 
also discussed British works on the Revolution. In his telling, the history of British political 
debates over the past four years was effectively a history of responses to Burke.190 Though 
much of this material would have been familiar to his readers, Rehberg made substantial 
alterations in his discussion of the Reflections. Three are particularly noteworthy. First, he 
excised his observation that a systematic apology of Burke’s politics needed to be written: 
Rehberg believed that he had now filled this lacuna.191 Second, he substantially altered his 
verdict on the Reflections’ rhetoric. In his 1790 review, he was palpably uncomfortable with 
this work’s incendiary tone – Burke’s impassioned declamations of the revolutionary mob, 
his near-censoriousness, his periodic bouts of enthusiasm. But in late 1792, in the aftermath 
of the September Massacres and the collapse of the monarchy, Rehberg believed that this 
tone was completely warranted. ‘Of course there is a good deal rhetorical embellishment.’ 
But this was not a sign of Burke’s unhinged or deranged imagination, but rather of his moral 
seriousness. ‘Woe to him who debates subjects that concern the wellbeing of the human race 
with cold blood, as if debating a geometric proof’, he warned. ‘The warmth that befits [such 
an] investigation … is completely unlike the heat of the passions: a complete placidity and 
coldness in such investigations is the start of an immoral indifference that leads ultimately to 
the callous and stupid revolutionary rage that has infected so many heads in France.’192 
Most significantly, however, in the Untersuchungen Rehberg considerably enlarged 
his discussion of what he saw as the Reflections’ skeptical critique of political theory. 
Whereas his initial review discussed the gap between Germany’s political theorists and 
administrators in a single paragraph, Rehberg expanded it into four dense pages for the 
Untersuchungen.193 He used this analysis of Burke to lay out a précis of his basic 
philosophical commitments. Sharpening his earlier presentation of the dichotomy between 
theory and practice, Rehberg now contended that the recent divergence of the 
‘Geschäftsmann’ and the ‘Gelehrte’ was not an accident of German history, but a necessary 
consequence of their incompatible worldviews. It was just as fruitless to expect a ‘man of 
affairs’ who ‘mechanically follows established customs and prescriptions’ to investigate 
about his own normative principles as it was hopeless ‘to expect the man of letters, too far 
removed from everyday affairs, to make especially apt observations about the very intricate 
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inner-workings of the state.’194 Theorists were simply unable to think politically. As such, 
practical politicians would never be able to enact their philosophical norms in practice:  
Having true insights into the theory of state-administration is far from 
sufficient ‹bey weitem nicht zureichend› to make a good judgment about the 
application of concepts and principles in the real world. In this as in many 
other areas of human knowledge, the perfection of theory has created the false 
belief ‹Vorurtheil› that it is adequate to simply insert abstract principles 
beneath all the questions that arise in the administration and ordering of a civil 
society’s affairs … in order to resolve [these questions].  Such answers are far 
too easily discovered for the great mass of essays that arise in this way to be of 
any instruction.195 
According to Rehberg, it was Burke’s resolute skepticism about the feasibility of a 
philosophical politics that was the distinguishing mark of the Reflections – that it was 
‘metaphysics [itself that] shattered the French monarchy and brought about a Revolution of 
which no equal has ever been heard before’.196 The deep problem of the Revolution, Burke 
recognized, was not merely that its leaders were especially inept or imprudent (though this 
was true, too); rather, it was that their dogmatic theory of liberty was impracticable in 
principle. And this boded particularly ill for Germany. From his experience of the 
Pantheismusstreit, Rehberg believed that his homeland was rife with overly-normative 
political writers – Wolffian, Kantian, Trinitarian – whose ideals could be used to indict 
Germany’s established governments just as easily as the philosophes’. Like a virus emanating 
from Paris, the confused premise that abstract theories of justice could be applied to practice 
threatened to subvert civil society in Germany.197 Just as the Reflections had immunized 
Britain against the threat of ‘metaphysics’, the Untersuchungen was meant to do the same for 
Rehberg’s Germany. 
 In his wider philosophical discussion of politics, Rehberg used this Burkean 
dichotomy between ‘metaphysics’ and politics as the central framing device of his argument. 
In his thinking, it tracked an opposition between government rooted in pure ‘reason’ 
‹Vernunft›, like the French, and those rooted in ‘understanding’ ‹Verstand›, like the 
British.198 The degree to which Rehberg associated Kant with the former is clear from his 
preliminary definition of political rationalism. For the normative political philosopher, he 
wrote, 																																																								
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… all relations in civil society must be judged … according to the laws of 
moral necessity: and everything in the civil society that is and should be legal, 
must be deduced from to the original laws of reason ‹Gesetzen der Vernunft›. 
Therefore, there is only one constitution, one legal code, for all the peoples of 
the earth – not merely the best one, but the only just one. And this consists in 
an absolute general liberty under the sovereign rule of moral necessity.199 
The revolutionaries’ faith in metaphysics had predetermined the entire course of their 
movement by its inflexible, inexorable logic. If pure reason was the ultimate arbiter of 
political justice, then the criteria of justice must (like reason itself) be transcendent, eternal, 
and universally accessible. From this premise quickly followed the doctrine of the original 
equality of men, as well as their collective right to judge the legitimacy of their governments 
according to this unchanging moral standard (and, if necessary, rebel against injustice). Any 
constitution or social institutions which had been formerly justified on the basis of accepted 
use, convention or tradition was unjust, and had to be dissolved.200 The French had ‘ruled out 
all grounds [of political judgment] other than rational ones ‹Vernunftsgründen›, which have 
been granted an exclusive right to rule over all matters in the political world’.201 
Such theories, which had ‘the false appearance of mathematical precision’, were just 
as pernicious as they were seductive.202 Part of Rehberg’s critique was couched in pragmatic 
terms, suggesting that the revolutionaries’ metaphysical vision of justice was too abstract to 
be practical. ‘The laws of reason are hardly sufficient, to deduce laws of civil society from 
them.’203 Even if, for the sake of argument, it were possible to derive the absolute norms of 
justice through a priori reasoning, these rudimentary criteria would not, in and of themselves, 
be adequate to construct a constitution. Other critical information, not accessible through 
deracinated cogitation – about the character of the people in question, its constitution, its 
history, its geopolitical situation, its finances, and so on – would be necessary. There are 
many possible constitutions that fulfill the criteria of Kant’s categorical imperative and that 
distribute justice equally. As he explained in the Untersuchungen:  
Form does not exist without substance: the principles of natural right, which 
are quite evident and demonstrative in abstraction [given the rationalist’s 
premises], cannot therefore be applied precisely in the real world in this 
abstract purity: human understanding must come to the aid of pure reason and, 
through positive legislation, explain what is right in cases where the pure 
natural laws [of reason] are lacking.204 																																																								
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It was not possible, in other words, to wash one’s hands of a-rational or empirical 
considerations when designing constitutions: the historically-contingent elements of one 
constitution ‘cannot be dismissed without letting other contingent modifications take their 
place, which would carry their own unique inconveniences.’205 The false conceit that there 
was only one just constitution, applicable in all times and places, was a delusion.  
 Rehberg’s second critique of the revolutionaries’ rationalism was subtler, but more 
lethal. He objected to the politics of Vernunft on the Humean grounds that a positive ‘theory 
of liberty’ was a contradiction in terms. Normative accounts of justice were internally 
inconsistent with the culture of toleration and individual liberty that had emerged in the wake 
of the Wars of Religion. It was obvious why the theological accounts of political legitimacy 
that prevailed in the Middle Ages were not conducive to toleration: if God had granted a king 
a divine right of rule, then his authority was logically derivative of the Church’s. Such a 
regime could not tolerate alternative religious systems within its borders without subverting 
its own legitimacy. But the same critique, Rehberg argued, applied to philosophical theories 
of legitimacy as well. If the revolutionaries had uncovered the essential criteria of justice – if 
they enjoyed the same access to transcendence that their medieval forebears claimed – there 
was no reason why dissent from their views should be tolerated. Indeed, to do so would be to 
undermine the grounds of the revolutionary state. This was why they had so quickly begun to 
reproduce the same religious zealotry that they rightfully condemned in the pre-revolutionary 
Church:      
The [revolutionaries] have persecuted the clergy … like no other class of men 
before them, through a series of decrees that have been increasingly unjust and 
grotesque: just like the religious sectarians of those times that are used as an 
pretext for attacking religion today. Louis XIV – whom today’s tolerant 
philosophers bitterly indict, and with good justification, for his oppression of 
the Huguenots – wanted to make everyone Catholic. But the current lawgivers 
[of France] seek to exterminate all religion with acts of violence that Louis 
XIV himself would not have contemplated. Hiding behind the disgraceful 
pretext of ‘religious liberty’, they have [ruthlessly] persecuted pitiable priests 
and monks who have held fast to their ancient faith….206  
The characteristic mark of a liberal constitutional order, in Rehberg’s view, was the 
displacement of moral certitude by a gentle skepticism, a willingness to accept that 
transcendence may not, in fact, be open to fallible, limited human beings. Whether explicit or 
implicit, such humility was a necessary precondition of toleration: only if our own views are 
possibly in error could it made sense to allow the teaching of other (possibly true) 
worldviews.  																																																								
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 The seminal risk in such a post-theological polity, of course, was instability: how was 
it possible to shore up the state in the absence of such reassuring moral foundations? 
According to Rehberg, if anarchy was to be staved off, then the authority of theology and 
philosophy needed to be displaced by the authority of ‘convention’ ‹Herkommen› – that is to 
say, by a widespread societal deference to custom, tradition, precedent, and the prescriptive 
authority of positive law. In such a society – Rehberg’s model was quite obviously Britain – 
‘the laws of civil society are conceived voluntarily ‹willkürlich› en masse and introduced 
through contracts, either explicitly or implicitly (for example, through conventions).’ These 
conventions are worthy of collective respect, because they are the result of an 
intergenerational process of ‘deliberation about what is most conducive to the common 
good’, and so can provide a reliable foundation for civil order.207  
At the same time, however, the moral authority of prescription is circumscribed: local 
traditions, peculiar to the circumstances of particular societies, cannot make the same claims 
to universality and exclusivity as normative theories of justice. In this way – by anchoring the 
state in historical time – it was possible to find a middle path between absolutism and 
anarchy. As Rehberg knew, this was a Humean insight: defining justice as a ‘convention’, an 
achievement in historical time, made it something more than a useful fiction, but less than an 
absolute norm.208 In a liberal state governed by the rule of law, the administration of justice 
was not tantamount to the sovereign’s arbitrary pronouncements: in this sense, it was not an 
illusion, but a real social fact. And this was why Burke had so vigorously defended the 
authority of prescription against the revolutionaries’ British apologists. He recognized, like 
Hume, that if the British turned against the authority of inherited custom, the only 
alternatives were tyranny or anarchy:  
He shows that the constitution of the state is not like a joint-stock company, 
rooted only in the choice ‹Willkür› of the present generation and without 
regard towards past or future generations, and indeed that civil society – to 
which the human race owes all of its intellectual and moral development – is a 
sacred gift handed down to us by our ancestors, which we must transmit to 
posterity.209 
Rehberg admired the Reflections because it so eloquently defended this historically-
contingent, non-normative form of liberalism.210 For Rehberg, liberty was not a principle to 																																																								
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be instantiated or a blueprint to be followed. It was a negative space, a void of self-
determination that opened up in the absence of normative political doctrines, whether 
theological or philosophical.211  
Rehberg was particularly exercised to rebut the criticism that in defending the 
authority of convention, he was embracing moral relativism. There is a difference, he 
insisted, between governments whose authority was rooted in constitutional tradition, and 
those founded through rank ‘violence’ ‹Gewalt›. Apologists of the latter did, in fact, believe 
that ‘our ideas of justice and duty are pure fantasies, rooted in deception, which receive their 
power [over time] from common usage’.212 This claim obviated the distinction between just 
and unjust societies. But the authority of tradition – which, crucially, was an authority 
delegated to the constitution through implicit contract – provided a moral standard by which 
contemporary institutions, politicians, and legislation could be judged. And because this 
authority was historical and therefore time-bound, traditional constitutions were open to 
reform and evolution in a way that philosophically-derived ones were not. As Rehberg put it 
in his critique of Paine: 
In short, the whole idea of a free contract that is willfully formed and 
dissolved through general consent does not apply to a [society] that never dies, 
but whose individual members are born and die at all different times. Rather, 
their ends are best served by a constitution that has attained stability over a 
long period of time and customary use ‹Gewohnheit›. But when one renounces 
the central premise of Burke’s opponents – namely, that every generation has 
an inalienable right to make a new constitution according to its discretion – 
one arrives at Burke’s own position: namely, that every age must endeavor to 
improve what is imperfect in its constitution, but that the cases in which 
intolerable evil makes general revolution necessary lie so far beyond the 
bounds of human understanding and insight that they cannot be discussed in 
the conventional terms of right….213 
If liberty were an absence – a vacancy created within civil society through a constitutional 
balance of power214 – then of course it was possible to debate how this space could be 
enlarged, protected, and fortified. And this was, in practice, how debates in the British 
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Parliament were conducted: new legislation was scrutinized to evaluate if it was in keeping 
with constitutional principles, or if it undermined them. Each generation inherits an imperfect 
society, and ‘has a right and a duty to improve [its] constitution’.215  
 In the German case, Rehberg’s Untersuchungen pressed for two reforms in particular. 
First, he argued that if the territorial aristocracy were to avoid becoming an anachronistic 
relic like the pre-revolutionary French aristocracy, its legal privileges and social 
responsibilities had to be revaluated. In constitutional terms, the role of an effective nobility 
was to exert a political check on executive power. But in Rehberg’s view, this was hardly the 
case anywhere in the Holy Roman Empire. In absolute monarchies like Prussia and Austria, 
the nobility was weak and ineffective; in Hanover, it had effectively arrogated executive 
power to itself. They were just as useless as their counterparts in pre-revolutionary France. 
Though he vehemently condemned the French legislature’s abolition of the nobility as 
shortsighted, imprudent, and unjust, Rehberg was more critical of the nobility than Burke, 
whose love of ‘ancient and customary constitutions’ had partially distorted his judgments.216 
In Germany, the nobility’s privileges no longer corresponded to their constitutional role: they 
had become mere indulgences. Reciting arguments that could have come from Möser or 
Spittler, Rehberg explained that ‘the origin of our territorial nobility was closely tied to [the 
need for a] common defense’. The principle of seigniorial jurisdiction arose so that the 
property-bearing aristocracy could effectively raise militias and protect the people’s liberties. 
But in the late-eighteenth century, Germans were no longer a self-governing ‘agrarian 
people’ defended by local citizen militias.217 With the rise of modern commercial economies, 
he explained,   
… common defense cannot be provided in the old way. The many inventions 
of industry, the tremendous accumulation of specie and its circulation – all 
this has changed everything. Property in land is no longer the only or even the 
preeminent kind of property, [and] the nobility is not so distinguished by its 
[landed] holdings as it was before, when they were necessary for waging 
[military] campaigns.218 
Now that wars were financed primarily through public debt, it was the entrepreneurial Bürger 
who contributed most to public defense. ‘There has arisen [within the modern state] a need 
for money, [and with it] a new nobility of service ‹Ehre des Dienstes›’.219 To maintain its 
vibrancy, the German nobility needed to follow the example of their British cousins and 
begin assimilating talented Bürger into their ranks. In states where the aristocracy had been 																																																								
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rendered impotent, this would enable them to assert political pressure on the executive and 
bring Germany’s absolute monarchies back into constitutional balance. At the same time, the 
nobility could curry popular support by relinquishing their tax exemptions. These 
‘correspond to a time long ago, when the [free-holding] nobleman did a service [to his 
community] in possessing these goods.’ Yet today, ‘this freedom from taxation still persists 
in those places … where the princes and the third estate are too weak to combat this 
monstrous injustice.’220 If the German aristocracy were to defend popular liberty against 
monarchical absolutism like the Whigs in Britain, they needed to address this legitimate 
bourgeois grievance. 
 If revolution were to be forestalled in Germany, its established churches also needed 
to be reformed. This task was especially pressing given the ascendant anti-clericalism 
emanating from France. Like Burke, Rehberg opposed the revolutionaries’ violent campaign 
of irreligion, censuring it as illiberal, dogmatic, and immoral. ‘Every civil establishment that 
serves religion runs contrary to their principles, and through the spirit of their system, 
religion itself looses its dignity’, he lamented: nothing less than an unvarnished ‘hatred of the 
clergy’ was the driving force behind their campaign of expropriation.221 Though Rehberg was 
agnostic about the claims of Christianity, and though he remained skeptical of Kant’s 
practical argument for rational faith, he nevertheless insisted that institutionalized religion 
was defensible, and indeed necessary, on practical political grounds. Like Burke, he saw 
public religion as a precondition of civil society. An established Church lends gravity to 
matters of state, conferring stability to politics. Naïvely,  
the revolutionaries believed that in deifying reason, they could maintain the reverence 
afforded to the pre-revolutionary constitution of Church and State: 
The laws of the [French] state, which are said to be rooted in [reason] alone, 
are supposed to be entirety sufficient to generate that respect [for law] that 
holds society together…. The first principles of this moral-political system 
have taken over the sacredness that once seemed to be appropriate only to 
religion itself. The only possible justification of religion therefore becomes 
anxieties about the life to come, which may be dismissed as chimerical by the 
friends of these philosophical and unphilosophical systems.222 
Secondly, Rehberg also believed that religion played a crucial role in most citizen’s moral, 
and therefore civic, development, one that could not be replaced through ‘a scholar’s 
education [of] reading and abstract reflection’.223 The notion that the French could reach 
‘moral perfection’ by replacing provincial vicars with a ‘professor of economics in every 																																																								
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village’ was as laughable as it was tragic. 224 For the majority of men, the degree of self-
control necessary for the smooth functioning of a free society was unattainable without the 
moral motivation that only faith could provide.225 
At the same time, however, Rehberg was deeply opposed to any attempt to reassert 
the Gallican Church’s authority on theological grounds. Whenever the Untersuchungen 
defended ‘Religion’, its arguments were always fundamentally secular, emphasizing the 
instrumental role that the church played in a liberal society.226 To Rehberg, religion was 
among the historically-contingent ‘conventions’ that were necessary to stabilize 
constitutional government (which is why he usually listed it among the other, secular 
conditions of political stability: e.g., ‘language, customs, habits, religion’).227 The danger of 
defending religion in more than conventional terms – as a set of doctrines, rather than an 
inherited tradition – was that it could erode the skeptical foundations of civil liberty, as ‘the 
Roman Church’s system of subordination’ illustrated.228 In cases where ‘the clergy 
[becomes] too rich and powerful’, Rehberg maintained that the state had a positive duty to 
intervene.229 Breaking dramatically with Burke, he insisted that ‘the right of the legislature to 
dispose of [the church’s] property cannot be abrogated’.230 The confiscation of Gallican 
properties was entirely defensible in principle (if not in practice). In Germany, he noted, the 
seizure of monastic lands in the Reformation had been an ‘exceptional blessing’, banishing 
superstition while also generating revenues that were wisely invested ‘in the sciences and in 
the cultivation of understanding ‹Verstand› among the higher classes’.231 This argument was 
colored by personal experience: as Brandes confided to Burke in 1796, the University of 
Göttingen was itself funded by income from ‘the suppress’d convents’ of Hanover.232  
To ward off the threat of dogmatism, Rehberg called for the general diffusion of a 
gentle, aestheticized Unitarianism in the Germanies, one that inculcated piety and fostered 
morals on the model of the English Church, ‘which grows ever more liberal in its 
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disposition’.233 He saw Herder’s poeticized Lutheranism and, somewhat remarkably, Sieyès’s 
Observations sur les biens Ecclésiastiques (1789) as prototypes for this sort of liberalizing 
religion.234 Germany’s priests needed to ‘bring religion closer to the feelings, which is the 
true element in which it lives.’ 235 In so doing, they could keep it rooted in historical time, and 
insulate it from (in Brandes’s words) ‘the extreme of bigotry [and] that of irreligion’ alike.236 
It was not only Trinitarians who were prone to bigotry, Rehberg noted. ‘Pure natural religion 
… is much more dangerous when it is dependent on metaphysics than the doctrines of 
Christianity, which are dependent on history.’237 
Rehberg was aware that, in comparison to Burke’s ‘excessive dependence on 
religion’, his Untersuchungen was considerably more skeptical.238 But this divergence was 
indicative of a more fundamental difference in their arguments against metaphysics, one that 
Rehberg may not have fully grasped. Like Rehberg, Burke had inveighed against ‘political 
metaphysicians’ in the Reflections, arguing that theoretical reason was insufficient to 
generate a politically intelligible account of justice. Yet this case against theory was not 
rooted in the ‘absolute skepticism’ that Rehberg celebrated in Hume. To Burke, the 
inapplicability of abstract theories of justice did not imply the non-existence of universal 
moral norms. Far from it: as recent studies of Burke have stressed, he held that questions of 
political justice were finally subservient to the authority of moral law.239 ‘The principles of 
true politics are those of morality enlarged, and I neither nor do nor ever will admit of any 
other.’240 In censuring the reductive simulacrum of morality touted by the philosophes, 
Burke’s aim was to defend the real item. This was closely tied to his campaign against 
irreligion. Rehberg tended to read Burke’s complaints about French ‘atheism’ as a critique of 
enthusiasm: the problem with the revolutionaries’ irreligion, from his perspective, was that it 
was too religious. But Burke’s anxieties about disbelief ran deeper than this. It was true, he 
believed, that men are religious animals, and that without the sanction that only an 
established Church can confer, civil society would be unstable. But Burke believed that 
liberal Unitarianism defended by Price, Priestley, and Paine – and which Rehberg defended 																																																								
233 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 190. 
234 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 220-24. Brandes was sympathetic to this programme: see Braune, Burke in 
Deutschland, p. 91. 
235 [Rehberg], review of Herder, Gott, in Schriften, vol. 1, p. 38; cf. ibid., pp. 45-46. 
236 Brandes to Burke, 29 Oct. 1796, in Skalweit, ‘Burke und Brandes’, pp. 37-72, at pp. 52-3. 
237 Rehberg, Verhältnis, pp. 10-11. 
238 Rehberg, Untersuchungen, vol. 2, p. 384. 
239 See, e.g., David Bromwich, The Intellectual Life of Edmund Burke: From the Sublime and 
Beautiful to American Independence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), esp. pp. 19-
26. 
240 The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. T.W. Copeland, 10 vols. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958-78), vol. 2, p. 282. 
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in an aestheticized form – was too thin a basis for civil society as well. In denying Christ’s 
divinity, Unitarians were also logically renouncing the apostolic succession, and with it, the 
Church of England’s title as the emissary of Christ in time. This was why Price argued that 
the British people could ‘cashier’ their monarch without offending God. Though Burke was 
not the full-throated, crypto-Catholic of his opponents’ caricatures, he strongly objected to 
the degradation of Christ’s divinity.241 The Church of England was a link to Christ himself, 
the author of the moral law, on that could not be severed without dramatic constitutional 
consequences.242 If, for Rehberg, ‘religion’ was among the time-bound conventions that 
could stabilize politics in the absence of moral certainty, Burke took the opposite view: the 
Christian tradition was worth conserving only insofar as it pointed beyond itself, to a moral 
anchor outside of time. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
Shortly after publishing the Untersuchungen, Rehberg grew increasingly disillusioned with 
the aging Burke. He regretted that in the wake of the Reflections, Burke’s justifiable 
indignation had boiled over into the sort of hysterical and unhinged fanaticism that he had 
rightly criticized in the revolutionaries. He later lamented that ‘this great man, who for so 
long was the subject of deep and widespread adoration, lost his bearings: he was completely 
overwhelmed by his disgust with French revolution, and by his fear of a similar one [in 
Britain]. … Everyone in Parliament grew weary of his repetitive and untimely 
declamations.’243 In Rehberg’s view, the hot-headed saber-rattling of Regicide Peace and the 
self-righteous declamations of his Letter to a Noble Lord were cut from a different cloth than 
Burke’s earliest warnings about the Revolution: 
Burke’s grave and sublime spirit [was that of] a cautionary genius. But after 
he left behind this [skeptical] spirit, he gave himself over to his natural 
inclinations – to his all-too-warm blood, to his too-indulgent temperament, to 
the allure of those impulsive ideas that often led him. What is more, in order 
to justify himself [in his dealings with Fox], he was forced into the unenviable 
position of having to ardently defend these [dogmatic] positions and 
principles, for which he had given up so much.244 
																																																								
241 See J.C.D. Clark, ‘Introduction’ to Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. idem 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 23-111, esp. pp. 23-43. 
242 This theme is explored in the context of Gibbon’s ‘socinianism’ in J.G.A. Pocock, Barbarism and 
Religion, Volume VI: Barbarism: Triumph in the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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243 Rehberg, ‘Carl James Fox’ (post 1810), in Schriften, vol. 4, pp. 34-73, at p. 57. 
244 Ibid., p. 58. 
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Yet if Burke abandoned the earlier ‘cautionary’ liberalism of the Reflections, Rehberg never 
did. Throughout the revolutionary era and into the Vormärz, he continued to push this 
Humean vision of liberty – skeptical, reformist, constitutionalist – as the best way for the 
German states to avoid the metaphysical cataclysm that destroyed France. In 1814, he was 
among the loudest voices to condemn the imposition of Napoleonic law on the German 
states, arguing that the abolition of the states’ right to make and interpret their own laws 
would spell the death of ‘teutsche Libertet’.245 Similarly, he repeated his calls for a 
fundamental reform of Germany’s antiquated aristocracy and for a liberalization of its 
parliaments – and this, during the restorationist climate of the 1810s and ’20s. 246 This stance 
provided sufficiently uncongenial to the north German aristocracy that Rehberg was 
eventually fired from his job in the Hanoverian civil service.247  
Perhaps unsurprising, the ‘Konservativen’ of late nineteenth-century Prussia had little 
use for him either. It was not until the early-twentieth century, almost a century after his 
death, that he was cast as a vital point of entrée for the introduction of Burke’s conservatism 
into Germany. Rehberg’s critique of Kant and his case for ‘convention’ were presented as the 
origin of a long-running struggle between the partisans of tradition and those of reason. 
Wilhelmine-era scholars cashed out the upshot of this new framing in two distinct ways. One 
line of interpretation stressed the impact that Rehberg’s critique of rationalism had on 
Savigny, Hugo, and the Historische Rechtsschule.248 If, as he had argued, the concept of a 
universalist jurisprudence was self-defeating, then all law had to be seen as a product of 
history, emanating from and intertwined with a society’s customs, traditions, and institutions. 
Savigny was said to have picked up this argument, and used it to re-conceptualize the just 
																																																								
245 Rehberg, Ueber den Code Napoleon und dessen Einführung in Deutschland (Hannover: Hahn, 
1814). 
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Germany in the Nineteenth Century: Austria's hegemony and the increase in the power of Prussia, 
1819-1830 (1885), ed. and trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: McBride, 1918), pp. 358-81. 
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lawgiver as the custodian of his society’s unique, historically-rooted character, one who 
defends it against the deracinating transnational forces of commercial modernity.249 In this 
way, Rehberg was conscripted as the forerunner of the sort of völkisch, Romantic 
conservatism that arose in the Vormärz, and which ultimately fed into the nationalist cause. 
But he was also cast as the progenitor of a ‘reform conservatism’, through his influence on 
his Göttingen classmate and erstwhile confidante, the Freiherr vom Stein.250 Like Burke, who 
knew that ‘the state without some means of change is without the means of its conservation’, 
Rehberg’s achievement, according to this second reading, was to recognize that by making a 
series of limited concessions to the revolutionary Zeitgeist, the German nobility could 
effectively preserve the substance of their the pre-revolutionary rights and privileges.251 This 
reformist agenda was said to have decisively influenced Stein, whose efforts to modernize 
Prussia’s bureaucracy, military, and legal system inspired subsequent generations 
conservatives later in the nineteenth century. If Savigny saw Rehberg as the exponent of a 
bottom-up, vöklish historicism, his reformist admirers were said to have conscripted him for 
the cause of a consciously top-down, reformist paternalism. 
But by reading Rehberg’s engagement with Burke within its eighteenth-century 
context, it is clear that how far his own politics were from the agendas of Stein and Savigny. 
The Prussian reform-effort that Stein and Hardenberg led may have resembled Rehberg’s 
proposals in certain superficial respects, but they were enacted in precisely the opposite spirit 
–  in order to augment the power of the Prussian state, to break the resistance of the nobility 
and parlements, and to concentrate authority in the person of the king. Similarly, whereas 
Rehberg used his anti-Kantian skepticism to deflate the pretensions of normative theory in 
order to create a space for toleration and liberty, Savigny filled this vacuum with a positive 
vision of a post-Kantian jurisprudence. In the place of Rehberg’s agnosticism, Savigny place 
a kind of historicist pantheism, a Romantic faith in History as the vehicle through which the 
divine reveals its transcendent character in time and space. This provided a solid 
metaphysical foundation upon which Savigny could argue for the moral centrality of the local 
traditions, customs, and mœurs; but it jettisoned the skeptical liberalism that Rehberg himself 
preferred. In each case, the Humean vision of Germany’s future that Rehberg shepherded 
through the revolutionary era, and which he used Burke to articulate and defend – this was a 
vision that Stein and Savigny recast in their own image. 																																																								
249 For an early attempt to disassociate Rehberg and Savigny, see Franz Uhle-Wettler, Staatsdenken 
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250 Erich Weniger, ‘Rehberg und Stein’, Niedersächsisches Jahrbuch, vol. 2 (1925): pp. 1-122. Cf. 
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In his early endorsement of the Reflections, Rehberg warned that unless Germany’s political 
leaders came to terms with Burke’s critique of the Revolution, they would not be able to head 
off the dangers that the republicans’ subversive ideology posed to their own territories. Given 
the stark sociocultural differences between Burke’s Britain and the German states, he worried 
that the Reflections’ message would be stunted upon its arrival in Germany. ‘In order to be 
fully understood’, Rehberg explained, Burke’s text ‘demands an extensive knowledge of 
English law, English history, and the specific conditions of modern-day England’ – a form of 
political expertise which most German readers lacked. En passant, however, he noted that a 
well-edited translation of the Reflections might be able to overcome this cultural impasse. 
‘Should a German translation appear, it is to be hoped that someone with an understanding of 
England’s history and constitution, someone who is well-versed in its people’s mentality and 
their present political context, will augment this translation with annotations.’1 By imposing 
editorial coherence onto Burke’s historically-specific, often-opaque arguments, an inventive 
editor might be able to make the text intelligible. 
 One month after Rehberg’s review appeared in the Literaturzeitung, Friedrich Gentz 
– a young civil servant in the Prussian government – began reading the Reflections himself.2 
Like most of his peers in Berlin, Gentz was an enthusiastic supporter of the Revolution in its 
early years. Even after the initial reports of popular unrest in Paris, he remained steadfastly 
loyal to what he called ‘the good cause’ ‹die gute Sache›. ‘I would regard the failure of this 
Revolution as one of the worst disasters ever to befall the human race’, Gentz told his friend 
and mentor, the philosopher Christian Garve, in late 1790: 
It is the first practical triumph of philosophy, the first example of a 
government that is based on principles and a coherent, consistent system. It is 
a hope and a comfort against the many timeworn afflictions under which 
humanity groans. Should it fail, these afflictions will become ten times more 
                                               
1 [Rehberg], review of Burke, Reflections, in Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (4 Mar. 1791): pp. 561-6, at 
pp. 565-6. 
2 Gentz to Garve, 19 Apr. 1791, in Briefe von und an Friedrich von Gentz, ed. F.P Wittichen, 3 vols. 
(Berlin: Oldenbourg, 1909), vol. 1, pp. 194-205, esp. pp. 204-5. 
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incurable.3  
As a partisan of the Revolution, Gentz approached Burke’s text with deep skepticism. He had 
spent the previous two years publicly celebrating the revolutionaries’ Déclaration des droits 
de l’homme et du citoyen, and drafting mock proposals for France’s new constitution with his 
friend Wilhelm von Humboldt.4 The splenetic diatribes against political philosophy that filled 
Burke’s text were ‘pathetic’, in Gentz’s view, and his highly-personalized attacks on France’s 
patriotic legislators completely unwarranted.5 
Yet in spite of their political differences, Gentz was captivated by the Reflections’ 
rhetoric. He admired the ways in which Burke deployed classical tactics – irony and satire, 
intricate syntactical formations, stylized verbiage – to imbue his language with gravitas and 
moment.6 ‘This man has earned the right to be heard, as indeed every man deserves when he 
speaks so masterfully,’ he told Garve in mid-1791. ‘I am reading this book – though firmly 
opposed to its principles and conclusions – (I have not yet finished it) with greater enjoyment 
than those of a hundred shallow advocates of the Revolution.’7 Whatever Gentz’s misgivings 
about its content, he believed that a work so inspired deserved a translation that did justice to 
the original. He found Dupont’s official French version staid and lifeless – ‘a most mediocre 
product in which not a trace of Burke’s spirit can be discerned’.8 Stahl’s German translation 
                                               
3 Gentz to Garve, 5 Dec. 1790, in Briefe, vol. 1, pp. 178-9. 
4 See Wilhelm von Humboldts Briefe an Karl Gustav Brinkmann, ed. Albert Leitzmann (Leibzig: 
K.W. Hiersemann, 1939), pp. 14-16; and Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der 
Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen (1791) (Breslau: E. Trewendt, 1851), which was composed in 
the course of these discussions with Gentz. Cf. F.C. Wittichen ‘Zur inneren Geschichte Preussens 
während der französischen Revolution: Gentz und Humboldt’, Forschungen zur Preussischen und 
Brandenburgischen Geschichte, vol. 19, no. 2 (1906), pp. 1-33; Albert Leitzmann. ‘Politische 
Jugendbriefe Wilhelm von Humboldt an Gentz’, Historische Zeitschrift, vol. 152 (1935): pp. 48-89. 
For Humboldt’s initial response to the Revolution, see Alexander Schmidt, ‘Freedom and State 
Action in German late Enlightenment Thought’, in Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage, ed. 
Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 208-
226, esp. pp. 215-19.  
5 Gentz to Garve, 19 Apr. 1791, in Briefe, vol. 1, p. 204. 
6 F.P. Locke, ‘Rhetoric and Representation in Burke’s Reflections’, in Edmund Burke's Reflections on 
the revolution in France: New Interdisciplinary Essays, ed. John Whale (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), pp. 18-39. 
7 Gentz to Garve, 19 Apr. 1791, in Briefe, vol. 1, p. 204. Cf. Gentz to Brinkmann, 27 Sept. 1803; in 
ibid. pp. 159-61, at p. 160 (rhapsodizing about Burke’s Letter to William Eliot): ‘I cannot tell you 
enough how often I have turned to this text for solace; it is my great comfort in our troubled times! 
And the style! … What richness, what fullness, what diversity! Thus, thus would I write, if only the 
heavens would grant it to me.’ 
8 Gentz, ‘Critisches Verzeichniß der bis in die Mitte des J. 1792 durch die französische Revolution 
und das Werk des Herrn Burke in England veranlaßten Schriften’; appended to his Betrachtungen 
über die französische Revolution nach dem Englischen des Herrn Burke, 2 vols. (Berlin: Vieweg, 
1793); reprinted in Gentz, Gesammelte Schriften, 12 vols., ed. Günther Kronenbitter (Zurich: Olms 
Verlag, 1997-2004), vol. 6, pp. 223-262, at p. 248. 
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was not much better – ‘a mere shadow of the original’, in Frieda Braune’s judgment.9 As an 
aspiring publicist, Gentz recognized the market for a more polished translation. Sometime in 
mid-1791, he resolved to produce it himself.10 
 As he translated this work over the next two years, he grew increasingly amenable to 
Burke’s politics. During these months, reports from abroad told of growing violence in Paris, 
a trend finally culminating in the September Massacres of 1792.11 The collapse of the French 
state seemed increasingly imminent, the spectre of civil war loomed on the horizon. Whereas 
Gentz initially recoiled at Burke’s scorn for the noble philosopher-legislators who sought to 
enlighten their nation, by late 1792 the Reflections now seemed almost prophetic. Through 
his clear-eyed analysis of the revolutionaries’ principles, Burke seemed to have predicted the 
rise of sans-culottes barbarism years before any of his contemporaries. By the time his 
translation appeared in print, Gentz was a sworn member of Burke’s counter-revolutionary 
résistance.12  
Yet despite his newfound sympathy for Burke’s politics, Gentz continued to harbor 
doubts about some of the particular arguments he had leveled against the revolutionaries.  
As he explained in an introduction to his translation, Burke was a talented statesman, but not 
a trained philosopher. The Reflections were an ‘appeal to the heart’, not an attempt to ground 
a worldview in secure ‘first principles’ ‹Grundideen›.13 As such it lacked philosophical rigor. 
Burke was equivocal in his use of key concepts, and often did not pursue his arguments to 
their logical endpoints. Yet rather than dampening his enthusiasm for the Reflections, Gentz 
saw in this critique an exciting opportunity. Latent within this text, he believed, there lay 
dormant a genuinely philosophic case against the Revolution, one which he could tease out 
through his own editorial interventions. As Burke’s translator, he could transform this text 
into a rigorous treatise: 
                                               
9 Braune, Edmund Burke in Deutschland (Heidelberg: Winters, 1917), p. 19. 
10 Gentz later informed Burke that he worked ‘nearly for two years’ on his translation, which suggests 
that he began translation soon after his first reading of the Reflections in April 1791 (i.e., 21 months 
before publication): see Gentz to Burke, 8 Feb. 1793, in The Correspondence of Edmund Burke, ed. 
P.J. Marshall and John Woods, 10 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968-78), vol. 7, pp. 
346-7.   
11 His sources on French politics included Mallet du Pan’s Mercure de France, Mirabeaus’s Courier 
de Provence, the Journal Encyclopédique, the Journal de Paris, and the Moniteur: see Gentz to 
Garve, 5 Dec. 1790, in Briefe, vol. 1, pp. 178-9. 
12 Gentz, Betrachtungen über die französische Revolution nach dem Englischen des Herrn Burke, 2 
vols. (Berlin: Vierweg Verlag, 1793). Gentz’s original contributions to this work – his introduction, 
appended essays, and annotated bibliography (but not the text of his translation) – have been reprinted 
in his Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 6, pp. 6-262. Where possible, I have referenced Kronenbitter’s 
edition of the text. 
13 Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 6, p. 31. 
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From a strict philosophical perspective, Burke’s work is nothing but a 
rhapsody: but a rhapsody from which the most comprehensive and ordered 
system can be devised ‹entwickelt›. … Eloquence like this has not appeared 
since the resplendent days of the old republics. This inexhaustible abundance 
of keen and new ideas, fierce words, unexpected expressions and felicitous 
images; this luxuriant richness to which no field of knowledge is inaccessible 
and no region of the human spirit closed: all this overwhelms the imagination 
and gives the astonished mind no moment of rest or recuperation.14  
In his translation, Gentz set out ‘to develop on political and philosophical grounds a complete 
theory of the antirevolutionary system’ – to distill an intellectually-coherent political theory 
from the embryonic political intuitions scattered across Burke’s original.15 This ‘ultimate 
purpose’ of Gentz’s Reflections, he announced, ‘to assail the French Revolution’s defenders 
with their own favorite weapons, the weapons of philosophical reasoning’.16 
To this end, Gentz did not merely translate Burke’s Reflections into German. As an 
ambitious and self-confident student of politics, he took bold editorial liberties in order to 
explain Burke’s arguments to his peers. The result of his interventions was a heavily-edited – 
indeed, nearly rewritten – edition of the English original, one that hewed to the editorial 
project that Rehberg outlined in the Literaturzeitung.17 Many of Gentz’s editorial choices 
were formal in nature: he inserted and deleted passages to achieve a more fluid prose, excised 
sections that distracted from the work’s major lines of argument, and standardized the use of 
key philosophical terms. With the ornate, neo-classical German of Schiller’s Dreissigjähriger 
Krieg (1790) as his model, Gentz presented the work in dramatic rhetorical register designed 
to capture his readers’ imagination.18 His translation of Burke’s famous description of Marie 
Antoinette’s humiliation at the hands of the Parisian mob, for instance, was rendered in a 
morally-charged language that exceeded even Burke’s famous indignation.19 Throughout his 
Reflections, he inserted long footnotes that sought to clarify Burke’s political and historical 
allusions, to explain difficult sections of argumentation – and, occasionally, to register his 
dissent. Most conspicuously, Gentz appended to his translation five original essays – on the 
                                               
14 Ibid., pp. 38-9, italics in orig.  
15 Gentz, Betrachtungen, vol. 1, p. 2. 
16 Gentz to Emperor Franz Joseph II of Austria, 23 Jan. 1793; unpublished mms., Haus-, Hof-, und 
Staatsarchiv, Vienna (Gentz Papers, carton 78); online access at http://www.ub.uni-
koeln.de/cdm/singleitem/collection/gentz/id/5228/. 
17 We know that Gentz read the Literaturzeitung (see, e.g., Gentz to Brinckmann, 18 Nov. 1793, in 
Briefe, vol. 2, pp. 42-3), but there is no direct proof that Rehberg’s review inspired his translation. 
18 Gentz’s prose style was widely admired by his peers: see, e.g., Friedrich Wilhelm Meyer, ‘Ueber 
die Verdeutschung des Burkeischen Betrachtungen über die französische Revolution’, Deutsche 
Monatsschrift (Mar. 1793): pp. 177-86.  
19 For the rhetoric of Gentz’s Reflections, cf. László Kontler, ‘Varieties of Old Regime Europe: 
Thoughts and Details on the Reception of Burke’s Reflections in Germany’, in The Reception of 
Edmund Burke in Europe, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick and Peter Jones (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), pp. 
105-124, at pp. 19-20. 
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right to revolution, the nature of political liberty, and the Déclaration, most importantly – in 
which he laid out the ‘antirevolutionary system’ that lay inchoate in Burke.20 He prefaced this 
amalgam of translation and analysis with a long discursive introduction.21 Finally, to help 
readers navigate the dense flurry of pamphlets and books that the Reflections had provoked, 
he prepared an annotated bibliography of all the English works written in response to Burke, 
both critical and sympathetic, from 1790 to late 1792. All told, Gentz’s two-volume edition 
totaled over 650 pages, almost twice the length of the English original. 
 Gentz published his new translation in January 1793, the same month as Louis XVI 
was executed in Paris. The concurrence of these events, along with the subsequent rise of the 
Terror, made his Reflections a remarkable publishing success almost overnight.22 Unlicensed 
reprints soon began appearing across the German states, while high demand in Prussia led to 
a second edition in 1794.23 His Reflections quickly became the definitive German translation 
of the text, retaining its predominance well into the nineteenth century.24 Its success not only 
elevated Burke’s profile in Germany – it launched Gentz’s career as a publicist too. Freed 
from his former obscurity in the Prussian civil service, Gentz quickly became one of the 
German-speaking world’s most recognizable political writers. Throughout the 1790s, Gentz 
consciously styled himself ‘the German Burke’ – a principled, eloquent critic of what he saw 
as a naïvely republican Zeitgeist. The political theory of Gentz’s Reflections provided an 
ideological platform from which he intervened into most heated political controversies of his 
day – debates over the relation between Enlightenment and Revolution; over the meaning and 
legacy of Kantian political thought; over Sieyès’s theory of representative republicanism; 
over Prussia’s relation to revolutionary France, and its geopolitical role within the European 
state-system. G.P. Gooch was exaggerating when he claimed that, ‘after the death of Burke, 
Gentz was beyond comparison the most influential publicist in Europe’, as was Golo Mann, 
when he dubbed Gentz ‘the greatest political writer the German language ever produced’.25 
                                               
20 These five essays were ‘Über politische Freiheit und das Verhältnis derselben zur Regierung’, 
‘Über die Moralität in den Staatsrevolutionen’, ‘Über die Deklaration der Rechte’, ‘Versuch einer 
Widerlegung der Apologie des Herrn Makintosh’, and ‘Über die National-Erziehung in Frankreich’. 
21 Entitled ‘Über den Einfluss politischer Schriften, und den Charakter der Burkischen’. 
22 See Braune, Burke in Deutschland, pp. 19-26, 41-66. 
23 Theresa Dietrich’s Ideologie der Gegenrevolution: Ursprünge konservativen Denkens bei Friedrich 
Gentz, 1789-1794 (PhD diss., Humboldt University, 1989), p. 132 estimates that Gentz sold around 
four thousand copies of his Reflections, a remarkable feat in his literary context.  
24 Indeed, it remains the standard translation to date: the catalogue of the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek 
indicates that Gentz’s Reflections was reprinted five times over past half-century; no rival translation 
was printed more than once. 
25 G.P. Gooch, Germany and the French Revolution (1920) (London: Cass, 1965), p. 103; Golo Mann, 
Friedrich von Gentz: Gegenspieler Napoleons, Vordenker Europas (1947), 3rd ed. (Frankfurt: Fischer, 
2011), p. 8. 
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Nevertheless, what is certain is that Gentz’s pen wielded considerable authority in the years 
following his Reflections, and that his prolific outpouring of translations, articles, and books 
exerted a decisive influence on German political debates during the revolutionary era.  
 But Gentz was not just a publicist – he also played a critical role in shaping counter- 
revolutionary policy. Throughout the 1790s, he served as a royal advisor ‹Kriegsrat› in the 
Prussian court, attempting to marshal intragovernmental opposition to the French cause, and 
especially to the Franco-Prussian armistice of 1795. When these efforts proved unsuccessful, 
he was forced to resign his post in Berlin in 1802. Traveling south to Vienna, he soon found 
employment in the Habsburg civil service, where he became a quasi-official publicist for the 
Austrian government. Throughout the 1800s and 1810s, he was tasked with rallying public 
support for the Coalition’s war-effort against Napoleon. In this capacity, he published a series 
of highly-influential works on geopolitics, which systematically laid out the legal and moral 
case against Napoleon’s hegemony in Europe.26 Durable continental peace was impossible, 
he argued, unless France was defeated and an equitable balance-of-power ‹Gleichgewicht› 
was restored on the continent. This case for intervention proved attractive to Metternich, who 
befriended Gentz in the mid-1800s and named him his chief advisor and strategist, a role that 
Gentz held until his death in 1832. It was these two men who, in 1815, orchestrated a postwar 
settlement at the Congress of Vienna, reasserting continental stability in the wake of 
Napoleon’s demise. Not accidentally, the peace regime that they constructed closely 
resembled the vision of international order that Gentz had called for over the previous two 
decades.  
 Owing to his importance in the revolutionary-era public sphere, recent scholarship on 
Gentz has tended to focus on his identity as a literary entrepreneur.27 Historians of political 
thought, meanwhile, are the inheritors of a long tradition of scholarship which sees Gentz’s 
embrace of Burke as a ‘conservative’ backlash against eighteenth-century liberalism (as we 
saw in Chapter 2). According to this interpretive tradition, his translation of the Reflections 
amounted to an ideological volte-face. An erstwhile student of Kant and defender of the 
droits de l’homme, Gentz is said to have subsequently developed a deep skepticism about the 
                                               
26 See esp. Gentz, Fragmente aus der neusten Geschichte des politischen Gleichgewichts in Europa 
(St Petersburg [=Leipzig]: Hartnock, 1806); in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 4. 
27 Günther Kronenbitter, Wort und Macht: Friedrich Gentz als politischer Schriftsteller (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1994); Iwan Michelangelo-d’Aprile, Die Erfindung der Zeitgeschichte: 
Geschichtsschreibung und Journalismus zwischen Aufklärung und Vormärz (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2013); Cf. also the proceedings of the conference ‘Virtuosen der Öffentlichkeit?: Friedrich 
von Gentz (1764-1832) im globalen intellektuellen Kontext seiner Zeit’ (University of Cologne, 
March 2015), available online at: http://www.historicum-estudies.net/epublished/virtuosen-der-
oeffentlichkeit/editorial. 
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value of normative political theory, choosing instead to follow Burke in deferring to the 
received authority of custom, tradition, and established political authority.28 The image of 
Gentz that emerges from this scholarship is not particularly flattering: in Enlightenment, 
Revolution, and Romanticism (1992), Frederick Beiser characterizes his ‘conservatism’ as 
‘the greatest intelligence in the service of the greatest stupidity’.29  
 What this scholarship misses, however, is the novelty of Gentz’s Burkean politics. In 
closely aligning Burke’s views with those of his German translator, historians have missed 
the radical extent to which Gentz’s heavily-edited translation of Burke recast the Reflections 
in his own philosophical image. By resituating Gentz’s engagement with Burke within his 
original political and intellectual context, the following chapter seeks to bring Gentz’s 
particular reading of Burke into focus. In his edition of the Reflections, Gentz put forward a 
critique of the Revolution on essentially Kantian grounds, and articulated a conservatism that 
self-consciously diverged from aspects of Burke’s traditionalism. Like Rehberg, the historical 
Burke doubted that philosophical reason was able to legislate practicable moral and political 
norms. The Burke of Gentz’s Reflections, on the other hand, dismissed as ‘nonsensical’ the 
idea that political norms could be located in the sheer contingency of historical tradition.30 
Like Kant, Gentz saw an a priori theory of justice as a necessary prerequisite for the rule of 
law. It was not the French revolutionaries’ metaphysics per se which doomed their 
movement, he argued but rather their exclusive attention to theory at the expense of practice: 
What was most absurd in the proceedings of those who wanted to construct 
the new constitution of France on what they call the rights of man was not 
their search for these rights and their respect for them… but that they thought 
these rights sufficed – that they dreamed to build a state with these bare rights 
‹bloßen Rechte› when, in fact, it calls for different materials as well.31 
For Gentz, the Reflections’ main insight lay not in the normative realm of reason ‹Vernunft›, 
but in the practical sphere of prudence ‹Klugheit›. Gentz translated Burke not to subvert the 
revolutionaries’ liberal ideals – aims which, on balance, Gentz supported – but to point out 
the hazards that lay along the path to their realization.  
                                               
28 But for an important exception to this trend, see Raphaël Cahen’s recent Friedrich Gentz: Penseur 
post-Lumières et acteur du nouvel ordre européen (PdD diss., Ais-Marseille Université, 2014), which 
describes Gentz as the defender of a ‘liberal conservative Spätaufklärung’ committed to ‘property, 
education, the rule of law, and the public-spirit of the reasoning citizen’ (p. 17).    
29 Frederick Beiser, Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German 
Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 326. Cf. for the same basic 
assessment, Dieter Henrich, Über Theorie und Praxis (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967), p. 21; 
Reidar Maliks, Kant’s Politics in Context (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2014), pp. 55-60. 
30 Gentz, Betrachtungen, vol. 1, p. 89.  
31 Ibid., p. 95, italics in orig. 
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A similar pattern informed Gentz’s interpretation of Burke on international relations. 
Throughout the late 1790s, Gentz believed that the Prussian state had a moral duty to join the 
Coalition and put an end to French expansionism. Yet at the same time, he was also beholden 
to a Kantian vision of cosmopolitan justice, and believed that statesmen have an obligation to 
pursue a just international peace. From his reading of Burke’s arguments for intervention, he 
came to believe that these commitments could be reconciled. Drawing on Burke’s appeal to 
Vattel, Gentz argued that Kant’s moral ideal could only be realized if the ‘republic of 
Europe’ acted collectively to stop France’s violations of international law, and to restore an 
approximation of the status quo ante bellum. As in his constitutional theory, in other words, 
Gentz believed that Burke’s geopolitical reasoning offered the best means for realizing 
Kantian ends.  
  In both of these arenas, Gentz used Burke to try to carve out a via media between the 
naïve, uncompromising idealism of the revolutionaries on the one hand, and the anti-Kantian 
skepticism of their conservative critics on the other. What was needed, in Gentz’s view, was 
a principled vision of liberty – of individual autonomy, law-governed states, and international 
justice – that was coupled to the sort of sober-minded prudence that he celebrated in Burke.32 
In this sense, the standard view of Gentz as a lapsed liberal is based on a category error: it 
presumes an opposition between Kantian liberalism and Burkean conservatism that Gentz did 
not accept. To his friend Anton von Prokesch-Osten, Gentz was a man whose ‘conservative 
disposition [was] closely tied to his purely liberal objectives’.33 It was this union of political 
prudence and liberal ideals that Gentz associated with the cause of ‘true Enlightenment’, and 
which he used Burke to defend. 
 
II. Translating Burke’s Reflections 
Friedrich Gentz was born in 1764, one year after Friedrich the Great’s armies conquered 
Silesia in the Seven Years’ War. His father Johann Gentze, a trained cameralist, was among 
the civil servants sent to rationalize territorial administration after the war’s end.34 Gentz’s 
                                               
32 On this theme generally, cf. Richard Bourke, ‘Theory and Practice: The Revolution in Political 
Judgement’, in Political Judgement: Essays for John Dunne (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp. 74-112. 
33 Aus dem Nachlassse Friedrichs von Gentz, ed. Anton von Prokesck-Osten, 2 vols. (Vienna: Gerold, 
1867), vol. 1, p. 250. 
34 On cameralism, cf. Marc Raeff, The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change 
through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1600-1800 (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1983); 
and Mack Walker, ‘Rights and Functions: The Social Categories of Eighteenth-Century German 
Jurists and Cameralists’, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 50, no. 2 (June, 1978): pp. 324-251. On 
Gentz’s father, cf. Friedrich Freiherr von Schroetter, Das preussischen Münzwesen im 18. 
Jahrhundert, 4 vols. (Berlin: P. Parey, 1913), vol. 4, passim. (Gentz’s family changed their name 
from ‘Gentze’ to ‘Gentz’ in the late 1770s.) 
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mother Elizabeth, née Ancillon, came from a prominent family of Prussian Huguenots. Her 
uncle Charles Ancillon founded Berlin’s colony of Protestant émigrés in the late-seventeenth 
century, and her nephew, Friedrich Ancillon (Gentz’s cousin), would go on to become a key 
figure in the Prussian diplomatic corps in the 1810s and ’20s.35 Gentz’s parents raised him in 
a milieu both austere and philosophical. In 1783 his father’s friend, Moses Mendelssohn, 
secured a position for Gentz to study law in Königsberg under Kant’s supervision.36 Gentz’s 
legal coursework included instruction on natural law, on the positive civil and criminal law of 
Prussia, and on the history and organization of the Holy Roman Empire. As Raphaël Cahen 
notes, he likely attended Christian Jacob Kraus’s lectures on Adam Smith as well.37 But 
certainly the most formative influence on his political views was Kant. From 1783 to 1784, 
Gentz attended (at least) two of the symposia that Kant held for his favorite students, on 
‘Naturrecht’ and ‘Natürliche Theologie’.38 ‘This exceptional man – both his instruction and 
his personal virtues – have raised up and formed within me a great appetite for philosophy’, 
Gentz reported to Garve. ‘I have ventured into his difficult and subtle speculations; I have 
plumbed the depths of his transcendental idealism.’39 After leaving Königsberg to take up 
government work in Berlin, Gentz continued to correspond with Kant. He helped to edit 
Kant’s Kritik der Urteilskraft in 1790, and publicly associated with Berlin’s liberal Kantians 
such J.G. Kiesewetter throughout the 1790s.40 Even in old age, Prokesh-Osten recalls, Gentz 
still thought of Kant as his intellectual ‘benefactor’ ‹Gönner›.41  
In a contribution to the Berlinische Monatsschrift in 1791 – roughly the same time 
that he began translating the Reflections – Gentz set out an explicit defense of his Kantian 
philosophical commitments, and spelled out their political implications in detail.42 His article 
was a rejoinder to an essay that Rehberg’s mentor, Justus Möser had published in the same 
                                               
35 Cf. Niels Hegewisch, Die Staatsphilosophie von Johann Peter Friedrich Ancillon (Marburg: 
Tectum, 2010), which tries to divorce Ancillon from Romantik, arguing that (like Gentz) Ancillon 
saw the settlement of 1815 not as an alternative, but as a return, to the politics of Aufklärung. 
36 On 16 August 1783, Kant told Mendelssohn that ‘this promising youth, the son of Herr Gentz,’ had 
been ‘taken into my close acquaintance’, and promised to ‘send him home from our university well-
trained in mind and heart’: see Kants Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königlich-Preussischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-), vol. 10, pp. 344-7, at p. 344. 
37 See Cahen, Gentz, p. 46. In 1790 Gentz told Garve that he was reading the Wealth of Nations ‘for a 
third time’; see Gentz to Garve, 5 Dec. 1790, in Briefe, ed. Wittichen, vol. 1, p. 181. 
38 Gentz’s notes on Kant’s ‘Naturrecht’ course were once an important resource for the study of 
Kant’s jurisprudence, but have been lost: see 
http://www.manchester.edu/kant/Notes/notesLaw.htm#Feyerabend. 
39 Gentz to Garve, 8 Oct. 1784, in Briefe, vol. 1, pp. 140-141. 
40 See Gentz to Garve, 5 March 1790, in Briefe, vol. 1, p. 155; see also Kronenbitter, Wort und Macht, 
pp. 32-34. 
41 Nachlassse Gentz, ed. Prokesck-Osten, vol. 1, p. 247 
42 Gentz, ‘Über den Ursprung und die obersten Prinzipien des Rechts’, Berlinische Monatsschrift, vol. 
18 (Apr., 1791): pp. 370-96; reprinted in Gentz, Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 7, pp. 7-33. 
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journal ten months earlier. In this article, Möser had harshly criticized revolutionaries’ recent 
Déclaration, and poured scorn on their republican idea of universal citizenship.43 Since time 
immemorial, Möser argued, the right to citizenship had been predicated on the ownership of 
property. It was reasonable that the state be led by those who are most invested in its 
flourishing, and who have the means to secure a political education. Furthermore, according 
to Möser, the ancientness of this custom was evidence of its wisdom. He explained that since 
the amount of property ‹Mansus› needed for citizenship varies across different societies, this 
right was particular and contingent. But recently, he complained, the French philosophes had 
declared that this right was self-evident and universal. To Möser, such a brash philosophical 
move seemed intellectually indefensible. Shorn from the particularities of custom and 
tradition, he insisted that philosophical reason is indeterminate – incapable of defining a 
concept like citizenship with any precision. Through their Déclaration, the revolutionaries 
had succeeded only in severing a concrete, historically-contingent right from its 
constitutional origins. 
In his response, Gentz sought to wrest the concept of right from the realm of history 
and to set it on the sure foundation of Kantian reason. He decried Möser’s traditionalism as 
‘medieval’ and ‘barbarous’.44 Indeed, Möser did not understand the concept of right at all. 
‘Observation, tradition, historical conjecture’ – such practices can investigate the empirical 
world of phenomena, but cannot pierce the theoretical realm of ideas. ‘If reason only 
conjectured about the realm of nature, nothing would … lead it to take up the strange and 
obscure concepts of right and duty into its system; nature shows … what man can do, not 
what he should do.’45 The concept of a historically-derived right was nonsensical, dissolving 
the seminal distinction between facts and norms. Fortunately, Gentz argued, we have reason 
to believe that the human mind can transcend a posteriori reasoning, and uncover a universal 
grounding for right. With clear reference to his Kantian education, he explained that human 
beings are uniquely twofold creatures. We exist in the world, as the phenomenal subjects of 
its causal and natural laws, and we exist outside it, as noumenal agents that are rational and 
responsible. But if right were chimerical, this latter dimension of our experience would be 
illusory: human beings would be no different than animals, without moral responsibility or 
real causal agency. Therefore, since ‘human nature is not equivalent to the nature of things’, 
he concluded that ‘the pure concept of humanity necessarily involves the concept of right’.46 
                                               
43 Justus Möser, ‘Über das Recht der Menschheit als den Grund der neuen französischen 
Konstitution,’ Berlinische Monatsschrift, vol. 15 (June, 1790): pp. 499-506. 
44 Gentz, ‘Ursprung’, in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 7, p. 32. 
45 Ibid., pp. 11-12, italics in orig. 
46 Ibid., pp. 12-13.  
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Building on this theoretical account of ‘original right’ ‹ursprüngliches Recht›, Gentz 
went on to elaborate the ‘derivative rights’ ‹abgeleitete Rechte› that his analysis implied.47 
‘Natural right is, in a true philosophical sense, the right that man possesses according to his 
nature, his being ‹Wesen›’.48 The idea of right is a precondition for intelligible human action. 
Its purpose is to secure an existential space in which rational agents can act freely. In a 
populous world of multiple free beings, however, absolute freedom is practically impossible. 
For Gentz, the idea of right was as a necessary consequence of this problem of collective 
action:  
The law that reason prescribes to free-acting beings – insofar as they regard 
themselves free, while in a community of other free beings – is the moral law. 
… Right is the moral capacity (the license) of an individual to constrict the 
freedom of another insofar as it is necessary for the preservation of his own 
freedom.49 
On this definition, right is universal, contractual and a priori. No historical investigation is 
needed to secure its legitimacy. Three discrete political rights were necessarily entailed by his 
theory. The first was the ‘right to personhood’.50 If action ceases to be free when it constricts 
the liberty of a rational being, no man can justly lay claim to the person of another. As Gentz 
curtly insisted, ‘I have the right to obstruct anyone who wants to make me a slave.’51 (This 
was not an academic point: in the 1790s, Möser was the German world’s leading apologist of 
serfdom.)52 From this position, Gentz inferred a necessary ‘right to property’ – which was, he 
argued, simply the ‘externalities’ ‹Äußerungen› of human autonomy – and an ancillary ‘right 
to the enforcement of finalized contracts’. If men had no right to the fruits of their labour, 
freedom would be an ‘empty name’.53 But without secure contracts, cooperation between free 
human beings would be impossible. This catalogue of rights proved, for Gentz, that although 
Möser could not prove the justice of his preferred conventions via inductive analyses of their 
histories, an a priori analysis could, in fact, establish theoretical norms to govern the practice 
of politics. Without a firm grasp of the concept of right, political theories are without 
philosophical mooring. 
* * * 
                                               
47 Ibid., p. 19. 
48 Ibid., p. 13, italics in orig. 
49 Ibid., p. 16. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., p. 20. 
52 Gentz knew that Burke, too, was a critic of slavery: see Gentz, Edmund Burkes Rechtfertigung 
seines Politischen Lebens (Berlin: Vieweg, 1796), pp. 567-9.  
53 Gentz, ‘Ursprung’, in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 7, pp. 21, 22, 43. 
Chapter 4: Friedrich Gentz 
 113 
In February 1793, one month after Gentz published his translation of the Reflections, he sent 
a copy to Burke. He attached a rushed cover letter, penned in a faltering English, to thank 
Burke for his inspiration and to present his work for evaluation: 
Sir! 
Having finished a toil which afforded to me, nearly for two years, that 
precious enjoyment to converse with the most sublime genius of the age, it is 
but very natural, I should wish to carry this labour of mine before the most 
competent judge, I can look for among the wise. I am certainly aware, that 
language I wrote in, is but little known to the nation, which is happy and 
glorious in your possession, and also perhaps unknown to you: still I hope, 
there may be among your acquaintance one willing to become my interpreter: 
and if not, I’ll think myself sufficiently rewarded, whenever this undertaking 
does not entirely die away, unreguarded by you. 
What power I had, I assumed, to deliver a faithful lively copy of your great 
original. What I thought proper, in order to put German readers into the just 
sense of your book, and to make them fair judges about those refined ideas 
which were too often misunderstood, I brought into annotations and annexed 
essays. Nay, I was bold enough to entertain a doubt against a very few of your 
opinions: much oftener I ought to reinforce what your experience, what your 
consummated wisdom foretold us two years ago, by what the sad history of 
these last two years is compelled to remember. This is a time, where every 
man, conscious of his forces is obliged to pay a public tribute to reason – a 
time as well for Germany, as for the rest of Europe….54 
As Gentz suspected, Burke did not read German. But as he leafed through Gentz’s edition of 
the Reflections, it must have been quite clear that his translator had asserted his own editorial 
voice quite vigorously. In his response Burke was gracious. ‘I ought to be somewhat ashamed 
of my total ignorance of the German language’, he told Gentz, ‘as it prevents me from seeing 
how much my thoughts are improved in your hands’.55 But if he privately harbored doubts 
about the trustworthiness of Gentz’s translation, his suspicions would have been justified. 
In his original Reflections, Burke had sharply criticized the philosophes’ attempts to 
theorize a normative vision of justice in the abstract. Sound political reasoning, he contended, 
must be grounded in a discrete context. Abstracted from the sociohistorical matrices that give 
them substance, political and moral claims are indeterminate: 
I cannot stand forward and give praise or blame to anything which relates to 
human actions, and human concerns, on a simple view of the object, as it 
stands stripped of every relation, in all the nakedness and solitude of 
metaphysical abstraction. Circumstances (which with some gentlemen pass 
for nothing) give in reality to every political principle its distinguishing color 
and discriminating effect. The circumstances are what render every civil and 
                                               
54 Gentz to Burke, 8 Feb. 1793, in Correspondence, ed. Marshall and Woods, vol. 7, pp. 346-7. 
55 Burke to Gentz, post 8 Feb. 1793, in ibid., vol. 7, pp. 347-8. 
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political scheme beneficial or noxious to mankind.56 
Since human existence is necessarily circumstantial, it was not possible to ascertain a reliable 
understanding of human nature through abstract reasoning. Efforts to pierce the veil of nature 
through theoretical ratiocination were, in Burke’s view, arrogant and foolish: 
These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays of light which 
pierce into a dense medium, are by the laws of nature refracted from their 
straight line. In the gross and complicated mass of human passions and 
concerns the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and 
reflections that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the 
simplicity of their original direction.57 
Yet at the same time, Burke was quick to insist that his mistrust of political rationalism did 
not entail an attack on political or moral norms as such. ‘Far am I from denying … the real 
rights of men. In denying their false claims of right, I do not mean to injure those which are 
real, and are such as their pretended rights would totally destroy.’58 It was dangerous to laud 
liberté in the abstract since the concept only became intelligible in the concrete. 
As an alternative to the revolutionaries’ rationalism, Burke contended for the wisdom 
bound up in Britain’s particular, historically-rooted Constitution. He argued that, just as the 
common law was the result of a long process of legal reflection, the British constitution was a 
moral inheritance, one that had evolved over many centuries in response to the unique needs 
and character of the British people. Since the human mind is limited and the historical record 
is vast, its essential principles were not amenable to geometric analysis: no individual could 
distill them into an abstract system, or export them to a foreign context. Nevertheless, Burke 
insisted that the moral wisdom of Britain’s ancient constitution was accessible. Throughout 
the Reflections, he encouraged statesmen to habituate themselves to the constitution’s inner 
raison d’être by studying its history and its institutional buttresses, to ‘employ their sagacity 
to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them’.59 This traditionalistic form of analysis 
– what Burke called reflection ‘upon the principle of reverence to antiquity’ – was rooted in 
his fundamental belief that the accumulated wisdom of the British constitution approximates 
political right far more reliably than the solipsistic theories of normative philosophers.60 For 
Burke, in other words, theory was derivative of praxis. 
Gentz, of course, disagreed. In his translation and exegesis of the Reflections, he took 
proactive steps to conceal Burke’s mistrust of political rationalism, and to carve out space for 
                                               
56 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J.C.D. Clark (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), p. 151. 
57 Ibid., p. 220. 
58 Ibid., p. 218. 
59 Ibid., p. 251. 
60 Ibid., p. 182. 
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a priori right in the logic of the text.61 His most aggressive intervention came in a footnote 
that he inserted into one of Burke’s most explicit defenses of prescription. In the English 
original, Burke had written the following of the revolutionaries and their English apologists: 
The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and in proportion as 
they are metaphysically true, they are morally and politically false. The rights 
of men are in a sort of middle, incapable of definition, but not impossible to 
be discerned. The rights of men in governments are their advantages; and 
these are often in balances between differences of good, in compromises 
sometimes between good and evil, and sometimes between evil and evil.  
Political reason is a computing principle: adding, subtracting, multiplying, and 
dividing, morally and not metaphysically or mathematically, true moral 
denominations.62 
For Gentz, this passage was emblematic of the Reflections’ broader philosophical confusion. 
How, he wondered, could a right be true in one sense (‘metaphysically’), yet false in another 
(‘morally and politically’)? For Gentz’s enlightened Prussian readership – accustomed to ‘the 
precision of conceptual terminology, and therefore the precision of philosophical language, in 
which we Germans indisputably surpass all other nations’ – this ambiguity would not do.63 In 
his translation, Gentz used a four-page footnote to try to rescue Burke from this embarrassing 
faux pas. In so doing, he set out the intellectual foundation of his ‘systematic’ reconstruction 
of Burke. 
Philosophers use the term ‘right’ in a rigorous and particular sense, to indicate ‘that 
which corresponds to so-called pure duty’ ‹vollkommenen Pflicht›, Gentz explained. ‘For us, 
it makes no sense to speak of a right that is true in one regard and is false in another.’64 How, 
then, could he make sense of the Reflections’ muddled discussion of right? He reasoned that 
for Burke, ‘metaphysical right’ corresponds to ‘real right’ ‹strenge Recht› – that is, universal 
norms derived from synthetic a priori precepts. But what Burke called ‘moral’ and ‘political 
right’ were not normative claims at all. Instead, Burke had used these terms to refer to 
second-order considerations about how to enact the demands of reason into practice: 
In the broad field of practical concept of permissiveness ‹Erlaubtheit›, there 
are three discernable gradations that pervade all of Burke’s reasoning but are 
never distinguished with the appropriate sharpness – namely, principles of 
                                               
61 For an expanded analysis of Gentz’s attempt to Kantianize Burke, see Jonathan Green, ‘Friedrich 
Gentz’s translation of Burke’s Reflections’, The Historical Journal, vol. 57, no. 3 (Sept. 2014): pp. 
639-59.   
62 Burke, Reflections, ed. Clark, p. 221. 
63 Gentz, Betrachtungen, vol. 1, p. 92. 
64 Ibid., pp. 92-3, italics in orig. 
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right, considerations of what is morally allowable ‹moralische Befugnisse›, 
and rules of prudence ‹Klugheit›.65    
Whereas Burke believed that moral and political norms were pregnant in the lived traditions 
of his nation, Gentz’s reinterpretation of the Reflections placed the ‘principles of right’ within 
the noumenal realm of pure reason. In so doing, he undermined Burke’s attempt to ostracize 
metaphysics from political reasoning, and opened a chasm between theory and praxis in the 
logic of the text. 
As Gentz explained in a metaphor, justice, morality, and prudence were three discrete, 
nonequivalent concepts. Just because an actor possesses a true theory of right does not mean 
that he also possesses a moral and prudent strategy for implementing it:   
He who wishes to venture across a broad ocean and begins by orienting 
himself towards the North Star will meet the approval of the wise…. But if he 
ends his preparation here, if he begins his trip around the world in an empty 
boat with nothing but a foolish faith in his preliminary knowledge – without a 
rudder or compass or oars or charts – he will be scorned as an idiot and 
chastised as a reckless adventurer.66 
Just as the seafarer must locate the North Star in order to navigate his vessel, a metaphysical 
goal is vital to impart normative direction to a political movement. Yet like the seafarer who 
requires tools to power his ship and to chart his progress, this philosophical understanding of 
right must be complemented with morality and prudence in order to be made practicable. For 
Gentz, this interpretation resolved the apparent confusion in Burke’s reasoning: 
In order to express Burke’s idea with as much accuracy as possible we would 
have to say: ‘The rights that these theorists chimerically take for everything 
are nothing but extremes. Since there must be many other sources of warrant 
‹Befugnisse› in the moral world, and many other rules in the political world, 
these rights are insufficient ‹unzureichend› for him who wishes to erect a 
constitution, and will produce bad results when taken as his sole principle.’67 
Thus according to Gentz, ‘the very true thought that lies concealed in this sentence’ was that 
the norms deduced by philosophers are necessary yet insufficient for the practice of politics.68 
This insight, he claimed, lay at the heart of the Reflections’ case against the Revolution. 
Burke faulted its leaders not for their philosophical theory of justice per se, but for their 
radical political ineptitude – for their immoral and imprudent attempt to enact their otherwise 
praiseworthy ideals.  
                                               
65 Ibid., p. 93, italics in org. In a separate footnote, he objected to Burke’s opposition between right 
and prudence, since prudential reasoning, he argued, is useful only once one has a teleological end in 
sight: see ibid., p. 88. 
66 Ibid., p. 95. Gentz seems to have borrowed this metaphor from Kant: see his ‘Was heißt: sich im 
Denken orientieren?’ (1786), in Kants Schriften, vol. 8, pp. 133-47. 
67 Ibid., pp. 92-3, italics in orig. 
68 Ibid., p. 91. 
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 This reinterpretation of Burke forced Gentz back onto the question of when a political 
movement is ‘morally allowable’, and when it accords with the ‘rules of prudence’. In the 
essays that he affixed to his translation, he attempted to clarify the nature of these two 
categories, and to explain the difference between them. According to Gentz, the rules of 
morality are universally binding, irrespective of circumstance. An actor is moral if and only if 
his means are congruent with his (just) ends; he is immoral, contrariwise, if he seeks to bring 
about a more just world through unjust means. The revolutionaries were an ideal case in 
point. Since ‘the essence of the social contract is that whoever enters into it must submit his 
own will to the general will’, an existing state cannot be dissolved unless every citizen agrees 
to abandon it. Thus a ‘total revolution’ like the French – a political movement that seeks ‘to 
tear the bands of civil society’ and ‘to create a wholly new order of things’ – is immoral 
unless it can secure unanimous consent.69 Without this unanimity, one faction within the 
nation must necessarily force everyone else to overthrow the state against their will. Their 
coercive means will contradict their liberal ends. Thus a ‘revolution that is coveted and 
instigated by a part of the nation is always a breach of the social contract and, from a 
philosophical perspective, … an immoral operation.’70  
Like morality, Gentz understood prudence ‹Klugheit› as a practical concept – that is, 
concerned with the implementation of right. But whereas the rules of political morality are 
rational and universal, the demands of prudence are contingent and unique, dependent on the 
particular circumstances in which an actor is imbedded. Prudence therefore demands a solid 
empirical grasp of one’s immediate surroundings. Before a statesman sets out to reform an 
institution, he must apprehend how it is interwoven with the habits, mores, and traditions of 
the nation it governs. This meant that ‘if a given nation invited a wise statesman to assemble 
a plan for the expansion of its political liberty and vested him with great power, he would not 
consent to their wishes at once’: 
He would first observe the character, customs, passions, degree of education, 
circumstances, needs, and history of the people for whom he is legislating; he 
would compare the results of his investigation with the degree of freedom that 
they have hitherto enjoyed, and the amount that they now demand. … It is just 
as unreasonable to hope that in an instant, a people can be converted from the 
slaves of a Sultan into a state of British enlightenment, … as it is foolish to 
seek to transform a Turkish constitution into a British one at once.71 
                                               
69 Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 6, pp. 85, 84. Gentz defined a ‘total 
revolution’ as an attempt to construct a ‘constitution that is new in its most essential points … and 
that gives no practical consideration to the old order’; see ibid., p. 85. 
70 Gentz, Betrachtungen, vol. 1, p. 99, italics in orig. 
71 Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 6, p. 66.  
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Whereas morality demands congruence between ends and means, then, prudence demands 
consonance between means and context. When these three factors are brought into alignment, 
the gap between theory and practice becomes passable. Such was the case, Gentz argued, in 
the Glorious Revolution of 1688, and more recently in the American Revolution of 1776.72 
The French revolutionaries, by contrast, had resorted to immoral tactics in their pursuit of a 
just constitution, and had allowed their zealousness to lead them into imprudence. ‘If begun 
with the arrogance of Icarus, man’s loftiest flights into unexplored regions will end with the 
downfall of Icarus. The human race can only progress toward the attainment of that which is 
sublime gradually, step-by-step.’73 
 This definition of prudence allowed Gentz to recast the Reflections’ frequent appeals 
to the authority of tradition as exhortations to caution. The Reflections used history in two 
discrete ways, according to Gentz. First, Burke’s close study of French history allowed him 
to chart the profound distance between the revolutionaries’ normative aims, and the realities 
of eighteenth-century French politics. The revolutionaries, by contrast – drunk on the ‘liquor’ 
of metaphysics, as Burke put it – were ignorant of their own historical context.74 Second, 
Burke’s extensive understanding of history alerted him to the difficulties that invariably 
attend the implementation of right. Channelling Aristotle’s Politics, Gentz saw prudence as 
an eminently practical skill, learned by emulating the examples of wise statesmen throughout 
history. In a moment of constitutional crisis, the prudent politician will compare his potential 
courses of action to similar situations in the past. If the lessons of history indicate that his 
plans are feasible, he can pursue them with confidence; if not, he can revise his strategy, or 
else abandon it altogether. This comparative form of reasoning thus ensures a high likelihood 
of success. ‘If ever a constitution of pure reason should be realized somewhere, then it will be 
time to depart from the wisdom of experience,’ Gentz wrote. ‘But until then, … reason and 
duty both dictate that the safest path lies along the well-travelled coast of experience.’75 This 
was why the spectre of 1688 loomed so large in the Reflections. The central lesson of the 
Glorious Revolution, according to Gentz, was that durable liberties could not be secured 
through fiat, but must be internalized and incorporated into the character of a free people. ‘He 
who wishes to build a new heaven and a new earth must know how to populate it with new 
                                               
72 For Gentz on America, see ibid., pp. 90-8. See also Gentz, ‘Ursprung und die Grundsatze der 
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men.’ Comparing the events of 1688 with the political reality of 1789, Burke saw that there 
were few republicans available to populate the revolutionaries’ new république. Since the 
revolutionaries were unable to recognize that their fellow countrymen were unfit for self-
government – that, as Gentz put it, ‘their work would lack meaning and purpose, unless they 
were able to achieve a congruence between their new political system and the abilities, 
habits, and character of their nation’ – theirs was a lost cause.76 
 
III. Gentz’s Burke in the Spätaufklärung 
Already by 1793, Burke’s German critics had begun presenting the Reflections as an attack 
on Enlightenment tout court. As Gentz noted in his translation, Burke’s ‘praise of medieval 
chivalry has become the cause of vicious attacks and biting mockeries’, and his defense of 
the French monarchy had been misconstrued as Romantic apology for absolutism.77 In his 
introduction to the Reflections, Gentz turned this critique back around on Burke’s critics, 
arguing that it was a ‘sacred duty for the enlightened friend of mankind’ ‹aufgeklärten 
Menschenfreundes› to oppose the Revolution.78 Gentz justified this assertion by situating the 
Revolution in historical context, and presenting it as a violent departure from the moral and 
political progress of the eighteenth century. In the years before the Revolution, he explained, 
Europe had gradually begun to free itself from the religious sectarianism of the early-modern 
era. As religious passions were mollified, social relations were softened by the advent of new 
codes of civility. Commercial prosperity enabled the expansion of a burgeoning civil society, 
and supported an incredible outpouring of art and learning. Meanwhile, the salutary progress 
of moral philosophy provided monarchs with a better understanding of their moral duties to 
their subjects. In this promising period, according to Gentz, 
… the great were made gentle and mild through the increase of knowledge, 
while the small became self-sufficient and corrigible. That which pleased 
citizens also strengthened governments. The scourge could rest as reason 
gripped the scepter, and enlightened citizens ‹aufgeklärte Bürger› were truer 
subjects than unknowing slaves.79 
With the arrival of the Revolution, however, all of this progress was swept away in a torrent 
of fanaticism. Making matters worse, the revolutionaries had perversely arrogated the title of 
Aufklärung to themselves. As the Revolution descended into violence, the fragile norms of 
enlightened political discourse – dispassionate analysis, ‘nonpartisan reason’, open debate, 
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critical introspection – gave way to partisan enthusiasm.80 Once associated with political 
improvement and moral self-government, Enlightenment now connoted popular violence, 
sedition, irreligion, and regicide.81 A ‘thick darkness’ loomed on the horizon.82 
 In setting out this contrast between Revolution and Enlightenment, Gentz was subtly 
drawing on a vision of historical progress that he took from Kant. In ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ – 
published in 1784, while Gentz was his student in Königsberg – Kant had described 
Enlightenment as a slow process that must be undertaken with great care and moderation.83 
‘A public can only reach enlightenment over time,’ he explained:  
A revolution might put an end to despotism or an acquisitive and domineering 
oppression, but it will never lead to true reform in men’s ways of thinking; 
instead, new prejudices, like the old, will serve as the controlling leash of the 
great unthinking mob.84 
According to Kant, men are best able to free themselves from their ‘self-imposed immaturity’ 
and achieve moral self-government in a robust public sphere, infused with ‘a spirit of rational 
respect for the worth of each man.’85 But since rational civil discourse is impossible in a state 
of nature, Enlightenment was logically dependent on the prior existence of a durable political 
order. As a result, statesmen must balance the growth of public reason with the requirements 
of state stability. When this tension is prudently managed – as was the case, for instance, in 
Friedrich the Great’s Prussia – then as subjects become capable of rational self-government, 
the need for a paternalistic regime will wane. But if this balance were upset – if emancipated 
subjects began questioning their government’s moral legitimacy – then the flourishing of 
public rationality would undermine the state and, ipso facto, destabilize the public sphere. 
Enlightenment, in other words, would dissolve the conditions of its own existence. 
 In 1801, reflecting on the origins of the Revolution and its wars, Gentz doubled back 
to expand the historical sketch that he first set out in the preface to his Reflections.86 Here, 
too, he depicted the collapse of Enlightenment into Revolution in recognizably Kantian 
terms. His story began with the rise of territorial sovereignty in the mid-seventeenth century 
and the advent of the Westphalian state-system, which liberated Europe from the violence of 
the Wars of Religion. As ‘the last residues of [Europe’s] feudal constitution’ were dismantled 
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by progressive monarchs, ‘the free exercise of the highest authority [was concentrated] in the 
hands of sovereigns’.87 As a result of this stability, commerce and industry flourished, while 
new markets for European wares were opened in Asia and the Americas.88 Throughout 
Europe, this ‘colonial and commercial system’ brought about ‘the most conspicuous 
progress’. ‘Everywhere the state of society became more refined’, he wrote. ‘As individual 
subjects became more cultured and prosperous, the financial means and abilities [of 
governments] were also strengthened.’89 As religious sentiments were softened, ‘a more 
enlightened, mild, peaceful way of thinking came to prevail among the vast majority of 
people’. He was willing to admit that ‘this promising era’ had its shortcomings: Gentz was 
critical of the partitions of Poland, and lamented that diplomats had not made more progress 
in lessening the incidents of war.90 Nevertheless, ‘if one had asked any reasonable statesman 
[before 1789] … whether it was desirable or advisable to try to improve Europe’s civil 
constitution through a universal and sudden dissolution of all [political] bonds, his answer 
would have been either a sneer of contempt or an exclamation of rage.’91 Yet just as Kant had 
warned, the diffusion of an anti-political form of reason subverted the authority of the 
Bourbon regime.92 Unaware of the contingency of their own historical position, the 
philosophes indicted their government before the bar of reason.93 Yet rather than advancing 
the cause of Enlightenment, ‘this Revolution broke out and stunted [its] progress at precisely 
the moment when it showed such extraordinary promise’.94 
* * * 
In recent decades, historical scholarship on the meaning of Aufklärung has tended to centre 
on the debate prompted by J.F. Zöllner in the Berlinische Monatsschrift in the mid-1780s.95 
What intellectual historians have not adequately appreciated, however, is that this German 
debate continued to remain vibrant well after the storming of the Bastille, echoing down into 
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the 1790s. In these years, the tectonic pressures of the revolution reshaped the debate. While 
early interlocutors were invested in identifying the motive forces of modern social progress, 
the collapse of the Bourbon regime cast this ‘progress’ in a new, disconcerting light. In the 
aftermath of 1789, and especially 1793, early disputes about the identity of Aufklärung gave 
way to a new debate about how to distinguish between ‘true’ and ‘false’ Enlightenment. As 
Gentz’s peers recognized, his Reflections was intended as a contribution to this latter iteration 
of the Aufklärungsdebatte.   
Even before Gentz’s Reflections appeared, Burke had been co-opted into debates over 
the relation between Aufklärung and Revolution. In 1791, Johann Wilhelm Archenholz took 
to the pages of the Neue teutsche Merkur to criticize a recent book by the Weimar cameralist 
and aristocrat Ernst August Anton von Göchhausen.96 Writing from Paris – where he had 
emigrated in solidarity with the republican cause – Archenholz took issue with Göchhausen’s 
attempt to turn ‘Enlightenment’ into a term of derision. ‘Those men he doesn’t like, he just 
curses as Aufklärer.’97 This cynical tactic was extremely dangerous, according to Archenholz. 
In abandoning the basic values of Enlightenment, Göchhausen had come to adopt the same 
‘principles according to which Galileo was imprisoned in Italy, Huss was burned in 
Germany, Henry IV was executed in France, the Inquisition arose in Spain, and hundreds of 
thousands were slaughtered in the Netherlands.’ If men like Göchhausen had their way, he 
warned, Europe would be dragged into a new Dark Ages – ‘and we know how things were 
back then!’98  
In responding to Archenholz, Göchhausen complained that Archenholz’s excessive 
partisanship had led him to neglect the central distinction in Göchhausen’s book – namely, 
the distinction between ‘true’ and ‘false’ Enlightenment: 
By Enlightenment, I simply mean the refinement of insufficiently-developed 
truths and the diffusion of insufficiently-known truths, ones that are beneficial 
to the general public. False Enlightenment, as I define it, is just the opposite: 
the creation and propagation of fantasies, prejudices, partisan catch-phrases, 
and sophistries.99 
The central question, according to Göchhausen, was not whether the revolutionaries claimed 
to be enlightened, but whether the effects of their reform movement were salutary. He was 
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quite prepared to admit that some ‘Staatsrevolutionen’ were ‘the necessary, gradual, and 
peaceful result of true enlightenment’.100 But this was not the case in France, as ‘wahre 
Aufklärer’ like Lally-Tolendal, Mounier, Raynal, and Burke had observed.101 As these men 
saw, the revolutionaries were using the false veneer of Enlightenment to provide cover for 
what was, in practice, a lawless coup d’état. Burke had already exposed this charade in 1790. 
‘If [Archenholz] wants to know more about those men I insist on sarcastically calling 
Aufklärer, he can familiarize himself with Girtanner’s Historische Nachricht (vol. 1, p. 87): 
the section about what Burke calls ‘atheistical priests’ is long, but I recommend it for the 
edification of my readers.’102 What Burke understood, according to Göchhausen, was that 
when well-meaning reformers begin to prefer utopian schemes to the more prosaic work of 
concrete social improvement, Aufklärung can quickly collapse into its opposite.  
By the time that Gentz’s Reflections appeared in 1793, this newer iteration of the 
Aufklärungsdebatte had fully eclipsed the earlier discussion prompted by Zöllner. Much of 
the critical reception of Gentz’s Reflections, accordingly, was framed in the terms of this 
debate about true and false Enlightenment. When, for instance, the Kantian publicist Karl 
Leonard Reinhold canvassed Gentz’s work in his review of ‘Teutschen Beurtheilungen der 
französischen Revolution’ (1793), he effectively replicated Göchhausen’s earlier 
distinction.103 According to Reinhold, the vocation of the Aufklärer was to chart a via media 
between a subversive libertinism and anti-revolutionary conservatism. ‘Human nature is 
constantly caught up in a battle with itself’, he explained,   
… [an] eternal war between despotism and lawlessness. Apologists of the 
former demand civil order; the latter, civil freedom. At every new and grave 
outbreak of this fight the cosmopolitan, independently-minded thinker must 
have no greater wish than for each side to hold the other in check…. He is 
obliged to defend what is true and shun what is evil in both sides, exposing 
himself to the charge of treason against mankind by democrats, and treason 
against his country by aristocrats. Burke in England, Necker in Switzerland, 
[Wieland] in Germany – as well as Rehberg, Genz [sic] and a few other fine 
writers among us – all loudly raised [their] voices against the chaos in France 
as soon as this new monstrosity appeared, overthrowing the tyranny of the 
ancien régime yet destroying the sacred foundations of civil order in the 
process.104 
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By 1793 there existed a ‘false prejudice among Germans that philosophy only degrades 
politics and jurisprudence’, a dangerous skepticism that Rehberg’s Untersuchungen had 
inflamed.105 Abandoning philosophy for the sake of political stability threatened to vitiate 
vital distinctions between ‘between the sovereign and the ruler, between the letter and the 
spirit of the law, between that which is and that which should be.’106 Yet as Gentz 
recognized, it was also necessary to reject the opposite view, ‘that politics and jurisprudence 
must draw their principles only from philosophy’.107 
 Happily, Reinhold observed, most German political theorists recognized this. Arguing 
against Rehberg, he insisted that conservative anxieties about the possibility of Revolution in 
the German states were wildly overstated. Here, the real threat to Enlightenment consisted in 
the possibility of an anti-revolutionary backlash against theoreticians. ‘Germany has … more 
to fear from the anti-philosophical defenders of her constitution than from its philosophical 
critics – more to fear from a one-sided, partisan, stubborn provincialism ‹Staatsbürgersinn› 
than from that weak, fickle, unpatriotic cosmopolitanism ‹Weltbürgersinn›, which is foreign 
to it.’ Tellingly, Reinhold saw Gentz not as an enemy, but as an ally, in this critical battle to 
preserve the dignity of theory. Gentz recognized that to reject liberalism per se in the face of 
the revolutionary threat would ultimately be self-defeating: the typical German conservative 
‘demands such radical restrictions on liberty and equality that he threatens not only the state’s 
health, but its very continuation’.108 Those statesmen and ministers who were using Gentz’s 
Reflections to defend unwarranted constrictions of civil liberty needed to read his work more 
closely, according to Reinhold: 
For some time now, Germany’s fanatical defenders of French principles have 
been completely silenced and discredited by the actions and decisions of the 
Jacobins and the National Assembly. Indeed, neither Burke’s thundering 
rhetoric nor Gentz … could ever have dreamed of such success themselves. 
Sadly, this repudiation of German Jacobinism was not the result of principled 
arguments leveled against both the apologists of anarchy and despotism – the 
sort of arguments that Gentz, for instance, offers – but was rather the result of 
a series of shocking events which, in the eyes of many observers, seemed to 
make despotism more attractive than anarchy….109 
Unlike many of his allies, Gentz had resisted the temptation to ‘scorn, neglect, satirize, and 
curse metaphysics’.110 His critique of the Revolution was more circumscribed, and needed to 
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be understood as an attempt to preserve Aufklärung against the twin dangers of ‘anarchy and 
despotism’.  
 But it was not only Gentz’s defenders who recognized the Kantian undercurrents in 
his Reflections: Gentz’s most strident critic, Georg Forster, detected it as well. Shortly before 
his untimely death in Robespierre’s Paris, Forster reviewed Gentz’s Reflections for the Neue 
Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek.111 In context, what was striking about his review was not its 
acerbic tone (that was to be expected), but rather Forster’s explicit admission that he shared 
Gentz’s normative vision of right. On the basis of this claim, his review argued – somewhat 
incredibly – that Gentz’s own principles obligated him to support the Jacobin regime in Paris. 
Following Gentz, Forster argued that human beings are rights-bearing moral agents, and that 
because their political rights can only be realized in society, states were a necessary condition 
of modern liberty. Where Gentz erred, according to Forster, was in his assumption that the 
state is a necessarily contingent, historical, and particular phenomenon. On Gentz’s way of 
thinking, ‘liberty is allowed only insofar as it coincides with the contingent conditions of the 
state’.112 This supposition led directly to his peculiar vision of the modern Rechtstaat as a 
union of Kantian liberty and Burkean prudence. But according to Forster, the revolutionary 
French state was a concrete refutation of this assumption. ‘It is of course true, as the author 
claims, that civil society does not exist in abstraction…; but what he does not see is that a 
state can, in fact, exist that is commensurate with only the pure concept of civil society.’113 
The French Republic had implemented only those minimal, a priori restrictions on liberty 
that are required for the state’s existence. Gentz’s prejudice had prevented him from seeing 
that the revolutionaries’ early, naïve vision of a post-political liberté had been abandoned 
long ago. ‘Where’, Forster sarcastically inquired, ‘are the advocates of these new systems 
that demand unconditional liberty? On the moon?’114 By 1793, Robespierre had transformed 
the Revolution into a defence of the rational state. Ironically, therefore, Gentz’s Reflections 
contained all the resources needed to vindicate it: 
If the French legislators believed that there exist certain natural rights of man 
and that it is a crime against mankind to constrict them arbitrarily; but that, 
since these rights can only be secured within a state, a constriction of natural 
right is necessary; that the ultimate purpose of all state institutions is to uphold 
the general rule of law; finally, if they were of the opinion … that demands on 
a state’s institutions are also demands on its individual citizens – if all these 
conditions were satisfied, we can conclude that duty compelled them to 
discover these natural rights and make them the legal foundation of their 
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constitution, even if overwhelming necessity did not compel them to do so 
and if the letter of their summons [to the états généraux] did not invite it.115  
In theory, Gentz’s vision of Enlightenment meant that he should have celebrated the French 
state’s world-historical achievement. His unwillingness to do so was proof not of his theory’s 
falsity, but of his inability to live up to its arduous demands. Because Gentz’s preference for 
the injustice of Prussian Recht over and against the purity of Jacobin liberté was intellectually 
indefensible, Forster concluded, it could only have been the result of his ill will. 
 
IV. Gentz’s Burke contra Kant 
In 1792, Gentz’s decision to translate the Reflections had disappointed his friend Humboldt. 
Writing to their mutual friend, Karl Gustav von Brinckmann, Humboldt admitted that he was 
worried. Though ‘the truths of the French Revolution will remain eternal truths, even if 1200 
idiots profane them’, it seemed as if Gentz had ‘come to love Burke more than the truth’.116 
A few months later, however, his viewpoint changed after he receiving ‘Gentz’s long-awaited 
book’:  
You know my critical opinions about this work from my earlier letters, and I 
began to read this voluminous book from that earlier [sceptical] perspective. I 
cannot describe to you how astounded I was. Every page pulled me in deeper 
than the one before. I read and read until late in the night, studying it for three 
uninterrupted days, with more intensity and fervour than I have ever dedicated 
to a book. It has been quite a long time since such a book, a real classic, has 
come before me. I am not talking about the Burke in particular, though it is a 
masterpiece of politics and rhetoric. I mean Gentz’s work: his translation, 
commentary, fine editorial revisions and most sublime essays. … One cannot 
fail to see that [Gentz’s] politics are the result of deep and sustained reflection. 
More than this, … his politics is applied to history and explained through 
history, such that his perspective is eminently pragmatic.117 
Initially, Humboldt had assumed that Gentz’s decision to translate Burke entailed a rejection 
of their shared principles. But he now saw this was mistaken. ‘If you want to build a house,’ 
he explained to Brinkmann, ‘it would be laughable to debate how houses are constructed in 
general, but to forget to check whether a house can stand on the [particular] ground you have 
selected.’118 This was what Gentz recognized in Burke. ‘The perspective from which Burke 
and therefore Gentz proceeds is political in the strict sense of the term – namely, the sense in 
which politics is the art of founding states and tending to their preservation and perpetuation.’  
By coupling this Burkean perspective to the normative vision of justice that he learned from 
Kant, he had transformed the Reflections into a handbook of Kantian statesmanship: 
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What presents a really nice contrast to Burke’s original is that, whereas in the 
English text one encounters Burke as a one-dimensional politician – as a 
statesman concerned with political stability and little else – Gentz casts [his] 
politics in the gentle light of a liberal philosophy ‹menschenfreundlichen 
Philosophie› that is concerned not merely with citizens but with human 
beings…. The style of Gentz’s philosophical essays reminds one continuously 
that he is a pupil and a reader of Kant: indeed, in certain sections I wanted to 
say that Kant himself would have written like this, if he had as much taste and 
eloquence as Gentz.119    
Over the coming year, the viability of the synthesis that Humboldt detected in Gentz’s 
Reflections emerged as a heated point of controversy in Germany. Under the shadow of Louis 
XVI’s execution and the Terror, Gentz forced German writers to stake out a clear position on 
whether the dictates of a priori reason were, in fact, compatible with the demands of political 
practice. As we saw in Chapter 3, Rehberg’s Untersuchungen answered in the negative, 
insisting that theoretical reason was unable to furnish a morally determinate account of right. 
Fichte’s Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die Französische 
Revolution (1793) took up the opposite position, arguing that Kantian reason was, in fact, 
sufficient to demonstrate the basic political equality of all men, and that any state that 
contravened its universal demands needed to be reformed, regardless of the costs.120 Gentz, 
finally, articulated a middle position between these extremes, arguing that reason’s political 
dictates are indeed practicable, but only if coupled with morality and prudence.  
In September 1793, Kant waded into this debate that his former student had catalysed. 
In ‘Theorie und Praxis’ – his first public comment on the Revolution – Kant dealt a dramatic 
setback to Gentz by publicly aligning himself with the republican cause.121 Not only did he 
renounce Rehberg’s scepticism, he also set himself in opposition to Gentz’s prudentialist case 
against the revolutionaries. Against the ‘would-be expert who admits the value of theory for 
teaching purposes … but argues that matters are quite different in practice’, he argued that a 
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priori reason was, in fact, wholly sufficient for the practice of politics.122 In his analysis of 
‘the relation of theory to practice in the right of a state’, Kant endorsed the revolutionaries’ 
Declaration, citing liberty, equality, and representation as the necessary conditions ‘in 
accordance with which alone the establishment of a state is possible in conformity with pure 
rational principles of external human right’.123 To the extent that France’s legislators had 
failed to realize these principles, their movement suffered from a dearth, not an excess, of 
theoretical reason. 
In his introduction, Kant set out a précis of his argument. Sometimes, he conceded, 
theory and practice seem incongruent. But could circumstantial prudence reconcile them? It 
was true that ‘between theory and practice there is required … an act of judgment through 
which the practitioner decides whether … something is a case of the rule.’ But prudential 
statesmanship could not make all theories practicable, for the obvious reason that ‘even 
where this natural talent is present, there can still be a deficiency in premises, that is, a theory 
can be incomplete.’ If a wise politician attempted to implement an underdeveloped theory, 
his aims would prove unrealizable. ‘In such cases it is not the fault of theory if it was of little 
use in practice, but rather of there having been not enough theory.’124 He elucidated his point 
with a metaphor from Newtonian mathematical physics: 
Now if an empirical engineer tried to disparage general mechanics, or an 
artilleryman the mathematical doctrine of ballistics, by saying that whereas 
the theory of it is nicely thought out it is not valid in practice since, when it 
comes to application, experience yields quite different results than theory, one 
would merely laugh at him (for if the theory of friction were added to the first 
and the theory of the resistance of air to the second, hence if only still more 
theory were added, these would accord very well with experience).125 
Rather than turning to Gentz’s concept of prudence, Kant suggested that the apparent failure 
of the Revolution was attributable to its leaders’ crude grasp of the nature of modern liberty – 
specifically, to their self-undermining claim that they possessed a natural right to revolution. 
According to Kant, if subjects had a categorical right to overthrow their sovereigns, this right 
would have to be rooted in a universalizeable maxim. This would be equivalent to a law that 
licenses lawlessness, which is absurd.126 With Hobbes, Kant unequivocally insisted that ‘any 
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resistance to the supreme legislative power, …is the highest and most punishable crime 
within a commonwealth, because it destroys its foundation.’127 It was the revolutionaries’ 
inability to grasp this theoretical point – not, as Gentz claimed, their imprudence – that led 
their movement into violence. Kant expanded this point into a broader claim about politics 
per se: the exigencies of practice, he insisted, could never be allowed to infringe upon the 
claims of pure reason. If statesmanship consisted in squaring the demands of justice with 
what he elsewhere described as ‘enlightened concepts of political prudence’, then what is true 
in theory would, in certain circumstances, be impractical.128 If this were so, morality would 
be contingent, and the very idea of justice would be a mirage: 
All is lost when empirical and therefore contingent conditions of carrying out 
the law are made conditions of the law itself, so that a practice calculated with 
reference to an outcome probable in accordance with previous experience is 
given authority to control a self-sufficient theory.129 
‘Theorie und Praxis’, in other words, inverted the argument of Gentz’s Reflections. In Kant’s 
view, the revolutionaries’ main error was not their imprudence; rather, like the engineers in 
his metaphor, they had ‘not enough theory’. The Revolution’s failure did not prove reason’s 
inadequacy for practice; rather, it illustrated the terrible consequences that follow when its 
sovereignty is ignored. 
* * * 
Kant’s intervention into the theory-practice debate gave Rehberg and Gentz occasion to 
clarify their earlier positions, and to rebuff his attempt to subsume political practice within 
the wider category of theory. Though scholars have often conflated their two responses – 
assuming that Gentz, like Rehberg, denied the sovereignty of reason for political practice –
their arguments against ‘Theorie und Praxis’ were essentially distinct.130 Rehberg’s response 
enlarged upon the Humean case against metaphysics that he set out in his Untersuchungen.131 
While he welcomed Kant’s rejection of Wolff’s eudemonism, he insisted that any theory of 
right solely deduced by (noumenal) reason could not, by definition, make determinate claims 
about the (phenomenal) world of politics. ‘Reason is not itself an object’, he wrote; ‘it exists 
only in the form of the imagination.’ Even if Kant were able to prove that the conditions of 
justice must universalizable, this would only be a formal definition of political morality. Kant 
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might be able to establish certain limiting conditions on the exercise of legitimate state power 
a priori. But as long as he remained in the lofty realm of abstraction, his theory would remain 
without content, and would be unable to describe features of a just polity with any specificity. 
As a result, Rehberg concluded, ‘the external effects of human freedom cannot be described 
as a system that is grounded purely upon principles a priori’.132  
Gentz’s ‘Nachtrag zu den Räsonnement des Herrn Professor Kant’ was far more 
deferential.133 As Gentz made clear, his critique of the Revolution had not been meant to cast 
doubt on Kant’s theory of justice. Far from subverting the authority of practical reason, Gentz 
insisted that his appeal to Burkean prudence was consonant with, and indeed presupposed by, 
Kant’s account of right: 
If the saying ‘that may be true in theory but does not apply in practice’ is 
intended to mean that something could be true in theory but nevertheless false 
in practice, then it is a thoroughly wrongheaded notion and deserves the full 
severity with which Prof. Kant, in his noteworthy and profound essay on the 
subject, reveals its emptiness. – Sometimes, however, it only means ‘that may 
be true in theory but is not sufficient ‹zureichend› for practice’. … Pure logic 
and well-constituted reason argue that what has been proven and established 
in theory cannot be overturned in practice. But there is another, much more 
complicated, interesting and fruitful question to be asked. At what point does 
practice cease to be a mere echo of theory? At what point does it earn the right 
to speak for itself, and indeed for theory as well?134 
Kant had shown that philosophical reason was necessary for politics. But had he proven that 
it was sufficient? ‘At first glance,’ he wrote, ‘one might be tempted to think that all theories 
that are grounded rationally upon a priori principles must be counted among those that are 
sufficient in and of themselves.’135 But closer examination show that this is not the case. In 
the sphere of interpersonal moral duties – what Gentz called ‘relations of pure obligation’ – 
pure reason is entirely sufficient to establish the rules of morality. Yet politics was another 
matter altogether: the relation between the sovereign and his subjects is not one of reciprocal 
moral obligations. ‘What is essential about the civil condition … is that it secures the rights 
of men through compulsory public laws.’136 As Kant’s own line of argument suggested, the 
rights of man cannot be secured in an anarchic state of nature. But as Gentz pointed out, a 
priori reason is not competent to describe the conditions of effective political order. Reason 
cannot explain how constitutions should be organized, how sovereign power is best wielded, 
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or how social stability can be best preserved. In order to enact the rights of man in practice, 
therefore, statesmen needed an empirical grasp of how states are constructed and maintained. 
Gentz called this supplement to Kant’s jurisprudence his ‘new empirical theory’:  
In order to create a just constitution, an understanding of the rights of man is 
indispensable, but merely preliminary. If the statesman is to uncover a way to 
realize these rights, he must go beyond his theory. The best-developed system 
of rights will always remain only a noble ideal without the practical substance 
‹Stoff› that experience alone … offers. In every just constitution, sovereignty 
must be vested somewhere. Where should this power be located? How should 
it be wielded? What are its limits? How should it be safeguarded? To these 
exceedingly important questions, a pure theory of right can offer no answers. 
An understanding of men, of individuals and groups; a knowledge of human 
abilities, inclinations, passions, and weaknesses; prolonged observation; a 
comparison of man’s many climates and circumstances; investigation of his 
social relations; a prolonged series of trial and error – only these can provide 
answers.137 
If reason furnishes the ends of politics, experience teaches its means. Because Kant offered 
only a theoretical account of justice, he had inadvertently ignored essential questions about 
how to reconcile order and liberty in practice. ‘If he only meant to establish the principles on 
which rational constitutions must be founded, this oversight would be unproblematic,’ Gentz 
wrote. ‘But it is curious that Kant neglected [the lessons of experience] in an essay on theory 
and practice.’138 
 This oversight led Kant to misjudge the revolutionaries, according to Gentz. Liberty, 
equality and independence are indeed foundational principles of the social contract. ‘But this 
contract is a mere norm, a guide for legislative reason,’ not a practical plan for how to build a 
stable polity.139 Just as projectiles do not fly through air at the speed predicted by physicists, 
the normative rights of man cannot be enacted unconditionally without casting nations into a 
state of anarchy. But this is just what Kant had recommended. ‘Theorie und Praxis’ defined 
liberty, for instance, as the antithesis of paternalism. But while a nation undergoes the slow 
process of Enlightenment, is not a well-intentioned paternalistic regime vital for the orderly 
expansion of subjects’ rights? Indeed, was this not Friedrich the Great’s central achievement? 
Similarly, Kant argued that since all men must be equal before the law, feudal honours and 
privileges must be abolished. But look to the example of modern Britain, Gentz countered. 
Here, in the most liberal nation in Europe, a virtuous nobility was necessary for maintaining 
public order. If the relation between a sovereign and his subjects was necessarily unequal (as 
Kant admitted), why could the sovereign not delegate authority to the vassals and allies who 
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help him uphold the peace? Though he posed these questions rhetorically, Gentz’s point was 
clear. Theories of justice are meaningless in a pre-political state of anarchy. To ignore the 
empirical question of order is to consign philosophy to irrelevance. 
* * * 
From Gentz’s perspective, the strident rationalism of ‘Theorie und Praxis’ was a betrayal of 
the reformist vision of Enlightenment that Kant taught him in the 1780s. But to Germany’s 
republican writers, it was Gentz who had betrayed the cause of liberty. Throughout the 1790s, 
his critics ruthlessly ridiculed him as a sophist who had perverted Aufklärung into a tool for 
rationalizing injustice.140 The seeming success of Gentz’s politics infuriated them all the 
more. As one of the Literaturzeitung’s writers noted, ‘the exceptional literary talents of the 
Kriegsrath Gentz have made him more the envy than the rival of the countless publicists who 
oppose him. They fear that his talents will give weight to opinions that they detest, and will 
make them impossible to resist.’141 But Gentz did not share his critics’ assessment. In the 
wake of the Peace of Basel (1795) he felt increasingly alienated in what had become a tacitly 
pro-French Prussian court. At the same time, his defense of the centralized Rechtstaat over 
and against the ‘feudal’ chaos of the early-modern era won him few friends in the German 
aristocracy.  By the late 1790s, he felt besieged from all sides, and grew worried that the 
grounds for his Burkean vision of politics were crumbling beneath his feet. ‘In the present 
age’, he wrote exhaustedly, ‘the life of a political writer is nothing but a never-ending 
battle.’142  
 Throughout this period, Gentz drew succor by turning periodically to Burke’s anti-
revolutionary writings. As he knew, Burke too had faced charges of ‘apostasy’ after turning 
against the Revolution. In 1796, Burke answered his Whig critics in his Letter to a Noble 
Lord.143 Far from a renunciation of his earlier liberalism, Burke insisted, his critique of the 
French Revolution was an extension of his lifelong commitment to constitutional liberty. 
Across his career, his touchstone had been ‘a liberty inseparable from order, from virtue, 
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from morals, and from religion’.144 In early 1796, soon after received a copy of Noble Lord 
from his contacts in London, Gentz began intensively studying Burke’s pre-revolutionary 
works, in order to assess the question of Burke’s intellectual ‘consistency’ for himself.145 
This exercise not only confirmed his admiration for Burke’s eloquence: it also seemed to 
corroborate his interpretation of the Reflections. Burke’s detractors saw a contradiction in his 
twin commitments to political stability and civil liberty. But to Gentz, it seemed a principled 
attempt to marry theory and practice. He quickly set about translation this work, publishing 
an annotated German edition in the summer of 1796.146 Using his translation as a platform, 
he magnified his Kantian reading of the Reflections into an account of Burke’s parliamentary 
career tout court. To emphasize this work’s true scope, he gave it a new title: Edmund Burkes 
Rechtfertigung seines politischen Lebens ‹Edmund Burke’s Vindication of his Life in Politics› 
(and removed all epistolary references to the Earl Fitzwilliam, Burke’s eponymous ‘noble 
lord’). As Gentz acknowledged in his preface, his decision to translate this work was not 
without risk: its polemical tone was likely to offend the sensibilities of German readers.147 
Nevertheless, he insisted, this book’s content was absolutely vital: it offered a window into 
‘the evolution of the principles and mentality of one of the most important men of this 
century’.148 
 In his introduction to this work, Gentz presented Burke’s critique of the Revolution as 
the logical and necessary culmination of the principles that he espoused over the course of his 
career.149 In his opposition to the excesses of the British Crown, in his support for the 
American colonists in the 1770s, in his prosecution of the East India Company’s corruption, 
and in his campaign for the rights of British and Irish Catholics, Burke’s steadfast goal had 
been to avoid ‘the extremes of a contemptible subservience ‹Unterwürfigkeit› and a wild 
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populism ‹Popularität›’.150 His critique of French republicanism was cut from the same cloth. 
What had changed over the course of Burke’s career, according to Gentz, was not his 
principles, but the rhetorical force with which he articulated them. Gentz found Burke’s early 
works tedious and technical, mired in the minutiae of esoteric parliamentary discussions. In 
the Reflections, however, Burke found his voice:   
Normally writers who are especially imaginative or inspired get carried away 
in their earlies works by their excessive warmth, their intense enthusiasm, or 
their poetic proclivities. Later, as their understanding gradually develops, they 
attain that sobriety and intellectual maturity [which] gives their writings true, 
lasting worth. But with Burke the opposite is the case. The work of his early 
years is, without exception, cold and severe, unlike the excited and stormy 
products of his aged mind. His overwhelming images; his depictions of all 
kinds of incredible figures; his allusions, both ancient and contemporary, 
sacred and secular…; his spirited, stinging, biting wit; his furious attacks on 
his enemies; the violence with which he exposes his critics’ misjudgements; 
the diverse gifts of an orator who, without any preparation other than his own 
uncanny talent, pours out his spirit from the depths of his soul – that is to say, 
everything that indicates the final ascendance of his powers of imagination … 
appeared in Burke in precisely those years that normally threaten to extinguish 
a writer’s fiery disposition.151 
What Burke’s critics saw as ‘apostasy’ was in fact the marriage of his lifelong principles to 
this newfound eloquence. ‘Since he expressed his defence of the old constitution [of France] 
against a brash new one with a liveliness, an extravagance, a level of eloquence that he had 
never displayed before … – this gave him the appearance of a panicked, desperate aristocrat, 
a sworn and bitter enemy of all great and noble human endeavours, of all progress, and of all 
freedom.’ But nothing could be further from the truth: Burke was, Gentz insisted, a man of 
‘enlightened and generous spirit’ whose liberal critique of the Revolution had been roundly 
misunderstood.152 
 How, exactly, was Burke able to square his lifelong commitment to English liberty 
with his caustic critique of French liberté? In the original edition of Noble Lord, Burke built 
his apology on the distinction between ‘reform’ and ‘innovation’: ‘it cannot at this time be 
too often repeated [that] to innovate is not to reform’. To reform, for Burke, was to address 
defects in a nation’s constitution by drawing on resources internal to the constitution’s own 
logic. It was ‘not a change in the substance … of the object, but a direct application of a 
remedy to the grievance complained of’.153 To innovate, by contrast, was to reject the 
authority of the constitution wholesale, in favor of an extra-constitutional vision of justice. 
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The innovator ‘alters the substance of the objects themselves; and gets rid of all their 
essential good, as well as of all the accidental evil annexed to them.’ According to Burke, the 
characteristic sign of innovation was the external nature of its critique. In a telling metaphor, 
he described the ‘rights of man’ as a ‘portentous comet’ which, if it had crashed down into 
Britain, would have destroyed the Settlement of 1688 – and with it, the possibility of true 
reform.154 This fidelity to the Constitution led him to oppose innovation throughout his 
career, even when it ‘prowled about our streets in the name of reform’.155 
 For Gentz, this distinction between reform and innovation did not adequately capture 
what was truly admirable in Burke’s career. In order to make it clearer, he massaged Burke’s 
language to fit his own agenda. Gentz recast Burke’s argument as a distinction between 
‘Aufheben’ and ‘Verbessern’, overthrowing and improving.156 If Burke’s original 
terminology sought to capture the difference between two theories of political legitimacy – 
one constitutional, one theoretical – Gentz’s rendering sought to evoke the mean-ends 
distinction outlined in his Reflections. For Gentz, what made the ‘comet of the rights of man’ 
such an ‘ominous’ spectre was not the mere fact of its externality, but the velocity with 
which it impacted on French society.157 Burke’s critique of ‘Aufheben’ was motivated not by 
any fundamental mistrust of theory, he suggested, but by his prescient intuition that the 
French legislature would be unable to enact their normative vision of right in practice. In his 
translation, Gentz highlighted one passage in particular that seemed to vindicate his intuition 
that Burke, too, recognized the sovereignty of reason in politics:  
From the first dawn of my spirit until this, its twilight, I have had a definitive 
aversion to all arbitrariness ‹Willkühr›, speculation, idle musing and fantasies. 
In affairs of state nothing is to be obeyed except sovereign reason ‹souveräne 
Vernunft›, which reigns high above all forms of government. Constitutions are 
designed precisely to set that sublime reason ‹ehrfurchtgebietende Vernunft› 
against all despotism and capriciousness ‹aller Willkühr und aller Grillen›, 
whether it manifests itself in subjects or rulers, be they kings, senates or 
nations.158 
For Gentz, Burke’s commitment to the rule of law presupposed an anterior commitment to a 
trans-temporal – and therefore extra-constitutional – account of right. What is more, Burke’s 
contrast between the irrational ‘Willkür’ of the tyrant and the self-mastery of the enlightened 
sovereign fit comfortably within Gentz’s own Kantian categories. It simply could not have 
been the case that Burke’s critique of ‘innovation’ was a wholesale critique of rationalism, 
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Gentz reasoned: he must have been intending to criticize the revolutionaries’ tactics, not their 
metaphysics. Whether consciously or not, Gentz admired Burke too much to take seriously 
the possibility that Burke’s politics militated against his own Kantian ideals.  
* * * 
Gentz’s last major attempt to divorce Kant’s idealism from the legacy of the Revolution came 
in a series of essays published in his Historisches Journal in the late 1790s.159 In his 
Reflections, Gentz took himself to be attacking an anti-political strain of republicanism, one 
that he associated with Robespierre and the Jacobins. By the end of the decade, 
circumstances forced him to recalibrate this critique. In the intervening years, the 
Revolution’s German apologists had moved on from debates about the rights of man, and set 
about tackling more pressing question of republican constitutionalism. How should the state 
be organized in order to realize the principle of popular sovereignty? And how could the 
rights of men against their governments be protected? In this context, Germany witnessed a 
revival of interest in the representative theory of republicanism that the Abbé Sieyès had 
contended for, unsuccessfully, in the early 1790s.160 According to Sieyès, the Jacobins’ 
experiment had failed because it relied on a naïve view of human sociability. Against their 
fraternalism, he spent the Revolution’s early years arguing that the only way to transform a 
large, commercial monarchy like France into a functioning republic was through the political 
mechanism of representation. In 1795, his vision of republicanism received Kant’s 
imprimatur. Whereas ‘Theorie und Praxis’ said little about questions of constitutional design, 
Zum ewigen Frieden made clear that if a ‘form of government is to accord with the concept 
of right, the representative system [must be] part of it’.161 
 As Isaac Nakhimovsky has demonstrated, Kant and Sieyès’s representative theory of 
government came to form the ideological hub around which an emergent axis of pro-French 
theorists, writers, and civil servants revolved in late-1790s Prussia.162 To Kant and many of 
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his followers, Sieyès offered a compelling vision of what France’s – and, in time, Prussia’s – 
government might become. From May 1798, the political position of these republicans in the 
Prussian court was strengthened by Sieyès’s arrival as the French ambassador to Berlin, a 
development that Gentz viewed with great alarm. (Sieyès was sent to negotiate a permanent 
alliance between Paris and Berlin, an aim that Gentz thwarted.) Gentz’s essays from the late 
1790s are best understood within this context, as an attempt to dismantle the foundations of 
this Franco-Prussian constitutionalist axis. Gentz’s Historisches Journal sought to show that 
– Kant’s passing remarks in Zum ewigen Frieden notwithstanding – a properly philosophical 
account of justice was incompatible with Sieyès’s constitutionalism.  
The crux of Gentz’s dispute with Sieyès revolved around their respective readings of 
Rousseau. Both men agreed with Rousseau’s claim that the sovereign’s coercive power was 
legitimate because it embodied the people’s volonté générale. Both men, moreover, rejected 
the Jacobins’ naïve reading of the Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité 
(1755). But past this, they diverged. According to Sieyès, the Jacobins’ critical mistake was 
to have ignored Rousseau’s distinction between sovereignty and government in Du Contrat 
Social (1762).163 Disregarding the Hobbesian premises on which Rousseau’s political theory 
was built, the Jacobins supposed that, if freed from the despotism of the ancien régime, the 
French people could serve as both sovereign and government, as the authors and arbiters of 
the law. In the absence of the state – without the executive agents and institutions needed to 
enforce the law – their movement collapsed into anarchy. While Rousseau held that the 
people were indeed sovereign, he had also warned that, as a form of government, democracy 
was fit only for gods.164 
The problem with most modern governments, in Sieyès’s view, was that they tended 
to arrogate sovereignty to themselves. Across Europe, kings and their ministers had twisted 
the state into an apparatus for enforcing their own will, rather than the collective will of the 
nations they governed. But how to overcome this problem of democratic alienation? Sieyès 
sought to transcend it by distinguishing ‘pouvior constituant’ from ‘pouvior constitué’. While 
he agreed with Rousseau that the sovereignty of the people was fundamental and inalienable, 
he argued that the people could periodically delegate sovereignty to a ‘constituted power’, a 
representative body capable of articulating and enacting their general will. Rousseau was 
famously skeptical about representation, insisting that legislatures invariably reproduced the 
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same patterns of alienation that characterized monarchical governments.165 But Sieyès was 
more sanguine. If Rousseau’s moral vision were to be enacted in a large state like France, it 
was necessary to institute a representative body capable of speaking on behalf of the people. 
He sought to mitigate the threat of alienation by constructing a multi-tiered electoral system, 
which was designed to make representatives accountable to their electorates. In addition, he 
argued that these institutions would only be practicable in a society characterized by material 
and legal equality – one which had abolished noble rights and privileges, and which sought to 
level material differences between poor and rich citizens. Representation was not sufficient to 
guarantee liberty. But if these constitutional and social conditions were met, it was possible 
to conceive of a government that was accountable to a democratic sovereign, but which did 
not collapse into it.  
 In Zum ewigen Frieden, Kant’s discussion of constitutionalism appealed directly to 
this distinction between government and sovereignty. His theory of sovereignty, on the one 
hand, was just an expansion of Rousseau’s. ‘A constitution based upon the principle of the 
liberty of the members of a society … their shared dependence upon a common legal 
authority … and their mutual equality [is] the only constitution that proceeds from the pure 
idea of the original contract’.166 Yet the form of government that was best able to enforce the 
demands of reason was an open question. In theory, a just state could be administered by one 
person (monarchy), by a group (aristocracy), or by the people themselves (democracy). Like 
Rousseau and Sieyès, he quickly ruled out democracy as a form of government. Monarchy 
and aristocracy were not without risk either: kings often governed willkürlich in their own 
interests, rather than in accordance with the demands of right. But if, Kant speculated, the 
people were able to begin expressing their collective will through the sort of representative 
institutions that Sieyès described, this would put pressure on kings and aristocrats to make 
their governments more responsible to the people. Eventually, the king might become the 
executor of the sovereign’s will, rather than its author. Such a process, Kant implied, could 
transform Prussia into a republican state with a monarchical ‘crown’, a German iteration of 
the kind of republic that Sieyès envisioned in France.167 
One strategy for undermining Kant’s republicanism, therefore, was to strike at its 
Rousseauian roots. This was the avenue that Rehberg, for instance, pursued in his response to 
Kant’s essay on ‘Theorie und Praxis’. ‘Herr Kant’s theory so completely corresponds [with 
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Rousseau’s] in its most salient points’, he wrote, ‘that if one just inserts the Contrat Social’s 
terminology in the appropriate passages’, one ends up with the same theory of sovereignty.168 
Rehberg believed that this observation exposed Kant’s theory as little more than unmoored 
speculation. The ‘people’ whose authority Kant invoked was necessarily immaterial, a pure 
legal fiction, as Rousseau himself admitted.169 The only way to grant sovereignty to ‘the 
people’ in practice, Rehberg argued, was through a sleight-of-hand that exchanged the idea 
of ‘the people’ with a collection of actual human beings in time and space. Rehberg shared 
Kant’s belief that the Hobbesian sovereign needed to be constrained. But rather than trying to 
moralize sovereignty, Rehberg followed Burke and Montesquieu in projecting sovereignty 
back into history, enmeshing the state in a dense constitutional web of precedents, customs, 
and conventions. Whereas Kant posited the united will of the people as sovereign, Rehberg 
pluralized the concept, tracing its varied origins back into the inscrutable reaches of time 
immemorial. 
But Gentz took a different tack. He saw that, since Kant’s Rechtstaat was squarely 
constructed on Rousseauian foundations, any case against Rousseau would weaken Gentz’s 
own theory of the state. Rather than following Rehberg, therefore, Gentz tried to show that 
Sieyès’s constitutionalism was a departure from Kant’s basic principles. It was Burke, not 
Sieyès, who belonged in the canon of true Kantians. Gentz traced out a new, counterintuitive 
line of succession, running not from Hobbes and Rousseau to Kant and Sieyès, but from 
Hobbes and Rousseau to Kant and Burke. Kant and his precursors were vital for theorizing 
the state’s normative foundations: to abandon the volonté générale was to abandon the idea 
of a just state altogether. But Burke was necessary for showing how to maintain the state, and 
how to steer it towards its rationally-ordained ends. The most obvious impediment in Gentz’s 
path, of course, was Burke’s well-known hatred of Rousseau. Yet already in 1793, Gentz had 
begun to qualify this enmity. In a footnote inserted next to one of the Reflections’ (many) 
criticisms of Rousseau, Gentz had conceded that ‘in many sections of Burke’s works one 
cannot miss his clear disdain for this man.’ He did not believe that it was possible to justify 
Burke’s scorn, ‘but it is possible to explain it, if one considers that Burke often confuses 
Rousseau the writer and Rousseau the man.’170 Gentz was quite ready to agree to Burke’s 
appraisal of Rousseau’s squalid character. ‘Nevertheless it is still a question whether 
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Rousseau, if he were alive, would have [consented] to be deified in the Pantheon of Paris.’ 
The revolutionaries had co-opted Rousseau as a forerunner of their cause, a claim in which 
Burke had readily acquiesced.171 But Gentz was loath to concede this point:  
Nothing is so completely opposed to the spirit of all of [Rousseau’s] political 
writings. He loved liberty, but an innocent and peaceful liberty. With all the 
rigor of a true student of human nature, he differentiated … the beautiful but 
utopian idea of a perfect constitution from that which human institutions can 
actually achieve. On more than one occasion he declared that he valued peace 
far more highly than all the uncertain hopes of reckless and impetuous 
revolutions.172 
This defense of Rousseau against Burke was conspicuous enough to attract the interest of his 
readers. ‘In one of his notes, Herr Gentz shows us the sort of liberty that Rousseau loved and 
recommended – an innocent and nonviolent liberty’, wrote one reviewer. ‘Anyone who reads 
this great philosopher without prejudice can see this, and so it is all the more curious that his 
fellow countrymen have interpreted him incorrectly ‹irrig›, and that so many men of letters 
have followed them’.173 For Burke, Rousseau’s highly abstract theory of political legitimacy 
seemed necessarily subversive. But for Gentz, it formed the ideological foundation of Kant’s 
political theory, and as such, offered necessary resources for any systematic, thoroughgoing 
critique of the Revolution. 
 Gentz’s reimagination of the social contract tradition came through most clearly in his 
article on ‘Staatswissenschaft’ (1799).174 In first part of this essay, he sketched the historical 
evolution of the tradition from its origins in Hobbes. ‘A society of free … beings can have no 
rightful origin other than … a contract of all its members’.175 Only under the assumption of 
such a contract was society possible at all. Echoing the language of Hobbes’s De Cive 
(1642), Gentz explained that while human beings can perhaps achieve a tenuous ‘concord’ 
outside the state, only by mutually submitting to a shared sovereign could a durable ‘union’ 
of men became possible: 
While mere violence can indeed attach men to one another, even over long 
periods of time, it cannot require of them anything but what it is able to 
compel through physical necessity: it can bind ‹binden›, but cannot combine 
‹verbinden›: it can press together a group of individuals … into a single mass, 
but it can never create a society of free beings.176 
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He credited Hobbes with the insight that all men had a natural interest in the creation of such 
a union, an argument from utility that was echoed in ‘Locke and Rousseau’. But it was their 
successors – Kant, above all – ‘who wrested the social contract from the level of a contingent 
contract and elevated it into a necessary one.’177 Thanks to the ‘work of the recent philosophy 
of the Germans’, Gentz argued, we now see that the state is a necessary demand of practical 
reason: 
Until then, this contract had been derived from dictates of prudence. But now 
men saw that it proceeded from a pure, fully-developed concept of right. We 
ceased to see the members of political society as voluntary participants in a 
community built on the basis of their shared interests; we now saw that every 
being capable of possessing rights must be [morally] authorized to force his 
peers to conclude the social contract.178   
Kant’s theory of the state, he went on to explain, was indebted to Rousseau. In Du Contrat 
Social, Rousseau had showed how it was possible, subjectively, for citizens to see the 
sovereign’s will as their own – not ‘the mere sum of all their individual wills [but] a will with 
which they should and must agree’, or ‘what Rousseau has helpfully called the general will 
(volonté générale)’.179 Kant’s seminal achievement, according to Gentz, had been to show 
that a priori laws of reason govern the conditions under which a group of men can unite their 
disparate individual wills into a single general will. According to Gentz, these laws were 
nothing other than justice itself. 
 This Kantian-Rousseauian argument set out an airtight case for the state’s legitimacy, 
one which Gentz fully endorsed. But he broke from these authorities in one crucial respect – 
namely, over the claim that government and sovereignty could be conceptually distinguished 
from one another. Gentz traced this error to Rousseau’s insistence ‘that sovereignty cannot be 
alienated’. On the contrary, he insisted, the essence of sovereignty is alienation. To claim that 
the people can retain their sovereignty within the state was to dissolve the state: 
Rousseau thought through the nature and the conditions of the social contract 
with an exquisite sharp-mindedness, and expressed them with a remarkable 
precision. On the basis of his foundations, the entire edifice of theoretical 
politics has been constructed with the happiest successes. At the same time, 
however, he proposed a system of governance that is not merely incomplete, 
but false, self-contradictory, and misleading for the people.180 
Gentz’s argument against Rousseau proceeded along recognizably Hobbesian lines. The 
people could not have a right to rebel against their sovereign because it was only within the 
state that they became a ‘people’ at all. Their capacity for corporate action, in other words, 
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logically depended on the alienation of their sovereignty. 
Sieyès’s reliance on Rousseau’s government-sovereignty distinction ultimately made 
his constitutionalism incoherent, according to Gentz. ‘Anyone who reads the famous book of 
Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?, will see this elemental error on every page: it repeatedly 
confuses a people ‹Volk› united under a sovereign with a community ‹Gemeinschaft› [in the 
process of] erecting a sovereign.’181 There can be no ‘constituent power’ within the state 
because the state is a precondition of this constituency’s existence:  
This confusion of a society that has been constituted and incorporated through 
the original contact (which only afterwards attains the status of a people) and 
a collection of free individuals existing prior to the original contract has 
become … the most terrible of all the political fallacies of our century.182 
Since there was no gap between sovereignty and government to be mediated, there was no 
need for the sort of the elaborate representative institutions that Sieyès insisted on. ‘If it is 
true that sovereignty is inalienable, it must also be true that it cannot be represented’, Gentz 
explained: 
Instead of claiming that sovereignty and representation are incompatible, one 
should in fact claim that every rightful sovereignty, in whatever hands it is 
vested, is nothing other than representation. The sovereign – whether a 
monarch, a senate, or a popular assembly – embodies the general will, whose 
representation is the highest goal of the social contract.183  
Sieyès, in other words, had confused the formal and substantive nature of representation, 
making ‘a contingent form into a necessary one’.184 In the legally relevant sense of the term, 
all states ‘represent’ their people. 
 Gentz’s rejection of the sovereignty-government distinction pushed constitutionalism 
out of the domain of reason, and into the sphere of Burkean prudence. The idea of the state is 
a dictate of reason, but the form of its institutions is not a ‘question of justice’ but ‘a matter of 
prudence’. A well-designed government is ‘the product of a very complex sort of knowledge, 
a kind of techné which, in order to be perfected, must unite … deep reflection and great 
experience.’185 This was a task not for a Kantian theorist of liberty, but for an empirically-
minded statesman. In some circumstances, representative institutions may indeed prove 
salutary. But it was a category error to assume, Gentz argued, that nations with legislatures 
were ipso facto freer than their neighbors. ‘Law-giving is a function, and in certain 
circumstances a form of power: but what does liberty have to do with functions or power?’186 
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To insist that liberty necessarily entails a right to take part in legislation was to conflate the 
state’s formal design with its normative ends – namely, ‘the absolute rule of law’.187 Try as 
they might, constitutional theorists like Sieyès would never be able to design institutions that 
guaranteed justice. ‘No constitution (speaking in ideal terms) can absolutely expel despotism 
‹Willkür› or absolutely guarantee justice in its laws.’ Rather, ‘the best constitution that men 
can devise can only guarantee a high likelihood of realizing civil society’s purposes.’188 
 Gentz extended his case against Sieyès’s representative republicanism into a critique 
of his broader egalitarianism. According to Sieyès, ‘every distinction between citizens that … 
is not immediately oriented to the common good is not only disgraceful but unlawful’.189 But 
this was not the case. Just as Sieyès’s constitutionalism confused the idea of the state with its 
form, his social thought confused the form and substance of equality:  
Just as the idea of popular sovereignty follows from a confusion between a 
constituted and a self-constituting people, the idea of political liberty (in 
contrast to civil liberty) follows from a confusion between the particular rights 
conferred by the constitution and absolute right, which is the condition of the 
constitution itself and which comprises the epitome of liberty in civil society. 
… The idea of political equality springs from a confusion of the subject of 
justice and its form.190    
Gentz agreed with Rousseau and Sieyès that it would be illegitimate to import relations of 
domination from the state of nature into civil society. But distinctions of rank established 
after the state’s founding were another matter. ‘All the distinctions which comprise a part of 
the constitution are not only very rightful, they are rightful per se.’ The sovereign was well 
within his rights to grant rights and privileges to those individuals who helped him carry out 
the state’s purposes. Gentz also objected to Sieyès’s redistributionist policy on the grounds 
that it treated some (rich) citizens as means to others’ ends, rather than as ends in themselves. 
‘It was not an equality of right ‹Gleichheit des Rechts› but an equality of rights ‹Gleichheit 
der Rechte› that was the true object and final goal of the Revolution.’191 In conflating justice 
and material equality, Sieyès and his compatriots had licensed a crusade of expropriation 
which, in practice, only succeeded in subverting the institution of property. If the Francophile 
ministers of Berlin imitated this policy in Prussia, Gentz warned, it would lead to similarly 
pernicious effects.     
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V. Gentz, Burke, perpetual peace 
Throughout the course of these constitutional debates – indeed, throughout the 1790s – Gentz 
was conspicuously silent on the question of foreign intervention against the French Republic. 
This silence was not born of indecision. When he first came across Burke’s Two Letters on a 
Regicide Peace in 1796, he found himself in total agreement with Burke’s case for a renewed 
war-effort against the Directory. ‘Burke’s recent work … appeals to me more than any of his 
other writings on the French Revolution, the first one [i.e. the Reflections] not excepted’, he 
told his friend Karl August Böttiger.192 Like Burke, Gentz saw the revolutionaries’ ideology 
as a virus which, if allowed to persist in France, would spread across Europe, subverting the 
rule of law and the cause of Aufklärung. Because rational arguments were powerless in the 
face of these ‘new evangelists’ (as Burke called them), they had to be combatted through 
force of arms.193 
Yet despite his determined support for intervention, Gentz was unwilling to publicly 
attach his name to the arguments of Regicide Peace. This came as a surprise to his friends, 
who assumed that he would translate this work, just as he had Burke’s Reflections and Letter 
to a Noble Lord.194 Gentz was convinced that Prussian opinion was firmly behind the policy 
of neutrality, and doubted that Regicide Peace would do much to change this consensus. ‘I 
already know that the whole world will judge this work differently from me’, he explained to 
Böttiger: 
Why should I unnecessarily expose this product, which I admire and revere 
with all the power of my soul, to their scorn and contempt? … If I translated 
Burke’s book, it would be impossible to restrain myself from praising it. This 
would only reinforce the absurd idea that I am an inveterate aristocrat, and 
would not win a single new admirer for Burke or a single new ally for me.195  
Gentz also had professional considerations to take into account. As one of Friedrich Wilhelm 
II’s Kriegsräte, it would have been imprudent in the extreme to translate Regicide Peace. In 
it, Burke explicitly cited Prussia’s policy of conciliation as an example of the sort of ‘regicide 
peace’ that he hoped Britain would avoid. ‘This pretended Republick is founded in crimes, 
and exists by wrong and robbery’, Burke had claimed. ‘To be at peace with robbery is to be 
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an accomplice with it.’196 Even more problematically, Regicide Peace had attacked Friedrich 
Wilhelm II’s personal integrity, indicting him as a cynical Machiavellian whose greed had 
undermined the prospects for European peace.197 As a member of the court, Gentz could not 
responsibly endorse such inflammatory accusations. 
But Gentz had been reticent to endorse Burke’s earlier, more circumspect arguments 
for intervention as well. In his edition of the Reflections, for instance, he simply sidestepped 
any discussion of the Revolution’s geopolitical consequences, ignoring the early skirmishes 
between France and Prussia in the Rhineland, and between France and the Habsburgs in the 
Netherlands. As Europe descended into open warfare in 1793, Gentz continued to focus 
exclusively on the constitutional and philosophical questions raised by the Revolution. After 
the Peace of Basel in 1795, Gentz disappointed his peers’ expectations – and indeed, the 
expectations of Kant himself – in choosing not to respond to Zum Ewigen Frieden.198 In his 
translation of Noble Lord, he went out of his way to excise passages that broached the topic 
of intervention.199  
Gentz’s silence on geopolitics was not only dictated by his circumstances: it was also 
borne of his conceptual inability to square his Burkean commitment to intervention with the 
ambitious vision of Völkerrecht that he took from Kant. Just as individuals in a state of nature 
have a moral duty to erect a sovereign to enforce the rule of law, Gentz believed that nations 
also have a duty to extricate themselves from their international state of anarchy, and to form 
a system of law in accordance with the demands of practical reason. In a letter to Garve from 
1789, he explained the pre-revolutionary European state system in precisely these terms. 
While individual states had made tangible domestic progress over the eighteenth century, 
relations among states were still essentially lawless. In the absence of a generally recognized 
code of international law and a sovereign to enforce it, Europe’s nations remained mired in a 
Hobbesian state of nature, where ‘normative duties’ were often eclipsed by the ‘prerogatives 
of the powerful’ ‹Recht des Stärken›.200 But how to escape this anarchic situation? During 
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Gentz’s time in Königsberg, Kant had begun sketching his own vision of what a pacified 
international arena would entail – a vision that continued to captivate Gentz throughout the 
1790s. In his essay on ‘Allgemeine Geschichte in weltbürgerlichen Absicht’ (1784), Kant 
claimed that all states had a duty to ‘go beyond a lawless condition of savages and enter into 
a federation of nations, where every state [could] expect its security and rights not from its 
own might, or its own legal judgment, but only from … a united might and from decisions in 
accordance with the laws of its united will’.201 Among the a priori conditions under which 
states can unite their individual wills into a collective volonte generale – that is to say, among 
the normative demands of reason in the sphere of Völkerrecht – was the duty to pursue 
‘perpetual peace’ among nations. A system of international law that allowed for extralegal 
military conflict was a contradiction in terms.  
Kant returned to this story in Zum ewigen Frieden, pointing to the French Republic as 
the motive agent that could spark this process of international pacification. He welcomed the 
Peace of Basel because, if properly enforced, it could lay the foundation for a new republican 
axis of states, headed by France and Prussia, that could extricate Europe from the destructive 
wars of the eighteenth century: 
For if good fortune should ordain that a powerful and enlightened people can 
form itself into a republic (which by its nature must be inclined to perpetual 
peace), this would provide a focal point of federative union for other states, to 
attach themselves to it and so to secure a condition of freedom of states 
conformable with the idea of the right of nations; and by further alliances of 
this kind, it would gradually extend further and further.202 
Kant contrasted the moral ideals of this alliance with what he considered to be the immoral 
consequences of the ius gentium tradition, which had governed international relations over 
the eighteenth century.203 In theory, this tradition was sought to prohibit wars of aggression, 
and forbid states from interfering in their neighbor’s internal affairs. But in practice, Kant 
argued, ius gentium had accomplished the opposite: it gave statesmen an arsenal of legal 
excuses with which to rationalize putatively ‘defensive’ wars. This tradition is ‘always duly 
cited in justification of an offensive war’, he complained, and yet ‘there is no instance of a 
state ever having been moved to desist from its plan by [the] arguments … of such eminent 
men’. Without a ‘common external constraint’ to compel obedience, the norms of the ius 
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gentium could not have ‘the slightest lawful force’. This made ‘Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, 
Vattel, and the like’ little more than ‘sorry comforters’ ‹leidige Tröster›.204 What was needed, 
according to Kant, was a federation of republics that could function as an ersatz international 
sovereign, delineating principles of right and compelling member-states to submit to them.205 
 This argument pushed Gentz in a difficult position. With Kant, he believed that the 
creation of a just international order was a demand of practical reason. But he also believed 
that without Prussian intervention, the Second Coalition would almost certainly be defeated, 
and with disastrous consequences for the rule of law across Europe. When he turned to 
Regicide Peace, he found little that could help him reconcile these seemingly contradictory 
commitments.206 The legal rationale that Burke relied on to justify intervention was rooted in 
the customary ‘law of vicinage’. A holdover from Roman property law, this norm constricted 
the right to property-ownership in deference to the exigencies of the community ‹vicinia›. At 
its heart was the principle that ‘no innovation is permitted that may redound … to the 
prejudice of a neighbour.’207 Reasoning in the style of ‘publick jurists’ who ‘form the law of 
nations from the principles of law which prevail in civil community’, Burke explained that 
the British state had ‘not only a right, but an indispensable duty, and an exigent interest, to 
denunciate this new work [in France] before it had produced the danger we have so sorely 
felt, and which we shall long feel’.208 Since this right could not be taken before a civil judge, 
it had to be defended through unilateral force. ‘What in civil society is a ground of action, in 
politick society is a ground of war’, he wrote. ‘When all these circumstances combine … the 
duty of the vicinity calls for the exercise of it’s competence; and the rules of prudence do not 
restrain, but demand it.’209 
 From Gentz’s perspective, the argument of Regicide Peace was doubly problematic. 
Not only had Burke reproduced precisely the sort of ‘moral’ case for violence that Kant had 
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criticized in Zum ewigen Frieden, he did so on the authority of a prescriptive legal tradition. 
Unlike the progenitors of the ius gentium, who at least tried to formulate their principles in 
universalizeable terms, Regicide Peace appealed to the historical particularities of Roman 
law. As Gentz recognized, much to his frustration, Burke’s was an anti-foundationalist case 
for war. 
* * * 
Burke died in the summer of 1797. Shortly afterwards, his executors collected and published 
a series of private memoranda that he had written in the Revolution’s early years, which they 
entitled Burke’s Three Memorials on French Affairs.210 As Ian Hampshire-Monk has argued, 
the case for intervention in Three Memorials differed materially from that of Regicide 
Peace.211 Whereas Burke’s latter arguments were grounded in the law of vicinage, these early 
works hewed more closely to the established ius gentium. For Burke, this move was tactical. 
While Vattel and Grotius admitted the right of one nation to intervene in a neighboring civil 
war, they denied that one state had a right to resolve constitutional disputes in another. By 
1796, Burke realized that his initial appeal to these authorities undermined his argument for a 
restoration of the Bourbon monarchy. As he rearticulated his case for intervention in Regicide 
Peace, he jettisoned (in Hampshire-Monk’s words) ‘the dangerous abstractions inherent in 
natural law theory’.212  
 To German audiences, the ‘natural law theory’ of Burke’s Three Memorials proved 
quite interesting. Soon after this work arrived in Germany in 1797, the erstwhile republican 
(and critic of Göchhausen) J.G. Archenholz informed the readers of his Minerva that, while 
Regicide Peace was no more than partisan invective, Burke’s arguments in Three Memorials 
were compelling, and needed to be taken seriously: 
In September, two friends of the recently-deceased Burke (who, despite all his 
flaws and eccentricities, was truly a great man) collected and published three 
memoranda by this famous orator. These recently-discovered works are of 
interest for their deep insight into statecraft, and for their sharp observations 
about the momentous events of those days before Burke became a partisan 
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enthusiast.213 
Archenholz announced that he had commissioned a German translation of this work, which 
would appear serially in future issues of his journal. Translated by the Hanoverian historian 
Johann Joachim Eschenburg (‘a famous scholar who does not want to be named’), the first 
installment appeared in November 1797.214 As this column began to monopolize the pages of 
the Minerva, however, Archenholz decided that his journal was the wrong format for such a 
work, and arranged for Eschenburg’s translation of Three Memorials to instead be published 
by his friend, the printer Benjamin Gottlob Hoffman.215 
 In late 1797, Archenholz mailed Eschenburg’s translation to Gentz, and asked him to 
review the text for the Minerva.216 Gentz enthusiastically agreed. ‘To every man who is not 
indifferent to the greatest issue of our time’, he wrote in his review, ‘this work offers a source 
of reflection that cannot be read without real satisfaction’. Unlike Regicide Peace, Burke’s 
early foreign policy memoranda were ‘composed with a calmness, a serenity, and indeed I 
want to say an intellectual sobriety that only seldom characterizes his later writings.’217 In a 
sober, juridical tone, Burke had laid out a well-reasoned case for intervention which, some 
five years after it was written, still offered ‘most essential guidance’ on the policy questions 
that confronted Europe.218 Burke’s Three Memorials were composed in ‘three specific, very 
different circumstances’, Gentz explained to the Minerva’s readers, and should be studied 
independently of each other. The last – written in ‘the horrible year of 1793’ – was certain to 
provoke hostility in Germany. ‘What will be offensive to some readers of this memorial is the 
decisive tone with which the author speaks of the possibility of restoring the monarchical 
regime, in a time in which a more cautious observer could already see the unbridgeable gap 
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between France’s current situation and this possibility [of restoration].’219 The second, 
written in the wake of the Brunswick Manifesto, would also likely prove controversial, since 
Burke’s aim in 1792 had been the reinstatement of the émigré nobility’s privileges.  
‘By far the most important section of this work’, and the most relevant to Gentz’s 
situation in 1798, was Burke’s first memorandum: his Thoughts on French Affairs (1791).220 
Whereas the case for intervention in Regicide Peace was articulated vis-à-vis the customary 
laws of vicinage, the argument of French Affairs was grounded in the natural law theory of 
the ius gentium. If European nations were akin individuals in a pre-political state of nature, 
Burke had argued, then these states had a natural Hobbesian right to self-preservation. This 
right to self-defense logically entailed a right to prevent the consequences of France’s civil 
war from spilling across the Channel. ‘In this state of things (that is in the case of a divided 
kingdom) by the law of nations, Great Britain, like every other power, is free to take on any 
part she pleases’.221 Since a restoration to stable government in France was a reason of state, 
other states could justly intervene, if prudence required it.222 Summarizing Burke’s argument, 
Gentz explained that this right to self-preservation ‘gave every European state not only a right 
but a duty to take notice of the inner transformations of that country’ and guard itself against 
‘the inevitable consequences of the system that the Revolution deployed.’223 Considered 
retrospectively, Burke’s case for intervention was even stronger. ‘What this author told us 
seven years ago about the political conditions of Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, 
England, etc., has been fulfilled almost word for word, to a degree that approaches the art of 
prophecy.’224 
Throughout French Affairs, Burke had repeatedly invoked the authority of Vattel’s 
Droit des Gens (1758).225 Further stressing the text’s centrality to his argument, his executors 
appended to Three Memorials excerpts of Burke’s own translations of the Droit des Gens, as 
well as his private notes on Vattel’s arguments. For instance, under the heading ‘Cases of 
Interference with Domestic Powers’ (Burke’s title, not Vattel’s), they included the following: 
If then there is any where a Nation of a restless and mischievous disposition, 
always ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to raise domestic 
troubles, it is not to be doubted that all have a right to join in order to repress, 
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chastise, and put it ever after out of its power to injure them. … If, by constant 
maxims, and by a continued conduct, one Nation shews that it has evidently 
this pernicious disposition, and that it considers no right as sacred, the safety 
of the human Race requires that is should be suppressed. To form and support 
and unjust pretension, is to do an injury not only to him who is interested in 
this pretension, but to mock at justice in general, and to injure all nations.226   
In his commentary on this passage, Burke had made clear that ‘this is the case of France’. 
Because the revolutionaries ‘acknowledge no power not directly emanating from the people’ 
they qualified as a predatory nation, one that pursued a policy of ‘despising and violating the 
rights of others’.227 But what Gentz found truly revelatory in French Affairs was Burke’s 
unexpected strategy for enforcing the rights of nations. The policy of intervention forwarded 
in Regicide Peace was essentially unilateral: Burke had called for Britain alone to restore the 
Bourbon regime. But his notes on Vattel suggested a different approach. The Droit des Gens 
depicted eighteenth-century Europe as a federation of nations, a corporate whole capable of 
collective political action. Under the title ‘System of Europe,’ Three Memorials quoted Vattel 
on this point: 
Europe forms a political system, a body, where the whole is connected by the 
relations and different interests of Nations inhabiting this part of the world. It 
is not, as anciently, a confused heap of detached pieces, each of which thought 
itself very little concerned in the fate of others…. The continual attention of 
Sovereigns to what is on the carpet, the constant residence of ministers, and 
the perpetual negociations, make Europe a kind of a Republick, the members 
of which, though independent, unite, through the ties of common interest, for 
the maintenance of order and liberty.228    
If Europe were in fact already united under a rudimentary system of law, then intervention 
against France was not a separate obligation for each state individually, but rather a moral 
imperative that needed to be undertaken by this collective ‘Republick’.   
 To Gentz, this vision presented a potential way to resolve the tension between his 
commitment to Kantian Völkerrecht and his anxieties about France’s policy of expansion. 
Zum ewigen Frieden had called for the creation of a new federation, headed by France and 
Prussia, that could institute and enforce an international rule of law. Drawing on Vattel, 
Burke suggested that such a federative system existed before the Revolution. Since the 
revolutionaries had repeatedly and flagrantly violated the norms of international law, the 
other members of this ‘Republick’ had a collective duty to punish their malfeasance through 
military force. Gentz knew, of course, Kant had rejected this sort of means-ends reasoning in 
Zum ewigen Frieden, and that Vattel was among the theorists that he had dismissed as ‘sorry 
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comforters’. But this did not deter Gentz.229 For as he saw, the Vattelian argument of Three 
Memorials was an isomorphism of Zum Ewigen Frieden: in principle, the comfort that Burke 
offered was no sorrier than Kant’s. In 1795, Kant’s essay amounted to a defense of France’s 
policy of expansionism, on the grounds that by spreading republicanism across Europe, it 
would eventually furnish the conditions for a perpetual peace. Burke, by contrast, saw the 
Coalition as the most promising vehicle for Europe to escape its current state of war. The 
relevant different between them was not a question of right, but one of prudence. To justify 
Prussian reentry into the Coalition, Gentz needed to show that it was Burke’s strategy, not 
Kant’s, that offered the best path towards the realization of Kant’s cosmopolitan ideals. Two 
years later, when the political winds in Berlin shifted in his favor, he attempted just that. 
* * * 
In June 1799, Sieyès was recalled as France’s ambassador to Berlin. Gentz took his departure 
as a sign that the political winds might be shifting in his favor. ‘The departure of Sieyès from 
the present crisis offers a situation that is very favorable to the advocates of strong measures’, 
he wrote excitedly to Mallet du Pan: 
On the one hand, it delivers us from unwelcome observer; on the other hand, it 
ensures that this proud, spiteful man … will no longer be Prussia’s secret 
enemy [in Berlin]. In the mind of the king, it will perhaps lead to a conviction 
that there is no salvation outside the common cause, and to the suspicion that 
a victorious Directory might one day punish our neutrality, just as a victorious 
Coalition might punish our inaction.230 
With one of the mainstays of the Prussian court’s Francophile axis removed, Gentz believed 
that Prussian entry into the Second Coalition was now more plausible than at any time since 
the Peace of Basel. What is more, the Coalition’s successive defeats at Zürich (September 
1799) and in the Italian Piedmont (June 1800) gave the question of intervention new urgency. 
By 1800, Britain’s navy was the only effective check against complete French hegemony in 
Europe. Gentz believed that unless Prussia chose to reconfigure the geopolitical landscape, 
permanent French control of Europe was inevitable. 
 This was the context in which, in December 1800, Gentz chose to finally respond to 
Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden, and to submit his own contribution to the debate over perpetual 
peace. Since 1795, most of the contributions to this debate had come from republican writers 
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who shared Kant’s admiration for the Revolution, and who cheered France’s military 
victories as the first, tentative steps out of the eighteenth century’s pathologically corrupt 
state-system.231 In this context, what was perhaps most striking about Gentz’s essay, ‘Ueber 
den ewigen Frieden’, was its direct endorsement of the moral vision at the heart of this 
deeply republican discourse.232 He began by unambiguously agreeing with Kant that      
… perpetual peace – or more precisely, that just relationship between states 
‹völker-rechtlichen Verfassung› which is the basis of perpetual peace – is not 
the arbitrary invention of a poetic or daydreaming imagination. It is rather a 
serious, deep and overwhelmingly great idea; it is our foreordained duty; it is 
a demand of reason, a necessary result of the progressive development of our 
concepts of justice and order and morality.233 
Those conservative critics who dismissed the ideal of peace as a ‘well-meaning enthusiasm’ 
‹gutmüthige Schwärmerei› had misjudged its philosophical force.234 In the same way that 
reason demands that individuals escape from their domestic state of nature, the universal 
norms of international right stood in condemnation of Europe’s current state of ‘international 
… anarchy,’ where ‘military force remains the … final arbiter of every international 
dispute.’235 Closely hewing to the logic of Kant’s earlier analysis, he explained that in order 
to exit this state of nature, Europe needed to establish a system of international law that was 
competent to define state’s mutual obligations to one another, and to install a sovereign 
power to enforce it:  
There cannot exist an entirely rightful community of independent political 
societies for as long as there is no common … lawgiver to define their rightful 
relation [to one another], no supreme court to decide disagreements according 
to the dictates of this lawgiver, and no ultimate executive power to enforce the 
decisions of this court, and to give weight to them.  
Like Kant, Gentz also believed that pre-revolutionary Europe’s ad hoc regime of treaty 
alliances was incapable of solving this problem. ‘Treaties only address the demands of the 
moment; they cannot anticipate the distant conjunctures of the future, or the sources of 
conflict that lie buried deep in this future.’236  
Gentz departed from his republican interlocutors, however, in rejecting the claim that 
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reason could furnish the practical means for arriving at this normative ideal. Just as Sieyès’s 
constitutionalism confused the state’s idea and form, republican theorists of perpetual peace 
had conflated morality and politics. Only the dictates of reason could describe what a just 
international system should look like; but to realize this vision in practice, the sort of abstract, 
technical schema that Kant and his allies had produced were completely unhelpful. In theory, 
Gentz explained, three discrete solutions to the problem of international rivalry immediately 
presented themselves a priori – the ‘complete unification of all nations’ into a single world-
state, making conflict between them impossible; the ‘absolute segregation’ of all states into 
isolated, hermetically-sealed societies; or an international federation that united all states 
under a common rule of law and an agreed system of arbitration.237 Taking each of these in 
turn, he argued that they were all intrinsically self-defeating. The upshot of this critique was 
that, because political theory was impotent to solve the riddle of perpetual peace, statesmen 
needed to turn to a less theoretical, more-empirically grounded strategy for pacifying Europe. 
Gentz first took aim at contemporary proposals for a ‘universal monarchy’ in Europe. 
If the main problem with the European state-system was that it lacked a sovereign, then the 
most obvious solution was to create a continental super-state. Whatever elegance this plan 
had in theory, Gentz argued that it would be disastrous in practice. Since any effort to create 
a European super-state was certain to meet armed resistance, it could only be realized 
through a protracted campaign of military conquest. ‘Any attempt to realize this vision would 
produce more suffering than the all the wars that it seeks to end.’238 But more fundamentally, 
this plan rested on a misapprehension of the nature of the state itself. When the centralized 
administrative states of modern Europe were formed in the seventeenth century, they were 
only able to achieve peace internally by sublimating their subjects’ sectarian passions and 
proclivity for violence up into the state itself, projecting these warring passions outwards 
against their neighbors.239 If, per impossibile, a single state were able to conquer all of 
Europe, the original violence of the state of nature would simply begin to manifest itself 
within this state. National uprisings, religious conflicts and civil wars would ultimately lead 
this universal monarchy to ‘collapse under its own weight’.240 The only way to arrest civil 
discord would be for the sovereign to resort to despotic forms of population control. ‘Every 
expression of sovereign power would appear as an intolerable tyranny, while every relaxation 
of this power would bring limitless chaos; between slavery and salvation there would be no 
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middle point.’241 This millenarian vision of a Napoleonic world-state, Gentz insisted, was no 
more than another iteration of the ancient dream of pax romana – an ideal which, however 
seductive in theory, had repeatedly proven impossible to realize. 
 Just as incoherent, according to Gentz, was the idea of a Europe of isolated, autarkic 
states – a proposal that Fichte had controversially defended in his Geschlossene Handelstaat 
(1800), which appeared a few months before Gentz’s essay.242 Fichte’s intuition was that, in 
a Europe of self-sufficient nation-states, the commercial and territorial rivalries that 
traditionally provoked conflict would be eliminated. His book laid out a strategy for ‘closing’ 
of the modern state-system – including, most controversially, the claim that Europe’s large 
states needed to expand to their ‘natural borders’ through military force, so that their national 
markets would be diverse enough to be self-sustaining. The result of this process, according 
to Fichte, would be a Europe of autonomous, self-contained republics, peaceably coexisting 
alongside one another. Gentz found this vision grotesque. Such an abrupt termination of 
international commerce would fatally stunt the progress of Enlightenment, consigning men to 
‘an eternal childhood’ and thwarting the development of their ‘Humanität’.243 ‘An insatiable 
drive pulls nations together,’ he wrote. ‘In its fulfillment lies the whole secret of modern 
civilization ‹Kultur› and of our cosmopolitan education ‹Erziehung›.’244 Fichte’s 
‘breathtaking experiment’ would lead not to sufficient, self-governing republics but to 
impoverished, dystopian societies of Asiatic despotism.245 What is more, Gentz saw his 
theory of ‘natural borders’ as no more than a justification for statesmen to enlarge their states 
to whatever limits they deemed natural.246 This principle, Gentz explained, ‘is the 
international-law analogue to the private-law theory of the equal distribution of goods – a 
maxim rooted in selfish envy, cloaked in respectability by the sophists of our day.’247 Fichte 
had not solved the dilemma of perpetual peace: he had ‘cut the knot, rather than untying 
it.’248 
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The third and final strategy for pacification lay in Kant’s proposal for a federation of 
republics, an idea with a deep pedigree stretching back to the Abbé St Pierre. Though Kant 
was vague about the specifics of his proposal, his basic premise was that Europe’s nations 
should install a system of international law, and submit themselves to a binding mechanism 
for resolving legal conflicts peaceably.249 This process of arbitration could take many forms: 
this federation could install judges to hear cases, it could put disputes to a majority vote of 
member-states, or it could erect a ‘permanent congress’ of delegates to govern on its behalf. 
But as Kant had pointed out, the real political problem was not making these juridical 
decisions, but enforcing them. ‘As long as such a constitution is based upon the mere will of 
its members,’ Gentz wrote, ‘it is a house built on sand.’ Without a powerful sovereign at the 
head of this federation, the member-states’ collective will would have no legal force. But this 
quickly led to a dilemma:  
It is implausible to think that every state will always submit dutifully to the 
decisions of the highest court; and so just as violence must often be employed 
to bring about justice within the state, so too in international legal disputes it 
would often be necessary to use coercive rulings to enforce the court’s 
decisions (perhaps even more frequently than in private relations). But to take 
coercive measures against a state, is nothing other than a war.250 
One the one hand, it was naïve to depend on the federation’s individual states to enforce the 
rule of law. Without a sovereign above the federation, it would quickly become a weapon in 
the hands of the most powerful member-states, just as the Holy Roman Empire had become a 
de facto tool of Austrian policy in the seventeenth century. Yet on the other hand, to install a 
sovereign above the federation would be to court disaster. Insofar as he was strong enough to 
enforce the rule of law, he would be strong enough to make himself into a universal monarch.  
He would either be too weak to rule effectively, or else too strong to allow this federation to 
exist long. In either case, Kant’s federation would collapse into violence.    
 In Gentz’s view, the fundamental error that each of these three strategies shared was 
that they followed Kant in supposing that the moral ideal of perpetual peace demanded the 
abolition of reason of state. Across the eighteenth century, Kant had argued, this immoral 
logic had allowed selfish statesmen to rationalize war as an unavoidable feature of modern 
politics. The error of the ius gentuim theorists, in his view, was that they had tried to tame 
reason of state, promulgating international norms that aimed at softening interstate relations. 
In so doing, they failed to address the fundamental dynamics that brought about wars in the 
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first instance. By contrast, the legal institutions that Kant and his allies had theorized were 
designed to banish competition from interstate relations. For Gentz, however, it was facile to 
suppose that formal constitutional mechanisms could fundamentally eradicate a fundamental 
aspect of human nature – namely, man’s unsociable drive towards competition. For as long as 
there are states, there exists the possibility that statesmen will act selfishly, in their own 
interests, rather than in the interest of justice. Because human beings are rational, we are 
capable of moral reflection and self-discipline; yet like all animals, we are also ruled by 
selfish instincts and base passions. In politics, Kant had argued, this tension is manifest in our 
‘unsocial sociability’ ‹ungesellige Geselligkeit›, our paradoxical inclination towards conflict 
and cooperation with our peers.251 According to Gentz, Kant failed to see the implications of 
this claim for his own vision of Völkerrecht. ‘Even if the human race could achieve the most 
rightful possible constitution,’ he wrote, ‘one that encompassed all of its members, even then, 
that propensity towards hostility that lies buried within our tumultuous passions would 
constantly threaten order. There will always be a tension between the laws of reason, which 
demand peace, and the laws of our raw nature, which compel us to war.’252 Because we are 
stuck with reason of state, perpetual peace – though a solemn moral obligation – will always 
remain just beyond our reach.  
 Given the intractability of human competitiveness, Gentz argued, the best that we can 
achieve practically is provisional peace. What was needed was a sober-minded strategy that 
did not banish, but rather harnessed, the logic of reason of state, reorienting it away from its 
currently-disordered state into an engine of moral progress. In this vein, Gentz argued for the 
creation of a federation that was governed by a relative balance of power ‹Gleichgewicht› 
among its leading states, such that no one member state was strong enough to subvert the 
federation to its own purposes, but that collectively, it was strong enough to discourage wars 
of aggression.253 Constructing this sort of federation was impossible in abstraction. Rather, to 
effectively calibrate the incentives of each member-state, one needed a thorough empirical 
understanding of their respective military power, economic productivity, geographic position, 
diplomatic vulnerabilities, constitutional structures, and national characters. In a system that 
balanced each member’s strengths and weaknesses against the others’, each state would have 
an interest – a reason of state – to remain under the juridical authority of the confederation, 
rather than ignoring its judgments and risking reprisal. What was accomplished in domestic 
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law through a unitary sovereignty, in other words, could be accomplished in international law 
through the dynamics of political rivalry. If such a balanced federation were constructed, 
Gentz argued, and if its leaders agreed on a minimalist vision of international right, then an 
ersatz approximation of Kant’s federative vision might in fact be feasible: 
Over the past century-and-a-half, this approximation … has come to be known 
as a political balance of power. … Statesman have concluded that if one keeps 
one’s neighbor from gaining an undue advantage over one’s own state, 
through suitable treaties, skillful negotiations and, if needed, through force, … 
the peace and security of everyone is necessarily and noticeably improved. … 
These statesmen wanted to make war, if not absolutely impossible, then 
improbable, making its allure less compelling than its risks, and thus to 
achieve through fear and self-interest that rightful, moral relation among states 
which could not be erected by a sovereign. Through separate confederations 
they sought to accomplish what the Abbe Saint Pierre hoped to achieve with a 
single confederation.254 
As Gentz doubtless knew, Kant was skeptical of such proposals. In ‘Theorie und Praxis, he 
had dismissed the ‘so-called European balance of power’ as a ‘pure illusion’ that had been 
wholly ineffective in reducing incidents of war in the eighteenth century.255 But in Gentz’s 
view, the republican vision of peace that Kant championed was even less likely to succeed. 
Five years on from the Peace of Basel, France’s strategy of republicanizing Europe through 
force had not shown any evidence that it was altering statesmen’s calculations of their own 
self-interest. Rather than triggering the sort of revolution in international relations that Kant 
envisioned, it had only produced further violence.         
 To his peers, the anti-republican implications of Gentz’s call for Gleichgewicht would 
have been unmistakable. In 1800, the only way for statesmen to balance the European state-
system was by resisting France’s hegemony. In ‘Ueber den ewigen Frieden’, Gentz broached 
the possibility of a Prussia’s reentry into the Coalition en passant. But even this oblique 
suggestion was enough to incite enormous controversy: 
Since it is almost certain that France will not return to its former borders, 
another system must now be the fixed goal of our statecraft – even if … this 
policy … can only be created through violence. I believe that in Europe’s 
current state of affairs, there is only one [nation] that holds out the calming 
prospect of peace and security. I cannot and will not say [its name] here: but it 
is so clear and evident from the nature of our current political relations … that 
it will be immediately obvious to every well-informed reader.256  
Gentz did not offer a legal defense of this policy in 1800. But one year later, in a long work 
on the Ursprung und Charakter des Krieges gegen die Französische Revolution (1801), he 
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insisted that Prussian intervention could be justified on Kantian grounds, deduced from ‘the 
general idea of a just community of independent moral persons.’257 It was in this later work 
that Burke’s influence on Gentz’s international relations thinking came through most clearly. 
Arguing from the same premises as Burke’s Three Memorials, he argued that, as a general 
rule, the international community cannot violate the sovereignty of nation-states, in the same 
way that a sovereign cannot rightfully infringe upon the autonomy of his subjects. Yet there 
were exceptions to this norm. Pointing to ‘those laws limiting [personal autonomy] which are 
known under the name of general police laws ‹Polizei-Gesetze›’, he explained that the state 
can rightfully ‘constrict the property rights of the individual citizen so that his own rights are 
made compatible with the preservation of the whole.’258 Though the right to property was 
inviolable, just like the principle of state sovereignty, it had to be circumscribed in practice 
such that civil order – and with it, the institution of property itself – could be preserved. In a 
similar way, the international community had a right to set limits on the exercise of state 
sovereignty. Gentz was quick to insist that intervention was not allowable in the case of every 
domestic revolution. If France had just set out to correct ‘defects in its constitution’ and ‘to 
adopt a new system of government’, it would have posed no threat to its neighbors. Judging 
when nations had violated international law was a difficult task, one that required a high 
degree of ‘Staats-Klugheit’.259 But when a member of the international community  
… violently eviscerates all bonds of duty, trust, and subordination; when it 
declares its rightful regent a usurper; when it suspends all sources of executive 
power in the state and announces an interregnum of all [normal] law until an 
unspecified time; when, in this terrible, quasi-constituted anarchy, it names 
itself sovereign and … permits an artificial congress of demagogues, and four-
thousand municipal tyrants, and a hundred-thousand clubs, and four-million 
armed men to rule in its name; when it throws off all distinctions of rank and 
respects no kind of property; when it destroys the liberty of every individual 
for the chimera of ‘general liberty’; … and when, finally, it … treads 
underfoot everything that is holy to mankind: at that time, the right of all other 
nations to lead it back within the social order is incontrovertible.260 
Like the Burke of Three Memorials, Gentz saw this right to intervene in corporate terms, as a 
moral obligation that fell to Europe collectively. ‘What is limited through positive law’ in 
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civil society, he explained, can only be rightfully limited in international law ‘through … the 
idea of a just community of independent states’.261 As Vattel argued, and as the recent 
formation of the Coalition attested, the modern European state-system had a capacity for 
corporate political action: 
Through its geographical situation, through its manifold connections, through 
the similarity of its customs, its laws, its needs, its ways-of-life, and its culture 
‹Cultur›, the collected states of this continent form a great political federation 
‹Bund› which has justly been called the Republic of Europe. The various parts 
of this federation of nations form such a close and such a continuous 
community, that no meaningful change that befalls one state can be indifferent 
to the other. If is too seldom said that they exist near one another: if they are 
to survive, they must survive with one another and through one another.262 
Since the Revolution represented an ‘attack on the security and existence of civil society’ per 
se, the concerted response of the Coalition in 1793 was a justifiable ‘defensive war in the 
higher international-legal sense’.263 This remained the case in 1800, as France continued to 
flout basic international norms. But if Prussia intervened to stop Napoleon, Gentz argued, the 
Coalition might be able to put an end to France’s lawlessness. In the wake of this conflict, 
Prussia would then be well-positioned to help inaugurate precisely the sort of balanced legal 
federation that he described in ‘Ueber den ewigen Frieden’.264 But without Prussian help, 
Austria and England would be unable to topple Napoleon, and the international rule of law 
would be imperiled, perhaps permanently. If perpetual peace was a compelling moral ideal, 
Prussia needed to head back to war. 
  
VI. Conclusion 
Gentz’s case for intervention fell on deaf ears. Immediately after the publication of ‘Ueber 
den ewigen Frieden’, the Prussian censor intervened to halt the publication of his journal.265 
Within a year, increasing public hostility in Berlin forced Gentz to resign his post in the civil 
service, a turn of events which left him deeply depressed.266 It also spelled the end of his 
career as a political theorist. Through he eventually found work as a publicist for the 
Habsburg regime in Vienna, the demands of this work turned his attention away from Kant, 
Sieyès, and his philosophical interlocutors in Berlin, and towards the more immediate task of 
rallying public support to the Coalition’s cause. Though he remained a prolific writer on 
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international relations, during his time in Vienna Gentz did not substantially engage with, or 
expand upon, the reading of Burke that he articulated in the 1790s.   
 In the final volume of his Historisches Journal, published shortly before Gentz left 
Berlin, he appended a note to his readers promising that, despite the challenges facing him, 
he would remain true to the counterrevolutionary cause. ‘In whatever form I publish my 
literary engagements [in the future], my principles will remain the same’, he swore: 
Perhaps there will come a time, sooner than many believe – and sooner than I 
myself, in retrospect, could have hoped – when the public’s opinion will turn 
against the fashionable ideas of our passing moment, out of necessity and out 
of shame. But even if that day does not come, I will never regret that I have 
relentlessly pursued and freely declared that which I believed to be true.267 
Since his death in 1832, however, has been a recurrent theme of Gentz scholarship that he 
was not, in fact, faithful to his early liberal principles. Under the political pressures of the 
Austrian war-effort, and especially during the Restoration, he is said to have exchanged his 
identity as a Prussian Spätaufklärer for the views of an illiberal, revanchist Romantic. Often, 
this charge of ‘inconsistency’ is couched vis-à-vis the suggestion that Gentz was an 
unprincipled mercenary – a charge leveled by Napoleon himself, who mocked him as a ‘a 
miserable scribe, … one of those men without honor who sell themselves for money.’268 A 
detailed examination of Gentz’s Austrian career is beyond the scope of this project.269 But in 
conclusion, it is worth scrutinizing this ‘inconsistency’ thesis at least briefly, for the premise 
of a dramatic rupture in Gentz’s political thought has blinded historians to the degree to 
which his activity as a diplomat – above all, his role in coordinating the post-war settlement 
in 1815 – flowed from, and was informed by, the Burkean political vision that he spelled out 
during his early years in Berlin.270  
 Distilled to its elemental parts, this discontinuity thesis turns on three charges. First, 
Gentz has been accused of abandoning his commitment to the international rule of law for the 
base, acquisitive power-politics of the Congress of Vienna. In facilitating the dismemberment 
of Europe’s smaller states, he seems to have perpetrated exactly the sort of ‘crime’ that he 
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denounced in the case of Poland’s partition. Second, scholars often point to Gentz’s role in 
crafting and enforcing the Carlsbad Decrees of 1819, which constricted the intellectual 
freedom of the German university system and the freedom of the press, as an abandonment of 
his earlier views. Gentz justified these strict measures by claiming that the student protests 
that precipitated the Carlsbad Decrees were dangerous to public order, and that demands for 
popular electoral representation in the German states were in violation of international law.271 
Finally, his close proximity to the Vienna Romantics in the 1820s – to Adam Müller and the 
Schlegel brothers, especially – and his admiration for de Maistre’s Du Pape (1819) have led 
some scholars to detect a change in his relation to religion in general, and to Catholicism in 
particular.272 Though Gentz remained an agnostic about Christianity throughout his life, he 
was certainly willing to countenance a substantial intrusion of religion into affairs of state, 
provided that the Church’s imprimatur would buttress the state’s political authority. 
 It is debatable, of course, whether the measures taken to stabilize postwar Europe in 
1815 were indeed necessary; whether the Carlsbad Decrees were a response to an imminent 
or imagined threat to the German Bund; and whether, in real terms, the popular authority of 
the Habsburg monarchy was dependent on its alliance with the Catholic Church. But what is 
important to see is that, from Gentz’s perspective, these were ancillary, practical questions 
about how best to preserve, in practice, the Austrian Rechtstaat and the international rule of 
law. Gentz’s approach to politics in the 1800s, in other words, can be sensibly interpreted vis-
à-vis the Burkean vision of Enlightenment that he articulated in the 1790s. While reason sets 
the normative ends towards which all statesmen must strive, the practical question of how to 
realize these ends politically – of the degree of press liberty that is compatible, for instance, 
with civil order; of the empirical conditions that need to be satisfied in order to pacify the 
international system; and so forth – was necessarily a matter of prudence.273 This was 
precisely the rationale that stood behind the Carlsbad Decrees: 
The two basic elements of civil life are liberty on the one hand, and the law, or 
regulation, on the other. To combine them, such that the law does not destroy 
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liberty or liberty the law, is the vocation of all those who dedicate themselves 
to serving and preserving the state. … Among those [educated] few who are 
positioned to reflect on [this question] …, either a desire for liberty or a 
deference towards the law will tend to outweigh the other…. There is nothing 
blameworthy about those who, though not averse to law, nevertheless prize 
liberty higher…. But [such men] must be reasonable enough to stop 
condemning those who proceed from the opposite perspective – who fear 
more for order than for liberty – as slavish minds, or the mere tools of 
despotism.274  
In order to balance these opposing principles of liberty and order, Gentz continued to study 
Kant and Burke throughout his time in Vienna. Though he did not publish on either of these 
thinkers publicly, the available evidence from his private diary and his archives in Cologne 
indicates that this engagement was substantial. In 1809, for instance, he composed a critique 
of Kant’s Rechtslehre (1797), in which he echoed his earlier endorsement of Kant’s liberal 
ideals. ‘The principles of public legislation must proceed not from the arbitrary will ‹Willkür› 
of the [state’s] highest will’, Gentz wrote, ‘but rather from reason, i.e., from a careful 
application of the universal conditions of the mutual existence of free beings onto the specific 
forms, purposes, and needs that proceed from a given society. Positive law must therefore 
transcend itself, so to speak, to be adequate to its own purposes.’275 Likewise, Gentz spent 
considerable time in the 1800s and 1810s translating passages of Burke’s anti-revolutionary 
works into his diary and circulating them among his friends.276 As late as 1825, he was still 
referring to Burke’s ‘profundity’ ‹Tiefsinn› as the gold standard of political judgment.277  
 From Gentz’s perspective, the rise and fall of the Revolution did not mark the end of 
Aufklärung, but a temporary hiatus. The Congress of Vienna was not an abandonment, but a 
revival, of his eighteenth-century aspirations: a return to a stable regime of international law, 
given political efficacy by a carefully-crafted balance of power. The stability generated by 
this system, in turn, was meant to underpin an enlightened world of property rights, interstate 
commerce, and gradually expanding civil liberties, overseen by orderly and impartial 
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Rechtstaaten.278 The problems that attended the formation of this re-enlightened world were, 
in his view, the very same ones that he identified in his Reflections: the challenge of 
conjoining morality and politics, of harmonizing the demands of reason and the exigencies of 
practice.   
  
                                               
278 The extent to which Metternich, too, saw the Congress System as a return to Aufklärung is brought 
out in Wolfram Siemann, Metternich: Stratege und Visionär (Munich: Beck, 2016) (challenging older 
interpretations of Metternich’s ‘authoritarianism’). In this vein, cf. Rhys Jones, ‘1816 and the 
Resumption of “Ordinary History”’, Journal of Modern European History, vol. 14, no. 1 (2016): pp. 
119-142. 












In July 1797, news of Burke’s death gave rise to a series of eulogies and remembrances in the 
German press. In London, his literary executors uncovered a number of unpublished anti-
revolutionary works that Burke had written in the years before his death. Three volumes of 
these posthumous material appeared serially from September 1797.1 The speedy translation 
of these works into German followed closely on the heels of his Letter to a Noble Lord and 
Regicide Peace letters.2 In early 1798, the first biography of Burke appeared in London, and 
was soon followed by an abridged German translation.3 In the wake of Burke’s death, this 
material afforded German reviewers an opportunity to grapple with his legacy as a statesman 
and a political theorist, and to render their own judgments on the question of his ideological 
‘consistency’. A steady stream of reviews appeared throughout 1797 and 1798.4 
                                               
1 Burke, Three Memorials on French Affairs (London: Rivington, 1797); Two Letters on the Conduct 
of Our Domestick Parties…, including ‘Observations on the Conduct of the Minority’ (London: 
Rivington, 1797); A Third Letter … on the Proposals for Peace with the Regicide Directory of France 
(London: Rivington, 1797). Burke’s executors were Walker King, French Laurence, and Jean-Gabriel 
Peltier. 
2 Burke’s Three Memorials was translated as Edmund Burke’s hinterlaßne Schriften, ... enthaltend 
drei Memoriale über französische Angelegenheiten, trans. Johann Gotthold Tralles (Hirschberg, 
Silesia: Pittschiller, 1798); and as Ueber den neuern politischen Zustand und die Verhältnisse der 
europäischen Staaten ... seit der Revolution [trans. Johann Joachim Eschenburg] (Hamburg: B.G. 
Hoffman, 1798). These translations were preceded by Burke’s Letter to a Noble Lord (Feb., 1796) 
and his Two Letters … on the proposals for peace with the regicide directory of France (Oct., 1796), 
which appeared in Germany as Edmund Burkes Rechtfertigung seines Politischen Lebens, trans. 
Friedrich Gentz (Berlin: Vieweg, 1796) and Zween Briefe … über die Vorschläge zum Frieden mit 
dem königsmörderischen Directorium von Frankreich, trans. Albrecht Wittenberg (Frankfurt and 
Leipzig: Hereld, 1797), respectively. Frieda Braune reports that a French edition of Noble Lord was 
also published in Hamburg, but I have been unable to locate it; see Frieda Braune, Edmund Burke in 
Deutschland (Heidelberg: Carl Winters Univesitätsverlag, 1917), p. 28. 
3 Robert Bisset, Life of Edmund Burke…, 2 vols. (London: Cawthorn, 1798); Edmund Burke’s Leben 
in historisch-literarisch-politischer Hinsicht unpartheiisch dargestellt, trans. Johann Christian Fick 
(Leipzig and Gera: Heinsius, 1799). 
4 See, inter alia, [anon.], comparative review of Gentz, Betrachtungen and Stahl, Bemerkungen, in 
Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung (22 June 1797): pp. 753-7; [anon.], ‘Burkes Charakter’, Deutsches 
Magazin, ed. C.U.D. von Eggers (Jan. 1798): pp. 24-8; [anon.], ‘Schreiben eines wahren 
französischen Bürgers an Mr. Burke in London’, Minerva (July, 1797): pp. 533-5. Cf. also the 
reviews of his posthumous works in the Neue allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek (1797, 1800), 
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Cumulatively, these articles and books catalyzed a renewed engagement with his anti-
revolutionary worldview – a renaissance, in miniature, of the prominence he enjoyed in 1793. 
 In 1797, during this period of renewed critical attention on Burke, Adam Müller – a 
seventeen-year-old Gymnasium student in Berlin – encountered the Reflections for the first 
time. Around the same time, he also befriended Gentz, Berlin’s most-famous Burkean.5 The 
archival record of Müller’s adolescence is sparse. It is unclear whether he first learned of 
Burke in the German press and then reached out to Gentz, or whether he met Gentz first – 
perhaps at Rahel Levin’s salon, which many of Müller’s classmates were known to attend – 
and began engaging with the Reflections afterwards. (There is also some oblique textual 
evidence to suggest that he came across Gentz’s translation of Noble Lord first, and then 
worked his way back to the Reflections.)6 Whatever the circumstances, this encounter with 
Burke was a pivotal moment for Müller. From 1797 until his death in 1827, throughout his 
career as a public intellectual – as a metaphysician, political theorist, economist, monetary 
theorist, literary critic, and theorist of aesthetics – Müller considered himself a foot-soldier in 
the counter-revolution that Burke inaugurated. Reading the Reflections for the first time, he 
later recalled, was like learning a new language, one that empowered him to articulate his 
inchoate intuitions about the moral and political disorder that enveloped him. ‘I was made to 
feel as if I, too, could speak.’7 
The language that Müller discovered in Burke, and which he spoke throughout his 
career, was the language of loss. A generation younger than Gentz and Rehberg, Müller came 
of age in the mid-1790s, in a Germany beset by moral, social, and political turmoil. In the 
course of his lifetime, he witnessed the fall of France’s civil and ecclesial establishment, the 
collapse of the Westphalian international system, and the dissolution of the thousand-year-old 
Holy Roman Empire. In Müller’s view, these political dislocations were the consequences of 
what was an even more distressing development – the final collapse of the feudal social order 
that Europe inherited from the Middle Ages, and of the Christian worldview that underpinned 
it. The Reflections offered Müller a coherent framework for explaining the intellectual causes 
                                               
Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung (1797, 1798, 1800), the Minerva (1798), and the Jenaer Allgemeine 
Literaturzeitung (1799). 
5 See Jakob Baxa, Adam Müller: Ein Lebensbild aus den Befreiungskriegen und aus der deutschen 
Restauration (Jena: Fischer, 1930), p. 3. 
6 Müller, Zwolf Reden über die Beredsamkeit und deren Verfall in Deutschland, gehalten zu Wien im 
Frühlinge 1812 (Leipzig: Göschen, 1816); reprinted in idem., Kritische, ästhetische und 
philosophische Schriften, ed. Walter Schroeder and Werner Siebert, 2 vols. (Berlin: Luchterhand, 
1967), vol. 1, pp. 292-451, at pp. 392-6. 
7 Ibid., p. 396.  
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of this breakup, a diagnosis of ‘this sickness of the human race’.8 What Burke saw, according 
to Müller, was that the French Revolution was an essentially theological event, and had to be 
combatted as such. The revolutionaries’ liberal ideology was rooted in a radical subjectivism 
which tolerated no sources of moral, political, or religious authority that were external to the 
sovereign self. If pursued to its logical conclusions, this athiestical vision of liberty would 
subvert the very foundations of European civilization. The promise of their movement was 
that, in freeing France (and eventually Europe) from the heteronomous yoke of the past, they 
would be able to found a new, liberated society on the rubble of their toppled ancien régime. 
What Burke perceived earlier than any of his peers, according to Müller, was that this vision 
of freedom – a freedom defined by the absence of Christianity, of monarchy, of aristocracy, 
and ultimately, of history itself – was Faustian. In destroying the theological grounds upon 
which all rightful political authority is grounded, their ideology destroyed the very possibility 
of society per se. If Britain followed France’s example, Burke warned, ‘men would become 
little better than the flies of a summer’.9 Their liberation from all external sources of authority 
would not lead to the millenarian era promised by the revolutionaries, but to rather a 
dystopian, post-Christian world of atomized, deracinated individuals, bereft of any shared 
moral referents or common language of politics.  
Reading the Reflections on the far side of the Terror, Müller believed that he and his 
peers were living in precisely the enervated, post-Christian world that Burke had prophesied. 
The Revolution had introduced a radical caesura, an irreparable tear, in the fabric of history. 
In the preface to his first book, Der Gegensatz (1804), Müller described the moral state of 
post-revolutionary Europe in precisely these Burkean terms – as an age adrift, unmoored, and 
disillusioned. In the Reflections, Burke compared the English Constitution to a venerable 
‘oak’ that had stood steadfast over time. ‘Upon that body and stock of inheritance we have 
taken care not to inoculate any cyon alien to the nature of the original plant.’10 But by 1804, 
Müller argued, the moral and theological foundations of German society – the roots of 
Germany’s great oak – had been destroyed. In the wake of their collapse, neither the moral 
vision of Christianity nor the failed promises of revolutionaries were able to ground political 
community: 
Philosophical systems, shattered crowns, republican constitutions, the schemes 
of Theophilanthropists, … moral principles and the great textbooks of natural 
law, obsolete duties and surrendered rights – all of these [now] lay next to one 
                                               
8 Müller, Elemente der Staatskunst (1809) (Berlin: Huade and Spener, 1936), p. 440. Below, I have 
cited to this 1936 edition of the text, unless otherwise indicated. 
9 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J.C.D. Clark (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2001), p. 259. 
10 Ibid., pp. 248, 181. 
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another in a great pile of rubble ‹Schutthaufen›. … As every individual coldly 
and unsociably tore himself away from his civil and his moral relations to the 
whole; as each man’s … appetites and demands [licensed him] to demarcate 
his own, isolated domain of external possessions and to wrest this claim away 
from the anarchy of the countless, chaotic, competing counter-claims of his 
peers; society itself – the very possibility of unified social view of things – lost 
its animating spirit. Each individual, in his own private, pathetic way, looked 
to the meager branch of his own understanding, and cut himself off from the 
great common stock of such noble concepts as religion, philosophy, nature, 
poetry, and art, which withered away into lifeless, barren stumps, losing all 
sign of their former grandeur and vitality.11 
Like an acid, the subversive causal logic of liberal individualism had corroded, weakened, 
and ultimately destroyed all of the structures of moral authority that rooted pre-revolutionary 
society. In the wake of their collapse, only the unvarnished Machiavellianism of a Napoleon 
had been able to ward off chaos in France, and to give some semblance of stability to Europe. 
But such emergency measures were not a lasting solution to this world-historical dilemma. 
Müller’s fear was that the death of Christianity was slowly producing a world of solipsistic, 
superficially ‘emancipated’ men and women who were, in fact, drowning in freedom. Unless 
new sources of moral authority could be resurrected, modern life would be characterized by 
ennui, angst, rootlessness, and – to use a term that Müller coined in precisely this context – 
‘Entfremdung’.12 
Happily, according to Müller, Burke was not only a ‘Cassandra’ who had predicted 
Europe’s dystopian collapse into revolutionary subjectivism: he was also a ‘Tacitus’, the 
prophet of a post-revolutionary era in which the moral fabric of Europe had been reknit, and 
in which Christianity had re-assumed its essential role as the cornerstone of social order.13 
Just as the Roman historian, ‘standing at the edge of his age’, prophetically foresaw the post-
Roman world that emerged from the unconquered forests of Germany, Müller situated Burke 
as the fulcrum of two different ‘world-epochs’. Even while lamented the passing of ‘the spirit 
of chivalric gallantry’, Burke also foresaw that a re-Christianized civilization would succeed 
it.14 In the preface to his Gegensatz, Müller pointed to Burke and Goethe as the forerunners 
                                               
11 Müller, Der Gegensatz (Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 1804); reprinted in idem., Kritische 
Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 193-248, at p. 195-7. Cf. Burke, Betrachtungen über den französische 
Revolution, trans. Gentz, 2 vols. (Berlin: Vieweg, 1793), vol. 1, p. 116: ‘A despotic philosophy 
narrowed the reasoning [of the revolutionaries], who announced their own ruling opinions, principles, 
maxims, and mores as the highest point of all human endeavor, and threw away the previous order 
‹Vorwelt› and all of its productions and treasures onto a great trash heap ‹Schlackenhaufen›.’ 
12 Cf. Martin Grieffenhagen, Das Dilemma des Konservatismus in Deutschland (Munich: Piper, 
1971), p. 223ff. 
13 Müller, Beredsamkeit, in Kritische Schriften, vol. 1, p. 369; idem., Vorlesungen über deutsche 
Wissenschaft und Literatur (Dresden: Arnold, 1806); reprinted in Kritische Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 11-
137, at p. 27. 
14 Müller, Vorlesungen, in Kritische Schriften, vol. 1, p. 30.  
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of ‘the new men’ whose vocation was to restore Europe. ‘We recognize ourselves as indebted 
to their revelation’ ‹Geständnis›, he wrote: 
Like prophets, both of them raised themselves out of the murky, bewildering 
entanglements of the world around them…. Through a careful admiration for 
their immortal works the delicate shoots of true science and art ‹Wissenschaft 
und Kunst› and of true social virtue ‹gesellschaftlichen Tugend› have begun to 
grow within us.15  
These ‘shoots’, Müller intimated, could in time mature into the unifying, vital ‘stock’ of a re-
Christianized civilization. As this Burkean transformation took place, moral anarchy, social 
fracture and existential alienation would give way to a world of order, justice, and meaning. 
Morally-intelligible social and political discourse would again become possible, as Müller’s 
once-mute generation rediscovered a language for debating the ends of human community.16 
The authority of the Church would function as a much-needed counterweight to the immoral, 
dehumanizing forces of market capitalism and Machiavellian raison d’état. Finally and most 
importantly, the vacuous autonomy of the Revolution would be transcended by a grounded 
vision of the Good, one that gave modern liberty intelligible substance. Rather than drifting 
through a void of pure choice, the revival of Christianity would provide a moral and social 
architecture in which individual autonomy could be exercised meaningfully.   
Describing what, exactly, such a revitalized Europe would entail was the overarching 
aim of Müller’s career. If ‘Burke was the first statesman and political theorist who, just after 
the outbreak of the French Revolution, discovered this spiritual Indies ‹geistiges Indien›’, 
then Müller saw himself as a cartographer and navigator, laying out a practical blueprint for 
how to arrive at this destination.17 It was an extremely ambitious project, which Müller laid 
out in dozens of books and articles throughout his life, ranging across such diverse fields as 
metaphysics, theology, aesthetics, rhetoric, history, constitutionalism, anthropology, politics, 
economics, fiscal theory, and international relations. His career as a writer spanned the rise 
and fall of the Napoleonic Empire, the Wars of Liberation and birth of German nationalism, 
the Congress of Vienna and the creation of the post-revolutionary state-system. In the wake 
of 1815, he witnessed the rise of transnational capitalism, the flowering of the Hochromantik, 
and the arrival of the nineteenth-century social movements. As we will see, Müller’s views 
were deeply shaped by these contexts, and sharpened in debate with his contemporaries. Yet 
throughout his career, his commitment to Burke was unwavering. ‘Even in the most trying 
                                               
15 Müller, Der Gegensatz, in Kritische Schriften, vol. 2, p. 197, italics in orig. 
16 For Müller on the language of politics, see his ‘Der Marquis de Bonald’, in Adam Müllers 
Vermischte Schriften über Staat, Philosphie, und Kunst, ed. Müller, 2 vols. (Vienna: Camesina, 1812), 
vol. 1, pp. 311-317. 
17 Müller, Elemente, p. 41; cf. Friedrich Schlegel, Ueber die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier 
(Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer, 1808), which was the proximate inspiration for this metaphor. 
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times’, he recalled just before his death, ‘I have remained steadfastly true to the Gentzian-
Burkean course’.18  
 As Müller composed his most important political and philosophical works, he spent 
‘considerable time’ meditating on Burke’s writings: ‘engaging empathetically, as it were, 
with how he felt’.19 His lifelong study of Burke produced an admiration that bordered on 
hagiography.20 According to Müller, Burke was ‘the greatest statesman that the last three 
centuries have produced’, a ‘master’ of political theory comparable to ‘Hugo Grotius, … 
Machiavelli and Guicciardini’, a student of modern liberty whose depth of insight was so 
profound that it made Smith and Montesquieu seem superficial by comparison.21 Indeed, 
Burke was so vital for understanding modern politics that the discipline should rightly be 
considered ‘his science’.22 In all of his writings, Müller saw Burke as the foundation upon 
which he built. In describing the political thought of his magnum opus, the Elemente der 
Staatskunst (1809), Müller expressly claimed that ‘Edmund Burke is its founder’, boasting 
that he had formulated his own book with the Reflections to hand: ‘the less one recognizes 
the words of that great man in the letter of my book, all the more do I hope that … the pure 
idea ‹reine Idee› that I took from him most of all, and which guided me, will be visible.’23 
Müller’s works are saturated with images, metaphors, allusions, and direct quotations taken 
from Burke, yet they are rarely cited, as if Müller had internalized Burke so completely that 
was unable to identify where Burke’s thoughts ended and his own began. Even still, Frieda 
Braune was certainly right to claim that ‘one feels that his words are not adequate to his 
purposes, that this man means far more to him than he knows how to say.’24 Müller admitted 
as much himself. ‘I wish I could convey to you all that I have learnt from this great figure; 
but … you must take me at my word.’25 
 Despite Burke’s centrality to his thought, Müller never published a straightforward 
interpretation of the Reflections (like Gentz’s Reflections or Rehberg’s Untersuchungen, for 
instance). Like the foundation of a building, Burke lies under the surface of Müller’s thought, 
implicit but indispensable. In order to reconstruct his interpretation of Burke, therefore, we 
                                               
18 Müller to Gentz, 15 Dec. 1828; in Adam Müllers Lebenszeugnisse, ed. Jakob Baxa, 2 vols. 
(Munich: Paderborn, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 953-54, at p. 953. 
19 Müller, Beredsamkeit, in Kritische Schriften, vol. 1, p. 396. 
20 For Müller’s extended discussions of Burke, see Müller, ‘Edmund Burke’ in Vermischte Schriften, 
vol. 1, pp. 252-9; ‘Studium der positive Wissenschaften’, in Kritische Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 259-60; 
Beredsamkeit, chs. 6-8, 11; Elemente, preface and chs. 1-3. 
21 Müller, Elemente, pp. 395, 8, 41. 
22 Müller, ‘Edmund Burke’, in Vermischte Schriften, vol. 1, p. 252, italics in orig. 
23 Müller, Ueber König Friedrich II und die Natur, Würde und Bestimmung der preussischen 
Monarchie (Berlin: Sander, 1810), p. 71. 
24 Braune, Burke in Deutschland, p. 185. 
25 Müller, Elemente, p. 395. 
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must draw inferences about the nature of this ‘foundation’ through a careful analysis of the 
particular structure that he built on it. This task is complicated by two factors. First, even by 
the notorious standards of German idealism, his writings are extremely difficult to parse (a 
complaint rehearsed by more than one of his contemporaries). Müller lived during the fertile 
period between classical German idealism and the rise of Romanticism. On the one hand, he 
aspired to an airtight systematicity in his argumentation; but on the other hand, he set out and 
explained his positions in the sort of poeticized, florid German that the Romantics pioneered, 
filling his works with puns, riddles, aphorisms, and (some quite obscure) artistic and literary 
allusions. The resulting tension made his works seem impenetrable to many readers: as one 
Weimar scholar put it, ‘anyone who tries to study Adam Müller’s national-economic system 
… can hardly fend off the impression of an imposing, hermetic closed-ness ‹imponierenden 
Geschlossenheit›.’26 Second, Müller rarely cited his philosophical or political interlocutors. 
In order to reconstruct his arguments contextually, one must oftentimes infer his most likely 
targets from allusions buried in the texts, or from his private correspondence. The scholar 
seeking to recapture Müller’s interpretation of Burke, therefore, is faced with a philosophical 
and political system with clear Burkean roots, yet one that is couched in a nearly-inscrutable 
argumentative style and arrayed against ideological targets that are often difficult to identity.  
 Further complicating matters, Müller’s reputation in the contemporary academy is 
dismal. Widely debated by German scholars in the early-twentieth century, Müller has been 
largely stigmatized and marginalized since the Second World War.27 Over the past seventy 
years, only one serious study of his political thought has been published.28 None of his major 
works are available in English, and there exists no accessible scholarly edition of his dozens 
of books, articles, and speeches (which has discouraged historians of political thought from 
engaging with his work firsthand).29 As a result of this scholarly neglect, Müller’s reputation 
is still largely governed by the verdicts of his pre-war interpreters. In broad terms, these 
verdicts take one of two forms. The earliest interpretation of Müller’s thought was assembled 
by his critics in the Vörmarz, who described him as the ideologist of the so-called ‘politische 
                                               
26 Ferdinand Reinkemeyer, Adam Müller’s ethische und philosophische Anschauungen im Lichte der 
Romantik (Osterwieck am Harz: Zickfeldt, 1926), p. 37; cf. Jakob Baxa, Einführung in die 
romantische Staatswissenschaft, 2nd ed. (Jena: Fischer, 1931), p. 184. 
27 For the scope of this earlier scholarship, see Ch. 2 above. 
28 Benedikt Koehler, Aesthetik der Politik: Adam Müller und die politische Romantik (Stuttgart: Klett-
Cotta, 1980).  
29 Müller’s Kritische, ästhetische und philosophische Schriften contains most of his major works in art 
criticism, history, and philosophy, but exclude his political and economic works. Müller’s self-edited 
Vermischte Schriften contains a number of his shorter political essays, and was expanded after his 
death into his Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Sophie von Müller (Munich: Franz, 1839). The only work 
available in English is his Beredsamkeit, trans. as Twelve Lectures on Rhetoric by Dennis Bormann 
and Elisabeth Leinfellner (University Microfilms International, 1978). 
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Romantik’. According to the left-Hegelians of the 1830s and ’40s, Romanticism was a 
violently illiberal, reactionary worldview – a poeticized defense of authoritarianism, of neo-
feudal social hierarchies, and of (Catholic) clericalism – which was the intellectual lifeblood 
of Metternich’s post-revolutionary Restorationism.30 This reading of Müller emphasized the 
emphatically political character of his thought: unlike Novalis, Schlegel, Görres, Bretano, 
and the other leading lights of the Romantik, Müller was dangerous precisely because he had 
weaponized their poeticized nostalgia for the Middle Ages into a viable political programme 
– a full-throated apology for the union of Church and State – with which he rationalized the 
injustices of Europe’s Catholic autocrats.31 
The second line of interpretation stems from Carl Schmitt’s Politische Romantik 
(1919).32 For Schmitt, Müller was a classic example of Romanticism’s inherent tendency 
towards a moralizing, utopian approach to politics. Rather than the dangerous mastermind of 
Metternich’s Restoration, Schmitt dismissed Müller as a hopelessly naïve dilettante. Müller, 
he argued, was trapped in a vicious ‘occasionalism’, a post-Cartesian metaphysics that did 
not see the order of nature as objective and permanent, but instead saw it as a series of divine 
occacio.33 In politics, this nominalist position prevented him from recognizing the authority 
of the state as objective (because divinely-grounded). Instead, he saw the state as a work of 
art, a manifestation of human genius, but one without any extra-aesthetic moorings. 
Ironically, therefore, Müller remained trapped within the same subjectivizing logic as the 
Jacobins he claimed to oppose: his Romantic dream of a revived medievalism was just as 
fantastical – and, crucially, just as unpolitical – as the French revolutionaries’ republicanism. 
Müller preferred this vision of politics because it seemed beautiful, and because his principles 
                                               
30 See Theodor Echtermeyer und Arnold Ruge, Der Protestantismus und die Romantik: Zur 
Verstandigung über die Zeit und ihre Gegensatze, ein Manifest (1839), ed. Norbert Oellers 
(Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1972); Georg Gottfried Gervinus, Handbuch der Geschichte der 
poetischen National-Literatur der Deutschen, 2nd ed. (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1842), pp. 300-301; David 
Friedrich Strauss, Die Romantiker auf dem Thron der Cäsaren, oder Julian der Abtrünnige 
(Mannheim: Baffermann, 1847); Herman Hettner, Die romantische Schule und ihrem inneren 
Zusammenhange mit Goethe und Schiller (Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1850). For the politics of Müller’s 
Vormärz critics, cf. Warren Breckman, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of Radical Social 
Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 230-35.  
31 For the liberal philosopher and Lutheran W.T. Krug, the successor to Kant’s chair at Königsberg, 
Müller was ‘the most-zealous proselytizer’ of his age. In the wake of Müller’s conversion to Roman 
Catholicism, Krug wrote, ‘his spirit could not rest. Since he was now Catholic, the whole world must 
become Catholic. From then onward, this goal was his singular focus…. For extra eclesiam (romano 
catholicam) nulla salus!’ See W.T. Krug, ‘Neuschte Geschichte der Proselytenmacherei in 
Deutschland nebst Vorschlägen gegen dieses Unwesens’ (1827); in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 2, pp. 839-
80, at pp. 839-41. 
32 Carl Schmitt, Politische Romantik (1919); trans. as Political Romanticism by Guy Oakes 
(Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1986). 
33 Ibid., p. 140. 
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were less important to him than his feelings. Without any firmly normative ground for his 
politics, Müller’s allegiances shifted radically throughout his lifetime: here, according to 
Schmitt, was ‘an Anglophile in Göttingen, a feudal and estatist-conservative anti-centralist in 
Berlin, a functionary of the absolutist centralized state in the Tyrol’.34 According to Schmitt, 
Müller could not be read as a serious political theorist. His writings had to be seen for what 
they were: as little more than an elaborate cocoon that he constructed in order to shield 
himself from reality.  
Both these established interpretive traditions are unhelpful for understanding Müller, 
however, because as they foreclose the possibility of reading him on his own terms. Müller 
had no conception of himself as the political theorist of a wider Romantic School, for the 
obvious reason that Romanticism was not turned into an ideologically-coherent ‘school’ until 
after his death. While Müller certainly admired Novalis and Schlegel, and while he formed 
his own views in conversation with Schleiermacher and Schelling, there is little evidence that 
his political works were a self-conscious attempt to ‘actualize’ their literary agenda into a 
political one. Still less did Müller see himself as a ‘reactionary’ sycophant in Metternich’s 
court. It is true that he saw medieval Europe as a kind of template for a spiritually healthy 
civilization, and that he took inspiration from it – in the same way that, for instance, 
eighteenth-century republicans were inspired by the example of ancient Greece. But just as it 
is misleading to read Rousseau, for instance, as a ‘reactionary’ dedicated to ‘reviving’ pre-
modern liberty, it is not useful to read Müller as trying to ‘return’ to a Germanic Middle Ages 
– as if its social order and institutions could be wrested out of history and transposed directly 
onto the nineteenth century. Indeed, he specifically denied this charge in his Elemente.35 The 
goal of his politics, Müller explained, was to revive the principles that grounded medieval 
European society, and to adapt them to the very different conditions of modern life. 
Equally, Schmitt’s polemics elide the central aim of Müller’s politics. Rather than 
offering an internal critique of Müller’s politics on terms to which he could have consented, 
Schmitt simply tarred him with the labels of inconsistency and subjectivism. But from his 
own perspective, Müller’s politics were meant as a communitarian critique of subjectivism. 
To Müller, the central philosophical problem posed by Burke’s analysis of the Revolution 
was whether, in a world of radical, atomizing individualism, it was possible to re-ground 
society in an extra-subjective source of moral authority. Whether his strategy for a post-
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revolutionary politics did in fact offer a way for Europe to escape the cage of the self is, of 
course, debatable. But in order to assess it properly, we must evaluate Müller on his own 
terms, within the context of his own conceptual horizons.  
Müller unfurled this Burkean vision in a series of books from 1804 to 1809. Together, 
they form the focus of the following chapter. For Müller, the radical irreligion that animated 
the Revolution was the manifestation of a deeper spiritual pathology, one that had subverted 
not only Europe’s traditional political authorities, but which had also weakened the Christian-
Aristotelian assumptions that were the cornerstone of pre-Kantian philosophy. In Der 
Gegensatz (1804), Müller argued that the loss of the Christian natural law tradition had lead 
modern metaphysics into an intellectual dead-end. The metaphysical and moral freedom of 
the autonomous Kantian subject could only be made coherent on the assumption that truth 
and goodness were extra-subjective facts about the world, not the mere contrivances of 
human reason. Translating these intuitions into politics throughout the 1800s, he argued that 
liberty-as-choice was a radically insufficient foundation on which to ground civil society. As 
the centrifugal course of the Revolution demonstrated, modern liberty had to be buttressed by 
an extra-subjective, transcendent source of moral authority if it were to be stabilized. In 
practice, this intuition led Müller to argue for a corporatist vision of post-revolutionary state 
and society, one in which the Church and the established aristocracy – the traditional bearers 
of the moral and spiritual inheritance of feudal Europe – were able to ‘box in’ liberalism. In 
Müller’s view, far from a rejection of liberalism, his Christian politics was the only way to 
save it. In the same way that the Kantian self needed to be situated within an objective moral 
order so that autonomy could be made meaningful, the Church and aristocracy needed to be 
revived so that modern liberty could be redeemed. Unless Europe turned to Christ, the 
Revolution would never end. 
 
II. Prussian beginnings 
Adam Heinrich Müller was born to a lower middle-class Lutheran family in Berlin in 1779. 
His father worked long, menial hours as a bill processor in the Prussian civil service – work 
so tiresome that, years later, Müller came to feel somewhat ashamed at the comparative ease 
of his life as a political theorist.36 Throughout Müller’s career, even after Metternich dubbed 
him ‘Ritter von Nitterdorff’ in 1827, his own sense of his identity remained closely tied to his 
humble, bourgeois roots. His father had plans for Müller to join the Lutheran clergy, but in 
1798 he chose instead to enroll in a ‘political economy’ ‹Diplomatik› course at the University 
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of Göttingen. In the wake of the Treaty of Basel, Göttingen had become perhaps the leading 
hub of anti-revolutionary sentiment in the northern German states. To his peers, Müller’s 
choice to study to Hanover rather than Prussia was a clear statement of his Burkean political 
leanings. During his student years, he self-consciously styled himself as an admirer of Burke. 
According to one of his classmates, Müller gave speeches at a university debating society in 
which he lambasted the French revolutionaries along Burkean lines.37 
 Müller’s professors in Göttingen included some of central Europe’s leading students 
of Anglophone political thought – Gustav von Hugo and A.H.L. von Heeren, most notably –
and it was these men who introduced him to the tradition of ‘philosophical history’ developed 
in Britain by Montesquieu, Hume, Ferguson, Smith, and Gibbon.38 During Müller’s time at 
university, Heeren released a major study of European political economy, his Geschichte des 
europäischen Staatensystems und seine Kolonien (1800).39 Building on his earlier histories of 
ancient political economy, this book was a bold attempt to revise Montesquieu’s account of 
constitutionalism in De l’Esprit de Lois (1748) in light of Adam Smith’s more-recent work 
on the origins of commercial society.40 According to Heeren, Montesquieu had indeed shown 
a necessary correlation between a nation’s political character ‹esprit› and its constitution 
‹lois›. To fully understand a given political system, one must understand the historically-
contingent traditions, customs, mores, and beliefs of the society that inhabits it. But what 
Montesquieu had neglected to see – and what Heeren tried to demonstrate through his own 
historical analysis – was that a nation’s political character was, to a very large degree, itself 
contingent upon its economic organization. As Smith’s Wealth of Nations (1776) had shown, 
the modern constitutional liberty of Britain and the political culture underpinned it were the 
second-order effects of its economic system. According to Heeren, the ‘liberté extrême’ that 
Montesquieu celebrated in the Britain was inseparable from its post-agrarian commercial 
economy, highly-developed networks of trade, and high degree of property ownership. These 
developments had shaped the British people’s character into one amenable to parliamentary 
government, the rule of law, and limited monarchy. In his Geschichte, Heeren’s ambition was 
                                               
37 See Wilhelm von Schütz, ‘Adam Müllers politische Bestrebungen’, Der Zuschauer am Main: 
Zeitschrift für Politik und Geschichte (1835): pp. 137-62, at pp. 144-5; cf. Koehler, Aesthetik der 
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38 For Müller on the Göttingen School, see ‘Ueber die politische Meinung in Deutschland’ and ‘Ueber 
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499-502.  
39 A.H.L. von Heeren, Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems und seine Kolonien (Göttingen: 
J.F Röwer, 1800). 
40 Heeren, Ideen über Politik, den Verkehr, und den Handel der vornehmsten Völker der alten Welt, 2 
vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoek, 1793-96). 
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to show that this insight applied to all societies – to demonstrate across a wide variety of case 
studies that there was a necessary causal relationship between a society’s economic structure 
on the one hand, and its political institutions and constitutional traditions on the other. It was 
economics, in Heeren’s view, that delimited the political possibilities that were available to a 
nation in the present. 
Müller’s first published article, an 1801 review of Geschlossene Handelstaat, shows 
the extent to which he internalized Heeren’s economic determinism.41 Here, Müller carefully 
reproduced the case for a deep causal relationship between modern commerce and modern 
liberty, and denounced what he saw as Fichte’s attempt to return the European continent to a 
pre-commercial stage in its development. As Smith – ‘the father of political economy’ –  had 
proven, the idea of an autarkic liberalism was a contradiction in terms.42 The rise of private 
property, international trade, and public credit markets were inextricably linked to the rule of 
law and individual liberty. In 1801, Müller clearly favored Smith’s defense of an open market 
society to Fichte’s Spartan republicanism (a judgment which, during the Wars of the Second 
Coalition, was a clear reflection of his preference for Britain in its war-effort against France). 
The apparent distance between the politics of this essay and Müller’s later anti-capitalism has 
led some scholars – Schmitt, most famously – to suppose that, later in life, he abandoned his 
early liberalism for its mirror inverse, an anti-liberal corporatism.43 But the historical record 
is more complex. Even during his time in Göttingen, Müller’s relation to Smith was fraught. 
On the one hand, he clearly registered the force of Smith’s story about the role that trade and 
commerce played in the formation of modern European liberty. As an admirer of Burke and 
the British Constitution, he was also inclined to admire the economic foundations that upheld 
it (and to defend them against Fichte). Yet on the other hand, Müller had reservations about 
the individualism and voluntarism at the heart of Smith’s economic vision. In a letter to 
Gentz in 1800, he disclosed that he was planning to ‘rework’ ‹umarbeiten› Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations along lines more amenable to his thinking. Müller’s prospectus for this planned 
revision has been lost (and Gentz talked him out of his ‘youthful enthusiasm’), so the exact 
direction in which Müller hoped to re-route Smith’s thinking is unclear.44 But in 1812, as he 
prepared to publish his early review of Fichte in a new edition of his Vermischte Schriften, 
                                               
41 Müller, ‘Über einen philosophischen Entwurf von Herrn Fichte, beteitelt: der geschlossene 
Handelstaat,’ Neue Berlinische Monatsschrift (Dec. 1801): pp. 438-457; edited and reprinted in 
Vermischte Schriften, vol. 1, p. 324-46.  
42 Ibid., p. 345. 
43 See Schmitt, Political Romanticism, p. 39; Richard Gray, ‘Economic Romanticism: Monetary 
Nationalism in Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Adam Müller’, Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 36, no. 4 
(2003): pp. 535-57, at p. 549.  
44 Gentz to Müller, 7 Oct. 1800, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 15-17, at p. 16.  
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Müller chose to affix an explanatory note to this essay to clarify that, as early as 1801, he was 
wary of the agnosticism at the heart of Smith’s liberalism. In engaging with the Wealth of 
Nations in his student years, Müller recalled, he was forced to confront the ‘problem of 
permanence’ ‹Dauer›, and came to realize that ‘the claims of civil society are inseparable 
from those of religion’.45 
In the decade after he left Göttingen, Müller came to increasingly doubt the political 
and moral viability of the sort of commercial society that Heeren envied in Britain. He began 
to believe that the voluntarism fostered by the unregulated market was leading to widespread 
irreligion, that it was subverting the integrity of local communities, and that it was weakening 
the authority of inherited social customs, traditions, and institutions. Ultimately, it threatened 
to undermine the moral foundations of civil society altogether. By the time he came to write 
the Elemente in 1809, Müller was convinced that the liberty of the market was a disorienting, 
destabilizing and disruptive force – a kind of economic Jacobinism which, in corroding the 
deference afforded to religious authority, made politics impossible. In order to be stabilized, 
he argued, the liberty of Smith’s homo economicus needed to be couched within a wider set 
of religious and social institutions that could ground a community’s shared moral vison. But 
this was not to reject Smith, he insisted, but to rescue him: moralizing markets was the only 
way to make Smith’s vision of commercial society viable.46 Notice, too, that in ‘reworking’ 
Smith, Müller never abandoned Heeren’s thesis that economics sets limits on politics. Indeed, 
it was this thesis that led him to expand his critique of the revolutionaries’ individualism into 
a critique of laissez-faire economics. In the Elemente, he reproduced Heeren’s Montesquieu-
Smith pairing as a kind of shorthand for the twin forces of liberalism, political and economic, 
that threatened the moral order of modern Europe. Not coincidentally, he dedicated this work 
to Heeren, his ‘teacher and friend’.47 His frequent insistence throughout the Elemente that the 
rise of post-feudal property-rights was a precondition of modern liberalism’s development 
can sound proto-Marxian; but to Müller, it was no more than an adaptation of Heeren on 
Montesquieu.  
After finishing his education Müller moved back to Berlin in 1801, where he would 
remain for a formative three-year period. Initially he hoped to teach ‘Staatswissenschaft’ in a 
Prussian university, but when this proved untenable, he found employment as a ‘legal clerk’ 
                                               
45 Müller, ‘Über einen philosophischen Entwurf von Herrn Fichte’, in Vermischte Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 
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46 Müller, Elemente, pp. 223-34. 
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‹Referendar› in the King’s cameral corps.48 Müller’s return to Berlin reunited him with Gentz 
for a brief period of time (Gentz left the city for Vienna in May 1802), and afforded him the 
opportunity to debate the meaning of the Reflections with Germany’s most-famous Burkean. 
Müller admired Gentz for his eloquence as a writer, and for the courage that he had displayed 
in opposing the Revolution against overwhelming public criticism. Gentz, for his own part, 
enjoyed Müller’s company (and his adulation), and found him a quick-witted, stimulating 
conversationalist whose political and philosophical ideas were extremely interesting and 
provocative, if somewhat extravagant. Throughout his life, Müller saw himself as Gentz’s 
protégé: ‘the genealogy of my best thoughts can nearly always be traced back to yours’, he 
told him, fawningly, in 1810.49 Over the course of their lifelong friendship, Gentz became 
something of a father-figure to his much-younger friend, and was very proud of the public 
recognition that Müller eventually received in the wake of the Elemente’s publication. 
Müller, in Gentz’s view, was ‘the best work that I will leave behind me’.50 Yet despite their 
close personal friendship, it would be a mistake to infer (as much of the German scholarship 
does) that Gentz and Müller shared either the same reading of Burke or a common diagnosis 
of the Revolution’s root causes. Indeed, as their correspondence makes clear, much of the 
vitality of their friendship arose from their passionate disagreements about precisely these 
questions. For instance, in one of the earliest surviving letters between them, we see Gentz 
chastising Müller for the ‘pure mysticism’ of his political system, and begging him to come 
down to earth, and to temper his wild intellectual ambitions.51 This paternalistic dynamic – 
Gentz as a sober-minded, prudent father-figure, chiding his starry-eyed, idealistic student – 
recurs frequently across their correspondence. Undeterred, Müller spent most of his life 
trying to persuade Gentz to adopt his essentially Christian reading of the Reflections. He was 
unsuccessful: ‘I am able to devote about as much time to [theological] speculation as I am to 
lunch’, Gentz told him after a period of particularly intense badgering.52 When Müller chose 
to join the Catholic Church in 1805, Gentz was respectful, but also baffled: he found such a 
decision ‘incomprehensible for a multitude of reasons’.53 While Müller’s engagement with 
Burke was mediated through and shaped by his friendship with Gentz, the two men disagreed 
fundamentally on how to understand his critique of the Revolution, and on how to apply its 
lessons in their own context.  
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During his time in Berlin, the other major set of interlocutors who shaped Müller’s 
interpretation of Burke were the Jena Romantics. Soon after arriving from Göttingen, he 
ingratiated himself among the well-known writers, poets, and critics who frequented Sophie 
Sander’s salon – August and Friedrich Schlegel, August Ferdinand Bernhardi, Ludwig Tieck, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher.54 Among these figures, Müller quickly gained a reputation for his 
anti-revolutionary politics: as one attendee later recalled, ‘Edmund Burke was his cherished 
idol’.55 Burke was a figure of immense interest for the rest of the Sander salon as well: during 
the height of the Jena Romantik in the late 1790s, many of its leading members were reading 
and reflecting on the Reflections.56 In these years, they developed a fundamentally aesthetic 
interpretation of Burke – one that was distinct from either Rehberg, Gentz, or Müller’s, but 
which was quite influential in German literary circles. In the early 1800s, Müller honed his 
reading of Burke in response to, and as a critique of, this early Romantic appropriation of his 
thought. Novalis, Schleiermacher, and the Schlegel brothers founded the Athenaeum journal 
in 1798 out of a desire to combat the disenchantment and exhaustion that, in their view, beset 
contemporary Europe. In the wake of the Revolution’s failed promise of emancipation, in the 
context of widespread cynicism, they hoped to reinvigorate German society by erecting new, 
life-affirming symbols for their disillusioned age. In so doing, they imagined themselves the 
inheritors of a programme that Burke had inaugurated. ‘One does not need to have been in 
Paris’ to grasp the Revolution’s significance, Friedrich Schlegel wrote from Jena; ‘Burke [is] 
better than so many other travelers’.57 In the Romantics’ view, Burke’s Reflections heralded a 
titanic clash between the Revolution’s abstract rationalism and the aesthetic integrity of the 
ancien régime. What Burke saw, they argued, was that it is ultimately a community’s shared 
aesthetic beliefs – the common symbols and icons which compel its respect and admiration – 
that bind a society together, giving it direction, meaning, and purpose. Because the French 
revolutionaries were blind to this reality, seeking to root community in the dry soil of reason 
and reason alone, their ideology was insufficient to hold France together. Burke foresaw that, 
after they had deposed their king, stripped their altars, and leveled their society, the result 
would be anarchy, enervation, and disillusionment. 
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For the Romantics, Burke’s description of the coherence, harmony, and order of the 
ancien régime offered not only an indictment of revolutionary rationalism, but also a poetic 
or literary template for how society might be restored in its wake. Through his eloquence, 
Burke showed how France’s desecrated icons and symbols could be resuscitated and revived. 
It was this intuition that led Novalis to coin perhaps the most-famous aphorism written of 
Burke: ‘There have been many antirevolutionary books written for the Revolution. But Burke 
has written a revolutionary book against the Revolution.’58 For Novalis, Burke was 
‘revolutionary’ because he had redeemed the objects of the revolutionaries’ scorn – the 
Bourbon monarchy, the Gallican Church, the institution of chivalry, and, most famously, the 
person of Marie Antoinette. He showed how the artist, orator, or poet could make discarded 
symbols into icons of veneration once more. Burke was the original Romantic poet, re-
imbuing a scared and fallen world with beauty, and his Reflections was the opening salvo in 
their crusade to rebuild society in the wake of revolutionary iconoclasm.59 Some years later, 
when Schlegel reflected back on the admiration that he and the editors of the Athenaeum had 
for Burke, he explained Novalis’s aphorism in precisely these terms: 
If I had to describe that era [of Romantic awakening] in a word, … I would 
call it ‘revolutionary’…. I use this word in the sense that it was once used so 
fittingly of Burke, to claim that he wrote a revolutionary book against the 
Revolution: that is to say, he depicted the convulsions of his age with such an 
enchanting eloquence because he fully grasped the dangers and the magnitude 
of the impending struggle, and put himself in a position of struggle and inner 
convulsion. This situation of not only external but of internal struggle is what I 
claim to be distinctive of the poets and writers of that generation.60 
It was through this process of ‘internal struggle’ that Burke’s creative genius had emerged.  
By internalizing the political struggle between the ancien régime and the revolutionaries as 
an essentially artistic battle between stultifying rationalism and life-affirming Romanticism, 
Burke set the agenda for Schlegel and Novalis’s project.  
 The Jena Romantics were perhaps inclined to read Burke through this aestheticizing 
paradigm because throughout the 1790s, they were also studying his Philosophical Enquiry 
into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757).61 Tieck, for instance, 
                                               
58 Novalis, ‘Blüthenstaub,’ Athanaeum (May 1798), p. 103; reprinted in The Early Political Writings 
of the German Romantics, ed. Frederick Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 
7-32, at p. 29. 
59 Friedrich Schlegel went so far as to describe Burke as ‘somewhat mad’, a man possessed by genius: 
see Philosophische Lehrjahre (c. 1797), in Kritische Ausgabe, vol. 18, p. 55, frag. II.355. 
60 F. Schlegel, Geschichte der alten und neuen Literatur (1812; pub. 1815), in Kritische Ausgabe, vol. 
6, p. 393, italics in orig. 
61 The full history of the Enquiry in Germany is yet to be written. The salient initial points of entry 
were Mendelsohn’s 1758 review in his Bibliothek der schönen Wissenschaften (‘Philosophische 
Untersuchung des Ursprungs unserer Ideen vom Erhabenen und Schönen’, [1758]: pp. 290-320) and 
Christian Garve’s 1773 translation: Burkes Philosophische Untersuchungen über den Ursprung 
Chapter 5: Adam Müller   
	182 
engaged Wackenroder in a series of debates about Burke’s aesthetics while writing his own 
treatise Über das Erhabene (1792).62 We know that Novalis also read the Enquiry, and that 
Schlegel lectured publicly on it during the late 1790s, in the same years that he was 
contributing to the Athenaeum.63 Burke’s analysis of human psychology in this work 
suggested that our capacity to appreciate beauty in the world is a reflection of our innate 
tendency towards sociability – our capacity for altruism, fellow-feeling, and love. (Our 
perception of sublimity, by contrast, betrays a conflicting desire for self-preservation. We are 
enchanted by terrifying objects that are distance from us – an imposing mountain, or the 
expanse of the night sky – because they remind us of our fragile mortality.)64 Given this 
suggestion, it was perhaps natural for the Jena group to register the Reflections’ apology for 
the ancien régime as a defense of beauty tout court. Unfortunately, however, this assumption 
blinded them to Burke’s more directly political arguments.65 For the Romantics, this 
aestheticized ancien régime was useful as an aesthetic ideal, an object of collective 
veneration – but little more. This helps to explain why, as Frederick Beiser and Pauline 
Kleingeld have noted, the early Romantics were able to cling to an explicitly republican set 
of political commitments – to cosmopolitan peace, individual liberty, a kind of egalitarianism 
– while simultaneously venerating Burke.66 To take a radical example, in the very same year 
that Friedrich Schlegel wrote to tell his brother how envious he was of Burke’s eloquence, 
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and that he longed to write a book that was ‘truly furious’ like the Reflections, Schlegel was 
also working on a defense of the Jacobin Georg Forster.67 As long as this apology was 
composed in the same aesthetic register as Burke’s – as long as it offered a rejuvenating, 
enlivening alternative to deadening Kantian legalism – Schlegel did not, apparently, see any 
contradiction here. 
Müller did. Although he agreed with the early Romantics that the Revolution had led 
to enervation and alienation, and although he shared their admiration for Burke’s eloquence, 
he believed that their answer to the challenge of the Revolution was radically deficient. To 
turn to aesthetics alone as a response to liberal rationalism was to substitute private taste for 
private reason, and thus to remain trapped within the same cage of revolutionary subjectivism 
as the Jacobins. (To his mind, the Romantic assumption that poetry could be so compelling, 
so beautiful, as to transcend personal taste and command universal assent had clear Jacobin 
resonances.) In their lament for the lost aesthetic integrity of pre-revolutionary Europe, the 
Romantics failed to offer an adequate account of why the traditions, customs, and institutions 
that Burke lauded had gained their elevated social status to begin with. According to Müller, 
the coherence of the French ancien régime ultimately lay in in the Catholic theology that 
animated it. Celebrating the corporations of pre-revolutionary France merely as symbols, the 
Romantics were unable to perceive the normative ground of these symbols. To attempt to 
resurrect these symbols without their necessary theological foundations was just to postulate 
artistic creativity as an ersatz substitute for divine authority – precisely the sort of irreligious 
premise that led to the Revolution in the first instance.  
Breaking out of this cycle of subjectivism demanded a more serious engagement with 
political theology. What was needed was an account of which symbols should be restored, 
and why – an account that demanded some extra-aesthetic ground of authority. Throughout 
his career, Müller explicitly criticized his Romantic peers on this point. In an advertisement 
for his Vorlesungen über deutsche Wissenschaft und Literatur lectures (1806), he condemned 
the ‘unfettered aesthetics’ of his contemporaries as a dangerous form of Spinozism:  
The faculty of aesthetic perception is intrinsically rooted in the human spirit. 
But when it is given absolute license to rule [over the soul] it becomes an idle 
amusement or, … in extremis, can lead to that pernicious, pantheistic swindle 
which is evident today not only in the [ideological] traps ‹Gespinsten› of our 
academies but throughout [our society] in diverse and diffuse forms.68  
                                               
67 F. Schlegel to A.W. Schlegel, 29 Jan 1799; in Kritische Ausgabe, vol. 24, p. 432. Cf. idem., Georg 
Forster: Fragment einer Charakteristik der deutschen Klassiker (1799), in ibid., vol. 2, pt. 1, pp. 78-
99. 
68 Qtd. in A.W. Schlegel, Kritische Schriften und Briefe, ed. Edgar Lohner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 
1962), pp. 114-18, at p. 117. 
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Again in the preface to his Elemente, Müller distanced himself from ‘today’s hyper-critical 
youth, who want to make the spiritual and the holy fashionable again’.69 Müller sometimes 
couched his critique of ‘unfettered aesthetics’ vis-à-vis the traditional theological distinction 
between idols and icons.70 In order to re-ground politics in the wake of the Revolution, what 
was needed was not merely a repertoire of shared symbols. These symbols needed to be, in 
some sense, true – pointing like icons towards a moral order that transcended them, rather 
than, like idols, become vessels for the veneration of the self. In the Middle Ages, he noted, 
the Church often used dramatic art to represent its moral teachings in an accessible, popular 
vernacular. Taking the portico of a city’s cathedral as their stage, touring troupes of actors 
would perform for audiences assembled in the marketplace below. Müller saw this practice 
as metaphorically instructive. From their position on the portico – situated between the 
cathedral and the market, representations of the Church and of civil society – these actors 
mediated between time and history, transcendence and particularity. In so doing, their drama 
shaped the moral imagination of their society. To Müller, the trauma of the Revolution was 
that, in subverting Europe’s theological foundations, political life had become untethered 
from its objective moorings in natural law and Christian revelation. To suppose that reviving 
aesthetically-compelling symbols – any symbols – would assuage the moral alienation that 
resulted from the Revolution was to demand, in the logic of his metaphor, that acting troupes 
be returned to the Church’s portico without any regard to the theology that their art revealed, 
or any concern for the shape of the society that their art would engender. 
 
III. Der Gegensatz against Fichte 
During his time in Berlin, in dialogue with these interlocutors Müller began conceptualizing a 
major philosophical project, which he provisionally called Die Lehre vom Gegensatz. This 
was to be a three-volume work which, following the outline of Kant’s critical works, would 
cover metaphysics in the first volume, then move into the practical realm of morality and 
politics, and conclude with a final volume on theology, aesthetics, and teleology. For three 
years, this project consumed his attention. ‘My entire life revolves, as you know, around the 
Gegensatz’, he told Gentz.71 Müller worked on the first and second parts of this work – on 
metaphysics, and on ethics and politics –simultaneously from Berlin, and released his first 
                                               
69 Müller, Elemente, p. 437, italics in orig.  
70 See, e.g., Müller, Über die dramatische Kunst (1806/7), in Kritische Schriften, vol. 1, pp. 139-291, 
esp. pp. 141-55; Vorlesungen, in ibid., vol. 1, pp. 127-32. 
71 Müller to Gentz, 13 Sept. 1802, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, p. 37. In German, this line reads as a 
pun: Müller is busy writing his Gegensatz, but is also trapped in an ‘antithesis’ or ‘dialectic’ that is 
consuming him. 
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volume, Der Gegensatz, in February 1804.72 To this essay on metaphysics, he affixed a brief 
preface in which he set out the ambition of his broader, three-volume project.73 According to 
Müller, Europe had recently undergone not one but two world-historical revolutions, 
‘Revolutionen in der Gesellschaft und in der Wissenschaften’, both of which were animated 
by the same basic principles. ‘Only in such an unstable age as the present, crumbling apart on 
all sides, could the realm of society be so separated from the realm of science and art that the 
total revolutions ‹Totalrevolutionen› that have taken place in both of these realms could 
appear as separate incidents’.74 These ‘total revolutions’ – a coinage that Müller lifted from 
Gentz’s commentary on the Reflections – had led not only to the subversion of political 
authority (as Gentz used the term to suggest) but to the collapse of the very concept of 
authority as such.75 The first volume of Müller’s three-part project was intended as a 
response to this intellectual crisis of the ‘Wissenschaften’. But soon, he promised to publish 
two further volumes, which would turn to the more-pressing questions of moral, political, and 
spiritual order. To indicate the shape of these forthcoming works – Die Wissenschaft und der 
Staat and Die Religion und die Kirche, respectively – he attached a provisional outline of 
their contents to his preface.76 
 But these latter volumes never appeared – at least, not in their promised form. Shortly 
after its release, Der Gegensatz was met with a series of harsh reviews. Müller’s friends 
found it esoteric, confusing, and impenetrable.77 The Allgemeine Literaturzeitung complained 
that Müller was playing a question-begging ‘conceptual game’ ‹Begriffsspiel› that obscured, 
rather than elucidating, metaphysical relations between subject and object, man and nature. 
To the extent that it could be understood, the philosophy of ‘antithesis’ ‹Gegensatz› that he 
had defended was either tautological or incoherent.78 The Neue Deutsche Bibliothek did not 
even dignify Müller’s book with a review.79 ‘I read this work slowly … but just could not 
grasp it,’ Gentz wrote to him, disappointedly, from Vienna: 
                                               
72 Müller sent Johannes von Müller a draft of the second volume, on politics, in late 1804: see J. von 
Müller to A. Müller, 25 Feb. 1805, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 161-2. He also sent a smaller essay 
on ‘freedom and necessity’ to Brinckmann around the same time: see ibid., vol. 1, pp. 137-43. 
73 See Müller’s ‘Vorrede’ to Der Gegensatz; in Vermischte Schriften, vol. 2, pp. 195-200. 
74 Ibid., p. 198. 
75 See Gentz, Betrachtungen, in Schriften, ed. Kronenbitter, vol. 6, p. 84. 
76 See Müller, Der Gegensatz, in Vermischte Schriften, vol. 2, p. 200. 
77 See, e.g., Johannes von Müller to A. Müller, 25 Fed. 1805, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 161-2. 
78 [Anon.], review of Müller, Der Gegensatz, in Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (26 Oct. 1805): pp. 177-
9, at p. 178. The Literaturzeitung’s columnist sarcastically suggested that in his next work, Müller 
should consider describing ‘virtue as that which is opposed to anti-virtue, i.e. vice, life as that which 
is opposed to anti-life, i.e. death, and so on ad infinitum’. 
79 Cf. A. Müller to Johannes von Müller, 17 July 1805, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 204-5. The 
only review that was vaguely sympathetic was Reinhold’s: see Jenaer Allgemeine Literaturzeitung (4 
May 1805), pp. 235-40. 
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For such a rapid treatment of a subject that is so far removed from [the realm 
of] appearance, my mind is just too weak. For you, it is a game to take Burke, 
Plato, Schelling, Novalis …, the Apollo Belvedere, the Planets, God, and the 
Gegensatz and to amalgamate them all to one another in an instant, leaving a 
mind like mine confounded. You are a poet, my dear friend: it can only be 
your imagination that explains this very odd game that you play. I will always 
admire your imagination … but I willingly leave it to those who are equipped 
with similar imaginations to follow you on your flights of fancy. I am not 
suited to it.80 
Müller was deeply invested in his first book – ‘you must never separate … my own life from 
the cause of the Gegensatz,’ he told a friend after its publication – and took its poor reception 
very badly.81 The whole affair was so upsetting that in its aftermath he decided ‘not to release 
my other works on antitheses to the public’.82 
 Yet as Benedikt Koehler has observed, though Müller set aside the intended format of 
his three-volume Lehre von Gegensatz project, the publishing agenda that he set out in 1804 
continued to structure his literary engagements over the next five years.83 Müller’s second 
book, the Vorlesungen über deutsche Wissenschaft und Literature (1806), set out his moral 
philosophy and a historical critique of Kantian idealism; his third work, Von der Idee der 
Schönheit (1808), laid out his aesthetics, theology, and teleology; finally, his Elemente der 
Staatskunst (1809) outlined his Burkean vision of a post-revolutionary political, economic, 
and international order. Throughout these works, he continued to rely on the philosophical 
foundations of Der Gegensatz. To understand the role that Burke played in Müller’s political 
thought, we must therefore begin with his theory of metaphysics, however opaque it may be. 
 Müller composed Der Gegensatz in a moment of renewed attention to the ‘subjective 
idealism’ of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, a metaphysical programme that he had developed in 
Jena during the 1790s, but which he brought with him to Berlin after moving to the Prussian 
capital in 1799.84 The provocative (and, to many readers, incendiary) suggestion of Fichte’s 
metaphysics was that Kant’s critical project, if pursued to its logical conclusions, implied a 
radical form of subjectivism. In the first Kritik, Kant had upended the Leibnitzian-Wolffian 
tradition of classical philosophy by arguing that the natural, objective world did not possess 
                                               
80 Gentz to Müller, 4 Mar. 1805, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, p. 165. Cf. Gentz to Müller, 9 Jan. 1805, 
in ibid., vol. 1, pp. 154-7, at p. 155: ‘I freely admit that … I preferred our personal discussions [of the 
Gegensatz] to your book.’ 
81 Müller to Karl Gustav von Brinkmann, 10 Apr. 1804, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 127-30, at pp. 
128-9. 
82 A. Müller to Johannes von Müller, 17 July 1805, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 204-5. 
83 See Koehler, Aesthetik der Politik, pp. 53-62, which persuasively argues that these later works 
should be read as the missing second and third volumes of the Lehre vom Gegensatz project. 
84 Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1795; 2nd ed. 1802); reprinted as The Science 
of Knowledge, trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
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any intrinsic meaning that was discernable by human cognition; rather, he claimed, a priori 
reason generates, of its own power, the conceptual resources necessary for giving coherence 
to our sense-impressions of the external world, thereby making nature intelligible. This was 
to bifurcate reality into two discrete parts: an inner realm of intellectual spontaneity, and an 
external realm of natural necessity. Kant’s moral philosophy reproduced the same dichotomy, 
locating moral duty not in divine revelation or natural law, but in (subjective) human reason. 
To act rightly, he argued, was to respect the demands that pure reason imposes upon action a 
priori. In this way, human freedom and the moral law (which were, in fact, one and the same) 
were situated in opposition to a morally-indifferent realm of nature. 
 Kant’s account of reality raised an immediate question, which preoccupied his readers 
throughout the 1790s: namely, if the world could be divided into a mechanical, inert material 
realm and an inner realm of cognitive and moral freedom, what first principle stood prior to 
both of them? Related to this question was the intuition that Kant had not adequately proven 
the systematic unity of pure reason, and that his theoretical and practical philosophies needed 
to be re-plinthed upon a common foundation.85 The aim of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre was 
to correct the shortcomings of Kant’s system by demonstrating that the dual realms of nature 
and freedom could both be deduced from the premise of human subjectivity. Fichte’s strategy 
(in the words of one modern interpreter) ‘was to begin simply with the ungrounded assertion 
of the subjective spontaneity and freedom (infinity) of the I and then to proceed to a 
transcendental derivation of objective necessity and limitation (finitude)’ as the preconditions 
of subjective experience.86 In other words, Fichte argued that the mere fact of human 
intellectual and moral freedom is prior to nature, and a condition of its existence. Kant had 
argued that the essential, non-subjective character of external objects – das Ding-an-sich, in 
his terminology – was inaccessible to human reason. Fichte’s claim was far more radical: 
Aristotelian essences did not exist, he insisted, because the existence of external objects was 
metaphysically contingent upon the fact of radical human autonomy. 
In context, many of Fichte’s readers interpreted the Wissenschaftslehre as an ex post 
facto attempt to justify the violent rationalism and individualism of the French Revolution – 
to show that the Jacobins were correct to insist that no external obstacles could justly be set 
                                               
85 See, e.g., Reinhold, Ueber das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens (Jena: Mauke, 1791). Cf. 
Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 226-65; Daniel Breazeale, ‘Between Kant and Fichte: Karl 
Leonhard Reinhold's “Elementary Philosophy”’, Review of Metaphysics, vol. 35 (1982): pp. 785-821. 
86 Dan Breazeale, ‘Johann Gottlieb Fichte’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (fall 2017), ed. 
Edward Zalta, at <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/johann-fichte/>. 
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in the path of human liberty.87 This perception grew even stronger after the Athiesmusstreit 
of 1799, a heated controversy in which Fichte lost his professorship in Jena over accusations 
of irreligion (which he hardly contested). During his time in Berlin, Müller became 
fascinated by Fichte’s subjectivism. ‘The most recent Wissenschaftslehre is currently being 
prepared,’ he told Gentz in 1803; ‘for me there is nothing so stimulating.’88 Müller 
recognized that if Fichte’s system were, in fact, a necessary extension of Kant’s idealism, the 
implications for politics would be explosive. Subjective human reason would be the only 
rightful arbiter of justice; the moral resources furnished by religion, custom, and tradition 
would have to be thrown away. To Müller, therefore, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre seemed 
like an attack on precisely the sort of foundationalist vision of the Good which, as Burke’s 
Reflections had shown, was essential for the formation and maintenance of political society. 
Historically, it was Fichte’s subjectivism that had animated the revolutionary campaign to 
divest Europe of its Christian inheritance, and which was responsible for the moral alienation 
that followed in the wake of its collapse. If Burke was the champion of Christianity and 
community, Fichte was the exact opposite, in Müller’s view, the most forceful exponent of a 
radical, subversive strain of individualism and irreligion. 
In 1804, Müller saw himself as part of a broader effort to dethrone Fichte’s system – 
a ‘war’ against subjective idealism that included thinkers such as Schiller, Jacobi, Hölderlin, 
Schelling, and Schleiermacher.89 By the time he joined their ranks, Müller believed that the 
basic flaws of Fichte’s system had already been exposed. During the Athiesmusstreit, Jacobi 
had shown that the Wissenschaftslehre was no more than a form of neo-Spinozism, a clever 
attempt to conceptualize the whole of reality as a single substance.90 According to Jacobi, 
this project was self-undermining.91 Fichte had effectively situated the sovereign subject in 
an existential vacuum. But in removing the self from the external, natural world of objects, 
Fichte offered his subject nothing to reason about. Even if abstract reason could generate 
concepts a priori (as Kant claimed), these concepts would remain vacuous in the Fichteian 
universe, because there existed nothing other than the self for these concepts to synthesize. 
Thus the final result of Fichte’s system, according to Jacobi, was ‘nihilism’. Müller greatly 
                                               
87 Cf. Fichte, Beiträge zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die Französische Revolution 
([Zurich]: 1793).  
88 Müller to Gentz, 20 Feb 1803, in Lebenszeugnisse, 1.94-6, at 95; cf. Friedrich Schelgel, Athenaeum 
(1798), fragment no. 216; reprinted in German Romantics, ed. Beiser, p. 118: ‘The French 
Revolution, Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre, and Goethe’s Meister are the great tendencies of the age.’  
89 Müller to Gentz, 20 Feb 1803, in Lebenszeugnisse, vol. 1, pp. 94-6, at p. 95. 
90 Jacobi, An Fichte (1799); reprinted as ‘An Open Letter to Fichte’, trans. Diana Behler, in The 
Philosophy of German Idealism, ed. Ernst Behler, (New York: Continuum, 1987), pp. 119-41. 
91 Cf. Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (Breslau: 
Löwe, 1789). For discussion, see Ch. 3 above.  
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admired Jacobi – indeed, at one point he considered him ‘Germany’s best political 
philosopher’ – and was attracted to this line of critique.92 But the more trenchant case against 
Fichte, in his view, was the line of attack suggested by Schelling.93 In situating the 
autonomous self as the ground of all reality, Schelling argued, Fichte had fallen prey to a 
vicious logical circularity. The self can only be defined dialectically, vis-à-vis an external 
world outside it: the concept of subjectivity presumed the existence of its opposite (i.e., some 
not-I). Therefore, to explain the objective world as posterior to the self was nonsensical. 
Fichte assumed the very thing he was trying to account for.94   
Even if most of Müller’s contemporaries were united in rejecting Fichte’s system as 
metaphysically incoherent and morally unacceptable, they were divided on how, given the 
premises of Kantian idealism, to stabilize human freedom.95 One suggestion came in the 
form of Friedrich Schiller’s Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen (1795), which 
sought to provide a transcendental account of beauty that could serve as a limiting condition 
on human subjectivity.96 This was an explicitly political agenda: in an age of revolutionary 
rationalism, Schiller argued, democratic self-government would remain practically 
impossible unless the aesthetic sentiments of the people were refined. This process of 
education, he argued, would enlighten citizens, teaching them how to love and venerate 
natural objects that transcend their own subjectivity, and to exercise their political liberty in 
the service of their community. A competing proposal appeared in Schleiermacher’s Über 
die Religion (1799), which turned to an attenuated kind of natural theology, rather than 
aesthetics, as a way to hem in modern subjectivism.97 Schleiermacher admitted, with Kant, 
that reason could not prove the existence of God or the immortality of the soul. But he 
                                               
92 Müller to Brinckmann, 22 Oct 1804, in Lebenszeugnisse, 1.146-50, at 147. 
93 Schelling, Vom Ich als Prinzip der Philosophie, oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen 
(1795); trans. as The Unconditional in Human Knowledge by Fritz Marti (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell 
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nevertheless insisted that religion – understood as an intuition of the world’s essential given-
ness, and an openness to the ground of being – was a necessary complement to Kant’s theory 
of moral freedom. Without a basic sense that the universe is pregnant with meaning, most 
men would not be able to fulfill the demanding moral duties that reason demands of them.98   
But it was Schelling’s response to Fichte that Müller found most intriguing. In the 
early 1800s, Schelling began arguing that man’s intellectual and moral freedom should be 
seen as an outgrowth of, or a manifestation of, a supersensible natural order that precedes it.99 
He explained that, rather than an inert, mechanized realm of causal laws, ‘nature’ was to be 
understood as an evolving, self-realizing organism which was, in some deep sense, radically 
free. To exercise one’s free will was to participate in the deep, all-encompassing freedom of 
the universe. If the Fichteian self could be stabilized within this system, Schelling believed 
that he could solve the conceptual puzzle of the Wissenschaftslehre. This monist account of 
nature offered him a way to define subjectivity in relation to the external world, yet without 
collapsing human freedom back into a natural order of Aristotelian essences. During his time 
among the Jena Romantics, Müller was hopeful that Schelling’s Naturphilosophie might 
provide a key to deposing Fichte.100 It seemed to demonstrate that individual reason was not, 
of its own accord, sufficient to explain reality, and that man’s freedom was contingent upon 
an extra-subjective natural order that transcends and precedes him, and which his reason is 
incapable of fully grasping. Schelling, he believed, had effectively systematized Burke’s 
claim that man exercises his free will in a divinely-ordered universe, and that deference to 
this natural moral law is the first principle of politics.101 In Der Gegensatz, Müller flagged 
his admiration for Schelling by describing his own metaphysics as ‘a history of self-
consciousness’.102 
                                               
98 Kant was himself open to this sort of argument for natural religion: cf. his Religion innerhalb der 
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Yet over the coming years, Müller became increasingly disillusioned with Schelling. 
He became certain that, in claiming to situate the Fichetian self within a supersensible nature, 
Schelling had in fact dissolved the self into nature. In this way, the Naturphilosophie had 
replicated the very same Spinozism that Müller abhorred in Fichte. By the time he left Berlin, 
Müller believed that neither Schiller, Schleiermacher, nor Schelling had found an alternative 
to the Wissenschaftslehre. Ultimately, these critics were all still operating within a Spinozist 
universe, governed by a single, self-generating substance – Fichte’s free subject, Schelling’s 
organicist ‘nature’, Schleiermacher’s pantheistic ‘ground of being’.103 They all foreclosed the 
possibility of an ordering principle outside the self, one that could give moral grounding to 
their unmoored age. What was needed, Müller believed, was a metaphysics that comprehend 
both freedom and nature, subject and object, without collapsing one into the other. ‘It is 
time’, he announced in his Gegensatz, ‘to put an end to the usurpation of an absolutely 
subjective or an absolutely objective [account of] beauty, truth, and morality’.104 Only such a 
system could rescue modern philosophy from the dangerous subjectivism into which the 
Kantian tradition had devolved. 
Müller opened Der Gegensatz by situating himself against ‘the Popularphilosophen 
of the English and German schools’ on the one hand, and the Kantian tradition on the other. 
The former were committed to an inductive, bottom-up philosophy, built up from the modest, 
skeptical foundations of the ‘maxims, rules-of-thumb, duties and virtues’ that common sense 
and experience recommend.105 In contradistinction to this Humean method was the deductive 
approach of Kant and his followers, who sought to identify incontrovertible, a priori truths 
that transcended the realm of experience, and then use these rational principles to synthesize 
their sense-impressions of the external world. In Müller’s mind, this idealist approach thus 
had a kind of ‘pyramidal or conical structure’.106 While Kant’s metaphysics was ‘higher’ and 
‘more meaningful’ than his empiricist rivals, Müller was dissatisfied with Kant’s agnosticism 
about whether the natural order had any essential, extra-subjective integrity or meaning in its 
own right: 
Constructing a permanent, stony, immovable wall around the limits of human 
understanding ‹Erkenntnis›; touring us all around its perimeter; reminding us 
of its immutability, its insurmountable height; hinting at an inaccessible realm 
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beyond it, an unknowable world-in-itself ‹unerkennbaren Welt an sich› – all 
of this is ill-suited to satisfy our doubts and longings.107 
In grounding his metaphysics solely in the operation of a priori reason, Kant paved the way 
for Fichte to deny that this world-in-itself existed at all. In the face of Fichte’s subjectivism, 
Müller did not advocate a direct return to the neo-Aristotelianism of the Leibnitzian tradition. 
Rather, he sought to reunite the autonomous Fichteian self to a real, objective natural order 
that transcended him – to reunite human freedom and divine necessity. Müller’s method was 
to demonstrate the necessary and irreducible interdependency of subjectivity and objectivity. 
Rejecting both the top-down and bottom-up approaches of his predecessors, Müller set out a 
metaphysics that was modelled ‘according to the example of the planets’.108 Just as opposing 
gravitational forces hold the planets and the sun in dynamic relation to one another, setting 
the cosmos in motion, a basic ‘antithesis’ ‹Gegensatz› between subject and object animates 
all of reality. This was the elemental premise from which all metaphysical, moral and 
political theorizing must begin, for ‘questions about a reality over and above this 
relationship, this antithesis, are self-contradictory, nonsensical, and empty’.109 
According to Müller, this subject-object antithesis was not just a logical dependency: 
it was a substantive one. Like a pair of Newtonian vectors which, although pulling in equal 
and opposite directions, do not negate one another but in fact augment the force of the total 
system, the antithetical relation between freedom and necessity, self and nature, gives reality 
its elemental dynamism. In a pre-critical essay on the ‘Begriff der negativen Größen’ (1763), 
which was reprinted in 1799, Kant had explored the possibility of a metaphysical opposition 
in which conflicting concepts do not negate, but in fact augment, each other.110 He pointed to 
virtue/vice, pleasure/pain, and wealth/debt as binary oppositions which are not immediately 
self-destructive.111 Virtue is opposed to vice, for instance, in a different manner than, say, +2 
and -2 are: because they are in ‘real opposition’, rather than ‘logical opposition’, their sum is 
not nothing but something. In Der Gegensatz, Müller latched onto this early Kant essay as a 
template for his own metaphysics: this ‘prophecy’, he wrote, made it possible to conceive of 
existence as simultaneously encompassing both radially free moral agents and a divinely-
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ordained natural order.112 Without sacrificing their claim to autonomy, human beings could 
be seen as embedded in a moral universe whose laws precede, transcend, and envelop us.  
For Müller, it was because of our essential embedded-ness that we are truly free to reflect 
upon, and act within, the external world. 
Müller claimed that this basic antithesis between subject and object structured not 
only metaphysics, but all of reality – moral, political, aesthetic. In Der Gegensatz, he tried to 
illustrate this claim by examining some of the most important antitheses for making sense of 
man’s existence in the world. Modern, post-Cartesian mathematics, for instance, is grounded 
in a basic, irreducible opposition between positive and negative numbers. Just like freedom 
and necessity, the concepts of positivity and negativity cannot be defined independently of 
one another: their essence is determined by a necessary relation to what they are not. 
‘Positive and negative, + and –, must be seen as nothing other … than subject and object in 
our earlier definition.’113 This dialectic relationship was a precondition for explaining the 
world scientifically, in terms of Newtonian physics. In the same way, Müller argued, the 
Gegensatz was replicated in the relation between nature and art: 
Only he who stands in relation to nature knows how to feel and create art…. 
Man is a work of nature only insofar as nature is a work of man and vice 
versa. No priority, no supremacy, to either nature or art! Like form and 
substance, soul and body, self and not-I, they stand in an active, wedded 
relation – reciprocally permeating through each other, each engendering the 
other as father and mother.114  
The recognition that nature is anti-art, and art, anti-nature, is foundational to human beings’ 
understanding of moral causality, responsibility, and freedom. If spontaneity and creativity 
are only possible in the presence of an extra-subjective natural order, and if the necessity of 
nature can only be defined conceptually in opposition to human freedom, it was question-
begging to try to establish one or the other as primary.115  
Foreshadowing Müller’s coming works, the last chapter of the Gegensatz examined 
the relation between science ‹Wissenschaft› and religion. Theology, he argued, provides an 
account of man’s normative ends, an image of ‘the highest Good’ to which he strives. In this 
way, it structures our moral activity and imparts coherence and integrity onto our lives. Yet 
religion is of no practical use apart from the knowledge of the material world that scientific 
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reason alone can generate. Science provides the means, as it were, to complement religion’s 
ends. The tragedy of contemporary Europe, according to Müller, was that this antithesis had 
been ruptured, leading to moral alienation on the one hand and to a doctrinaire, scientistic 
rationalism on the other: 
When science ‹Wissenschaft› tears itself away [from religion] unilaterally and 
inflexibly, there arises a cold, empty, rigid rule; the mob becomes enlightened 
and rebellious; men of letters become dry and worthless; and ingenious nature, 
allowing itself to be borne away on the currents of the age, is drowned in a sea 
of absolute knowing ‹Wissen› and pure forms. Science becomes idolatrous, 
religion hardens into a system; and [men] perish in a just yet indistinct and 
mournful yearning for the lost unity of these forces.116 
In 1804, Müller believed that he was living in precisely this dystopian world. Fichte’s radical 
subjectivism had cut the link between subject and object, engendering moral enervation and 
political anarchy. Whereas earlier generations of Europeans lived their lives in deference to a 
compelling, substantial picture of the Good ‹Bild›, his own generation had become obsessed 
with etiolated sketches of justice ‹Zeichen› – a complaint that Müller stressed by describing 
the Wissenschaftslehre as a ‘Zeichenlehre’.117 In the wake of this fissure between Kantian 
‘concepts’ ‹Begriffe› and Platonic ‘ideas’ ‹Ideen›, it was naïve and sacrilegious to think that 
the autonomous self could flourish outside of the natural order. ‘It is wrong to think that by 
stripping away and throwing off the flesh, the sensible nature of things ‹sinnliche Natur der 
Dinge›, one can bring the whole world under the domain [of concepts].’118 Rather, the bond 
between self and nature needed to be re-knit, and society re-rooted in a theological vision of 
divine order. With this theory of antitheses, Müller thus set out a problematic that framed his 
wider Burkean project:  
In these exhaustive definitions of things and concepts ‹Begriffe› lies only 
weariness and death. Life is in the idea ‹Idee›! But who will explain to me, 
who will tell me the story of how a concept becomes an idea?119 
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IV. Burke, tradition, ‘mediating history’ 
Around the time his Gegensatz was published, Müller left Berlin and traveled south to visit 
Gentz in Vienna. It was here that, after his dispiriting literary debut, Müller began to regain 
his psychological and intellectual bearings. His conversion to Roman Catholicism in 1805 
was a crucial step in this process. One of the weaknesses of his Gegensatz was that, even if 
Müller were able to prove the necessary interdependence of subjects and objects, he was 
noticeably vague about the character of the natural moral order from which Europe had been 
severed. What, exactly, had been lost in the Kantian turn? After his conversion, Müller was 
positioned to begin thinking seriously about this question – to go beyond a merely negative 
critique of Fichte and begin fleshing out a positive account of the ‘nature’ that his own age 
had abandoned. In the Catholic natural law tradition, Müller discovered a well-developed, 
historically-grounded theology of man’s position in the natural order, and of God’s role in 
creating, sustaining, and redeeming it. 
There is no evidence to indicate that Müller believed that Burke, too, was a secret 
Catholic. Indeed, Bisset’s biography of Burke, which Müller owned, specifically denied this 
charge.120 Interestingly, however, around the time of his conversion, Müller was studying 
Burke on Catholic toleration: ‘the Irish Catholics [occupy] nearly all of my current thoughts’, 
he told Gentz in 1805.121 While conceding the Anglican Church’s centrality to the British 
Constitution, he nevertheless felt that there must be a ‘higher Catholicism’ which, as Burke 
saw, was compatible with modern British liberty.122 By the late-eighteenth century, the most 
acute threat to Burke’s Britain was not Ultramontanism or the threat of sectarian strife among 
Christians, but the politicized atheism of the revolutionaries. The distance between Anglo-
Catholicism and Roman Catholicism paled in comparison to the gap between Trinitarianism 
and Spinozism, Müller believed. Perhaps, in the face of the revolutionary threat, Burke had 
modified his theological views in a Catholic direction? 
Soon after his conversion in Vienna, Müller traveled to Dresden, the capital city of 
the Electorate of Saxony. In the next four years, as an attaché of the Saxon court, he enjoyed 
a period of exceptional intellectual productivity. Within a few months of his arrival, Müller 
was delivering a public series of lectures on Deutsche Wissenschaft und Literatur.123 Müller 
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found himself at home in the genre of oratory, and lectured in the coming years on dramatic 
art, aesthetics, and political science.124 In 1808 he founded and edited the Phöbus, a journal 
of poetry, literature, and social criticism, with his close friend Heinrich von Kleist.125 Aside 
from the copious material he produced for the Phöbus, Müller was also a regular contributor 
to the Pallas, a Dresden-based journal on ‘the art of politics and the art of war’, and penned 
dozens of other essays that were eventually published in his Vermischte Schriften (1812).126 
It was in this fertile four-year period that Müller organized and articulated his mature theory 
of politics.   
Müller lived in Saxony during a period of profound constitutional and social 
upheaval. A few months after his arrival, Napoleon’s grande armée defeated the Third 
Coalition at Austerlitz. In the battle’s aftermath, the thousand-year-old Holy Roman Empire 
of the German Nation was dissolved, and the German states reorganized on French terms. 
The Empire’s collapse spelled an end to the Electorate of Saxony’s imperial constitution. In 
1806, it was reincorporated as a sovereign kingdom under loose French control. This lenient 
arrangement did not last long however. The Saxons dissolved their tenuous alliance with 
Napoleon in October 1806, in order to join Prussia in the newly-formed Fourth Coalition. 
They were summarily humiliated at the Battle of Jena, stripped of their erstwhile autonomy, 
and made to enter the French-controlled Confederation of the Rhine. It was this arrangement 
that prevailed throughout the rest of Müller’s time in Dresden. The kingdom’s officially pro-
French policy placed him in a precarious political position, and forced him to level his public 
criticisms of the Revolution somewhat esoterically. But to his audiences in Dresden and his 
wider German readership, the anti-revolutionary implications of Müller’s political writings 
were unmistakable. Indeed, his anti-Napoleonic politics eventually cost him his position at 
court. In June 1809 Dresden was briefly occupied by Austrian troops, only to be recaptured 
by the French a few weeks later. When the French returned, they were informed that Müller 
had publicly celebrated the city’s ‘liberation’ by the Austrians. He was summarily jailed for 
treason, and then exiled permanently from Saxony, forced to return to his native Berlin. 
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Driven in large part by this political tumult, Müller’s Dresden years comprised his 
most intense period of engagement with Burke.127 In 1805, he composed a glowing literary 
portrait of Burke’s career (published in 1812).128 Three years later, he published a hymn to 
Burke’s genius in the Phöbus, imploring his contemporaries to ‘read, oh read above all the 
writings of Burke!’129 In his lectures on Die Idee der Schönheit (delivered winter, 1807/8), he 
expended considerable effort to show the beautiful and the sublime, as Burke described them 
in his Philosophical Enquiry, should be understood as a subject-object antithesis of the sort 
described in Der Gegensatz.130 Our childlike awe at the imposing grandeur of the cosmos, 
Müller argued, is evidence of a natural order that precedes us; but our concomitant ability to 
detect beauty in the world is proof of this order’s basic goodness. To revel only in nature’s 
beauty is to embrace an aestheticized Spinozism, but to see nature only as overwhelming is to 
overlook its moral integrity.131  
In composing the major political works of his Dresden years – Deutsche Wissenschaft 
und Literatur (1806), Die Elemente der Staatskunst (1809) – Müller looked to Burke out of a 
belief that his Reflections contained a strategy for transcending the crisis of subjectivism: in 
the wake of the rupture between concepts and ideas, here, Müller claimed, was ‘the architect 
of such bridges as I have demanded’.132 In an irreligious society trapped in a prison of moral 
solipsism, how was it possible to escape – to reunite man and God, self and nature, individual 
and community? Once a society had rejected all extra-subjective claims of authority and had 
blinded itself to their divine foundations, how could its faith be revived? Müller’s solution to 
this paradox was to appropriate and refashion the appeal to ‘tradition’ that he found in the 
Reflections, and to situate it as the cornerstone of his political theory. Even if an immediate, 
uncritical form of religious faith was no longer available, it was possible, through tradition, 
to revive a mediated point of access to the moral truth of Christianity. The Reflections had 
described a society’s longstanding customs, institutions, and mœurs as a repository of the 
accumulated wisdom of past generations. As such, it had a prima facie claim to authority 
over the limited, fallible reason of abstract metaphysicians. In judging questions of right, 
Burke had suggested, ‘individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank 
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and capital of nations and of ages’ than to lean solely on their own solipsistic cognition.133 
For Müller, the super-rational, historically-grounded authority of tradition thus seemed to 
offer a way to cut through Fichteian subjectivism. It was a kind of epistemological lifeline, a 
way to reconnect his own unmoored age to the moral and political foundations of earlier 
generations. In awakening his peers to the natural order that the revolutionaries had tried to 
destroy – helping them to recognize its coherence, integrity, and harmony – tradition gave 
Müller a way to ‘dialectically ‹gegensätzlich› wed judgment and history’, bringing the moral 
wisdom of the past back into a deracinated present.134 This, in turn, would allow philosophers 
to begin re-tethering Kantian concepts to their objective referents in the world: 
Through tradition (that is, through the histories of the previous age ‹Vorwelt›) 
the letters ‹Buchstaben› of the present, which are meaningless in themselves, 
are made into words of life ‹Worte des Lebens› for the state. In summoning 
history to us our ancestors are not cold witnesses; they answer, they continue 
to have an active effect, because the heart’s magic has awoken them…. They 
seem to take back what we give them into the past, and they seem to become 
our posterity, insofar we renew the ancient sentiments of earlier times [in the 
present].135  
Through tradition, the word can ‘become flesh’ again.136 Müller was clear that tradition was 
not itself truth: in the wake of the subjective turn, the possibility of an unmediated access to 
the divine order had been destroyed. (This, incidentally, was Müller’s critique of Bonald: he 
mistakenly saw tradition as a kind of sacred deposit, which provided immediate access to the 
divine order.)137 Tradition offered a window through which modern Europeans, stranded on 
the far side of Enlightenment, could peer and begin to perceive, however dimly, a natural 
order to which they had formerly been blind. 
It is worth recognizing that, by modifying Burke in this way, Müller was departing in 
significant respects from the traditionalism of the Reflections. In his own context, Burke was 
worried that the revolutionaries’ hyper-rationalism threatened to upset the fragile equilibrium 
of authority and liberty that his forebears secured in 1688. This constitutional balance was 
tightly interwoven with the institutions and structure of the modern British state. In rooting 
its authority in history, Burke sought to preempt those who would destroy it in their pursuit 
of an abstract vision of right. Because the Constitution’s historically-accumulated wisdom 
exceeded the powers of individual reason, neither a single king nor parliament could claim to 
fully comprehend its inner raison d’être. Its historicity demanded deference, and set political 
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limits on government. These limits opening a space for individual liberty within civil society 
– for property, religious toleration, and individual conscience. British liberty did not collapse 
into libertinism, according to Burke, because of the central role of Christianity in the nation’s 
political life. The union of Church and State, in his view, was the necessary lynchpin of this 
entire constitutional order, because it upheld public faith in the reality of an immutable moral 
law. Tradition was to be respected precisely because it offered the best available heuristic for 
discerning the providential nature of justice.  
In Müller, this logic was reversed. The existence of this created moral order was not 
the premise from which his argument began, but the conclusion that it was designed to reach. 
Historicizing politics was a way not to loosen, but tighten, the grip of theology on nineteenth-
century society. If Burke and the British Whigs turned to tradition in order to protect a pre-
existing balance of liberty and authority, Müller found himself in the opposite position. In the 
aftermath of the Revolution, he looked to tradition in order to reconnect politics to a divinely-
ordained moral order. As a conduit that mediated transcendent truth to fallible human beings, 
tradition was a way to establish a fruitful, gegensätzlich relation between the autonomy of the 
Fichteian self and the authority of nature. ‘History and critique, the law of nature and the law 
of liberty are united in mediating history ‹vermittelnde Geschichte›.’138 Schlegel described 
the Romantic historian as ‘a backwards-facing prophet’, a poet who projects meaning and 
coherence back onto the past.139 But if tradition had an intrinsic integrity of its own – if, as 
Burke suggested, there were moral truths embedded in history – then Schlegel’s description 
was insufficient. For Müller, ‘the true student of the past is at once prophet and historian: an 
obedient child of the past, because he seeks to direct the future.’140  
Müller’s traditionalism was not only a political strategy: it implied a particular mode 
of political reasoning as well. The true statesman needed to see himself as embedded within 
tradition, and to work his way towards an understanding of its inner logic. ‘What is the past 
other than a youth which has grown old; what is the future except the unending refreshment, 
rejuvenation, revival, resurrection of the old?’141 The role of the Burkean statesman was to 
mediate past and future. By sympathetically engaging with and internalizing the wisdom of 
tradition, Müller explained, he is able to apply it to the challenges of his day:  
The present world is a great tradition of all its earlier forms. The past has 
passed down to us its heroes, its events, and its deeds as a [dead] letter, a kind 
of ruin, an accurate, well-preserved sign ‹Zeichen›; but they can only be 
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comprehended insofar as we read them vis-à-vis the tradition through which 
they were handed down to our own time.142  
Paradoxically, deferring to the wisdom of tradition is not limiting, but liberating. Tradition 
frees us from the paralysis and disorientation of pure subjectivity, rooting us in a grounded, 
morally-coherent world of order and authority. Acknowledging the necessary historicity of 
moral reasoning allows us a richer understanding of the intellectual categories that have been 
handed down to us from the past: 
History is valuable to me – I am conscious of it – because I can see that both 
yesterday and tomorrow, I am enveloped by it in a thousand different ways; 
because I feel myself working in tension with past and future in just as many 
ways. But because I recognize this freely, I can understand history: because I 
act with open and pure eyes, my critique can track down the destructive critics 
[of history] with the weapons of history itself.143  
In an essay published in the Phöbus entitled ‘Studium der positive Wissenschaften’ 
(1808), Müller set out a précis of this way of thinking, and made its Burke roots explicit.144 If 
the moral sciences ‹Wissenschaften› are to transcend mere critique, he argued – if nature is to 
be understood in all its substance and integrity –we must learn to study politics and morality 
as a positive (i.e. historical) science, and to see the temporal roots of a custom, practice, or 
belief as prima facie evidence of its validity. Müller’s essay dramatized an imagined dialogue 
between a teacher and his student. Why, the pupil wondered, should he study an ‘outmoded’ 
political thinker like Burke? ‘Certainly we must live in our own time, in the present.’ But this 
was to conceive of politics too narrowly, according to his teacher. To master ‘the difficult art 
of living in the present’, one needs to have a deep understanding of justice – an image of the 
good society – in order to get one’s moral bearings. And this could only be learned through  
‘meticulously observing how another just, true figure was present in his own time’. But why 
could ‘the textbooks of political science ‹Staatswissenschaft›, written not about transient 
questions but for all circumstances and for all times’ not furnish such orientation?145 
Channeling Müller’s theory of tradition, the teacher argued that such an ahistorical, 
deracinated approach to politics produces only vacuous, brittle concepts. To access their 
inner content, one needed to study political norms in historical context: 
Precisely because [political science textbooks] are written for all times and all 
places and for all readers, they [are not] suitable in any particular place or true 
in any age. By contrast, that which is said for or against a particular age, in the 
context of a discrete occasion, with proficiency and integrity – it belongs to all 
time. To study the substance ‹Stoff› of the statesman, to grasp the hero in his 
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environment, one must see the time, place, and occasion that gave rise to him: 
and how can one understand the hero except in battle? To read an author like 
[Burke] one must put oneself in his position…. The rules in these handbooks 
… are nothing: it is the living statesman, situated in the context of the vast, 
manifold, living commerce of the world, that we want: we want to read both 
[the author and his context] vis-à-vis one another. So observe Burke, study 
him in vis-à-vis the British Constitution, America, east India, the Revolution 
in France, etc., and you will have attended the greatest school of political 
wisdom. You will have engaged with him intellectually ‹ideenweise› like an 
artist: not conceptually ‹begriffsweise›, like a mere craftsman.146 
With this contextualist approach, Müller exhorted his peers to drill down into the marrow of 
political concepts in order to extract their meaning, and to see past statesmen as themselves 
engaged in the process of mediating past and future. The tragedy of the Revolution was that, 
tradition having been mistakenly discredited as inimical to liberty, this process of mediation 
had broken down, leaving post-revolutionary Europeans stranded in the present. 
 Müller’s Vorlesungen über deutsche Wissenschaft und Literatur, was an attempt to 
outline the intellectual historical origins of the dire situation in which Europe found itself in 
1806, in the aftermath of the Holy Roman Empire’s collapse. He structured his argument 
around Montesquieu’s double-history of European civilization in De l’Esprit de Lois.147 In 
this work, Montesquieu had pointed to ‘ancient’ social forms of Greece and Rome, and the 
‘modern’ forms of the Germanic Middle Ages, as the twin inheritances of modern Europe. 
Müller framed these two ‘world-epochs’ ‹Weltalter› in diametric opposition to one another, 
contrasting the ‘pagan’ ‹barbarisch› worldview that collapsed with the Roman Empire and 
the Christian or ‘Germanic’ ‹germanisch› dispensation that was built on its ruins.148 If the 
philosophers of the ancient world were characterized by Socratic ‘skepticism’, the Church 
Fathers – St. Augustine, especially – were notable for their ‘dogmatism’. In contrast to the 
‘masculine’ culture of Roman imperialism, the Middle Ages were marked by a ‘feminine’ 
culture of manners and the ‘spirit of chivalric gallantry’ (a consequence of the displacement 
of Aristotelian megalopsychia with Christian humility). Finally, if ‘republicanism’ was the 
characteristic political form of the ancient world, the medieval world was built upon the 
tribal ‘monarchism’ that emerged from the forests of Germania.149 
According to Müller, from the High Middle Ages until the Renaissance Europe had 
achieved a synthesis of these gegensätzlich worldviews in its theology, politics, and culture. 
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In the thirteenth century, Aquinas had reconciled the (skeptical) natural philosophy of the 
ancients with the (dogmatic) revealed theology of scripture. In the Summa Theologica, an 
‘active and delicate skepticism’ reinforced and ‘polished faith into a deeper inner rigor and 
integrity’. Faith and reason, authority and critique, law and freedom – in Aquinas and the 
Scholastics, these principles coexisted alongside one another in a dynamic tension. Thomism, 
Müller argued, contained within itself an ‘authentic Protestantism, rooted in Catholicism and 
inseparable from it.’150 In political and cultural terms, Müller pointed to the Renaissance city-
states of Italy and northern Germany as an expression of this ancient-modern synthesis. Here, 
a vibrant (republican) culture of commerce and trade was complemented by and couched in a 
Christian (monarchical) political order. Precisely this admixture of liberty and authority was 
the fertile soil in which the creativity and ingenuity of the Renaissance took root.  
With the Protestant Reformation, however, these two worlds – Greek and German, 
pagan and Christian – began to come unglued. In Luther, Europe witnessed the revival of a 
radical form of ancient skepticism, one that licensed the solitary individual to pronounce on 
fundamental questions of religious authority (and, a fortiori, on the nature of this-worldly 
justice). Protestantism created a subjective inner realm of conscience and oriented it against 
the external claims of the Catholic Church. The Church’s obdurate response, in turn, was not 
to stress the dialectical interdependence of inner liberty and external authority, but rather to 
revert to the crass, primitive dogmatism of the Inquisition and counter-Reformation. As 
‘dogmatism and skepticism were ripped apart from one another’, the liberty of Protestantism 
and the authority of Catholicism descended into debased imitations of their earlier forms.151  
In time, this theological split between the ancient and modern worlds bled over into 
politics. Rejecting the ‘stoic’ premise of human sociability, post-Renaissance theorists of the 
state began embracing the skeptical ‘epicurean’ premises of Hobbes and Machiavelli.152 This 
nominalist turn placed politics on the shaky foundations of rational consent or unvarnished 
power (respectively), displacing the older Christian vision of politics as participation in, and 
submission to, a divinely-licensed natural order. For Müller, the cataclysm of the Revolution 
represented the total and final victory of the ancient world over the modern: its subjectivist 
theory of liberty represented the triumph of skepticism over dogmatism, republicanism over 
monarchism, freedom over authority. In the years after 1789, however, the revolutionaries’ 
republicanism proved just as combustible as its ancient precursor. Just as the Roman republic 
collapsed into Caesarism, so too France had collapsed into Bonapartism and imperialism. To 
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Müller, Napoleon was not to be seen as the Revolution’s conclusion – the displacement of 
(subjective) anarchy with (objective) authority – but as another, more-militant phase in the 
unfolding of the same pagan logic that brought down the ancien régime. In Europe generally, 
and across the German states especially, the Napoleonic Empire was exporting a radicalized 
form of irreligion that was incompatible with the principles of the Germanic Middle Ages. 
Because this Empire was built on conquest, Müller predicted that it would eventually fall just 
as Rome did. But what would take its place?   
According to Müller, the only way to avert a return to a new Dark Ages was to restore 
the ancient-modern synthesis that the Reformation had destroyed. This, he contended, was a 
uniquely German vocation. Even if the German states were no longer able to resist Napoleon 
militarily, Müller and his fellow countrymen had a duty – given their role as the founders of 
medieval Europe – to undermine Napoleon’s hegemony by erecting a Christian alternative to 
his pagan power-politics. ‘Never is the revival of national sentiment … more necessary’, he 
argued, ‘than in precisely that moment when the body politic has been unsettled.’153 Having 
been stripped of their ancient Empire, the Germans needed to begin defining their identity in 
spiritual terms, as the custodians of Europe’s Christian heritage. In the wake of Napoleon’s 
collapse, the Germans would be able to bring modern Kantian liberty and Christian authority 
into a gegensätzlich union once again. ‘Just as Germanic peoples founded the bodies politic 
of this continent, so a Germanic spirit will [again] rule throughout it.’154 
Müller pointed to Burke as both as the herald of the collapse of Christendom and as 
the prophet of the new world that ‘we’ (i.e., Müller and his Saxon listeners) were to build on 
its ashes: 
The most important epoch in the history of the cultivation of German political 
science was the introduction of Edmund Burke onto German soil; the greatest, 
profoundest, mightiest, most fully human, most warlike statesman of all times 
and all peoples. He raised the hopes of those few who knew how to recognize 
his Germanic spirit ‹deutschgesinnten Geist› and, despite the distinctive 
melancholy of his soul, his eloquence demolished all their worries. (I prefer to 
call him a German most of all because of the kindred, patriotic traits that I see 
in him – not forgetting, however, that he engaged with and gave expression to 
the world in general, and that he belonged more closely to his own beloved 
fatherland.) We [Germans] have translated, comprehended, and incorporated 
his works in all of their breadth into our moral sciences: we have written, 
created, and lived wholly in the spirit of his works, while [other] foreigners 
have ignored him, and while his own country has only half understood him, 
appreciating him as an eloquent orator, partisan, and patriot. I say it proudly, 
he belongs to us more than the British; my own ideas about the state (which I 
am presenting today) are the proud children (grandchildren I should like to 
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call them) of his spirit, perhaps immature but nevertheless promising. He has 
become famous in Germany as a most effective and happy mediator between 
freedom and law, between the division of [state] power and its unity, between 
the division of labor and its unity, between the bourgeois and noble principles. 
And so, however effective his deeds on behalf of Great Britain may have 
been, his praises belong in the German sphere: may [my] future work, may 
life itself be a worthy continuation of this praise!155 
Having assimilated Burke to their own ‘moral sciences’, Müller argued, the German peoples 
were on the cusp of a major intellectual breakthrough, one that would transcend the caustic, 
poisonous war between subject and object that had raged for centuries. In Kant, the Germans 
had revived a pure form of Socratic skepticism: there now remained only ‘the resurrection of 
St. Augustine’.156 Müller was confident – perhaps naïvely so – that in the wake of the failure 
of Fichte and Schelling’s systems, the Germans would turn to the Gegensatz. To achieve the 
‘great vocation’ to which Burke had summoned them, they needed to resurrect an image of 
Christian order and situate it in dynamic tension with Kantian liberty – that is, ‘to reconcile 
the old world to the new and, in so doing, dialectically spread the education of humanity 
across the earth’.157 
 In context, Müller’s vision of Germany’s moral vocation stood in contrast to the 
republican nationalism of Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation.158 For Müller, German-
ness was a universal ideal, cutting across cultures and even languages: as he wrote in his 
Vorlesungen, ‘recalling that which the German spirit [once] achieved and envisaging that to 
which the German spirit [now] strives, is relevant not only to us Germans, but to everyone 
who is bound up in the great moral fraternity of our continent’.159 While the German people 
were the van-guard of Christian cause, the moral purpose of this cause transcended them. 
Fichte, by contrast, had simply traded in the French revolutionaries’ liberal subjectivity for 
the collective subjectivity of the nation: according to Müller, his politics were trapped in the 
same vicious circularity as his metaphysics. In an 1808 review of the Reden, Müller rejected 
Fichte’s nationalist agenda in no uncertain terms.160 ‘The whole project … smacks fairly 
strongly of the Fichtean philosophy.’161 He agreed with Fichte that, in the wake of the fall of 
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the Empire, a new account of Germany’s identity was needed. But the ‘moral Spartanism’ in 
which Fichte – here represented as a ‘Lycurgus’ preaching a politicized ‘Moravianism’ – was 
attempting to root nationalism would be unrecognizable to most ‘actual Germans’.162 It might 
appeal to rarified set of idealist philosophers, but this was evidence against it, not for it. ‘To a 
great extent, the degradation of the Germans consists in the fact that they have fallen into an 
enervating lust for thinking and speculating.’163 Fichte’s rigorous educational programme 
was, in Müller’s eyes, simply an attempt to spread subjectivism throughout Germany in the 
false guise of patriotism, and threatened to infect young minds with the very same irreligion 
that destroyed France. ‘This is to be the dawn of the new world, a dawn that is already 
emerging and that glows on the mountain peaks? – Poor Germany!’164 
 As Isaac Nahimovsky has noted, Fichte’s Reden were composed during a period of 
renewed German interest in Machiavelli.165 Like many former defenders of the French cause, 
Fichte had grown increasingly convinced that, if republicanism were to be made viable in a 
competitive world of power-politics, it needed to be injected with a degree of Machiavellian 
raison d’état.166 But in Müller’s view, this attempt was doomed to failure. As he made clear 
in a contemporaneous essay on ‘Montesquieu und Machiavelli’, the modern state – whether 
conceived in Hobbesian or Machiavellian terms – could not hem in subjectivism of its own 
power, because it was grounded in the very same secular nominalism.167 To stabilize liberty, 
modern Europe needed a principle of authority outside of politics, outside time:  
One must state this clearly: it is not enough to place pure physical force 
‹physische Macht› at the head of a people, because it is weak in comparison to 
the whole state, which consists in the conjunction of the physical and the 
spiritual. A pure spiritual power ‹geistige Macht› is just as inadequate, for the 
same reason. Perfect power ‹vollständige Macht› … proceeds from [the unity 
of] justice and liberty. Thus the opinion of … the great Hobbes in his book on 
unfettered power, which he called Leviathan, is false. Even Hobbes missed the 
essence of true spiritual power: it is not equivalent to clarity of understanding 
or intelligence. The true principe cannot be defined as the one who combines 
clarity of understanding with the physical force of arms…. [It is] only with the 
spirit of enthusiasm and love, which entered the world in their purest form in 
Christ, that true sovereign power appeared…. To have overlooked this fact is 
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the fundamental error of Machiavelli, and also, in a very different sense, of 
Hobbes.168 
Neither the Fichteian subject nor the national collective nor the charisma of a Napoleon could 
furnish the spiritual resources necessary to stabilize modern politics. Fichte could not see this 
because, having rejected Christianity, he was unable ‘to transcend the Bonaparte within’.169  
 
V. Müller’s Elemente der Staatskunst 
By the time Müller delivered his lectures on the Elemente der Staatskunst, the initial trauma 
of the Holy Roman Empire’s collapse had given way to a series of technical debates about 
how, in the wake of their subjugation, the German states could regain their political and 
economic footing.170 As in Prussia to the north, Saxon reformers had begun contending for a 
programme of modernization designed to facilitate economic dynamism and more effective 
government – for the abolition of outmoded, feudal property laws; for an end to the nobility’s 
exemption from taxation; for a policy of merit-based (rather than nepotistic) promotion in the 
military; and for a relaxation of the monopoly rights traditionally granted to the guilds. The 
prospect of these reforms provoked a quick backlash from the aristocracy, and led to a heated 
constitutional struggle that persisted over the next decade, in both Saxony and Prussia. (After 
his expulsion from Dresden, Müller quickly found himself at the center of the Prussian storm, 
leading the charge against Rehberg’s old friend, the Freiherr vom Stein.)171 The Elemente – 
delivered to an assembly of Saxon noblemen from November 1808 to March 1809172 – was 
composed as an intervention into this debate over the future of German politics and society, 
and over the relation of the German territories to Napoleonic Empire. For Müller, it was also 
the definitive statement of his political thought, the culmination of the Lehre vom Gegensatz 
project that he had first outlined in 1804. 
 This was an extremely ambitious work, both in aspiration and scope. Totaling over 
1,000 pages in its original format, Müller divided the work into six sections. In the first two, 
on political and legal theory, he set out his ‘idea of the state’ against the enervated ‘concept’ 
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‹Begriff› of political life to which, in his view, Saxony’s reformers were beholden. His third 
section offered a conjectural history of ‘the spirit of law-giving in the ancient world and the 
Middle Ages’. In the fourth and fifth, he turned to political economy, setting out the social 
and economic principles at the heart of his Burkean worldview, as well as a new theory of 
money. Finally, Müller’s sixth section described the proper relation of Church and state, and 
hinted at an agenda for a post-revolutionary settlement in the wake of the French Empire’s 
collapse.173 Across this diverse terrain, his central aim was to show that the Hobbesean state, 
grounded as it was in a voluntarist theory of legitimacy, was unable to postulate any 
objective grounds for its own authority. If this were so, then Gentz’s attempt to stabilize 
Kantian liberalism through a merely political strategy was doomed to failure. Rehberg’s 
recourse to a historicized form of Humean ‘opinion’ was even more problematic: it did not 
even try to ground politics in an objective foundation. (For Rehberg, as we saw in Chapter 3, 
this was precisely the point.) To escape the libertinism that enveloped his age, Müller argued, 
what was needed was a reunion of the secular state and the modern liberty that it 
underpinned, with an essentially theological account of justice. ‘I want to learn’, he wrote, 
‘how my heart’s twin yearnings for liberty (for my own sake) and law (for the sake of others) 
can be satisfied.’174 Showing what this meant, conceptually and institutionally, was the 
ambition of the Elemente. 
In his preface, Müller began by contrasting his own politics to Montesquieu’s. The 
Esprit des Lois had proven that, in order to understand a society’s legal-political structures, 
one must understand that society’s historically-contingent, and fundamentally pre-political, 
mœurs, customs, and character. Montesquieu was especially useful for understanding how 
this relation between esprit and lois breaks down in historical time, and of the political 
‘sickness’ that ensues from their rupture. According to Müller, such was the case in France, 
where the revolutionaries’ violent extirpation of all the longstanding institutions that upheld 
the French esprit had led to an un-constituted anarchy:  
If I want to see the symptoms of such a sickness, how they accelerate, and 
how they ultimately undermine the human race – for these questions 
Montesquieu is the first and most capable guide. But what about the healthy, 
correct form of mankind, and of the state? How does it develop out of such a 
sickness? This is a much greater question.175 
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Montesquieu’s sociological agnosticism meant that he could not answer it. ‘Considered next 
to Burke, he is irreligious through and through: to him, the law is completely a question of 
secular institutions and secular prudence.’ Once a society’s collective esprit had been lost, 
what beliefs should it adopt in order to regain its health? To this question, Montesquieu’s 
‘famous book’ had ‘just as little to [say] as Bayle’s work’.176 Müller argued that in Europe’s 
current predicament, De l’Esrit des Lois needed to be updated by an approach to politics that 
saw a society’s esprit as, most fundamentally, an expression of its religious beliefs about the 
eternal nature of justice.   
 To effect this revision, Müller turned to Burke. As a Christian, Burke was able to see 
the indispensability of the Church for grounding the ancien régime, and to predict that, in the 
absence of any divine moorings, the revolutionary experiment would disintegrate into chaos. 
In the Elemente, Müller praised Burke’s break with his former ally, Charles James Fox, in 
just these terms. Because Fox saw the Revolution in merely secular, this-worldly political 
terms, he could not perceive its profound theological implications. Burke, on the other hand, 
recognized that the French cause was, at root, driven by an anti-Christian ideology that could 
not tolerate any authority outside the sovereign, self-legislating will. It was driven ‘by a dead 
concept of “liberty,” not by the idea of it’: 
This concept spread rapidly across France, destroying all that was ancient and 
ordered – everything that Burke, alongside his veneration of liberty, held dear 
within his great heart. He did not want to see a living world squandered for a 
dead concept; he threw the entire weight of his heart and eloquence behind the 
idea of liberty and behind the cause of monarchical power – and at a time, in 
which the rest of world was either shocked into silence by these monstrous 
events, or else had fallen into a frenzy of enthusiasm for the [empty] concept 
of liberty…. Here is the power of the living idea and its sublime victory over 
the dead concept!177  
Inspired by Burke’s example, Müller’s Elemente set out a theory of political order that sought 
to account for both secular and spiritual power, and to bring them into a dynamic, mutually-
reinforcing relationship. ‘The state’, he wrote, ‘is not an artificial invention that encompasses 
everything [physical]; the spiritual and the moral life [of a people] belong to its remit just as 
much as their corporeal and legal life…. Only the most depraved, barren, heartless science,  
only the most useless speculation, could proceed as if they stood in no relation to the state.’178  
 On the basis of this Burkean insight, Müller developed a twofold theory of the state. 
All true order, he argued, must be grounded in both ‘utility’ ‹Nutzen› and ‘justice’ ‹Recht›. 
The great ambition of political theory since Hobbes had been to construct a system of right 
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on the basis of an appeal to self-interest; and in this process, ‘utility (or, as one tended to call 
it in the days before Burke, “politics”)’ had swallowed up theology as the ground of modern 
society.179 Rejecting this procedure, Müller argued that utility and justice were an irreducible 
Gegensatz: theology could no more be collapsed into post-Hobbesean political theory than 
Fichte’s subjective idealism could account for the objective world. The state was not merely 
a union ‘in space’ to provide for a society’s security, liberty, and prosperity, as most modern 
political theorists claimed: this was to ground politics only in ‘utility’. Rather, the state was 
also a union ‘in time’ – a great succession of generations which, in transmitting moral and 
spiritual truths via tradition, rooted society in a shared apprehension of divine ‘justice’. As 
Müller explained, channeling the Reflections, the state is  
… an alliance of past generations with subsequent ones, and vice versa. It is 
an alliance not only of those existing together in time ‹Zeitgenossen›, but also 
of those in space ‹Raumgenossen›…. This doctrine of the union of successive 
generations is missing in all of our state-theories to date; and therein lies their 
great error. For this reason they appear to build states for a moment: they do 
not acknowledge or respect the sublime grounds of the state’s permanence 
‹Dauer› and its most important binding agents ‹Bindungsmittel›, above all the 
hereditary nobility.180  
In order to rescue the politics of utility from incoherence, Müller’s contemporaries needed to 
recognize, with Burke, that ‘Christ died not only for men, but also for states’.181 According to 
the Reflections, ‘the consecration of the state, by a state religious establishment, is necessary’ 
for the existence of civil society:  
This consecration is made, that all who administer in the government of men, 
in which they stand in the person of God himself, would have high and worthy 
notion of their function and destination; that their hope should be full of 
immortality; that they should look not to the paltry pelf of the moment, nor to 
the temporary and transient praise of the vulgar, but to a solid, permanent 
existence, in the permanent part of their nature…182 
Without the moral authority that is mediated in time through the institution of the Church, 
Müller argued, society lacks any access to a trans-temporal ground of permanence ‹Dauer›. 
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Thus unmoored, the state is unable to regulate (in Burke’s words) ‘the lust of selfish will, 
which without religion it is utterly impossible [to extinguish]’.183 
 This recourse to religion put Müller, like Burke, in opposition to those revolutionary 
reformers who ‘build wholly-new and completely-unsustainable states through their political 
metaphysics’.184 Foolishly, they presumed that, having ‘stepped out of all social bonds’, they 
could to locate an ‘Archimedean point’ outside history and build a theory of politics on this 
foundation. To these anti-historical theorists, the state was merely a ‘useful invention’ meant 
to provide for men’s material needs. Such a ‘state-designer stands outside his state, just like a 
carpenter stands apart from the table that he constructs’.185 From this position, divorced from 
the past, they were unable to legitimize authority morally. Instead of looking to religion, they 
helplessly tried to ground right in the principles of human reason. But as the revolutionaries 
discovered, this ‘chimera of natural justice’ was a poor substitute for real thing.186 According 
to Müller, ‘every citizen is located in the middle of the life of the state: he has behind him a 
past that must be respected, and before him a future that must be prepared for.’187 By cutting 
themselves off from the moral resources of this inherited past, the revolutionaries retreated 
into the present, just as Fichte’s subjective idealism collapsed into solipsistic nihilism.     
 In coming to see the centrality of religion to civic life – in recognizing the state as 
‘unification of all the physical and spiritual needs, all the physical and spiritual resources, of 
a nation’s entire inner and outer life, into a great, dynamic, living, and eternally-moving 
whole’ – it is necessary to elevate the historic bearers of a society’s ‘moral imagination’ to a 
position of constitutional prominence within the state.188 In addition to the Church, Müller 
pointed to the hereditary aristocracy as a vital custodian of a nation’s traditional values and 
beliefs. In a healthy society, the nobility provides a moral check on the transient interests of 
the bourgeoisie. Elevated above the turmoil of the market and daily electoral politics, their 
responsibility is to uphold a social architecture within which freedom becomes intelligible. 
This was precisely the genius of the state that the Reflections defended, according to Müller. 
‘The problem of uniting freedom and the law, permanent property and transient talent – in 
short, the antique form with the Germanic – was happily resolved (at least to some extent) in 
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the British Constitution’.189 In juxtaposing the interests of the Houses of Commons and Lords 
against one another, the British state enshrined a gegensätzlich tension between bourgeoisie 
and aristocracy, freedom and authority, at the heart of the nation’s civic life. It allowed for 
figures such as Burke – ‘the representative of the invisible England’ – to remind his fellow-
countrymen of the sacred moral and religious principles of their national tradition, and to 
bring these principles bear on the nation’s political life:  
The statesman stands in the middle of his nation and his time, elevated above 
all its individual laws and with all of its individual advantages at his disposal. 
His nation’s legal code is to him just a point of departure, the esprit of his 
nation’s history…. He must harmonize and mediate the [claims of the future] 
with those of the past, which are just as audible and as serious: he must weave 
together past and future. He can do this only … if, following Burke’s manner, 
he consults the ages, brings the laws of permanence into his calculus, keeps 
the alliances in space and in time in view, and thus carries both time and 
eternity ‹Zeit und Ewigkeit› in his breast.190 
To a large extent, Müller argued, the political crisis of modern Germany was due to the moral 
enervation of its nobility, who had readily capitulated to the neo-paganism of their French 
conquerors, rather than standing up for their nation’s Christian heritage.191 
But by far the more serious threat to German society, Müller believed, was the growth 
of a secular political economy throughout continental Europe, a frightening prospect that had 
been accelerated by the Prussian and Saxon reform movements.192 Like a cancer, commercial 
liberalism was metastasizing throughout Germany, subverting what vestiges of aristocratic 
order still remained, and undermining the coherence and integrity of local communities. The 
‘doctrine of the absolute tiers-etat’ and the partisans of private property, he argued, had been 
trapped in another iteration of the same fundamental error that doomed France: namely, they 
were unable to conceptualize value in non-material terms, and had no conception of the role 
that ‘spiritual capital’ played in a healthy economy.193 Out of an ‘unconditional idolization of 
the unconstrained, absolute, and exclusive right to private property’, they could not see that 
such an individualism ‘destroys any sentiment of community’.194 The liberty-of-choice that 
prevailed in an unregulated market was hollow: without any moral limits on the exercise of a 
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community’s economic freedom, all that was left was the accumulation of wealth for its own 
sake. Against ‘the slavish German followers of Adam Smith’, Müller argued for a political 
economy in which ‘Roman’ private property and ‘Germanic’ feudal property coexisted 
alongside one another.195 The former would imbue a society with the dynamism of the 
market; the latter, which placed moral and social limits on the exercise of property-rights, 
would prevent commercial society from degenerating into mere acquisitiveness. In guarding 
Germany’s moral and spiritual inheritance against the liquefying effects of capital, such a 
synthesis of feudalism and commercialism would redeem modern society. For Müller, this 
‘Christian economics’ ‹christliche Haushaltung› was a precondition of liberty in a modern 
commercial society. ‘For as long as you live for things and the accumulation of things, you 
yourself remain a dead thing, a slave in the truest sense of the word.’196 
 
VI. Conclusion 
After the final victory over Napoleon in 1815, Müller was hopeful that the nations of Europe, 
led by Austria, would implement something like the political vision of his Elemente – that the 
Congress of Vienna would mark the beginning of a ‘new dawn’, a world in which liberty was 
reconciled to authority. The Europe of Müller’s imagination was one of dynamic, life-giving 
antitheses between Church and State, aristocracy and bourgeoisie, feudal tenures and allodial 
property, Catholic universalism and local patriotism. In international politics, he envisioned 
something like a projection of the former Holy Roman Empire across the whole of Europe. 
Just as medieval German princes’ submission to the authority of the Catholic Church (and its 
emissary, the Emperor) had allowed for a wide degree of local variation across the Empire, a 
federated Europe united in its submission to a gegensätzlich Christianity, Protestant and 
Catholic, would allow for the continent to be pacified under a shared moral authority. Rather 
than the positivistic vision of international law championed by Grotius, Vattel and the ius 
gentium, Müller hoped to see international relations grounded in a divinely-ordained natural 
law.197 
 But he was bitterly disappointed. Rather than turning to Europe’s common religious 
heritage, the Congress of Vienna adopted a balance-of-power strategy. In reconfiguring the 
map of Europe, they eradicated many of the Continent’s historically-grounded and morally-
coherent local communities. These statesmen, Müller complained in a letter to Gentz,  
                                               
195 Ibid., p. 230; but cf. Müller, Friedrich II, p. 139, where he explains that he is not opposed to Smith 
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…don’t know how to distinguish the absence of war from peace (i.e., to 
distinguish a negation from a negative). Balance of power can bring about an 
absence of war (the silence of a dead stone). But peace is something genuine 
and tangible; it consists not in the absence of a predominant power, but in the 
weighty predominance of a highest Good, one shared by everyone together – 
i.e., God.198 
The partisans of Gleichgewicht – Gentz included – relied upon a fundamentally Hobbesian 
vision of politics that denied the state any spiritual character. ‘In the public mind, the state is 
nothing more than a raw, unformed mass’ to be manipulated as Europe’s leaders saw fit.199  
 The more worrying development, however, was the emergence of a new international 
regime of unfettered capital. In 1815, politicized irreligion had not been defeated, but merely 
shifted from politics to economics: the Coalition had won a war against the revolutionaries’ 
liberalism, only to make the world safe for capitalism. In the last decades of his life, Müller 
became increasingly fixated on the danger that ‘Smithianism’ posed to modern society.200 In 
a series of books throughout the 1810s and ’20s, he predicted that if the effects of capitalism 
were not counteracted, European life would become increasingly deracinated, alienated, and 
anxious.201 Voicing these scathing arguments from within the Habsburg civil service made 
him an unwanted gadfly in the eyes of his colleagues. Gentz’s correspondence recalls one 
particularly humorous example of Müller’s intransigence: 
I dined today with Müller at Joseph Schwarzenberg’s, where Müller tried to 
explain his theory of wool-sales ‹Woll-Verkaufs-Theorie› (the subject which 
most animates him at the moment!). He loves wool just as passionately as he 
hates cotton. This love has gone so far that, among other things, he is 
consistently wearing sheep pelts around the house – in the current weather! 
For Metternich, this discovery was a source of rich amusement and fun.202 
Conscious of how marginal his anti-capitalist views had become, Müller spent his last years 
wondering whether, rather than a career in political theory, it would have been better if he 
had become a priest.203 
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 Müller’s career ended, in other words, in opposition to those German Burkeans with 
whom he is often categorized. For a skeptic like Rehberg, Müller’s attempt to re-Christianize 
Europe was animated by the very same illiberal, dogmatic enthusiasm as the revolutionaries 
he claimed to oppose. In an 1810 review of Elemente, Rehberg complained that Müller’s had 
produced a kind of spiritualized politics, wholly unmoored from reality. He was far closer to 
a charlatan like Herder than a sober thinker like Möser.204 In particular, Rehberg disputed his 
mythologized picture of the British Constitution as the union of ancient and modern political 
forms (‘Are we really supposed to believe that the House of Commons is just a collection of 
bankers?’) and ridiculed his melodramatic warnings about capitalism.205 In Rehberg’s view, 
Müller had missed the skeptical, Humean premises of the Reflections entirely. ‘Does he not 
see that his warm endorsement of Burke’s works makes a mockery of his own lectures?’206 
 Despite their friendship, Gentz also found Müller’s Christian politics rather quixotic. 
Against Müller’s suggestion that the post-Christian Rechtstaat was fundamentally unstable, 
Gentz insisted that all human authority was unstable. ‘However sacred it may be’, he wrote 
to Müller during the Congress of Vienna, ‘the principle of legitimacy is born in time, cannot 
be grasped except in time, and, like all human things, must be modified over time.’207 To try 
to ground the state in a transcendent moral foundation was to demand more than politics can 
offer. But Müller was undeterred by Gentz’s skepticism and Rehberg’s sarcasm, insisting that 
these men had simply missed the deep theological vision of the Reflections. If Rehberg used 
Burke to theorize a historically-grounded constitutional liberalism, and if Gentz used Burke 
to stress the political conditions of an orderly, rule-based liberalism, Müller was more 
ambitious. He turned to Burke to find a way past mere liberty, to create a post-revolutionary 
world that was something more than free.  
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In 1847, the liberal-nationalist historian Heinrich von Sybel published a fresh appraisal of 
‘Burke und die französische Revolution’.1 Drawing on a recently published trove of Burke’s 
correspondences, Sybel brought into question the unflattering caricature of Burke that was 
prevalent among Vormärz liberals.2 Johann Gustav Droysen, for instance, had described him 
as the ‘most vocal herald’ of the British ‘party of alarm’, a conservative doggedly opposed to 
the cause of liberty in his own nation as in France.3 Sybel, by contrast, painted Burke as the 
defender of a politically-grounded liberalism that, while abhorring popular rebellion, was 
nevertheless open to the prospect of constitutional reform. The revolutionary events of 1830 
‘confirmed the correctness of his conclusions, for both Europe and for England.’4 In Sybel’s 
own German context, the encouraging signs of a nascent reform movement made Burke’s 
moderate vision of constitutionalism, between revolution and absolutism, ‘more than an 
antiquarian interest’: 
The war to which he dedicated his last, most substantial energies has resumed 
itself in manifold forms in the practical circumstances of the present, and 
many signs point to the fact that there are now developments underway – 
more favorable than any before – [which compel us] to assess the value of this 
old master.5    
Three years after Sybel’s essay, on the far side of 1848, there appeared a new collection of 
Burke’s political writings under the title, Aus Edmund Burke’s Schriften: ein conservatives 
Handbüchlein (1850).6 Its editorial agenda could not have been more different from Sybel’s: 
Burke was devoted to the old social order of Europe with his whole soul; he 
hoped for its reformation, and above all for its salvation; and in his later years, 
he devoted all his energies to this cause. The essays below … attest to a man 
                                                        
1 Heinrich von Sybel, ‘Edmund Burke ünd die französische Revolution’, Allgemeine Zeitschrift für 
Geschichte, vol. 7 (1847): pp. 1-53. Cf. Richard Bourke, ‘War Edmund Burke ein Konservativer? 
Notizen zum Begriff des Konservatismus’, Leviathan, vol. 44., no. 1 (2016): pp. 65-96, at p. 70.  
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His Decease in 1797, ed. Charles Fitzwilliam and Richard Bourke, 4 vols. (London: Rivington, 1844). 
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Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1846), vol. 1, p. 438. Cf. Wilfred Nippel, Johann Gustav Droysen: ein 
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4 Sybel, ‘Edmund Burke’, p. 20. 
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whose worldview was as different from the so-called liberals’ as a free-born 
man’s is from a freedman’s.7  
As this collection’s publisher noted, Burke’s war against popular revolution had taken on 
new resonance of late: he printed these essays in the hope that ‘they would do some good.’8 
The wisdom of Burke’s ‘conservative’ opposition to ‘so-called liberals’ had been made vivid 
by the recent past, and Germany’s conservatives needed to return to Burke in order to rearm 
themselves against the dangers of constitutional upheaval in their own day.  
In the years after 1848, it was this latter view of Burke that won out. In comparison to 
France or Britain – where ‘conservatism’ was a party-political label as early as the 1830s – 
‘Konservatismus’ did not appear as a coherent ideology in Germany until the 1840s, and did 
not gain real political traction until the 1850s and ’60s, with the rise of modern parties in the 
German states.9 But once it did emerge, it was the conservatives who, imagining themselves 
the successors to Burke’s war against revolutionary principles, laid claim to his mantle. This 
process of realignment extended to his students as well. After 1848, Rehberg dropped out of 
the Burkean canon. As we saw in Chapter 3, Rehberg’s politics underwent a radical revision 
during the Vörmarz. His critique of revolutionary liberalism, initially grounded in a skeptical, 
Humean metaphysics, was co-opted by his successors in the historical school, and re-plinthed 
upon a more philosophically self-confident foundation. His rejection of Kantian rationalism 
in deference to experience had been intended as an exhortation to modesty: but in the eyes of 
later admirers, it read as a defense of the unfolding, inner logic of history per se. Midcentury 
liberal nationalists like Savigny, Stahl, and Luden were thus able to position Rehberg at the 
head of their own historicist tradition, reading his critique of the Code Napoléon as a defense 
of the German nation’s historical and moral integrity. In the aftermath of 1848, however, as 
Burke was pulled toward national conservatism, Rehberg’s association with Burke made him 
increasingly less useful to German liberals. By the end of the century, he had been almost 
forgotten – only to be rediscovered by Wilhelmine scholars and situated at the beginning of a 
tradition of ‘reform conservatism’.10 
Gentz and Müller, meanwhile, were pulled with Burke into the conservative vortex. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, by the time of his death, Gentz’s role in the Metternich government, 
and especially his role in drafting the Carlsbad Decrees, had made him the bête noir of the 
                                                        
7 Ibid., p. 5. 
8 Ibid., p. 60. The original preface is dated 1822; the publisher’s note, 1850.  
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young Hegelians and the radical nationalists. From their perspective, Gentz was the apologist 
of a reactionary, illiberal authoritarianism. But in the course of their attacks on his character, 
what was neglected was that – at least in Gentz’s mind – he defended the Rechtstaat and the 
post-1815 state-system precisely because they were necessary means for the realization of 
liberal Kantian ends. As his case for political prudence was decoupled from its original moral 
rationale – the creation of domestic liberty and an international rule of law – it came to seem 
no more than crass, amoral pragmatism. Müller, similarly, was criticized in the Vörmarz as a 
dangerous, reactionary ideologue, whose ‘political Romanticism’ formed the spiritual core of 
Metternich’s Restorationism. His critique of liberalism – meant, from Müller’s perspective, 
as a means of rescuing liberalism – was depicted as an attempt to shore up the Holy Alliance 
and the morally-bankrupt Congress system. Thus, by the eve of 1848, both Gentz and Müller 
had come to be associated with an illiberal, reactionary politics. As Burke was aligned with 
conservatism in the latter-nineteenth century, German conservatives could look to Gentz’s 
defense of state-based order, and to Müller’s veneration of the nobility, as precursors to their 
own campaign against liberalism and egalitarianism.     
When Frieda Braune came to write Edmund Burke in Deutschland in the early 1900s, 
therefore, this soil had already been tilled for her. From her perspective, Rehberg, Gentz, and 
Müller seemed the logical extension of a campaign against Enlightenment that Burke 
inaugurated, and their visions of post-revolutionary politics as the ideological origins of the 
long process of Germany’s national liberation from the tyranny of the eighteenth century. It 
did not occur to her that, rather than the forerunners of the German present, Rehberg, Gentz, 
and Müller held different visions of Germany’s post-revolutionary futures – visions that were 
not realized, but rejected, over the course of the nineteenth century.    
 Far from proto-nationalists, each of Burke’s German students was roundly critical of 
the early nationalist cause. Their skepticism was born from different premises – Rehberg, 
because the nationalist cause smacked of enthusiasm; Gentz, because it threatened to subvert 
the balance of power in central Europe and to undercut the legitimacy of the polyglot, multi-
national Austro-Hungarian state; Müller, because the national cause was a sacrilege, a 
political idol that demanded obedience which was rightly God’s due. As critics of Napoleon’s 
policy of colonialism, they were glad to see the German states band together to overthrow the 
French Empire in 1813. But this enthusiasm did not translate into any kind of grand ambition 
to see a unified Germany take France’s place as a European hegemon. 
 By stepping out from under the shadow of the later nineteenth-century history, 
however, a different story from Braune’s comes into view. Rehberg, Gentz, and Müller each 
brought their own experiences, philosophical views, and political anxieties to their 
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engagements with Burke, and these different worldviews led them to read him in 
dramatically different ways. Each of them, for instance, took Burke’s critique of politicized 
atheism to be central to the argument of his Reflections. But they interpreted the implications 
of this critique in almost diametrically opposed ways. Rehberg condemned France’s atheists 
for being too religious, claiming immediate access to universal moral truths which were 
necessarily inaccessible to human beings (if they existed at all). For Müller, by contrast, the 
revolutionaries’ atheism was precisely that: it entailed a denial of Christ’s divinity and of the 
Church’s moral authority in history – an authority without which, he believed, society was 
impossible. Gentz, finally, was bothered by the prospect of atheism only insofar as it 
represented a threat to the state, or insofar as it incited imprudent and unpolitical moralizing.  
To take another example, consider their divergent relations to Burke’s endorsement of 
experience over ‘metaphysics’. Rehberg took this to be part and parcel of skeptical Humean 
argument about the indeterminacy of reason, and about the necessarily contingent character 
of justice. Gentz, by contrast, saw it as an endorsement of empirically grounded approach to 
politics, in opposition to idealistic, impracticable theories of liberty. Müller, finally, saw 
Burke’s defense of experience as an aspect of his traditionalism – a defense of the moral and 
theological truths that are transmitted through historical time by the Church and aristocracy, 
and which were indispensable for giving order and meaning to modern, post-revolutionary 
society. 
In the Reflections, Burke described the Revolution as an attack on the three essential 
roots of civil society – property, government, and religion. His students, in turn, disagreed on 
the relative priority of these institutions. Rehberg’s Humeanism led him to think that society 
was prior to the state: commerce and popular ‘opinion’, not force, were the true organizing 
principles of modern social life. Gentz, on the other hand, was a Hobbesian like Kant: he saw 
politics as conceptually and historically anterior to economics. Since the maintenance of civil 
society implied sovereignty, the modern state was a precondition of Enlightenment. As a 
Christian, Müller was skeptical that either politics or economics were sufficient grounds for 
human life in community, since both the state and the market were predicated upon the self-
cannibalizing logic of self-interest. It was rather the Church, and the shared moral consensus 
that it enabled, that was the necessary (though insufficient) prerequisite of modern liberty.11  
These divergent readings of Burke, in turn, generated different visions of Germany’s 
future. Rehberg hoped to see the German estates transformed into effective parliaments, in 
                                                        
11 In Istvan Hont’s formulation (Politics in Commercial Society [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2015], pp. 48-67), Rehberg believed that the law predated judges; Gentz, that judges were prior 
to the law; and Müller, that the Church preceded both. 
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much the same way that Burke had (unsuccessfully) called for ‘resuscitating the ancient 
constitution’ of France in 1789.12 A politically effective legislature would exert a check on 
the power of Germany’s monarchs, create a vehicle for the expression of popular ‘opinion’, 
and vouchsafe the continued viability of property-based civil liberty. Gentz, as we have seen, 
envisioned a post-revolutionary Europe of centralized, consolidated Rechtstaaten, pacified by 
a carefully constructed balance of power. The international stability generated by this balance 
would, he argued, undergird an enlightened regime of international law, open up space for 
international commerce, and preserve an equilibrium of order and liberty within European 
states. Whereas Rehberg deplored the settlement of 1815 as an unnecessary constriction of 
civil society, Gentz was more sanguine. He believed that, in stabilizing Europe, the Congress 
of Vienna had set the political conditions for the process of Kantian Enlightenment to begin 
anew after the revolutionary hiatus. Ultimately, however, the rise of the nation-state spelled 
the end of this system, as Bismark’s Germany became the sort of destabilizing continental 
Machtstaat that Gentz and his compatriots feared. Müller, meanwhile, envisioned a world in 
which a reunion of Church and State was able to give modern liberty substance – grounding 
citizens in coherent moral communities, hemming in the corrosive logic of the market, and 
setting moral limits on power. He died despondent, convinced that the Revolution did, in fact, 
spell the death of Christendom, and that a new age of moral alienation was ineluctable.   
* * * 
In his history of modern Deutsche Literatur (1836), the literary critic Wolfgang Menzel saw 
more clearly than most of his peers what was at stake in Burke’s German reception. ‘There 
appeared at that time other foundational thinkers ‹gründliche Denker›, men who, following 
the example of Edmund Burke in England, sought to investigate and explain the French 
Revolution from a historical and an anthropological point of view…. Rehberg and Gentz 
judged it in this way.’13 What was remarkable about these Burkeans and their Romantic 
contemporaries, according to Menzel, was that they came to recognize that the Revolution’s 
‘root causes’ were as deep as ‘modernity’ itself: 
The German Romantics oriented themselves not only against the French 
Revolution and its consequences, but also against its root causes: against 
modernity per se ‹die ganze Modernität›.14  
                                                        
12 Burke, Letter from Mr. Burke, to a Member of the National Assembly (1791); in The Writings and 
Speeches of Edmund Burke, ed. Paul Langford et al., 9 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970-2015), 
vol. 8, p. 328. 
13 Wolfgang Menzel, Die deutsche Literatur, 2nd ed., 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Hallberger Verlag, 1836), vol. 
2, p. 217. 
14 Ibid., vol. 3, p. 131. 
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Menzel went on to denounce the Romantics, Müller included, for their reactionary, illiberal 
views. Nevertheless, what his description got right is that, despite their profound differences, 
Burke’s students were all indeed sensitive to, and grappling with, a common problem – one 
that we might, following Menzel, call the problem of ‘modernity’. In reading Burke, they 
became alive to the deep instability of politics in the wake of 1789. The cause of this 
instability lay in the conceit that politics may one day be rationalized: that a transcendent 
standard of right could be rationally discerned, and then enacted, in the world of real politics. 
This prospect generated a perverse cycle of striving for, yet failing to reach, the millenarian 
state heralded in the revolutionaries’ Declaration. In turn, this cycle engendered social 
pathologies that crippled politics. All of Burke’s students offered a different diagnosis of this 
illness. In Rehberg it was a return of religious enthusiasm; in Gentz, a naïve, moralizing 
idealism; in Müller, an enervating moral rootlessness. For all of them, however, these 
pathologies were more than merely local or epiphenomenal: they were in some sense intrinsic 
to politics after Kant, in the shadow of the Revolution. What makes Rehberg, Gentz, and 
Müller interesting is that their engagements with Burke were, at root, about finding ways to 
cope with ‘modernity’ – to describe what we might call post-modern conjectures of order. If 
what it is to be modern is to live under the conceit that we can escape from history into 
timelessness, then we need Burke’s German students precisely because they show us ways of 
confronting this condition. It is because Meinecke was wrong, because we have not squared 
morality and politics, time and timelessness, that we still need Burke’s German students. 
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